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3266 lines
111 KiB
3266 lines
111 KiB
WEBVTT
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01:00.000 --> 01:30.000
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No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no,
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01:30.000 --> 02:00.000
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no, no, no, no, no,
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02:00.000 --> 02:30.000
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no, no, no, no, no, no, no,
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02:30.000 --> 03:00.000
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no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no
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03:00.000 --> 03:05.000
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Japanese television. People everywhere are starting to listen to him.
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03:06.000 --> 03:08.000
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It's embarrassing.
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03:13.000 --> 03:15.000
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Where does this one come in?
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03:15.000 --> 03:18.000
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What better way for a swimmer to disappear?
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03:18.000 --> 03:21.000
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Uncle Stewart, why did you do it?
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03:21.000 --> 03:25.000
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Well, I guess he can explain it to the sheriff when he gets here.
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03:25.000 --> 03:27.000
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I bet you kids are starving.
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03:27.000 --> 03:29.000
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Zoinks, that's for me.
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03:32.000 --> 03:34.000
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Hey, what's this?
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03:34.000 --> 03:37.000
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Scooby Dooze was here.
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03:37.000 --> 03:39.000
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The whole turkey?
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03:39.000 --> 03:40.000
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Gone?
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03:43.000 --> 03:45.000
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Scooby, here we go!
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03:57.000 --> 04:15.000
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Are we doing the stand-through in the city of the age?
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04:15.000 --> 04:17.000
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Yes, two days ago.
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04:17.000 --> 04:19.000
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One side to the receiver.
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04:28.000 --> 04:33.000
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Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.
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04:33.000 --> 04:38.000
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This is Kigo, biological, high resistance, low noise, information brief brought to you.
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04:38.000 --> 04:40.000
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High biologists don't understand.
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04:40.000 --> 04:45.000
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It's the 1st of October, 2020.
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04:45.000 --> 04:54.000
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They are still slowly fighting our way out of this wet paper bag of a spectrum of debate.
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04:55.000 --> 05:00.000
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It's taken a while, though, because a lot of people have been deceived.
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05:00.000 --> 05:09.000
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A lot of people have been deceived by an illusion of consensus created by people on the internet and on TV.
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05:09.000 --> 05:13.000
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All with the idea of misleading the young.
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05:13.000 --> 05:16.000
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And that's the spell we've got to break.
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05:16.000 --> 05:20.000
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That's where we've got to take this, and that's how we've got to think about it.
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05:21.000 --> 05:29.000
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We've got to go back to things we've known for decades, if not generations.
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05:29.000 --> 05:33.000
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Make sure that this history is not lost.
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05:37.000 --> 05:42.000
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And the way to get it back is to take it from these charlatans, that's correct.
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05:42.000 --> 05:46.000
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We must take back power from these charlatans.
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05:47.000 --> 05:52.000
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Because the brick wall is visible at the back of the theater.
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05:52.000 --> 05:56.000
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It's only a question of what are you going to do about it now?
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05:56.000 --> 05:59.000
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What are you going to do about it now?
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06:05.000 --> 06:10.000
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What if I was to tell you there was no spread in New York City that infectious clones were the only real threat
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that placebo badges were likely distributed in their transfections in healthy mammals?
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06:15.000 --> 06:18.000
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It's dumb.
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06:18.000 --> 06:21.000
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What if I was to tell you the protocols were murder?
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06:21.000 --> 06:27.000
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The gain of function is a mythology in that this Scooby-Doo mystery is actually a real thing.
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06:27.000 --> 06:32.000
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And that the players are just spectacularly committed to lies.
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06:32.000 --> 06:35.000
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Wouldn't that make a lot more sense?
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06:35.000 --> 06:46.000
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A lot simpler than some complex idea about adding nucleic acids to a chain of other nucleic acids
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06:46.000 --> 06:53.000
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and then suddenly it's endowed with the ability to disrupt an entire planet?
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06:53.000 --> 06:56.000
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Because that's really the story we've been told, right?
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06:56.000 --> 07:07.000
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Is that a DNA molecule created in a laboratory is able to disrupt the economy and cultures
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and health systems of a planet?
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07:14.000 --> 07:16.000
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Are you listening to this?
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07:16.000 --> 07:18.000
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Are you hearing this?
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07:19.000 --> 07:26.000
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We are being told that a combination, yeah, get out of here, Captain.
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A combination of amino acids, sorry, my bad.
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07:32.000 --> 07:42.000
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A combination of nucleic acids in a ribonucleic acid chain is capable of creating a bioweapon
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that if released could disrupt the social and economic framework of an entire species
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which up until that point was doing just fine.
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07:59.000 --> 08:03.000
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I mean, that's really a Star Trek-level story that they've told us.
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08:03.000 --> 08:11.000
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It's a weapon that's as Kim.com said when he was alive with Andrew Huff or whoever it was
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that he was talking to, that it's much better than a nuclear weapon.
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08:15.000 --> 08:20.000
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I mean, you can kill billions of people. This is a planet-wide power.
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08:20.000 --> 08:23.000
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It's the biological equivalent to a Death Star.
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Only you don't destroy the real estate.
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08:27.000 --> 08:33.000
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I mean, we are talking dream-team-level biology here.
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08:33.000 --> 08:38.000
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And so it's a spectacular narrative that needs disruption.
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08:38.000 --> 08:46.000
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Sorry for that audio cut being so drastically quick there, right back to the crickets.
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08:46.000 --> 08:51.000
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Don't take the bait on TV and social media. It is getting quite hectic out there.
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08:51.000 --> 08:56.000
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That's because the Scooby-Doo is starting to fall apart on the inside
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08:56.000 --> 09:01.000
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and they're starting to understand that people are starting to really get it,
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that they've been lied to.
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09:03.000 --> 09:08.000
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And that's really enough for most people, right? Because they've had this gut feeling for a long time.
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09:08.000 --> 09:12.000
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They've had all these anecdotal things that just don't add up in their head.
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09:12.000 --> 09:17.000
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And so if you give them this pretty easy to understand explanation
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with a combination of power and money and comfort and any other number of things
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like prestige among your peers, lots of people do stupid stuff.
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09:29.000 --> 09:35.000
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And in this case, you know, they've worked on this for a couple of decades.
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09:35.000 --> 09:42.000
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And some of the people that are involved in it probably really don't understand how bad it is.
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09:42.000 --> 09:49.000
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But it's bad because we've been lied to for a very long time about the pandemic potential of coronaviruses
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and with good reason because once this mythology is settled in,
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09:54.000 --> 10:02.000
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then this combination of patents and products can be used to control us for the next decade or decade and a half.
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10:02.000 --> 10:10.000
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Unlike any time in history, patents have come to market without, like in the bio-text sphere,
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without elaborate time frame needed for research and development and testing and approval.
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Instead, they've been brought to market en masse under the pretext of an emergency
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and because they've been so widely distributed and accepted as working,
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most of these patents are probably going to go on forward.
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10:30.000 --> 10:36.000
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These products are going to be gone forward, maybe in new versions.
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10:36.000 --> 10:38.000
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But nevertheless, you're going to have testing.
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10:38.000 --> 10:41.000
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You're going to have these products that are going to be going forward
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that are going to be testing for other things using the same methodologies.
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We're going to have mRNA shots with lipid nanoparticles for other targets,
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10:51.000 --> 11:04.000
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and so this whole collection of new ideas and their sort of legal control exerted on the market
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by setting a sort of industry standard for what's coming in the future,
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and then using the pandemic to leverage these technologies into place
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without this normal extended regulatory hoops to jump through all this other stuff.
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11:24.000 --> 11:28.000
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Now, a couple of that in with the fact that during the deployment of this,
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there were probably lots of different people producing different formulations,
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and so with careful record-keeping, the best formulations, the best methodologies
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could be kept track of, could be noted, and moving forward,
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perhaps the widespread devastation could be reduced,
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and this all goes along well with people who are just selling the product,
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just selling, just pushing, and with the full belief that this stuff works,
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kind of like Theranos.
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When in reality, the people that actually understand the biology
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are first and foremost concerned with the idea of the transfection
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such a long-lived animal as a human, it's just not really a viable technology
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because of the cascade of possibilities that exist in a long-lived animal
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and the cascade of possibilities that exist in an animal,
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12:29.000 --> 12:33.000
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yeah, well, in an animal as complex as a human,
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and I'm not really sure how to codify exactly how complex we are,
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but suffice it to say that it's easier to make a genetic knockout mouse
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than it is to make a genetic knockout rat genetically modified monkeys
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are even harder to make, and it is the complexity of the animal,
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and the brain, and the immune system, and everything.
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As you go up the evolutionary ladder, and as you get longer lifespans,
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it seems in many of these mammals that in order for that pattern integrity
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to sustain itself for that long, you either need to have a very slow metabolism
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like a reptile, or if you're going to be high metabolism like a mammal,
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then you're going to have to have enzymes and homeostatic mechanisms
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that are far beyond that required in a mouse where generationally,
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it doesn't matter if they get cancer.
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And so this is really the crux also of understanding the danger
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of a lot of these applications, which appear to work in mice,
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appear to work in an animal model.
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In an animal model where the animal is not evaluated for its long-term health,
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is an evaluated for subtle pains and aches and all these things
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that a child or a teenager or an adult would, of course,
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be aware of, complain about, and experience.
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How do you go about evaluating the side effects of transfection
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in an animal model for whom the only outward signs are tumors or death?
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14:18.000 --> 14:24.000
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So this is really the sort of extraordinary jump that we've made at this point,
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all under the pretense that this is a gain of function virus,
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most likely leaked from a laboratory, maybe even on purpose.
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And so at least they tried something, at least we got lucky,
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and some of the shots worked, or some of the people were protected,
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or some of the people got antibodies.
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And it's these people who have misled us.
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And as they've misled us, they've misled us about very specific things,
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which have led us down this path of figuring it out.
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And that's the part that gets me the most frustrated,
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is that we've been misled to think that we are figuring it out,
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and I'm one of those people who dedicated a year and a half of my life
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to trying to spread the message of this is what we've got to figure out.
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We've got to figure out who did this, where it came from.
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It's very important.
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And a couple times I decided that it wasn't important where it came from
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because of the biology that they were telling us.
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And a couple times I became convinced by other people that no,
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maybe it is really important to figure it out.
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In the end, I've come to the conclusion that there isn't anything to figure out.
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And in fact, it's that urge to figure it out, which was the trap,
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that they tried to suck everyone into.
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And if you didn't get sucked into it, that's fine.
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You were most likely going to believe it was natural and didn't want to get sucked into it
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was a scary discussion.
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But if you did get sucked into it, it was almost inevitable that you would come
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to the conclusion that this was a lab leak.
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The only question of whether or not it was a lab leak of a natural virus
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from a bad cave in the Mojang province of China,
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or whether it was a genetically altered or some kind of chimeric virus
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or a virus with a genetically altered spike protein
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with inserts from HIV that was released inadvertently in a Wuhan laboratory
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or maybe brought to the market in Wuhan.
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And so this is the story that people have been figuring out for the last three years.
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I've been trying to figure that out.
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You are forced to accept the faith of the Scooby-Doo episode.
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And the faith of the Scooby-Doo episode is there's a novel virus.
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We had to shut down.
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My goodness, thank goodness we did.
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And although we had no idea what to do about it,
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16:52.000 --> 16:56.000
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we had no idea what medicines would work.
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16:56.000 --> 17:01.000
|
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Warp speed brought about a mRNA vaccine
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17:01.000 --> 17:05.000
|
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that saved the day, that saved millions of lives,
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17:05.000 --> 17:09.000
|
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and that, you know, the adenovirus ones, they didn't work so well
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17:09.000 --> 17:13.000
|
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because people got some clots, so they pulled those off the market.
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17:13.000 --> 17:17.000
|
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And we saw that they lied about where this virus came from
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17:17.000 --> 17:21.000
|
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and those lies seemed to reveal the same thing
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17:21.000 --> 17:25.000
|
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that that leaked diffuse proposal seems to reveal,
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17:25.000 --> 17:29.000
|
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and that is that the United States couldn't make it here
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17:29.000 --> 17:33.000
|
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because the laws were changed and the regulations were changed
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17:33.000 --> 17:36.000
|
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and so they shipped this over to China
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17:36.000 --> 17:40.000
|
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and made this in a lab in China.
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17:40.000 --> 17:44.000
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And the diffuse proposal shows clearly that they were going to insert
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17:44.000 --> 17:48.000
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fear and cleavage sites into lots of different bat viruses
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17:48.000 --> 17:50.000
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and then spray them back into caves.
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17:50.000 --> 17:54.000
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So it makes perfect sense that EcoHealth Alliance did this
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17:54.000 --> 17:57.000
|
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with USAID money in cooperation with the lab in Wuhan
|
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17:57.000 --> 17:59.000
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because that's where it leaked from.
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17:59.000 --> 18:02.000
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John Stewart could even figure it out.
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18:02.000 --> 18:05.000
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But then we debated about it and argued about it
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18:05.000 --> 18:09.000
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and insisted that that's ridiculous for two and a half years
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18:09.000 --> 18:13.000
|
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or a year and a half to get everybody fired up.
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18:13.000 --> 18:18.000
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And in reality, misinformation and disinformation
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18:18.000 --> 18:23.000
|
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is carrying people to believe things that are untrue.
