30 KiB
A lightweight Express service that schedules and sends Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) & text (SMS) push notifications to wake up registered devices.
Device registrations are stored in a local SQLite database.
Quick Start
cp .env.example .env
Edit .env — set FIREBASE_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON.
Here is one way to generate the contents: cat your-downloaded-key.json | jq -c .
Optionally set ENDORSER_URL / PARTNER_URL if you are not using the production Endorser (https://api.endorser.ch) and Partner (https://partner-api.endorser.ch) hosts.
Optionally set NOTIFY_DATA_DIR if you want the SQLite database somewhere other than ./data.
pnpm install
pnpm run dev
pnpm test
The server starts on http://localhost:3003 (or the port in PORT). Hot-reloads on file changes. pnpm start is the same tsx entry without watch. These commands are not the production Docker path (node dist/index.js).
On first use, the service creates NOTIFY_DATA_DIR (default ./data) and the SQLite file notify.sqlite with the required schema.
FCM
Authentication
POST /notifications/register and POST /notifications/refresh require a Bearer JWT. After local JWT verification, the service checks the token with Endorser (GET /api/report/rateLimits on ENDORSER_URL). Registration and refresh continue only if Endorser accepts the JWT.
PUT /notifications/alert-authorization uses the same current-user Bearer JWT + Endorser check. It does not accept the testMode local bypass. The 100 delegated JWTs in the body are stored credentials, not the request authenticator.
Local notification test bypass: send testMode: true in the JSON body and omit the Authorization header. The request skips JWT and Endorser checks and uses a synthetic local test user, same as before. This applies to register/refresh only.
Set NODE_ENV=test-local in .env to bypass ethr JWT expiry verification during local development (this is separate from the testMode bypass above).
Alert authorization
PUT /notifications/alert-authorization
Authorization: Bearer <current-user-JWT>
{
"batchId": "client-batch-id",
"timezone": "America/Denver",
"jwts": [
{
"sequence": 0,
"day": "2026-08-27",
"nbf": 1756270800,
"exp": 1756357200,
"jwt": "eyJ..."
}
]
}
timezone is the IANA zone used when minting the 100 validity windows; it is stored as batch metadata, not live device-timezone tracking. A successful call replaces that user's previous unused JWTs atomically. Passkey (did:peer) identities cannot mint this batch and receive DELEGATED_JWT_UNSUPPORTED_IDENTITY.
Alert search retrieval
The daily scheduler runs retrieveAlertSearch against:
{ENDORSER_URL}/api/v2/report/alertSearch{PARTNER_URL}/api/partner/alertSearch
The delegated JWT is sent as Authorization: Bearer. Pass independent endorserAfterId / partnerAfterDate (or omit them on first run). Nearby search uses the alertSearch bbox (minLocLat, maxLocLat, minLocLon, maxLocLon).
loadAlertSearchCursors / retrieveAlertSearch / advanceAlertSearchCursors (or runAlertSearchCycle) persist those bounds per user DID in SQLite. Cursors advance only after a complete success retrieval (not empty, pagination, or errors). A Partner page of 50 rows that share the oldest updatedAt is pagination because exclusive beforeDate cannot drain timestamp ties.
runDailyAlertSearch(userId, now?) uses the latest batch's stored IANA timezone to pick today's unused delegated JWT, runs runAlertSearchCycle with that JWT, and marks that specific JWT consumed only when both Endorser and Partner complete (success or empty, including both empty). Pagination or source failures leave the JWT unused so the same day can be retried. An invalid stored timezone is an error; there is no fallback to the server timezone. After a retrieve, the result includes digest from buildAlertSearchDigest (six bucket records and counts). digest is null when there is no batch or no unused JWT for today. Consumption does not depend on digest.hasUpdates.
startAlertSearchScheduler() (started from src/index.ts next to the FCM scheduler) is a separate user-level job. It lists distinct userIds from alert_authorization_batches and calls runDailyAlertSearch once per user. After each run, if the digest is complete with updates and today's JWT was consumed, it sends a user-visible FCM message (title: TimeSafari, body You have N new updates., data type: alert_search) to that user's registered tokens. It does not call sendPushToDevice or change WAKEUP_PING. Subsequent ticks the same local day see no unused JWT (digest: null) and do not resend. FCM send failures are logged and do not roll back cursors or JWT consumption. A process-local in-flight flag skips a tick if a pass is still running.