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18:23.000 --> 18:27.000
|
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And vaccinations is a perfect example of it.
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18:27.000 --> 18:29.000
|
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Like any.
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18:29.000 --> 18:33.000
|
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And so taking an extreme position like this
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18:34.000 --> 18:38.000
|
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person did is part of this narrative.
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18:38.000 --> 18:41.000
|
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It gets people, the extreme positions,
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18:41.000 --> 18:46.000
|
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define the space within which people are arguing
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18:46.000 --> 18:49.000
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and make it much more likely for people to take a central position
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18:49.000 --> 18:53.000
|
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between those two, whatever extremes they are.
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18:53.000 --> 18:57.000
|
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And of course then the extreme positions are,
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18:57.000 --> 19:01.000
|
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on one hand, you have Trudeau and Sam Harris saying,
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19:01.000 --> 19:04.000
|
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oh my goodness, you people are idiots.
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19:04.000 --> 19:09.000
|
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And on the other hand, you have people saying that Robert F.
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19:09.000 --> 19:16.000
|
|
Kennedy Jr. and ICANN network and CHD are crazy anti-vaxxers
|
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19:16.000 --> 19:19.000
|
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who don't believe in medicine.
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19:19.000 --> 19:22.000
|
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And so then somewhere in between here,
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19:22.000 --> 19:25.000
|
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you decide, well, there's obviously a virus.
|
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19:25.000 --> 19:27.000
|
|
I mean, there are obviously other ones
|
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19:27.000 --> 19:30.000
|
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that would be arguing about then if there wasn't a virus.
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19:31.000 --> 19:32.000
|
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That's the debate.
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19:32.000 --> 19:36.000
|
|
And that's the perfect reason why these people took such extreme positions
|
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19:36.000 --> 19:39.000
|
|
that made everybody go, oh,
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19:39.000 --> 19:42.000
|
|
it's the exact same effect that Trump has on some people,
|
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19:42.000 --> 19:45.000
|
|
but they did it with the biology
|
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19:45.000 --> 19:48.000
|
|
and the absurdity of the certainty
|
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19:48.000 --> 19:51.000
|
|
that none of these people could have had.
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19:51.000 --> 19:53.000
|
|
Think about this as a couple of weeks ago.
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19:53.000 --> 19:55.000
|
|
A week ago or two weeks ago,
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19:55.000 --> 19:57.000
|
|
so many of us would like to leave it in the past,
|
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19:57.000 --> 20:00.000
|
|
but cases are once again on the rise.
|
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|
20:00.000 --> 20:02.000
|
|
So when will new booster shots roll out?
|
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|
20:02.000 --> 20:06.000
|
|
And Thompson asked the CDC director.
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20:06.000 --> 20:09.000
|
|
This summer, most Americans left COVID in the past,
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20:09.000 --> 20:12.000
|
|
gathering together once again, mask-free.
|
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20:12.000 --> 20:15.000
|
|
But tonight, signs of a COVID resurgence.
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|
20:15.000 --> 20:17.000
|
|
Across the country, COVID hospitalizations
|
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|
20:17.000 --> 20:21.000
|
|
jumped more than 14% in the most recent week.
|
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20:21.000 --> 20:23.000
|
|
I mean, that could have been, sorry.
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20:23.000 --> 20:26.000
|
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You know, but that could have been anybody.
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20:27.000 --> 20:30.000
|
|
That could have been anybody on that cart.
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20:30.000 --> 20:34.000
|
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We don't even know what hospital or where that was
|
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20:34.000 --> 20:36.000
|
|
or what year that video was shot.
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20:36.000 --> 20:39.000
|
|
I'll play that a little bit. Sorry about that.
|
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20:42.000 --> 20:44.000
|
|
COVID is making a comeback this summer,
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20:44.000 --> 20:46.000
|
|
so many of us would like to leave it in the past,
|
|
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|
20:46.000 --> 20:49.000
|
|
but cases are once again on the rise.
|
|
|
|
20:49.000 --> 20:52.000
|
|
So when will new booster shots roll out?
|
|
|
|
20:52.000 --> 20:55.000
|
|
And Thompson asked the CDC director.
|
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|
20:55.000 --> 20:58.000
|
|
This summer, most Americans left COVID in the past.
|
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|
20:58.000 --> 21:01.000
|
|
This is from about, I think, two weeks ago, or maybe three,
|
|
|
|
21:01.000 --> 21:03.000
|
|
but the point is the same.
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21:03.000 --> 21:04.000
|
|
They're running.
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21:04.000 --> 21:06.000
|
|
They've been running up the story again,
|
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21:06.000 --> 21:08.000
|
|
and they're continuing to do it now.
|
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21:08.000 --> 21:10.000
|
|
We can look at that.
|
|
|
|
21:10.000 --> 21:12.000
|
|
But far lower than pandemic levels,
|
|
|
|
21:12.000 --> 21:16.000
|
|
NBC News medical contributor Dr. Kavita Patel.
|
|
|
|
21:16.000 --> 21:19.000
|
|
What's behind this uptick in COVID that we're seeing?
|
|
|
|
21:19.000 --> 21:23.000
|
|
The main driver of this is a variant that's relatively newer
|
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|
21:23.000 --> 21:25.000
|
|
to the scene, EG5.
|
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|
21:25.000 --> 21:28.000
|
|
It's easier to give and get, so that makes it kind of easier
|
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|
21:28.000 --> 21:29.000
|
|
to pass along.
|
|
|
|
21:29.000 --> 21:33.000
|
|
It's been almost a year since the last COVID booster came out.
|
|
|
|
21:33.000 --> 21:35.000
|
|
CDC director Dr. Mandy Cohen.
|
|
|
|
21:35.000 --> 21:38.000
|
|
The new COVID booster is expected to be approved by the FDA,
|
|
|
|
21:38.000 --> 21:41.000
|
|
and then we will make recommendations from the CDC
|
|
|
|
21:41.000 --> 21:43.000
|
|
probably by the second or third week of September.
|
|
|
|
21:43.000 --> 21:46.000
|
|
Will it protect against this new strain?
|
|
|
|
21:46.000 --> 21:47.000
|
|
Yes.
|
|
|
|
21:47.000 --> 21:50.000
|
|
The booster is tailored to what we are seeing circulating now.
|
|
|
|
21:50.000 --> 21:54.000
|
|
Critics say the federal government is behind once again.
|
|
|
|
21:54.000 --> 21:57.000
|
|
People knew there was going to be a COVID resurgence,
|
|
|
|
21:57.000 --> 21:59.000
|
|
so why don't we have a booster today?
|
|
|
|
21:59.000 --> 22:01.000
|
|
Why do we have to wait until next month?
|
|
|
|
22:01.000 --> 22:04.000
|
|
The way we go about doing our, just like we do with our flu shots,
|
|
|
|
22:04.000 --> 22:06.000
|
|
right, we make sure that we're looking at the ways
|
|
|
|
22:06.000 --> 22:08.000
|
|
in which the virus changed.
|
|
|
|
22:08.000 --> 22:10.000
|
|
They look at and evaluate that.
|
|
|
|
22:10.000 --> 22:11.000
|
|
The FDA is doing its work.
|
|
|
|
22:11.000 --> 22:15.000
|
|
We likely will see this as an annual COVID shot,
|
|
|
|
22:15.000 --> 22:16.000
|
|
just like the flu shot.
|
|
|
|
22:16.000 --> 22:19.000
|
|
Just in time for Paul, when we'll also face RSV.
|
|
|
|
22:19.000 --> 22:24.000
|
|
Can you take the flu shot, the COVID booster and the RSV vaccine
|
|
|
|
22:24.000 --> 22:25.000
|
|
all at once?
|
|
|
|
22:25.000 --> 22:29.000
|
|
So for flu and COVID, yes, RSV again is only available for older adults.
|
|
|
|
22:29.000 --> 22:33.000
|
|
That's one where I'd say talk to your doctor about what's right for you.
|
|
|
|
22:33.000 --> 22:37.000
|
|
So until the new COVID booster comes, get prepared,
|
|
|
|
22:37.000 --> 22:39.000
|
|
stock up on at home test.
|
|
|
|
22:39.000 --> 22:40.000
|
|
They do cover that new strain.
|
|
|
|
22:40.000 --> 22:43.000
|
|
Keep a mask handy in case you're in a crowded place,
|
|
|
|
22:43.000 --> 22:45.000
|
|
and most of all, get your shots.
|
|
|
|
22:45.000 --> 22:50.000
|
|
COVID flu and RSV all by Halloween to give yourself
|
|
|
|
22:50.000 --> 22:52.000
|
|
your best chance of staying healthy.
|
|
|
|
22:52.000 --> 22:54.000
|
|
So she said it right there, right?
|
|
|
|
22:54.000 --> 22:56.000
|
|
She told everybody you get all of your shots.
|
|
|
|
22:56.000 --> 22:58.000
|
|
No age, no nothing.
|
|
|
|
22:58.000 --> 23:00.000
|
|
Don't see your doctor.
|
|
|
|
23:00.000 --> 23:04.000
|
|
Just get all your shots like you're a, I don't know,
|
|
|
|
23:04.000 --> 23:06.000
|
|
a dog going to a pound or something.
|
|
|
|
23:06.000 --> 23:08.000
|
|
It's impressive.
|
|
|
|
23:08.000 --> 23:14.000
|
|
The way that they're pushing it now, have a mask in case you're in
|
|
|
|
23:14.000 --> 23:15.000
|
|
crowded position.
|
|
|
|
23:15.000 --> 23:16.000
|
|
I mean, it's impressive.
|
|
|
|
23:16.000 --> 23:18.000
|
|
And this is 2023.
|
|
|
|
23:18.000 --> 23:20.000
|
|
This isn't a year ago or something like that.
|
|
|
|
23:20.000 --> 23:22.000
|
|
Either the COVID never went away.
|
|
|
|
23:22.000 --> 23:23.000
|
|
All right.
|
|
|
|
23:23.000 --> 23:24.000
|
|
And thank you.
|
|
|
|
23:24.000 --> 23:25.000
|
|
That's pretty scary.
|
|
|
|
23:25.000 --> 23:26.000
|
|
Thanks for watching.
|
|
|
|
23:26.000 --> 23:27.000
|
|
Are you?
|
|
|
|
23:27.000 --> 23:30.000
|
|
So here's, here's Sam Harris, what I was talking about.
|
|
|
|
23:30.000 --> 23:33.000
|
|
Dial up the, the deadliness of the pathogen.
|
|
|
|
23:33.000 --> 23:37.000
|
|
You know, give us something like, you know, airborne Ebola.
|
|
|
|
23:37.000 --> 23:41.000
|
|
Now the reason why, oops, darn it, I'm a little, little weak on the
|
|
|
|
23:41.000 --> 23:43.000
|
|
trigger here tonight.
|
|
|
|
23:44.000 --> 23:45.000
|
|
You know, but.
|
|
|
|
23:45.000 --> 23:54.000
|
|
So he says, he says, dial up the, the deadliness of the pathogen.
|
|
|
|
23:54.000 --> 23:58.000
|
|
You know, give us something like, you know, airborne Ebola.
|
|
|
|
23:58.000 --> 24:00.000
|
|
Airborne Ebola.
|
|
|
|
24:00.000 --> 24:09.000
|
|
So we heard, um, Robert Malone talk about airborne Ebola with
|
|
|
|
24:09.000 --> 24:17.000
|
|
even Hatfield, we heard, um, I've heard actually also, uh, who's
|
|
|
|
24:17.000 --> 24:23.000
|
|
the guy from Minnesota, um, Ulster home has also talked about
|
|
|
|
24:23.000 --> 24:31.000
|
|
airborne Ebola and I'm sure I actually have heard someone else say
|
|
|
|
24:31.000 --> 24:33.000
|
|
something like airborne Ebola.
|
|
|
|
24:33.000 --> 24:38.000
|
|
So you can almost be sure at some point that, uh, that's going to
|
|
|
|
24:38.000 --> 24:39.000
|
|
come into the story.
|
|
|
|
24:39.000 --> 24:42.000
|
|
It's, it's ridiculous for him to have mentioned it, but maybe just
|
|
|
|
24:42.000 --> 24:44.000
|
|
because he listens to those podcasts too.
|
|
|
|
24:44.000 --> 24:45.000
|
|
I don't know.
|
|
|
|
24:45.000 --> 24:49.000
|
|
So his, uh, man, I'm really blowing it with this because my
|
|
|
|
24:49.000 --> 24:50.000
|
|
head's in the way.
|
|
|
|
24:50.000 --> 24:57.000
|
|
So in this video, the interesting thing about what Sam says is that
|
|
|
|
24:57.000 --> 25:01.000
|
|
he says, if everything was perfect or if this was super dangerous,
|
|
|
|
25:01.000 --> 25:05.000
|
|
then nobody would be able to, uh, object to taking vaccines.
|
|
|
|
25:06.000 --> 25:11.000
|
|
And it's really just like saying, you know, if, if we could implant a
|
|
|
|
25:11.000 --> 25:16.000
|
|
chip in your head that was the size of a human hair and was
|
|
|
|
25:16.000 --> 25:22.000
|
|
completely inert, guaranteed not to hurt you, but could make you
|
|
|
|
25:22.000 --> 25:28.000
|
|
super smart, uh, and, and live for a hundred years, there would be
|
|
|
|
25:28.000 --> 25:31.000
|
|
nobody on the earth who wouldn't take it, especially if it did
|
|
|
|
25:31.000 --> 25:32.000
|
|
only cost 50 cents.
|
|
|
|
25:32.000 --> 25:33.000
|
|
Yeah.
|
|
|
|
25:33.000 --> 25:34.000
|
|
Okay.
|
|
|
|
25:34.000 --> 25:35.000
|
|
You're right about all.
|
|
|
|
25:35.000 --> 25:36.000
|
|
They were right about that.
|
|
|
|
25:36.000 --> 25:40.000
|
|
If you, if you had a little chip the size of a human hair that you
|
|
|
|
25:40.000 --> 25:43.000
|
|
could implant on somebody's head that didn't have to go in the head
|
|
|
|
25:43.000 --> 25:47.000
|
|
that could make somebody super smart and it only cost 50 cents,
|
|
|
|
25:47.000 --> 25:50.000
|
|
then you would be crazy not to have one.
|
|
|
|
25:50.000 --> 25:51.000
|
|
Yes.
|
|
|
|
25:51.000 --> 25:52.000
|
|
That's so what?
|
|
|
|
25:52.000 --> 25:54.000
|
|
That, that, what does that even mean?
|
|
|
|
25:54.000 --> 25:57.000
|
|
And so he says, well, you know, if there's a airborne Ebola that's
|
|
|
|
25:57.000 --> 26:03.000
|
|
65% deadly or you have super safe vaccines, then there'll be no
|
|
|
|
26:03.000 --> 26:04.000
|
|
excuse not to take them.
|
|
|
|
26:04.000 --> 26:05.000
|
|
Okay.
|
|
|
|
26:05.000 --> 26:09.000
|
|
So what if intramuscular injection of any combination of
|
|
|
|
26:09.000 --> 26:13.000
|
|
substances in order to ignore, uh, augment the immune system is
|
|
|
|
26:13.000 --> 26:14.000
|
|
dumb?
|
|
|
|
26:14.000 --> 26:19.000
|
|
What if you just look at how the immune system is arranged and
|
|
|
|
26:19.000 --> 26:22.000
|
|
look at how it operates and realize that you need to interact
|
|
|
|
26:22.000 --> 26:26.000
|
|
with that a barrier and that we need to reformulate and rethink
|
|
|
|
26:26.000 --> 26:32.000
|
|
our attempting to vaccinate and then really make choices about
|
|
|
|
26:32.000 --> 26:38.000
|
|
and, and with what and against what we vaccinate.
|
|
|
|
26:38.000 --> 26:43.000
|
|
And, and I think this is really the issue here because a lot of
|
|
|
|
26:43.000 --> 26:44.000
|
|
money is made.
|
|
|
|
26:44.000 --> 26:46.000
|
|
A lot of guaranteed money is made.
|
|
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|
26:46.000 --> 26:51.000
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And it's a, you know, it's something that people don't want to
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26:51.000 --> 26:55.000
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lose just like monopolies on antibodies or something that a lot
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26:55.000 --> 26:56.000
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of people didn't want to lose.
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26:56.000 --> 26:59.000
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But now that they're gone, anybody that wants to make antibodies can
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26:59.000 --> 27:02.000
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probably make them as long as they got good enough lawyers, they can
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27:02.000 --> 27:04.000
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make whatever they want now.
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27:04.000 --> 27:07.000
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And that's probably part of what's happening here.
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27:07.000 --> 27:11.000
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So in this case, you're just going to hear Sam Harris talk like an
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absolute moron.
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27:12.000 --> 27:15.000
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But again, what is the point?
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27:15.000 --> 27:21.000
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The point is to take this extreme position so that all of us feel
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27:21.000 --> 27:26.000
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very natural taking a position in between his and the other extreme.
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27:26.000 --> 27:32.000
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And as long as the narrative control mechanism makes it very
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easy for people who are kind of passively looking to see what the
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27:37.000 --> 27:41.000
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other end of the, of the spectrum is, you're trapped.
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27:41.000 --> 27:47.000
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As soon as you see crazy people over here at anti-vaxxers on one side
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27:47.000 --> 27:51.000
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and on the other side, you see crazy people like Sam Harris.
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27:51.000 --> 27:53.000
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You're trapped in between them.
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27:53.000 --> 27:55.000
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You got no power.
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27:55.000 --> 27:56.000
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It's no problem at all.
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27:56.000 --> 28:00.000
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You'll take a digital ID and digital currency when the time comes.
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28:00.000 --> 28:02.000
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Jobged up.
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28:02.000 --> 28:05.000
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And we need to be on the outside of that spectrum.
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28:05.000 --> 28:08.000
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We need to be on the outside of that spectrum where we understand that
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the biology that keeps people there is nonsense.
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28:14.000 --> 28:18.000
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The people, the biology that he's going to talk about right now is
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completely mythological.
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28:22.000 --> 28:28.000
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And the biology that is described disingenuously about the people
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28:28.000 --> 28:33.000
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who are anti-vaxx is also, it's not plausible.
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28:33.000 --> 28:34.000
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It's crazy.
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28:34.000 --> 28:41.000
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And so you try to create this trap that's based on two really crazy
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28:41.000 --> 28:47.000
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positions you can't take anyway so that you take this one in between.
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28:52.000 --> 28:57.000
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You know, if you don't let trans kids be trans kids and you're a,
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28:57.000 --> 28:59.000
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you hate kids or something like that.
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28:59.000 --> 29:04.000
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It's a ridiculous, it's a ridiculous position to take.
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29:04.000 --> 29:10.000
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But these ridiculous positions create this, create these spaces of debate
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29:10.000 --> 29:17.000
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that are hypothetical and real to the people inside of them,
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29:17.000 --> 29:19.000
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but ridiculous on their face.
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29:19.000 --> 29:22.000
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They, to keep and get us to argue about this,
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29:22.000 --> 29:25.000
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this, what he talks about is ridiculous.
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29:25.000 --> 29:27.000
|
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But that's his job.
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29:27.000 --> 29:32.000
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And I'm taking a lot of time because I really want to make this point that
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29:32.000 --> 29:35.000
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it's not always the position that these people take.
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29:35.000 --> 29:37.000
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It's where they shine the flashlight.
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29:37.000 --> 29:42.000
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And if there's enough space over there for the flashlight to go all the way over
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29:42.000 --> 29:47.000
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to another cavern, and it's a cavern that doesn't lead out,
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29:47.000 --> 29:52.000
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then why not, that's why they say why not shine my flashlight over there?
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29:52.000 --> 29:56.000
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And so he's going to shine his flashlight way over there where there's
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29:56.000 --> 30:02.000
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airborne Ebola and it's killing 50% of the kids and listen to this.
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30:02.000 --> 30:06.000
|
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And bodies of kids are piling up in the street shining his light over
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30:06.000 --> 30:12.000
|
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that hypothetical cavern over there and making us walk over there and explore it.
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30:12.000 --> 30:16.000
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Now, I'm not suggesting making us go over there and explore it.
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30:16.000 --> 30:20.000
|
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But what I'm saying is, is that having this person promoted on the Internet,
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30:20.000 --> 30:27.000
|
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getting attention, people listening to him, is his words going through people's heads
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30:27.000 --> 30:33.000
|
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and occupying one of those 39,000 thoughts that they have every day.
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30:33.000 --> 30:38.000
|
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And that's been going on for decades.
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30:38.000 --> 30:44.000
|
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And so this extreme position doesn't seem as extreme as it sounds to us
|
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30:44.000 --> 30:49.000
|
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because there are people out there who think exactly like Sam.
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30:49.000 --> 30:54.000
|
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And if you read these comments, you will see that lots of people think like him.
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30:54.000 --> 31:01.000
|
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Obviously, I don't, but it's important to hear how extreme this position is.
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31:01.000 --> 31:06.000
|
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Oh boy, I'm still failing miserably at directing my own show today.
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31:06.000 --> 31:08.000
|
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Horrible.
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31:08.000 --> 31:14.000
|
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Come on, really?
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31:14.000 --> 31:19.000
|
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This is like flunky town here.
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31:19.000 --> 31:24.000
|
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But dial up the deadliness of the pathogen.
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31:24.000 --> 31:30.000
|
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Give us something like airborne Ebola that incubates for a month.
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31:30.000 --> 31:33.000
|
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You don't know you have it, and you're what you walk around spreading it,
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31:33.000 --> 31:38.000
|
|
and it's got a 75% fatality rate, and it's mostly killing kids.
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31:38.000 --> 31:40.000
|
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No one gets to make that choice anymore.
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31:40.000 --> 31:45.000
|
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I mean, then literally the cops come in and vaccinate you.
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31:45.000 --> 31:50.000
|
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Now, notice one of the things that he extended there very much longer than
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31:50.000 --> 31:56.000
|
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even the ridiculous stories that we were told was the asymptomatic spread of the virus.
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31:56.000 --> 32:02.000
|
|
It incubates for a month where you spread the virus and you don't know you're spreading it.
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32:02.000 --> 32:08.000
|
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That part of the mythology, the fact that he even has it in there, in my mind,
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32:08.000 --> 32:16.000
|
|
already tells you that this is a planted story because he's reinforcing asymptomatic spread
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32:16.000 --> 32:19.000
|
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even with his dumbassery.
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32:19.000 --> 32:25.000
|
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And so when people hear this and share it on social media, they're not even aware of the fact
|
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32:25.000 --> 32:31.000
|
|
that Sam Harris' dumbassery is still reinforcing asymptomatic spread,
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32:31.000 --> 32:35.000
|
|
and you just think that asymptomatic spread for a month would be ridiculous.
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32:35.000 --> 32:37.000
|
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That's crazy biology.
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32:37.000 --> 32:43.000
|
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But asymptomatic spread for a week with COVID is fine, right?
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32:43.000 --> 32:46.000
|
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No.
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32:46.000 --> 32:48.000
|
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It's not right.
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32:48.000 --> 32:54.000
|
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But that's the magic spell that happens even when people take the ridiculous positions
|
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32:54.000 --> 32:57.000
|
|
that Trudeau does and that Sam does.
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32:57.000 --> 33:04.000
|
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Listen carefully, see if you can find other examples of that where the mythology is reinforced
|
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33:04.000 --> 33:08.000
|
|
even by his ridiculousness.
|
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33:08.000 --> 33:12.000
|
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25% fatality rate, and it's mostly that incubates for a month.
|
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33:12.000 --> 33:16.000
|
|
You don't know you have it and you're what you walk around spreading it, and it's got
|
|
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33:16.000 --> 33:21.000
|
|
a 75% fatality rate, and it's mostly killing kids.
|
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33:21.000 --> 33:23.000
|
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No one gets to make that choice anymore.
|
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33:23.000 --> 33:28.000
|
|
I mean, then literally the cops come in and vaccinate you.
|
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33:28.000 --> 33:33.000
|
|
And I would say that all of us would agree to that.
|
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33:33.000 --> 33:41.000
|
|
It's pretty funny because he purports to be so smart, but imagine what he just said.
|
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33:41.000 --> 33:46.000
|
|
It's a 75% fatality rate, but it incubates for a month and you can spread it.
|
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33:46.000 --> 33:51.000
|
|
So after a month, where is it?
|
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33:51.000 --> 33:53.000
|
|
Is it everywhere?
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33:53.000 --> 33:54.000
|
|
Once it gets on an airplane, right?
|
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33:54.000 --> 33:59.000
|
|
I mean, how many times did it have to get on an airplane in a month?
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33:59.000 --> 34:01.000
|
|
Is it everywhere?
|
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34:01.000 --> 34:06.000
|
|
Isn't every like 75% of the people dead are infected already by the end of the one?
|
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34:06.000 --> 34:11.000
|
|
What scenario is that where warps speed in nine months gets us anywhere?
|
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34:11.000 --> 34:14.000
|
|
Warps speed in nine weeks.