buildAlertSearchDigest maps a retrieve result into structured payload data: per-bucket record arrays, counts, totalCount, hasUpdates, and Endorser/Partner completion status. It does not invent a notification string; FCM uses only totalCount for the short body. Incomplete outcomes (pagination, auth, network, etc.) yield completed: false and hasUpdates: false. Empty successful retrieves are complete with hasUpdates: false and do not send FCM.
SMS
/notify-sms delivers the daily alertSearch digest by text as well as by push.
A user registers a phone number, proves possession of it with a 6-digit code,
authorizes a batch of delegated alertSearch JWTs for the SMS channel, and
receives at most one text per local day when that day's retrieval finds updates.
The whole surface is off unless SMS_ENABLED is true; every route answers
503 SMS_DISABLED otherwise, and the SMS scheduler does not start.
Endpoints
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /notify-sms/phone |
List this DID's registrations; with ?phoneNumber=, the other DIDs on a number this DID has verified |
| POST | /notify-sms/phone |
Record a phone for the DID, unverified, and text it a 6-digit code |
| PUT | /notify-sms/phone |
Match the code and mark the registration verified |
| DELETE | /notify-sms/phone |
Remove the phone entirely |
| POST, PUT | /notify-sms/alert-authorization |
Store a delegated JWT batch for the SMS channel |
| POST | /notify-sms/inbound |
Twilio's webhook for STOP / START / HELP |
GET /notify-sms/phone returns the caller's own numbers in full. Adding
?phoneNumber= also returns dids, every DID holding a verified registration
of that number — but only to a caller who has itself verified that number.
Otherwise 403 SMS_PHONE_NOT_VERIFIED_BY_CALLER, with no count and no
identities.
POST /notify-sms/phone takes { "phoneNumber": "+15555550123" }. A number the
DID has already verified returns 200 with verified: true and sends nothing.
Otherwise it mints a code, stores the code's HMAC, and texts the plaintext. The
response carries { success, phoneNumber: "+1555*****23", verified: false, expiresAt } and never the code. Sends are throttled to three per phone per hour
(counted across every DID) and ten per DID per day.
PUT /notify-sms/phone takes { "phoneNumber", "code" }. A miss returns
400 SMS_CODE_MISMATCH with attemptsRemaining; SMS_CODE_MAX_ATTEMPTS misses
return 429 SMS_CODE_ATTEMPTS_EXHAUSTED and clear the code, so recovery is
another POST.
DELETE /notify-sms/phone accepts the number in the body or as ?phoneNumber=,
because a fair number of proxies drop bodies on DELETE. It removes the row
matching (user_id, phone_e164) and sets phone_e164 to null on that DID's
sms_phone_log rows for that number, leaving phone_hash and the action
history intact. Deleting a number that is not registered returns
{ success: true, deleted: false }, not an error.
POST /notify-sms/alert-authorization takes the same body as the FCM twin and
requires at least one verified phone for the DID; without one it returns
409 SMS_NO_VERIFIED_PHONE. PUT is accepted as an alias, since the FCM twin
is PUT and the semantics are replace-not-append either way.
Action claim
Every /notify-sms call is authorized by a Bearer JWT whose claim names the
action and the phone number it applies to:
{
"iss": "did:ethr:0x…",
"iat": 1756270800,
"exp": 1756271100,
"claim": {
"@context": "https://giftopia.tech",
"@type": "SmsNotificationAction",
"action": "register-phone",
"phoneNumber": "+15555550123"
}
}
action is one of list-phones, register-phone, verify-phone,
delete-phone, authorize-alert-search. phoneNumber is required for
register-phone, verify-phone and delete-phone, and required for
list-phones only when the request carries the query parameter. The claim holds
no DID — the authenticated identity is iss — and no batchId.