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34:14.000 --> 34:16.000
|
|
I mean, it's just, it's silly talk, right?
|
|
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|
34:16.000 --> 34:24.000
|
|
But again, what I'm trying to say is that what Sam Harris is reinforcing is how wide
|
|
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|
34:24.000 --> 34:35.000
|
|
the potential is that an RNA molecule could go anywhere from infecting millions of people
|
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|
34:35.000 --> 34:43.000
|
|
in three years and killing millions, or it could incubate for a month and spread without
|
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|
34:43.000 --> 34:48.000
|
|
symptoms and also kill 75% of the people it infects.
|
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34:48.000 --> 34:58.000
|
|
And so the hypothetical parameter space that a virus can occupy has just been expanded greatly
|
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|
34:58.000 --> 35:02.000
|
|
by Sam Harris' dumbassery.
|
|
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|
35:02.000 --> 35:11.000
|
|
He's reinforced the idea that asymptomatic spread is possible by giving you a ridiculous
|
|
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|
35:11.000 --> 35:13.000
|
|
scenario of asymptomatic spread.
|
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35:13.000 --> 35:18.000
|
|
But then nonetheless, if you argue with him about it, even in your head subconsciously,
|
|
|
|
35:18.000 --> 35:23.000
|
|
you're accepting the existence of that principle.
|
|
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35:23.000 --> 35:29.000
|
|
And that goes the same with the lethality of the virus being 75%.
|
|
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|
35:29.000 --> 35:34.000
|
|
And the consequences of that and the potential of that and how would that work?
|
|
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|
35:34.000 --> 35:40.000
|
|
That an RNA molecule can be 75% lethal to those mammals exposed to it?
|
|
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|
35:40.000 --> 35:46.000
|
|
What kind of weakness would be built into our immune system if that was the case?
|
|
|
|
35:46.000 --> 35:54.000
|
|
What kind of diabolical, sinister, synthetic thing would be able to do that?
|
|
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|
35:54.000 --> 36:00.000
|
|
Just think about that, the absurdity of it, and yet he's very happy to spew that out.
|
|
|
|
36:00.000 --> 36:05.000
|
|
Why? Because it pushes this narrative faith down the road.
|
|
|
|
36:05.000 --> 36:13.000
|
|
If you don't accept the existence of viruses and you accept that they can be released and go around the world,
|
|
|
|
36:13.000 --> 36:19.000
|
|
and the only debate is how bad can they really be, then you're ruleable.
|
|
|
|
36:19.000 --> 36:25.000
|
|
Your kids will be ruleable by this mythology because they just have to tell you a scarier story next time.
|
|
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|
36:25.000 --> 36:29.000
|
|
They just have to turn the screws a little tighter next time because you've already accepted
|
|
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|
36:29.000 --> 36:32.000
|
|
that the boogeyman is there.
|
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|
|
36:32.000 --> 36:37.000
|
|
And that's not that there are no viruses, it's that viruses can't pandemic.
|
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|
36:37.000 --> 36:44.000
|
|
RNA molecules don't do this, not even when they're really nicely coded.
|
|
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|
36:44.000 --> 36:48.000
|
|
Let's keep listening to his absurdity because it's important to learn from it.
|
|
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|
36:48.000 --> 36:53.000
|
|
The moment, again, that you turn up the lethality on the pathogen,
|
|
|
|
36:53.000 --> 36:58.000
|
|
you turn up the effectiveness of the vaccine, you turn down the risk of the vaccine,
|
|
|
|
36:58.000 --> 37:05.000
|
|
give me a truly safe vaccine where there's not even one documented case of vaccine injury, right?
|
|
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|
37:05.000 --> 37:11.000
|
|
So then you just have to be completely crazy to be worried about being vaccinated.
|
|
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37:11.000 --> 37:17.000
|
|
So what's interesting about this position is then you have to almost be crazy to be worried about vaccination.
|
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|
37:17.000 --> 37:25.000
|
|
So then if there are people who are vaccine injured and it's not an insignificant number of people,
|
|
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|
37:25.000 --> 37:29.000
|
|
then you're not so crazy to be worried about it.
|
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|
37:29.000 --> 37:32.000
|
|
And so in a way, he sort of slips up here, right?
|
|
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|
37:32.000 --> 37:36.000
|
|
He kind of looks like a dipshit if you think about it.
|
|
|
|
37:36.000 --> 37:42.000
|
|
But again, it's the absurdity of it that's important so that no matter who talks about it,
|
|
|
|
37:42.000 --> 37:49.000
|
|
no matter who discusses it, whether this ball gets thrown to Tim Poole, he can say dumb stuff about it.
|
|
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|
37:49.000 --> 37:51.000
|
|
The narrative will never be questioned.
|
|
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|
37:51.000 --> 37:53.000
|
|
This ball can be tossed to Brett Weinstein.
|
|
|
|
37:53.000 --> 37:56.000
|
|
Brett Weinstein can say, boy, it's too bad.
|
|
|
|
37:56.000 --> 37:59.000
|
|
My friend Sam Harris is such a moron now.
|
|
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|
37:59.000 --> 38:01.000
|
|
He's really brainwashed.
|
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38:01.000 --> 38:04.000
|
|
And the narrative will never be questioned there.
|
|
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|
38:04.000 --> 38:06.000
|
|
Either they're all on the faith.
|
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38:06.000 --> 38:08.000
|
|
The ball can be thrown to someone like Sam Cedar.
|
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38:08.000 --> 38:13.000
|
|
And he can whine even more about how Sam Harris gets picked on all the time.
|
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38:13.000 --> 38:15.000
|
|
This makes perfect sense to me.
|
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|
|
38:16.000 --> 38:25.000
|
|
And so the entire time this conversation of him that getting made fun of is actually a tool
|
|
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|
38:25.000 --> 38:30.000
|
|
for all these other little people on the internet to amplify the same ideas
|
|
|
|
38:30.000 --> 38:37.000
|
|
and to talk about what these ideas mean or don't mean, just like I'm doing except
|
|
|
|
38:37.000 --> 38:43.000
|
|
they don't reveal the fact that this keeps you on the faith that there was a novel virus.
|
|
|
|
38:43.000 --> 38:44.000
|
|
We had to do something.
|
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|
38:44.000 --> 38:45.000
|
|
mRNA did something.
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38:45.000 --> 38:50.000
|
|
And it was gain a function so it could come again.
|
|
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|
38:50.000 --> 39:00.000
|
|
I'm trying to explain to you why absurd behavior like this can exist and can be useful for them.
|
|
|
|
39:00.000 --> 39:09.000
|
|
Because this gets clicks, this gets listens, this gets complaints, this gets retweets, this gets quoted.
|
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39:09.000 --> 39:12.000
|
|
And so doing, you're solving the mystery.
|
|
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|
39:12.000 --> 39:14.000
|
|
You're in the argument.
|
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39:14.000 --> 39:20.000
|
|
You're buying the premise that there are viruses that they can go around the world.
|
|
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|
39:20.000 --> 39:29.000
|
|
It's only a question of how many people die or who's vulnerable, who's got the antibodies and who doesn't.
|
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|
39:29.000 --> 39:31.000
|
|
And it might be about mandating stuff.
|
|
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|
39:31.000 --> 39:36.000
|
|
Maybe you don't like mandating, but he's just saying if it's really dangerous and things work really well,
|
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|
39:36.000 --> 39:39.000
|
|
then what's wrong with mandates?
|
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|
39:39.000 --> 39:47.000
|
|
And once again, you're trapped.
|
|
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|
39:47.000 --> 39:53.000
|
|
And so you've got to be really careful not to get trapped in this Scooby-Doo because if you do,
|
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|
39:53.000 --> 39:58.000
|
|
then very quickly they're going to change the way you think about the rest of the way a respiratory disease develops
|
|
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|
39:58.000 --> 39:59.000
|
|
and what causes it.
|
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|
39:59.000 --> 40:04.000
|
|
You're going to be very quickly bamboozled in not thinking about all cause mortality anymore.
|
|
|
|
40:04.000 --> 40:12.000
|
|
You're going to be very quickly bamboozled into thinking about antibodies and not the actual way that your immune system works.
|
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|
40:12.000 --> 40:16.000
|
|
And with regard to immunization and vaccination, they'll be the same thing.
|
|
|
|
40:16.000 --> 40:21.000
|
|
You're going to be bamboozled into thinking that mRNA is not bad in principle.
|
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|
40:21.000 --> 40:23.000
|
|
That's their goal.
|
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40:23.000 --> 40:29.000
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You may have seen this video in Japan that are investigating the effects.
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Tonight we're getting to you guys.
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I will be here in 1.35 days.
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I'll talk to a few guys about the settings.
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The settings we've experienced are very quickly done.
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When you look at all of theallel seminars we're going to use for immunization.
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So just think about it carefully.
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40:55.000 --> 41:02.760
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Now, of course, this is kind of a fringy group, and so it's not clear to me how much traction this
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is really getting a mainstream Japan. Maybe we can find out from Kevin McCarran if he's covering
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any of this. Maybe somebody can let me know in the chat. But it does seem they're starting to
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realize a little too late that they were told to do something they shouldn't have been told to do.
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This, of course, has happened all around the world. And so it'll be interesting to see how that
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all rolls out again. These things, of course, allowed all of these other bad things to happen,
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and that's also part of the Scooby-Doo because they're not talking about how many people have
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been damaged by Remdesivir. There are currently two suits that I've been made aware of. One,
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which has to do with glass being in the Remdesivir preparation. And another one has to do with kidney
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malfunction, not being listed in the possible side effects of Remdesivir.
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But none of the suits are really going after the idea that Remdesivir is not appropriate for
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anything. The Remdesivir shouldn't have been given to anyone or anything like that. So I'm not
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really sure if those suits are going to do anything for everyone. But again, nobody's really
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trying to solve this. Where did this order to not use antibiotics come from? How widespread was
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it around the United States? Where was Remdesivir used and how widespread was it applied? Is it
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still being applied now and why? How many people were ventilated and never came out of their vent?
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We got to try and figure some of this stuff out, but right now we're not really trying to
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figure it out. That's the point. And again, they're not talking about certain things. That's how you
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get kept on the Scooby-Doo. If you don't talk about PCR and you're not talking about masking and
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lockdown and spread the lack of spread, if you're not talking about all this list,
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pretty much daily as part of your explanation for fifth-generation warfare,
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then you're not really explaining what fifth-generation warfare is all about. It's about
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creating monsters. It's about creating Scooby-Doo's so that the people think they're figuring stuff
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out and that people are getting caught and that the bad guys are going to jail
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and slowly but surely that Scooby-Doo thing is starting to change to like, you know,
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oh, they're using directed energy weapons to burn the shore of Maui and they're blowing up
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chemical trains in Ohio and they're polluting the waters and they're doing all this stuff because
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they're going to ruin all this stuff because they want us to run out of all of our stuff and
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maybe all of these things are true but in reality, in reality, the way that we check out is this
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because once we get rid of this public health thing, once that thing is all gone and we root
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that out of our system, most of the rot will be exposed. Most of the rotten people, most of the
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rotten programs, most of the rotten impotuses inside of that bureaucracy will be exposed
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and they want us to think about these other things. They want us to be worried about this other
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stuff but it's primarily our need to rein in our public health, the Department of Homeland Security,
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control our borders, get back control of our country again but definitely get back control
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of our biology because if we keep debating about viruses and we keep debating about
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gain of function and we keep debating about this stuff until we're done debating it,
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then all of these things will be out of our control by then. That's their plan even as they
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point to the who and say, see the who is doing it, the who's doing it. No, anybody could step
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out of the who whenever we wanted to. They want you to believe that if the who signed some papers
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or we signed some papers, it's like signing in blood and Satan is sitting at the table so once
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you do that, it's over. And I refuse to believe that that's the way the who is or the sepe is or
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the wef is. If we can get our act together as a country and just decide that we're going to lead
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the way out and we're going to try and figure out the out of our fiscal destructive position
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that we're in. Maybe there is no way out of it but goodness knows we need to extract some of the
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money that's been stolen from us from the oligarchs that stole it from us. We need to correct this
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wrong. We need to correct this wrong because there's, we don't know what's going on anymore.
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The average person on the street doesn't know what's going on anymore. Everything is corrupted,
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everything is a show. All the world's a stage and they lied to us about this pandemic and we need
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people to understand this maybe this year. Didn't I have it here? Didn't it? Oh yeah, sorry. So,
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you know, this is the way I'm going to I'm going to keep telling everybody to say it.
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46:27.960 --> 46:33.160
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And let's go on to the let's go on to the video. What's going on here? Why was the video not here?
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Sorry, I'm going to skip ahead here and see if I go there. Sorry.
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Here we go.
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And Philip Buckholt. So, this is a guy who I think confirmed a lot of the analysis that was done by
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Dr. Kevin McKernan. I shouldn't say Dr. Kevin McKernan because he didn't get his doctorate,
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but what difference does it make? He's earned his doctorate. So,
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Kevin McKernan, the guy who found the DNA in the vaccine shots that he was sent. It's interesting
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to note that the story of how he got the vaccines that he tested and found the DNA
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plasmid in has varied. The original story that I heard twice was that for an experiment that he
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47:40.440 --> 47:52.280
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was doing for his cannabis genetics company, he needed a polyA RNA control. And if you know
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anything about RNA, you know that if you wanted to get taken up by the ribosome, it needs to have
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a polyA tail for some reason. And so he needed a control and an anonymous person sent him
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vaccine miles in the mail. And that was very curious. He used them as a control and just because
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he used them as a control, they were also therefore in the sequencing reaction, you see.
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48:24.840 --> 48:30.360
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So the story is that he didn't even mean to sequence the vaccine. It's just that he got the
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vaccine and he was using it for a polyA RNA control. And then because it was already in there, it got
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sequenced. And when he sequenced it, he noticed that there wasn't just the spike protein RNA in
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there, but he noticed an SV40 promoter in that that led him to realize that it was DNA in there,
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I believe, could be wrong. He could have found DNA some other way and then look for something that
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he expected by being there like an easy one like that. I'm not sure exactly what direction it went.
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49:07.960 --> 49:13.480
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So let's listen to how he confirmed this. He's a pretty good guy. I think this is like 43 minutes,
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49:13.480 --> 49:18.360
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so I'm going to speed it up just a little. He's a good speaker though, so there's no reason to speed
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it up too much just to make it peppy. So a little bit of what am I doing here? For those of you
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who don't know me, my name is Philip McCall. I have a PhD in biochemistry, molecular biology.
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I'm a cancer gene jock. Basically, I do cancer genomics research at the University of South Carolina.
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And what that means is that I'm kind of an expert on all the ways that the human genome can get
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fussed with during your lifetime and which of those things cause cancer and which ones don't.
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49:48.120 --> 49:53.480
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Okay. So technically, that means that I'm very, very skilled in the art of DNA sequencing.
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Okay, I can figure out the sequence of things that I didn't know what I was looking for.
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And I'm also pretty good when I say I, I mean, the people in my laboratory, you're not going to
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hear their names, but there's a group of people that do this excellent work. We're really good at
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detecting foreign pieces of DNA in places where they're not supposed to be, even if they're low
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levels. And we use those skills during the pandemic to, we invented the COVID test that many of you
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did a spit test. Okay, that came out of my lab because we were really good at that kind of stuff.
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And so I've earned a fair amount of respect in the state of South Carolina and in this body because
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we did a ton of COVID testing in the middle of the night when people were afraid and we told them,
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no, you don't have COVID in your home or yes, you do. So my qualifications to comment on this are
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both technical and kind of relational in the state of South Carolina.
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It leads me to believe that he might be a very interesting person to talk to because he said
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that he was testing for COVID, which means very likely he designed his own PCR test for it, which
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50:55.400 --> 51:01.480
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is cool. Because a lot of the people that were in academic biology at the time, we're all saying
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that, yeah, we could all do this on our benches. And then we'd save all this time waiting for these
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tests to be released. We could just do it. And the government definitely didn't want that to happen.
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51:14.280 --> 51:19.240
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I'll cut to a very narrow theme here, but it does touch on lots of these regulatory issues.
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51:19.240 --> 51:23.800
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And I'll leave it to you to expand on those if you want to. I'll try to stay in this narrow lane
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of some problems in the Pfizer vaccine as a case study for places in which regulatory oversight
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51:29.880 --> 51:35.720
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could be improved. Alright, so first of all, let me say that my interpretation of the literature is
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that the Pfizer vaccine did a pretty good job of keeping people from dying, but it did a terrible
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job of stopping the pandemic. The early publications showed that it stopped infection,
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but that only lasted for like a month. Could you pull the mic a little closer to you,
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51:50.040 --> 51:53.240
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staff's telling me having trouble getting you on the recording? Okay, thank you.
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In my professional evaluation of the literature, the Pfizer vaccine did a pretty good job of keeping
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people out of the cemetery, but it sucked at stopping the pandemic. And it was the best of
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lucky options that we had. And I still believe that it was deployed mostly in good faith,
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but there were a lot of shortcuts taken because the house was on fire and we could do a better
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job next time from the lessons that we're going to learn here. That's my own personal view of this,
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but I'm also my philosophical bent here is, I'm sure many of you've heard of Occam's razor,
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right? Choose the simplest of explanations. Well, there's another one called Hanlon's razor,
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which is never a tribute malice to that which can be better explained by incompetence. And so,
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I'm trying to be gracious here in many circumstances. There could be malice underneath,
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but I'm trying to see just incompetence to be gracious. So the Pfizer.
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So it's important to point out that for reasons beyond me, he thinks that after reviewing the
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literature and his professional opinion, the mRNA kept people alive, kept people out of the hospital,
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kept people out of the grave. And there's no evidence for that in Denny Rancor's data,
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none at all. Not only is there none at all, but he probably had access to it because this is like,
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you know, a month ago. So it's absurd to say that in his public, you know, he's a pharmacist.
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He says it himself. He's not an epidemiologist. It's, you know, I'm sure he's smart.
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But where's your data? If you're going to say this, kept people alive is a very big claim
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that it didn't really stop infection for very long. I mean, it was deployed in good faith
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after 45 minutes of design consideration. And all it was rushed. We could do it better next time.
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Is this any? Is there anything here that even comes close to going off script?
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Because I don't hear it. So far, there's a virus. It's spreading around the world like wildfire
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even now. And we had to do something and we rushed it, but the mRNA kept people out of the grave.
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54:08.200 --> 54:17.720
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A vaccine is contaminated with plasmid DNA. It's not just mRNA. It's got bits of DNA in it.
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This DNA is the DNA vector that was used as the template for the in vitro transcription reaction
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when they made the mRNA. I know this is true because I sequenced it in my own lab. The vials of
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Pfizer vaccine that were given out here in Columbia, one of my colleagues was in charge of that
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vaccination program in the College of Pharmacy. And for reasons that I still don't understand,
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he kept every single vial. So I got a whole freezer full of the empty vials. Well, the empty
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vials have a little tiny bit in the bottom of them. He gave them all to me and I looked at them.
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We had two batches that were given out here in Columbia. And I checked these two batches
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and I checked them by sequencing. And I sequenced all the DNA that was in the vaccine. And I can
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see what's in there. And it's surprising that there's any DNA in there. And you can kind of work out
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what it is and how it got there. And I'm kind of alarmed about the possible consequences of this,
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both in terms of human health and biology, but you should be alarmed about the regulatory
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process that allowed it to get there. So this DNA, in my view, it could be causing some of the
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rare but serious side effects like death from cardiac arrest. There's a lot of cases now of
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people having suspicious death after vaccine. It's hard to prove what caused it is just, you know,
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temporally associated. And this DNA is a plausible mechanism. Okay. This DNA can and likely will
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integrate into the genomic DNA of cells that got transfected with the vaccine mix. This is just
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the way it works. We do this in the lab all the time. We take pieces of DNA, we mix them up with a
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lipid complex like the Pfizer vaccine is in, we pour it onto cells and a lot of it gets into the
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cells and a lot of it gets into the DNA of those cells. And that's called transformation. And if
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you do it with with an RNA, it's called transfection. And you should say that.
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Teach everybody, make it plain and simple. We know all this works. This is how we do it.
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56:06.600 --> 56:11.160
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These are the terms. They should have told you that the adenovirus was a transformation
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56:12.040 --> 56:18.200
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and the lipid nanoparticle with the mRNA and it was a transfection. It becomes a permanent fixture
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56:18.200 --> 56:24.040
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of the cell. It's not just a temporary thing. It is in that cell and all of its progeny from now
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56:24.040 --> 56:29.560
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on forevermore on in. So that's why I'm kind of alarmed about this DNA being in the vaccine.
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56:29.560 --> 56:34.520
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It's different from RNA because it can be permanent. This is a real hazard for genome
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56:34.520 --> 56:39.640
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modification of long-lived somatic cells like stem cells. And it could cause theoretically.
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56:39.640 --> 56:44.440
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This is all a theoretical concern, but it's pretty reasonable based on solid molecular biology
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56:44.520 --> 56:49.080
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that it could cause a sustained autoimmunetact or that tissue. It's also a very real theoretical
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56:49.080 --> 56:53.800
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risk of future cancer in some people. Depending on where in the genome this foreign piece of DNA
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56:53.800 --> 56:58.440
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lands, it can interrupt a tumor suppressor or activate an oncogene. I think it'll be rare,
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56:58.440 --> 57:01.720
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but I think the risk is not zero and it may be high enough that we are to figure out if this
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57:01.720 --> 57:07.320
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is happening or not. And again, the autoimmunity thing is not my wheelhouse. I'm not an immunologist,
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57:07.320 --> 57:11.560
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but the cancer risk is. That's my bag. I know this is a thing and it is a possibility.
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57:12.360 --> 57:18.600
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Okay, a little nerdy science here at the center. Okay, so I'm just going to hit this off at the
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57:18.600 --> 57:27.880
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past while I'm going to turn the page soon. He said DNA contamination could cause the cardiac
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57:27.880 --> 57:34.440
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arrest, the deaths. It could be integrated into cells. It could cause the autoimmune response to
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57:34.440 --> 57:40.920
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those tissues. It could cause cancer in those tissues by interrupting tumor suppressors, etc.
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57:41.880 --> 57:49.800
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Now, what I want you to see here is that I don't think there's any reason to think that a
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57:50.680 --> 57:58.680
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codon optimized chemically altered pseudo uridine optimized, whatever you want to call it, RNA
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57:59.320 --> 58:09.400
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packaged in liposomes and injected in the muscle could be discounted as being the cause of this
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58:09.480 --> 58:17.560
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as well. But here we have a guy listing everything that we think the mRNA is doing and more
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58:18.440 --> 58:24.120
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and saying that the DNA could explain all of these things, which means what?
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58:25.960 --> 58:29.320
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Which means if we hadn't rushed it, the RNA could be great.
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58:30.680 --> 58:33.800
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Like what a great technology it would have been if we wouldn't have blown it.
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58:34.760 --> 58:40.040
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Be very careful, ladies and gentlemen, because it is very enticing to think that we have another
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58:40.040 --> 58:48.280
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ally here now. Great. He's on our team. The DNA is a contaminant. It's a story, ladies and gentlemen.
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58:48.280 --> 58:55.160
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The DNA is a contaminant. The DNA is a contaminant is one of the reasons why they knew this was
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58:55.160 --> 59:01.160
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not a therapy that was ready for mainstream, that was ready for healthy humans. Can you hear me?
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59:02.120 --> 59:08.440
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That's the reality. The fact of the matter is, is that these molecular biologists all around the
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59:08.440 --> 59:15.240
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world know that you can't separate completely the plasmid from the RNA that you generate from it.
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59:15.880 --> 59:21.240
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You can try really hard. You can digest the DNA, but it doesn't get it all out of there.
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59:22.600 --> 59:26.520
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And especially when you go from nanograms to kilograms of production.
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59:26.840 --> 59:36.920
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Just think breaking bad, small batch blue crystals, giant batch of blue crystals. It's different.
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59:38.920 --> 59:41.400
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It's part of what made that story a little bit me.
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59:44.040 --> 59:51.080
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But we are really talking about something very special here because it's not wrong. He is not
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59:51.160 --> 59:58.600
|
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wrong to be excited about there being DNA in there. But it's not unexpected. What's
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59:59.560 --> 01:00:05.560
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what's unexpected is that people are so silly as to think that this isn't part of the panoply
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01:00:05.560 --> 01:00:12.200
|
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of reasons why this would never work. But it's not the most important one. The most important one is,
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01:00:13.080 --> 01:00:20.360
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as I've said many times before, the most important one is that...
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01:00:24.760 --> 01:00:33.480
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Oops. Now what did I do? Where to go? What the hell? Boy, I'm really, I'm really failing you guys.
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01:00:33.480 --> 01:00:39.480
|
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I really apologize. That's really terrible. I was supposed to go here. And so you've really
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01:00:39.560 --> 01:00:45.000
|
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got to say this. You've got to say the transfection isn't immunization. That you can't augment the
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01:00:45.000 --> 01:00:49.560
|
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immune system from the inside. That's what I think we should be saying all the time.
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01:00:51.320 --> 01:00:52.840
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Okay. Let's listen more.
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01:00:52.840 --> 01:00:58.520
|
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Told dogma of molecular biology is that DNA gets transcribed into RNA. Okay. And then RNA
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01:00:58.520 --> 01:01:04.040
|
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gets translated into protein. This is just how life runs. Why does this matter? Well,
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01:01:05.000 --> 01:01:09.480
|
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for the purposes of this discussion, DNA is a long-lived information storage device.
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01:01:10.120 --> 01:01:13.480
|
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Okay. What you were born with, you're going to die with and have some of your kids. DNA lasts
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01:01:13.480 --> 01:01:18.520
|
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for hundreds of thousands of years, and it can last for generations if you pass it on to your kids.
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01:01:18.520 --> 01:01:24.840
|
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Right? So alterations to the DNA, they stick around. RNA, by its nature, is temporary. It
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01:01:24.840 --> 01:01:30.360
|
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doesn't last. And that feature of RNA was part of the sales pitch for the vaccine. The
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01:01:30.440 --> 01:01:33.640
|
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pseudo-urettine was supposed to make the RNA last a little bit longer. But still, it's a
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01:01:33.640 --> 01:01:39.400
|
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transient phenomenon. We're talking hours to days. Okay. And then proteins. Once proteins are made,
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01:01:39.400 --> 01:01:43.960
|
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they also don't last forever. They last for hours to days. But something that makes its way into
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01:01:43.960 --> 01:01:49.160
|
|
DNA has the potential to lack. See, so he's already also saying that RNA is only around for hours
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01:01:49.160 --> 01:01:55.720
|
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to days. But we know that's not true with this, this altered RNA. We don't know how long it stays
|
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01:01:55.720 --> 01:02:02.520
|
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around. The crazy stories tell us it's around for as long as they've looked for it. And the other
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01:02:02.520 --> 01:02:08.280
|
|
end of the crazy story is that it's only around for days. And so again, they're sculpting this
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01:02:08.280 --> 01:02:14.120
|
|
narrative. But the narrative really is that the RNAs find the RNA is temporary. The RNA is not
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01:02:14.120 --> 01:02:18.680
|
|
dangerous relative to DNA. The DNA is much worse. Now there's DNA and they're all bets are off,
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01:02:18.680 --> 01:02:25.000
|
|
blah, blah, blah, blah. But we said this was going to happen like a year and a half ago,
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01:02:25.000 --> 01:02:28.920
|
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maybe even more than that, maybe even two years ago now, we said this was going to happen.