@context is https://giftopia.tech with no trailing path, shared with the FCM
setup claim; @type is what separates them. https://giftopia.me is the app
link that appears in messages and is never the claim namespace.
The middleware chain is requireAuth (Bearer JWT, signature verified against
the issuer DID), requireEndorserAuth (Endorser accepts the same token), then
requireSmsActionJwt(action), then the handler. The handler performs no
authorization checks of its own. There is no testMode bypass: no local-test
path sends real texts to real handsets.
| Failure | Response |
|---|---|
| No claim in the token | 403 SMS_ACTION_JWT_MISSING_CLAIM |
| Claim names a different action | 403 SMS_ACTION_JWT_WRONG_ACTION |
| Claim names a different number | 403 SMS_ACTION_JWT_PHONE_MISMATCH |
iat outside SMS_ACTION_JWT_MAX_AGE_SEC |
401 SMS_ACTION_JWT_STALE |
exp has passed |
401 SMS_ACTION_JWT_EXPIRED |
| Token already used | 401 SMS_ACTION_JWT_REPLAYED |
The token's sha256 is recorded before the handler runs, so one token buys one
action. A handler that fails afterward does not release the hash; the client
mints a fresh JWT, which it can do freely. SMS_REQUIRE_ACTION_CLAIM=false
turns the stage off entirely.
This is a client change. The TimeSafari app sends a plain identity JWT to
/notifications/*; a /notify-sms call carrying no claim returns
SMS_ACTION_JWT_MISSING_CLAIM.
One phone, several DIDs
Every read and write is scoped by (user_id, phone_e164), so two identities
sharing one handset stay independent: registering, verifying, or deleting under
one DID does not touch the other's row, and each identity runs its own
alertSearch against its own cursor. Two verified DIDs on one handset therefore
receive two texts a day.
SMS_MAX_DIDS_PER_PHONE bounds how many DIDs one handset can carry, counting
verified rows only — counting every row would let five throwaway DIDs lock
the handset's owner out by registering and never verifying. The count is checked
at POST as an early rejection and again at PUT, which is the check that holds,
since PUT is the moment a row starts consuming a slot.
A blocked POST returns 409 SMS_PHONE_DID_LIMIT with limit and
verifiedCount and no identities: a POST names any phone number on earth
and proves nothing about it, so answering with DIDs would make the endpoint a
phone-number-to-identity lookup oracle. A blocked PUT returns the same code plus
dids, because a PUT that reaches the limit check has already matched a correct
code and the caller is holding the handset. The code is consumed on a limit
rejection exactly as on success, so a fresh answer costs a fresh POST.
Carrier opt-out is the one place the DID boundary is crossed on purpose: STOP
arrives with a phone number and no identity, so it marks every registration of
that number unverified. START does not restore anything; possession has to be
proved again with a fresh POST and code.
SMS delivery
startSmsAlertSearchScheduler() is a third scheduler alongside the FCM wakeup
and FCM alertSearch passes, with its own interval
(SMS_ALERT_SEARCH_INTERVAL_MS, default 5 minutes) and a 150-second initial
offset so the two alertSearch passes do not hit Endorser in the same instant. It
lists distinct user_id from sms_alert_authorization_batches, calls
runDailyAlertSearch(userId, now, {}, "sms"), and then deliverAlertSearchSms.
It logs [SmsAlertSearchScheduler] Pass started / Pass completed in. The
in-flight guard is process-local, exactly like the other two, so a second
replica double-texts.
Eligibility is the same predicate the FCM path uses: the run consumed today's
JWT and the digest is complete with updates. Consumption is what makes later
ticks on the same local day no-ops. The message is
Gift Economies: you have N new updates. https://giftopia.me Reply STOP to end.,
kept inside one 160-character GSM-7 segment, since a second segment is a second
charge. Underneath the JWT rule, an sms_phone_log count caps sends at one per
handset per identity per day. Send failures are logged and do not roll back
cursor advancement or JWT consumption.
The SMS channel keeps its own JWT inventory and its own cursor table. A user on both channels produces two Endorser and two Partner queries per day and needs 200 minted JWTs; the counts can differ transiently when one channel's retrieval fails and the other's succeeds. A shared cursor was rejected: two independent daily runs against one row means whichever fires first consumes the delta and the other reports nothing.
Testing SMS locally
Two scripts cover the two things worth checking separately. Both default to fake data and neither needs a real handset, a purchased number, or 10DLC registration.
pnpm run sms:send [to] [body] makes one send and prints the result. No server,
no database, no auth — just the Twilio path. The destination can also come from
SMS_SEND_TO.
TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID=ACxxxx TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN=xxxx \
TWILIO_MESSAGING_SERVICE_SID=MGxxxx \
pnpm run sms:send +15551234567 "test from my Mac"
pnpm run sms:smoke [to] runs the whole route flow: POST, PUT with the echoed
code, both GET forms, DELETE, then a dump of sms_phone_log. The destination
can also come from SMS_SMOKE_TO. It stubs the two things
that otherwise need the real world — it starts a throwaway Endorser that answers
/api/report/rateLimits with 200, and mints unsigned did:ethr JWTs, which
decodeAndVerifyJwt accepts under NODE_ENV=test-local without checking a
signature. The middleware chain, the claim check, the throttles and the database
are all real. Each run gets a fresh NOTIFY_DATA_DIR, so the three-codes-per-
hour throttle never interferes.
With no Twilio credentials set, sends go to the console adapter and nothing leaves the machine.
pnpm run twilio:whoami answers "whose account am I about to bill?" — it
fetches the Account resource with the configured SID and token, which separates
a mismatched credential pair from a working one before any message is involved.
It sends nothing and costs nothing.
TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID=ACxxxx TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN=xxxx pnpm run twilio:whoami
200 prints the account's friendly name, status and type, and that is the
account a send would bill — note type: Trial can only reach verified numbers.
401 / 20003 means the SID and token are not a matching pair. 403 / 20008
("Resource not accessible with Test Account Credentials") means the pair is a
valid test pair: test credentials may not read the Accounts resource, so
that refusal is a pass, not a fault.
Twilio test credentials are the cheapest way to exercise the real API, and they behave the same whether or not a 10DLC campaign is approved — nothing they send reaches a carrier. They are a separate Account SID and Auth Token from the live pair, under Console → API keys & tokens → Test credentials; a live SID with a live token sends real, billable messages. They are a second Account SID / Auth Token pair in the Twilio console, separate from the live ones; they need a (free) account but no purchased number, they deliver no message, they trigger no status callbacks, and they cost nothing.
TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID=ACxxxxtest TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN=xxxx \
TWILIO_FROM_NUMBER=+15005550006 pnpm run sms:smoke +15551234567
+15005550006 is the only From that passes validation; every other number
returns 21606.
The To is validated even under test credentials, so a reserved fictional
number such as +15555550123 is rejected with 21211. Both scripts refuse to
run with that placeholder once Twilio is configured, rather than spending a
round trip to learn it.
The destination is normalized before anything is sent, and both scripts echo
the result — check that line first when Twilio rejects a number. Ten digits with
no + are assumed US, so 8015601471, 801-560-1471 and +18015601471 all
reach the same place. A + prefix is taken at its word: +8015601471 is
syntactically valid E.164 with country code 80, so it passes normalization and
is rejected by Twilio rather than here.
A real To under test credentials is less predictable: some accounts accept
it and return a synthetic SID, others answer 20404
(resource ... Messages.json was not found) despite the credentials being
valid. Treat the magic To numbers below as the dependable path for test
credentials, and use live credentials when a text has to actually arrive.
These magic To numbers force specific failures, useful for exercising the
code-send-failed path on purpose:
To |
Twilio error |
|---|---|
+15005550001 |
21211 invalid number |
+15005550002 |
21612 cannot route |
+15005550003 |
21408 no permission for that region |
+15005550004 |
21610 blocklisted |
+15005550009 |
21614 not SMS-capable |
Even with deliberately wrong credentials the round trip is worth running once:
Twilio answers Authentication Error - invalid username, which proves the URL,
the Basic auth header, the form encoding and the response parsing all work and
only the credentials are missing.