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01:02:30.120 --> 01:02:40.280
|
|
That they were going to blame contamination, incompleteness, contaminated RNA, bad lipid
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01:02:40.280 --> 01:02:45.800
|
|
nanoparticle, bad spike protein, they were going to blame something so that they could say but
|
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01:02:45.800 --> 01:02:50.360
|
|
the transfection were great. Best for a very long time, maybe a lifetime.
|
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01:02:51.240 --> 01:02:56.120
|
|
So this is a picture of the sequencing read that the sequencing run that I did in the lab
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01:02:57.000 --> 01:03:00.040
|
|
from a couple of batches of the Pfizer vaccine. And all those little bitty lines here are the
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01:03:00.040 --> 01:03:04.200
|
|
little tiny pieces of DNA that are in the vaccine. They don't belong there. They're just not part
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01:03:04.200 --> 01:03:08.120
|
|
of the sales picture of the marketing campaign. And they're there. There's a lot of them. This
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01:03:08.120 --> 01:03:11.480
|
|
little graph here in the middle is the size distribution that peaks around 100 base pairs,
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01:03:11.480 --> 01:03:17.080
|
|
120 base pairs. So the DNA pieces that just dawned on me, do you think that they can convince
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01:03:17.160 --> 01:03:22.680
|
|
everybody that took a shot to get sequenced to track this down? It says underneath here,
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01:03:23.400 --> 01:03:27.880
|
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we should sequence a few hundred people and find out if this DNA ever got into the human genome.
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01:03:29.640 --> 01:03:34.600
|
|
Could they trick people into thinking that, yeah, you should definitely get your gene sequence.
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01:03:34.600 --> 01:03:39.400
|
|
You should get your genome sequenced right away. We'll pay for it for free because we're trying
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01:03:39.400 --> 01:03:44.360
|
|
to track down this possible integration. Boy, that would be a funny one, wouldn't it?
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01:03:44.440 --> 01:03:49.640
|
|
They're in the vaccine are short little pieces, 100, 120. There's some that are about 500 base
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01:03:49.640 --> 01:03:55.560
|
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pairs, a few that are even 5,000. But most of them are around 100 base pairs. Why is this important?
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01:03:56.600 --> 01:04:03.720
|
|
Because the probability of a DNA piece of DNA integrating into the human genome is unrelated to
|
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01:04:03.720 --> 01:04:09.000
|
|
its size. So your genome risk is just a function of how many particles there are. So it's like,
|
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01:04:09.000 --> 01:04:13.080
|
|
you know, if you shoot a shotgun at a washboard, if you shoot a slug, you have some probability
|
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01:04:13.080 --> 01:04:16.360
|
|
of hitting it and they shoot buckshot. You have a bigger probability of hitting it with some shot,
|
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|
|
01:04:16.360 --> 01:04:20.040
|
|
right? All these little pieces of DNA that are in the vaccine are analogous to buckshot.
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|
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01:04:21.240 --> 01:04:27.960
|
|
You have many, many thousands of opportunities to modify a cell of a vaccinated person.
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01:04:29.240 --> 01:04:32.680
|
|
The pieces are very small because during the process, they chopped them up to try to make
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01:04:32.680 --> 01:04:36.840
|
|
them go away. But they actually increased the hazard of genome modification in the process.
|
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01:04:36.840 --> 01:04:45.880
|
|
That's how this got here. In my view, somebody should go about sequencing DNA samples from stem
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|
01:04:45.880 --> 01:04:51.480
|
|
cells of people who are vaccinated and find out if this theoretical risk has happened or not.
|
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|
|
01:04:52.360 --> 01:04:57.240
|
|
I think this is a real serious oversight, regulatory oversight that happened at the federal level,
|
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|
|
01:04:57.240 --> 01:05:02.280
|
|
and somebody should force this to happen somewhere. Dr. McArthur, are you capable of doing that?
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|
01:05:02.280 --> 01:05:06.760
|
|
Yeah, we do that kind of thing. But in order for it to be trustworthy by the public,
|
|
|
|
01:05:06.760 --> 01:05:10.600
|
|
this has to be done by lots of people. I'll talk to you more about that later.
|
|
|
|
01:05:10.600 --> 01:05:14.200
|
|
Yeah, this is our deal. This is why I know this should have been done at the federal level.
|
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|
|
01:05:17.240 --> 01:05:22.280
|
|
So we took all these pieces of DNA and we used them to glue together what the source DNA must have
|
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|
|
01:05:22.280 --> 01:05:26.600
|
|
been. This is kind of, again, this is what we do in the lab all the time. And all these little
|
|
|
|
01:05:26.600 --> 01:05:30.680
|
|
little red and green lines here, these are all in a bit, little pieces of DNA. This must have
|
|
|
|
01:05:30.760 --> 01:05:35.160
|
|
100,000 pieces of DNA in this sequencing run. And you can put them all back together and see
|
|
|
|
01:05:36.040 --> 01:05:40.520
|
|
what they came from is this circle over here. It's a plasmid that you can go shopping online
|
|
|
|
01:05:40.520 --> 01:05:46.440
|
|
to buy from Agilent. And it's clear that Pfizer took this plasmid and then they cloned spike into
|
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|
|
01:05:46.440 --> 01:05:53.080
|
|
it. And they used it in a process called in vitro transcription translation, in vitro transcription,
|
|
|
|
01:05:53.080 --> 01:05:58.280
|
|
where you feed an RNA polymerase, this plasmid, and it makes a whole bunch of mRNA copies for you.
|
|
|
|
01:05:59.160 --> 01:06:02.760
|
|
And then you take this mRNA, you mix it with the lipid nanoparticle transfection reagent,
|
|
|
|
01:06:02.760 --> 01:06:06.600
|
|
and now you've got your mRNA vaccine, but they failed to get the DNA out before they did.
|
|
|
|
01:06:06.600 --> 01:06:11.800
|
|
So you understand that basically he's describing the exact same way that pieces of an infectious
|
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|
|
01:06:11.800 --> 01:06:15.480
|
|
clone would be made before they're ligated together to produce the whole RNA.
|
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|
|
01:06:17.480 --> 01:06:26.760
|
|
It's the same plasmid DNA, grown at quantity in a bacteria, and then produced or mixed together
|
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|
|
01:06:26.760 --> 01:06:33.080
|
|
with a master mix transcription translation enzyme, and then you get your RNA. So listen to
|
|
|
|
01:06:33.080 --> 01:06:40.520
|
|
him say it again, because it's nice to hear him explain how you take a plasmid DNA, which could
|
|
|
|
01:06:40.520 --> 01:06:47.720
|
|
easily code for a coronavirus. In this case, it's coding for the coronavirus spike, and you make a
|
|
|
|
01:06:47.720 --> 01:06:54.840
|
|
lot of mRNA after you grow the plasmid in translation in vitro transcription, where you feed an RNA
|
|
|
|
01:06:54.920 --> 01:06:57.800
|
|
polymerase, this plasmid, and it makes a whole bunch of mRNA copies for you.
|
|
|
|
01:06:58.680 --> 01:07:02.280
|
|
And then you take this mRNA, you mix it with the lipid nanoparticle transfection reagent,
|
|
|
|
01:07:02.280 --> 01:07:06.040
|
|
and now you've got your mRNA vaccine, but they failed to get the DNA out before they did this.
|
|
|
|
01:07:06.040 --> 01:07:10.040
|
|
So these little pieces, they did make some effort to chop it up, so all these little pieces of
|
|
|
|
01:07:10.040 --> 01:07:14.520
|
|
the plasmid got packaged in with the RNA. That's clear as day what happened just from the forensics
|
|
|
|
01:07:14.520 --> 01:07:22.280
|
|
of looking at the DNA sequencing. A little bit of a regulatory note here. The way you do RNA
|
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|
|
01:07:22.280 --> 01:07:27.720
|
|
transcription, in vitro transcription reactions, you have to give it a DNA template. And you can
|
|
|
|
01:07:27.720 --> 01:07:32.360
|
|
give it a DNA template that is just a synthetic piece of DNA that is only the instructions to make
|
|
|
|
01:07:32.360 --> 01:07:37.880
|
|
the RNA, and that's what was done for getting the emergency use authorization and the clinical
|
|
|
|
01:07:37.880 --> 01:07:42.360
|
|
trial. That's called process one, if you look up that kind of stuff. They made a PCR product of
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|
|
01:07:42.360 --> 01:07:45.720
|
|
just the bits that they wanted, and then they did the in vitro transcription, made a bunch of
|
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|
|
01:07:45.720 --> 01:07:51.480
|
|
RNA of that. There was no plasmid DNA to contaminate the stuff that was used for the trial. But that
|
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|
|
01:07:51.560 --> 01:07:56.600
|
|
making that PCR product doesn't scale the way. So you see he's talking very clearly about
|
|
|
|
01:07:57.160 --> 01:08:01.560
|
|
what Vincent Rancin Yellow talked about at the beginning of the pandemic, how fascinating it was
|
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|
|
01:08:02.600 --> 01:08:09.080
|
|
that they were scaling up from nanograms on a bench to kilograms in a vat. And this is what
|
|
|
|
01:08:09.080 --> 01:08:15.400
|
|
he's describing the original batches in the trials and the data that he just defended, by the way.
|
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|
|
01:08:16.360 --> 01:08:23.320
|
|
The product that was injected into those people and was likely distributed on movie sets,
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|
|
|
01:08:23.320 --> 01:08:28.760
|
|
it distributed anywhere where they didn't want to hurt people or wanted to be sure they were
|
|
|
|
01:08:28.760 --> 01:08:36.840
|
|
giving them the best product. It would have been done that way. They would have made the DNA sequence
|
|
|
|
01:08:37.640 --> 01:08:44.840
|
|
synthetically, so that there was none of this plasmid stuff. There was no possibility of
|
|
|
|
01:08:44.840 --> 01:08:50.520
|
|
contamination in that way, and then they would just do it all synthetically. You can do that
|
|
|
|
01:08:50.520 --> 01:08:56.920
|
|
for nanograms, you can do that for treating one cancer patient, but you can't do it for treating
|
|
|
|
01:08:56.920 --> 01:09:03.720
|
|
a bit, making a billion shots. Think about the scale there that they purport to have done,
|
|
|
|
01:09:04.280 --> 01:09:09.240
|
|
because they're just so badass. They went from being able to make small batch,
|
|
|
|
01:09:10.360 --> 01:09:17.640
|
|
you know, really microbrewery type stuff, like a single cappuccino for a really sick guy with a
|
|
|
|
01:09:17.640 --> 01:09:26.920
|
|
very unique genetic condition to making that cappuccino for everyone. It's just crazy.
|
|
|
|
01:09:26.920 --> 01:09:34.920
|
|
But like I said, and like other people I think I see pointed out, he did defend the trial data,
|
|
|
|
01:09:34.920 --> 01:09:43.480
|
|
he didn't question it at all. And so he's clearly not questioning where we are or where we went.
|
|
|
|
01:09:43.480 --> 01:09:47.720
|
|
I also saw it pointed out in the chat that he was actually not only was he testing, but he was
|
|
|
|
01:09:47.720 --> 01:09:55.000
|
|
testing a lot of people and helped make a few products for testing. Probably still own some
|
|
|
|
01:09:55.080 --> 01:10:00.280
|
|
patents on testing methodologies and those will go forward, maybe even in a patent pool
|
|
|
|
01:10:00.920 --> 01:10:06.600
|
|
distributed by the who. So keep in mind, ladies and gentlemen, what's happening here.
|
|
|
|
01:10:07.560 --> 01:10:14.760
|
|
It is very likely that there is a patent pool of countermeasures that include diagnostics,
|
|
|
|
01:10:15.720 --> 01:10:22.600
|
|
that include vaccines and the technologies used to make them, bottle them, create them.
|
|
|
|
01:10:25.240 --> 01:10:33.960
|
|
And countless other patents that are bundled together and are being distributed by world
|
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01:10:33.960 --> 01:10:39.880
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governments to set a new industry standard on all of these things that they will then leverage
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01:10:40.840 --> 01:10:49.800
|
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as medical industry standards to enforce testing, to enforce the continued existence of COVID,
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01:10:50.760 --> 01:10:56.600
|
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to enforce the continued funding and pushing of shots.
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01:10:59.720 --> 01:11:05.800
|
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This is not going away. This was the plan all along. This was a shift, a permanent shift that
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01:11:05.800 --> 01:11:10.920
|
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if we don't stop it, it will be permanent. And in a way, we don't need to stop it. We just need
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01:11:10.920 --> 01:11:17.160
|
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to step away from it because if we don't need to replace that system with something else,
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01:11:17.160 --> 01:11:21.240
|
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right, we just need to get out of it. All right, let's listen. Sorry.
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01:11:21.800 --> 01:11:26.280
|
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That was necessary to vaccinate the whole world. So a cheaper way to scale up the production of
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01:11:26.280 --> 01:11:30.600
|
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this template is to clone that PCR product into this plasma vector, put the plasma vector into
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01:11:30.600 --> 01:11:33.880
|
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bacteria and then you can grow up big vats of the bacteria. They make a lot of the plasma DNA
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01:11:33.880 --> 01:11:38.600
|
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for you and use that plasma DNA as the template to drive this transcription reaction to make your
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01:11:38.600 --> 01:11:45.640
|
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RNA. And that's where how the contamination ended up in the production batches, even though it was
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01:11:45.720 --> 01:11:51.320
|
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not in the stuff that was used for the authorization trials. So I know it's a little bit of nerdy
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01:11:51.320 --> 01:11:56.600
|
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science, but it has regulatory implications for you guys. So it's interesting because there's a
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01:11:56.600 --> 01:12:02.120
|
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new paper out that analyzes that data and shows what Steve Kirsch was kind of pushing a long time
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01:12:02.120 --> 01:12:07.960
|
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ago, which is that more people were killed in the control group after on masking or sorry,
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01:12:07.960 --> 01:12:11.720
|
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in the experimental group that got the shots versus the people who didn't get the shots.