Sending to a real handset needs a real (trial or paid) account, a real From
number, and — for a US long code — completed A2P 10DLC registration.
Provider
Sends go to Twilio over plain fetch against
https://api.twilio.com/2010-04-01/Accounts/{SID}/Messages.json with HTTP Basic
auth and a form-encoded To / From (or MessagingServiceSid) / Body. There
is no twilio SDK dependency. With configuration absent or incomplete, sends
return SMS_NOT_CONFIGURED and the process still boots: a texting outage must
not take push down with it. Under NODE_ENV=test-local with no Twilio
credentials, a console adapter prints the message instead of sending it.
SMS_DEV_ECHO_CODE adds a devCode field to the POST response holding the
plaintext six digits, so a developer with no Twilio account or no carrier
coverage can still exercise POST-then-PUT. It is honored only when
NODE_ENV is also test-local, checked first, so a production process with the
flag set by accident echoes nothing.
US A2P 10DLC registration is required before Twilio will carry
application-to-person traffic on a long code. Brand and campaign registration
take days and carry per-campaign fees. Unregistered traffic gets filtered by
carriers silently, with a sent status from the API.
A registered campaign lives on a Messaging Service, and every number in that
service's sender pool inherits the campaign — including numbers added later.
Set TWILIO_MESSAGING_SERVICE_SID rather than TWILIO_FROM_NUMBER once a
campaign is approved. Both deliver, since the pool carries the registration
either way, but a bare From leaves the Messaging Service off the message
record in Twilio's logs and Insights, and it makes it possible to point at a
number outside the pool and quietly send unregistered traffic. The Messaging
Service also picks the sender for each destination. When both variables are set
the Messaging Service wins and TWILIO_FROM_NUMBER is ignored.
A sent status means Twilio accepted the message, not that a handset received
it. This service records alert-sent on that acceptance and does not register a
StatusCallback, so delivered / undelivered / failed outcomes are not
tracked. That is a gap to close if delivery receipts matter.
The inbound webhook authenticates by Twilio's X-Twilio-Signature over the
exact URL Twilio posted to, not by JWT — it is Twilio calling, not a user. Set
TWILIO_WEBHOOK_URL to that public URL; behind a proxy or tunnel the request's
own headers do not reliably reproduce it.
Storage
Database location
| Path | Description |
|---|---|
{NOTIFY_DATA_DIR}/notify.sqlite |
Primary SQLite database (default dir: ./data) |
{NOTIFY_DATA_DIR}/notify.sqlite-wal |
WAL journal (present while the process is running) |
{NOTIFY_DATA_DIR}/notify.sqlite-shm |
Shared-memory file used with WAL mode |
NOTIFY_DATA_DIR defaults to ./data (relative to the process working directory). The data/ directory is gitignored.
Production must keep these files on durable storage (disk or a Docker volume). A container or VM rebuild that drops NOTIFY_DATA_DIR loses FCM registrations, delegated JWT batches, and alertSearch cursors. Back up all three files together when using WAL.
Schema (high level)
Table fcm_registrations holds one row per registered device:
- Identity:
id,user_id,device_id,fcm_token,platform - Flags:
test_mode - Timestamps:
created_at,updated_at,last_notified_at
Unique on (user_id, device_id). Indexes also exist on user_id, device_id, fcm_token, and (user_id, fcm_token).
Tables alert_authorization_batches and alert_authorization_jwts hold a user's delegated notification-JWT inventory (separate from device registration):
- Batch:
id,user_id(authenticated DID),batch_id,timezone(IANA name at mint time),created_at - JWT:
batch_pk,sequence,day(YYYY-MM-DD),jwt,nbf,exp,status(unused/consumed),consumed_at, timestamps
Unique on (batch_pk, sequence) and on (user_id, day) for unused rows. Indexes also exist on (user_id, status), (user_id, day), and batch_pk.