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01:12:12.200 --> 01:12:19.640
|
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And there is a new paper out. It's a it's a pre-print that will probably cover this week in a journal club
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01:12:19.640 --> 01:12:26.200
|
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as we try to get into the swing of things again. And I think this will be really important to
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01:12:26.200 --> 01:12:31.080
|
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acknowledge that this person is not really talking about that at all. In fact, glossing over that
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01:12:31.640 --> 01:12:38.760
|
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well-known fact that they unblinded the trial. They gave everybody that wanted it in the control
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01:12:38.840 --> 01:12:46.200
|
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group, the transfection. And in that group of people, then a few more people died,
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01:12:47.000 --> 01:12:52.840
|
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which put it at a total of during the study period, 14 people died in the control group.
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01:12:52.840 --> 01:12:57.000
|
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They were unvaccinated and 20 died in the control group.
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01:12:59.400 --> 01:13:06.440
|
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So, you know, they say that's insignificant, but it's definitely not good. And he's glossing over
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01:13:06.440 --> 01:13:08.200
|
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that right now and not saying it at all.
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01:13:12.680 --> 01:13:17.160
|
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We can we can measure the quantity of this stuff pretty easy in the lab. This is we're good at
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01:13:17.160 --> 01:13:21.240
|
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doing this kind of stuff. This is the same we made a little PC, a colleague of mine at MIT made,
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01:13:21.240 --> 01:13:27.240
|
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you know, from who used to work for the Broad Institute at MIT, he made a little PCR test.
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01:13:27.240 --> 01:13:31.640
|
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And we cloned it here. This is similar to the PCR test that you all took for the spit test.
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01:13:31.640 --> 01:13:36.360
|
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Okay, same same idea and same expertise behind it. And we can quantify exactly how much of the
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01:13:36.360 --> 01:13:41.640
|
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stuff is in a vaccine or any other tissue. And, you know, I estimate that there were
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01:13:42.280 --> 01:13:46.840
|
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about 2 billion copies of the one piece that we're looking for in every dose.
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01:13:47.720 --> 01:13:51.640
|
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And if you look back at that map, I showed you where it's all these little the little piece
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01:13:51.640 --> 01:13:56.600
|
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that we're looking for is just that little bit right there. Okay. But if you see 2 billion copies
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01:13:56.600 --> 01:14:02.680
|
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of this, there's about 200 billion of everything else. So what this means is that there's probably
|
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01:14:02.760 --> 01:14:10.840
|
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about 200 billion pieces of this plasma DNA in each dose of the vaccine. And it's encapsulated
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01:14:10.840 --> 01:14:16.360
|
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in this lipid nanoparticle. So it's ready to be delivered inside the cell. Okay, this is a bad idea.
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01:14:18.600 --> 01:14:22.360
|
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My conclusions from this, we should check a bunch of people.
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01:14:25.400 --> 01:14:27.960
|
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My conclusions from this are actually learn how to run PowerPoint.
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01:14:28.920 --> 01:14:35.320
|
|
We should check a bunch of vaccinated people getting tissue samples, especially if we focus
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01:14:35.320 --> 01:14:40.600
|
|
on harmed people, but that's not necessary. We could also just focus on regular unharmed people
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01:14:40.600 --> 01:14:45.480
|
|
and see if this plasma DNA is integrating into the genomes of any of their stem cells. It leaves
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01:14:45.480 --> 01:14:49.880
|
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a calling card that is there. One of the reasons why I'm focusing on this is because
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01:14:50.760 --> 01:14:54.200
|
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it's kind of different from a lot of the other imagined harms where you can't really prove it.
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01:14:54.200 --> 01:14:57.000
|
|
You can be suspicious because of the timing, but you can't really prove it. This one,
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01:14:57.000 --> 01:15:03.160
|
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you can prove it because it leaves a calling card. Okay, now that's really nice, but keep in mind
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01:15:03.160 --> 01:15:10.280
|
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the one general mechanism that we've talked about time and time again, make sure you understand
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01:15:10.280 --> 01:15:21.160
|
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that he's not able to blame this mechanism on the shot, sorry, the DNA. And that mechanism is
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01:15:21.160 --> 01:15:28.840
|
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the mechanism that that Sukhrat Bhakti really codified best. It is the mechanism if I draw
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01:15:28.840 --> 01:15:36.120
|
|
the inside of a capillary here, okay, with endothelial cells beating these rectangles,
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01:15:36.120 --> 01:15:43.800
|
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which of course is terrible. And so you have blood flow this way. Then when these cells get
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01:15:43.800 --> 01:15:48.520
|
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transfected and they're very likely to get transfected, because again, these are cells that are
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01:15:49.400 --> 01:15:55.080
|
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are experiencing a lot of local fluid pressure here. And so this is supposed to be where the
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01:15:55.080 --> 01:16:00.280
|
|
lipid nanoparticle will come into contact with membrane the most. And of course, the surface
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01:16:00.280 --> 01:16:08.680
|
|
area of your capillaries in your body is ginormous. When these cells are expressing spike protein,
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01:16:09.800 --> 01:16:17.640
|
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the first shot, they will be attacked by the immune system and removed. And you hope that the spike
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01:16:17.720 --> 01:16:23.240
|
|
protein is presented to the immune system and you develop antibodies to it. And this would be
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01:16:23.240 --> 01:16:32.760
|
|
the first shot. The second shot and beyond will give you spike protein down here. And you will
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01:16:32.760 --> 01:16:40.040
|
|
have antibodies that stick to it. And those antibodies can bring in a cytotoxic T cell response. They
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01:16:40.040 --> 01:16:45.640
|
|
could bring in a a natural killer cell response, a neutrophil response. They could bring in the
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01:16:45.640 --> 01:16:51.960
|
|
complement system. And they can also cause complement to cling to the outside of the cell
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01:16:51.960 --> 01:17:00.840
|
|
if there's enough spike protein. And that can cause clotting, micro clotting or just playing
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01:17:00.840 --> 01:17:08.040
|
|
clotting. And so this general mechanism will occur irrespective of whether the special spike
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01:17:08.040 --> 01:17:13.560
|
|
protein is there or whether it's a frog protein or or another membrane bond protein that's not
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01:17:13.560 --> 01:17:19.640
|
|
supposed to be there. There's a good chance that transfection into the muscle that leaks out into
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01:17:19.640 --> 01:17:27.560
|
|
your into circulation will will transfect endothelial cells and you'll get this possibility for every
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01:17:27.560 --> 01:17:33.800
|
|
subsequent exposure to the transfection because it will express that protein again in the presence
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01:17:33.800 --> 01:17:40.840
|
|
of those antibodies. That's a very different effect than what we've been talking about with regard
|
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01:17:41.800 --> 01:17:46.120
|
|
with regard to this, what what he's been saying with the DNA. And why is that important just to
|
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|
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01:17:46.120 --> 01:17:54.280
|
|
acknowledge that it's this time when these cells are destroyed that neutrophils will come along,
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|
|
01:17:55.240 --> 01:18:04.520
|
|
should be neutra, neutra. Is it pH? I think it's pH, right? Neutrophils,
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|
01:18:05.400 --> 01:18:12.200
|
|
something's not compiled there, right? Neutrophils will come along and they destroy things with
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|
01:18:12.200 --> 01:18:21.320
|
|
enzymes. Those enzymes will release. These cells are flexible. These cells contain fibers in them
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|
01:18:21.320 --> 01:18:27.240
|
|
that make them flexible. And when the neutrophils come along to dissolve these guys, they have a
|
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01:18:27.240 --> 01:18:35.240
|
|
very special neutrophil elastase, which is a neutrophil enzyme. Elastase is the enzyme
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|
01:18:36.040 --> 01:18:41.160
|
|
that can destroy some of those fibers. And then those fibers are now floating around
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|
|
01:18:41.960 --> 01:18:48.680
|
|
and part of this cleanup. And so again, you hope that your cells won't present those
|
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|
|
01:18:48.680 --> 01:18:53.560
|
|
self-antigens to T cells and find a T cell that will recognize them. You hope that they're only
|
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|
|
01:18:53.560 --> 01:19:01.080
|
|
going to present the S protein. But when those fibers are released and they're building up,
|
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|
|
01:19:01.080 --> 01:19:08.520
|
|
they don't necessarily get cleared. And that seems to be these fibrous clots that are found in some
|
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|
|
01:19:08.520 --> 01:19:14.200
|
|
of these people that are dead. So it could be that a lot of endothelial cells are being destroyed
|
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|
|
01:19:14.680 --> 01:19:23.160
|
|
each shot or on the deadly shot. And that that fibrin that's released when the neutrophil
|
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|
|
01:19:23.160 --> 01:19:30.120
|
|
elastase is dissolving endothelial cells is part of that clotting mechanism as well.
|
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|
|
01:19:30.120 --> 01:19:36.200
|
|
And so again, this has nothing to do with DNA integration or anything like that because this
|
|
|
|
01:19:36.200 --> 01:19:45.480
|
|
is just expression of a foreign protein driven by transfection. And so I need, I'm hoping that
|
|
|
|
01:19:45.480 --> 01:19:54.200
|
|
you can keep in mind how general this is up here, how general this is versus how the DNA is a very
|
|
|
|
01:19:54.200 --> 01:19:59.400
|
|
it's an interesting thing. I'm no doubt about it and could be devastating and ugly and yucky. But
|
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|
|
01:20:00.680 --> 01:20:05.400
|
|
if the DNA integrates into your endothelial cells, your endothelial cells are not going to be passed
|
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|
|
01:20:05.400 --> 01:20:11.480
|
|
onto your children. So the real danger would be if it integrated into your gametes, into your
|
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|
|
01:20:11.480 --> 01:20:18.360
|
|
eggs or into your sperm. And that's very testable, obviously, especially with sperm,
|
|
|
|
01:20:19.240 --> 01:20:25.880
|
|
to a certain extent, at least it should be. And it you have all the eggs that you're ever going to
|
|
|
|
01:20:25.880 --> 01:20:32.680
|
|
have as a woman. So as a girl, so that's extremely terrifying from the perspective of young women
|
|
|
|
01:20:33.560 --> 01:20:39.480
|
|
being exposed to DNA contamination. So there you have very much dangerous crazy things.
|
|
|
|
01:20:40.120 --> 01:20:46.280
|
|
But it's important to understand that this mechanism above, which was really best and first described
|
|
|
|
01:20:46.280 --> 01:20:52.040
|
|
by Sukhir Bhakti is a mechanism that is completely independent of the spike protein being extra
|
|
|
|
01:20:52.040 --> 01:20:58.200
|
|
toxic, extra dangerous, having any clotting factors coded into it or whatever other magic you want to
|
|
|
|
01:20:58.200 --> 01:21:05.000
|
|
say, because it doesn't matter what protein you express via transfection. If it's transmembrane
|
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|
|
01:21:06.120 --> 01:21:12.600
|
|
and it sticks out and you do it repeatedly, that endothelial cells are going to be the target of
|
|
|
|
01:21:12.600 --> 01:21:19.400
|
|
this, this clearance, this autoimmunity is potentially there. And also the clotting is always there. The
|
|
|
|
01:21:19.400 --> 01:21:24.520
|
|
more shots you take, the more possible it is, I think. And we may see that as we move forward
|
|
|
|
01:21:25.160 --> 01:21:29.000
|
|
as we get people with four or five shots. Who knows?
|
|
|
|
01:21:34.040 --> 01:21:39.400
|
|
You find it in the stem cells of harmed people. It's equivalent to finding a certain type of lid
|
|
|
|
01:21:39.400 --> 01:21:43.480
|
|
in someone who is now dead. It's pretty reasonable to assume that that's what caused it.
|
|
|
|
01:21:44.840 --> 01:21:51.320
|
|
The royal we, meaning you guys should insist that the FDA force Pfizer to get the DNA out of the
|
|
|
|
01:21:51.320 --> 01:21:57.240
|
|
booster and all future versions of this vaccine. I'm a real fan of this platform. Okay. I think
|
|
|
|
01:21:57.240 --> 01:22:03.640
|
|
it has the potential to treat cancers. I really believe that this platform is revolutionary and
|
|
|
|
01:22:03.640 --> 01:22:10.120
|
|
in your lifetime, there will be mRNA vaccines against antigens in your unique cancer. Okay.