Table alert_search_cursors holds one row per user DID:
endorser_after_id— last complete Endorser ULID (afterId), or nullpartner_after_at— last complete PartnerupdatedAtbound (afterDate), or nullcreated_at,updated_at
Table sms_registrations holds one row per (DID, phone) pair:
- Identity:
id,user_id,phone_e164(E.164 normalized) - Verification:
verified,code_hash(HMAC of the pending code),code_expires_at,code_attempts,last_code_sent_at,verified_at - Timestamps:
created_at,updated_at
Unique on (user_id, phone_e164). Indexes also exist on user_id, on
phone_e164 (opt-out arrives with the number, not the DID), and on
(user_id, verified).
Table sms_phone_log records every phone action: user_id, phone_e164
(nullable, nulled by DELETE), phone_hash (HMAC, never nulled), action,
result (ok / rejected / failed), detail, jwt_hash,
provider_message_id, created_at. Actions are register-requested,
code-sent, code-send-failed, verify-succeeded, verify-failed,
did-limit-blocked, did-limit-disclosed, deleted,
alert-authorization-stored, alert-sent, alert-send-failed, and opt-out.
Indexes on (user_id, created_at), (phone_hash, created_at), and
(action, created_at); the throttle counts read the second.
This is the first table in this database with directly identifying personal
data. phone_e164 is nulled on delete; a prune job for rows older than 400
days is a follow-up.
Table sms_action_jwt_use holds the replay guard: jwt_hash (unique),
user_id, action, used_at. Rows older than
SMS_ACTION_JWT_MAX_AGE_SEC × 10 are pruned on each SMS scheduler pass; a token
that stale fails the freshness check anyway.
Tables sms_alert_authorization_batches / sms_alert_authorization_jwts and
sms_alert_search_cursors are column-for-column mirrors of their FCM
counterparts, holding the SMS channel's independent JWT inventory and cursor.
The schema is created automatically on startup if the database or tables do not already exist. New tables are added with CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS; existing fcm_registrations rows are not migrated or altered.
Backup
Persist or back up the SQLite files under NOTIFY_DATA_DIR:
- Prefer stopping the service, then copy
notify.sqlite(and any-wal/-shmsidecars if present). - Or, while the service is running, copy all three files (
notify.sqlite,-wal,-shm) together so the backup stays consistent under WAL mode. - For Docker, mount a volume at the data directory (or set
NOTIFY_DATA_DIRto a mounted path) so registrations survive container recreation.
Production
Canonical production deployment is the Docker image: pnpm build then node dist/index.js (Dockerfile CMD). That is not the same as the development commands pnpm run dev / pnpm start, which run TypeScript through tsx and are for local development only.
Single replica
Run exactly one Node process / one production replica. AlertSearch scheduling and its in-flight overlap guard are process-local. There is no distributed scheduler lock. SQLite is a local file. Two processes will double-run AlertSearch and FCM wakeup and can corrupt or fork the database.
Firebase credentials
Working Firebase Admin credentials are required for both WAKEUP_PING and AlertSearch FCM (type: alert_search). The app initializes Firebase once at process start (src/services/firebase.ts).
Supported paths (in this order):
FIREBASE_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON— inline service-account JSON (one line). The application reads this variable.- If that variable is unset or empty, Application Default Credentials. ADC may use
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS(a file path to a key JSON). The application does not readGOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALSitself; the Google/Firebase ADC stack does.
Invalid FIREBASE_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON prevents the process from starting. Missing ADC typically allows listen//health but FCM sends fail later.
Persistent SQLite
Set NOTIFY_DATA_DIR to a durable directory, or keep the Docker default /app/data on a persistent volume. The service uses:
{NOTIFY_DATA_DIR}/notify.sqlite{NOTIFY_DATA_DIR}/notify.sqlite-wal{NOTIFY_DATA_DIR}/notify.sqlite-shm
Environment checklist
| Variable / constraint | Production requirement | Default if unset |
|---|---|---|
PORT |
Optional | 3003 |
ENDORSER_URL |
Optional if using production Endorser | https://api.endorser.ch |
PARTNER_URL |
Optional if using production Partner | https://partner-api.endorser.ch |
FIREBASE_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON or working ADC |
Required for FCM (wakeup and AlertSearch) | ADC if JSON unset |
NOTIFY_DATA_DIR |
Durable path (or volume on /app/data) |
./data (cwd-relative; in Docker that is /app/data) |
NODE_ENV |
Must not be test-local (that bypasses ethr JWT expiry) |
Docker image sets production |
SMS_ENABLED |
Optional; /notify-sms returns 503 SMS_DISABLED while off |
false |
SMS_CODE_SECRET |
Required when SMS_ENABLED (startup fails without it) |
None |
TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID, TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN |
Required to send; absent means SMS_NOT_CONFIGURED per send |
None |
TWILIO_MESSAGING_SERVICE_SID or TWILIO_FROM_NUMBER |
One of the two required to send; prefer the Messaging Service, which wins when both are set | None |
TWILIO_WEBHOOK_URL |
The public URL Twilio posts /notify-sms/inbound to; it signs that exact string |
Derived from request headers |
SMS_CODE_TTL_SEC |
Optional | 600 |
SMS_CODE_MAX_ATTEMPTS |
Optional | 5 |
SMS_ACTION_JWT_MAX_AGE_SEC |
Optional | 300 |
SMS_MAX_DIDS_PER_PHONE |
Optional | 5 |
SMS_ALERT_SEARCH_INTERVAL_MS |
Optional | 300000 |
SMS_REQUIRE_ACTION_CLAIM |
Must not be false in production |
true |
SMS_DEV_ECHO_CODE |
Must be unset or false; honored only under NODE_ENV=test-local |
false |
| Replicas | One process | Not enforced in code |
| Persistent volume | Required for Docker so SQLite survives replace | None unless you pass -v |
Rotating SMS_CODE_SECRET invalidates every pending verification code and
orphans every stored phone_hash. Rotate between deploys, not casually.
Optional: DEFAULT_ENDORSER_API_SERVER / DEFAULT_PARTNER_API_SERVER are honored only if the corresponding ENDORSER_URL / PARTNER_URL is unset (src/env.ts).
Docker (canonical)
docker build --no-cache -t notify-wakeup-api:amd-$NOTIFY_WAKEUP_API_VERSION --platform linux/amd64 .
docker run --env-file notify-wakeup-api.env -p 3003:3003 \
-v notify-wakeup-data:/app/data \
notify-wakeup-api
The image runs node dist/index.js. Mount a volume at /app/data (or set NOTIFY_DATA_DIR to another mounted path). Do not scale this container to multiple replicas.
Smoke test
Every line this service prints is prefixed with an ISO-8601 UTC timestamp
(src/util/log.ts).
/health only means the HTTP server is up. It does not prove Firebase, Endorser, Partner, SQLite durability, or AlertSearch.
- Listening:
curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://127.0.0.1:3003/health(or the host/port you published). Expect200. - Health body:
curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:3003/health→{"ok":true}. - The schedulers are started from
src/index.ts(startScheduler(), thenstartAlertSearchScheduler(), thenstartSmsAlertSearchScheduler()whenSMS_ENABLED) as the process reaches* Running backend. None of them runs a pass on startup; the first pass is on the timer, and the SMS pass waits an extra 150 seconds. - AlertSearch activity in logs: look for
[AlertSearchScheduler] Pass startedand[AlertSearchScheduler] Pass completed in(orPass skipped (already in flight)). User failures log as[AlertSearchScheduler] User failed. FCM wakeup passes log[Scheduler] Pass started/[Scheduler] Pass completed in. These lines appear after the first interval, not at boot. - SMS activity in logs (when
SMS_ENABLED): look for[SmsAlertSearchScheduler] Pass started/Pass completed in. Route activity logs under[NotifySms], and rejected authorizations under[SmsActionJwt] Rejected. - SQLite location: after the process has handled a request or a scheduler pass that opens the DB, confirm
{NOTIFY_DATA_DIR}/notify.sqliteexists (Docker default:/app/data/notify.sqliteon the volume). WAL sidecars may appear while the process is running.