|
|
|
|
01:22:10.120 --> 01:22:14.680
|
|
And but they got to get this problem fixed. Okay. And I right now, I think the financial incentives
|
|
|
|
01:22:14.680 --> 01:22:19.400
|
|
are too great to just keep on rolling with it. And it's going to take some encouragement to get it
|
|
|
|
01:22:19.480 --> 01:22:25.640
|
|
out. The regulation that allowed this DNA to be there in the first place. I don't think that this
|
|
|
|
01:22:25.640 --> 01:22:32.040
|
|
amounts there actually exceed the regulation limits. In some batches, it may. In the two batches that
|
|
|
|
01:22:32.040 --> 01:22:35.160
|
|
I looked at, one of them, it was just under the limit and one, it was just over the limit. My
|
|
|
|
01:22:35.160 --> 01:22:38.920
|
|
colleague in Boston has looked at a fair number of other batches. And there's a handful that are
|
|
|
|
01:22:38.920 --> 01:22:43.400
|
|
super high and there's a handful that are super low. But the fact that there is a regulatory threshold
|
|
|
|
01:22:43.960 --> 01:22:49.400
|
|
for amount of DNA allowed in the vaccine is a throwback to an era when we were talking about
|
|
|
|
01:22:49.400 --> 01:22:53.720
|
|
vaccines that were like a recombinant protein that you are a dead virus, you know, attenuated virus
|
|
|
|
01:22:53.720 --> 01:22:59.560
|
|
produced in CFO cells or something like that. And the DNA that might be in it is naked DNA.
|
|
|
|
01:22:59.560 --> 01:23:03.800
|
|
And you might have a little bit in the vaccine. That's not a problem because naked DNA gets
|
|
|
|
01:23:03.800 --> 01:23:07.880
|
|
chewed up immediately upon vaccination. And there's no real mechanism for it to get inside the cells.
|
|
|
|
01:23:07.880 --> 01:23:12.680
|
|
And they inappropriately applied that regulatory limit to this new kind of vaccine where everything
|
|
|
|
01:23:12.680 --> 01:23:17.080
|
|
is encapsulated in a slip and nanoparticle is basically packaged in a synthetic virus able
|
|
|
|
01:23:17.080 --> 01:23:22.040
|
|
to dump its contents into a cell. So I'm thinking Hanlon's razor here. Okay, I don't think there
|
|
|
|
01:23:22.040 --> 01:23:27.320
|
|
was anything nefarious here. I think it was just kind of a dumb oversight. And it's going to take,
|
|
|
|
01:23:27.320 --> 01:23:31.480
|
|
because the financial incentives are so great to just, you know, sweep it under the rug and the
|
|
|
|
01:23:31.480 --> 01:23:34.440
|
|
career incentives of people that approve this are going to be, there's nothing wrong here,
|
|
|
|
01:23:34.440 --> 01:23:40.120
|
|
you know, it's going to take some encouragement to make people prove that it's okay. But I really
|
|
|
|
01:23:40.200 --> 01:23:44.680
|
|
believe this was an inappropriate application of an old school regulation to a new kind of
|
|
|
|
01:23:44.680 --> 01:23:48.440
|
|
vaccine. And who knows, maybe we'll check a bunch of people and we'll find out for sure that this
|
|
|
|
01:23:48.440 --> 01:23:52.840
|
|
is indeed not a problem. And that will do the public good if we prove that. Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
01:23:55.000 --> 01:23:59.560
|
|
So that's pretty spectacular. I mean, he's giving them the opportunity to prove that it's
|
|
|
|
01:23:59.560 --> 01:24:05.320
|
|
not bad. So we could do some papers and publish some stuff and this, this whole rumor could go away.
|
|
|
|
01:24:06.280 --> 01:24:11.160
|
|
But he believes in this technology and he doesn't want this technology to be ruined or lost.
|
|
|
|
01:24:12.840 --> 01:24:20.280
|
|
And so tell me you hear it. Tell me you see exactly what I see. A guy who has been interested
|
|
|
|
01:24:20.280 --> 01:24:25.880
|
|
in the virus since the very beginning. He gave us a number of testing platforms so that we,
|
|
|
|
01:24:26.840 --> 01:24:30.600
|
|
we definitely had a mystery to solve. And we definitely had bad guys to catch
|
|
|
|
01:24:31.560 --> 01:24:33.000
|
|
because his tests prove it.
|
|
|
|
01:24:39.160 --> 01:24:39.480
|
|
Wow.
|
|
|
|
01:24:41.960 --> 01:24:46.920
|
|
I mean, he said it in spades. It's just, it's crazy. It's just absolutely crazy. I don't know
|
|
|
|
01:24:46.920 --> 01:24:51.000
|
|
how else to say it. I mean, they're doing exactly what we expected them to do.
|
|
|
|
01:24:52.600 --> 01:24:58.840
|
|
And it's not even a little bit off right now. And so now the only question is how can we get ahead
|
|
|
|
01:24:59.800 --> 01:25:05.320
|
|
and stop the dominoes from falling is right now we're right at where it's like we're in a drone
|
|
|
|
01:25:06.040 --> 01:25:11.960
|
|
and we're watching the dominoes fall and we're following it right as the dominoes hit the next
|
|
|
|
01:25:11.960 --> 01:25:19.880
|
|
domino. But we're not quite able to stop that one. So the question is how we can leap frog ahead
|
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01:25:19.880 --> 01:25:24.680
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a few dominoes and then knock one out of the way or something so that this whole thing just ends.
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01:25:25.480 --> 01:25:28.840
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I think that's really kind of a way we need to think about it.
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01:25:30.120 --> 01:25:32.120
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Does that mean we need to teach our children?
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01:25:35.400 --> 01:25:38.760
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Does that mean we need to save the children? I think that's what it means.
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01:25:40.280 --> 01:25:44.520
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We've got to think farther ahead the next year. That's for sure. We don't need to save the next
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01:25:44.520 --> 01:25:54.200
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election. We need to save the next generation. We need to save our kids. We need within the next
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01:25:54.200 --> 01:26:03.640
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five years we need a group of kids to go into college not believing this or better yet not going
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01:26:03.640 --> 01:26:14.680
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to college. How's that for a big statement? We need to raise a kid's kids not to need to go to college.
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01:26:15.800 --> 01:26:20.200
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We need to figure out a way for them to do it without it or do it at another means.
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01:26:21.080 --> 01:26:25.880
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Maybe they can all take classes at the Jordan Peterson online university and combine that with
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01:26:25.880 --> 01:26:33.880
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Prager and whatever Brett Weinstein's going to do. I don't know what the answers are ladies and
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01:26:33.880 --> 01:26:38.200
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gentlemen but I know that we are being bamboozled. We are being fooled and every time somebody new
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01:26:38.200 --> 01:26:42.680
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steps up to the mic it seems like they just stay on script. Okay.
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01:26:43.400 --> 01:26:45.400
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Thank you.
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01:26:46.920 --> 01:26:53.000
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Dr. We appreciate all that you're saying although we don't understand most of what you're saying.
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01:26:53.000 --> 01:26:57.000
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Sorry. I have a limited amount of time somewhere down there agreeing a lot so you must have been
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01:26:57.000 --> 01:27:04.920
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a chemistry major or something but what is going to help us is to know what you can do like
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01:27:04.920 --> 01:27:09.320
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checking a bunch of vaccinated people. Of course that's what I can do right but we
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01:27:10.280 --> 01:27:16.600
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are not going to have any authority over the FDA to force Pfizer to do something.
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01:27:16.600 --> 01:27:21.560
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I mean that's a federal issue unless you can explain to me how we could do something at a
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01:27:21.560 --> 01:27:25.800
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state level you know some of this is going to have to be taken up by our congressmen right.
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01:27:26.680 --> 01:27:32.520
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So just whatever your remaining comments are just keep in mind that I understand what we can do
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01:27:32.520 --> 01:27:36.280
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and really these technical things you're throwing out as a senator from Greenville's
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01:27:36.360 --> 01:27:40.680
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already mentioned we're going to throw right back at you because there's no you're the expert
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01:27:40.680 --> 01:27:44.520
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so if someone's going to do this testing I don't know who would find to do it
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01:27:44.520 --> 01:27:48.680
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well other than someone like you. I can do it lots of other people can do it. I've had a lot
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01:27:48.680 --> 01:27:54.840
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of corners and pharmacists from different states contact me I posted all this on Twitter right
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01:27:54.840 --> 01:27:58.760
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and so people will private message me and say I'd like to send you some samples and then they say
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01:27:58.760 --> 01:28:03.560
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oops state regulations will not allow our coroner to send any samples for this so there are some
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01:28:03.560 --> 01:28:10.360
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policy issues that can the trouble is is if you look for the integration of this DNA and you
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01:28:10.360 --> 01:28:16.040
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don't find it what does it mean doesn't mean you didn't look in the right place that you sampled
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01:28:16.040 --> 01:28:26.760
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the wrong part of the thigh like what I don't even know what I think this is is again one of these
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01:28:26.760 --> 01:28:31.960
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kind of scooby-doo unmaskings where here's the bad guy over here we better solve that puzzle now
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01:28:32.840 --> 01:28:37.560
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and it won't get us any farther down the road because we're not questioning the spread of the
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01:28:37.560 --> 01:28:43.960
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virus we're not questioning the protocols we're not questioning the biology of transfection at all
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01:28:45.720 --> 01:28:50.520
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we're really not questioning anything if we follow this narrative we follow this story we
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01:28:50.520 --> 01:28:56.840
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chase this shiny object that none other than Kevin McCurnan put in front of us
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01:28:57.160 --> 01:29:03.560
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and he only put it in front of us after I started talking about clones and the scooby-doo
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01:29:05.320 --> 01:29:10.200
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and before that everything was great and he was on my stream twice and he was telling me all about
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01:29:10.200 --> 01:29:18.120
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how the PCR had had primers that made little dimers and that the RNA was in pure because of
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01:29:18.120 --> 01:29:26.680
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the smear on the gel there is a big game of foot ladies and gentlemen and we are
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01:29:26.760 --> 01:29:34.920
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very very close to tying the game are you with me are you with me we're very very close to
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01:29:34.920 --> 01:29:42.040
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tying this game we've got to keep the pressure up we've got to keep working we've got to keep
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01:29:42.040 --> 01:29:49.000
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showing up every day for our family and friends we've got to keep showing up every day for our
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01:29:49.080 --> 01:29:57.720
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family and friends and we've got to keep from letting them recite the faith letting them be
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01:29:57.720 --> 01:30:05.400
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bamboozled into the faith because it's very easy to be bamboozled and trapped into thinking
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01:30:05.400 --> 01:30:12.120
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that one of these tv scenarios is still really not that ridiculous because it fits I mean I was
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01:30:12.120 --> 01:30:15.960
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sick you were sick my neighbor was sick so obviously there was something
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01:30:17.720 --> 01:30:24.600
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it's a very enticing trap but the conflated background signal is the best explanation the
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01:30:24.600 --> 01:30:32.520
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widest net doesn't have to have specifics I'm just very sure that they have absolutely zero data
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01:30:32.520 --> 01:30:40.680
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before 2020 about the prevalence of any of these RNA signals they have no idea what these PCR tests
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01:30:40.760 --> 01:30:46.200
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would have found in 2019 and how many people would have tested positive without being a
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01:30:46.200 --> 01:30:56.360
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symptomatic at all meaning we don't know whether this is noise or not most likely it is most likely
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01:30:56.360 --> 01:31:01.320
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it's a signal of noise that they characterized very well before the pandemic so they knew exactly
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01:31:01.320 --> 01:31:08.200
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what was there and how to use it do you understand what I'm saying most likely they characterized
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01:31:08.200 --> 01:31:12.920
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the noise that was there already a long time ago so that during the pandemic they would know how
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01:31:12.920 --> 01:31:19.080
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to use it that's what Nathan Wolf was doing that's what the eco-health alliance was doing
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01:31:22.520 --> 01:31:27.160
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characterizing this background so that maybe an endemic coronavirus could be blamed I don't know
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01:31:27.160 --> 01:31:35.240
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if that's what the background really is biologically maybe we haven't been able to track coronaviruses
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01:31:35.240 --> 01:31:39.800
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before this we can find them if you call it what we do finding them
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01:31:41.560 --> 01:31:46.120
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but we can't track and trace them like we claim to suddenly be able to do with this one just because
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01:31:46.120 --> 01:31:53.880
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it's so novel protocols were murder and transfection is in medicine it could have been an infectious
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01:31:53.880 --> 01:32:00.520
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clone I think an infectious clone is a very good plausible explanation of how a genuine sequence
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01:32:00.520 --> 01:32:08.200
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could have genuinely be found using PCR to amplify them even if it's 99 primer pairs you could get a
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01:32:08.200 --> 01:32:15.240
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really robust signal across lots of primer pairs if you had seeded the pandemic with an infectious
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01:32:15.240 --> 01:32:24.440
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clone and maybe an infectious clone would actually make people have a kind of recognizable suite of
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01:32:24.440 --> 01:32:30.760
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symptoms maybe not I don't know but I definitely know if you needed the seeding of a molecular
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01:32:30.760 --> 01:32:36.040
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signal that molecular biologists around the world would say holy shit there's a pandemic
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01:32:36.040 --> 01:32:44.280
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that's how you do it infectious clone a transfection agent releases another way of saying that because
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01:32:44.280 --> 01:32:51.480
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when you spray RNA into people's lungs or put it in their drinking water or or spray it in the air
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01:32:51.880 --> 01:33:00.440
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then you're transfecting them so conflated background signals where we are protocols were
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01:33:00.440 --> 01:33:06.760
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murder and transfection is not medicine and that holds true to you if you don't believe in viruses
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01:33:06.760 --> 01:33:12.120
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but of course that's a really ridiculous statement because viruses are a very tiny fraction of the
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01:33:12.120 --> 01:33:19.320
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total signal at that size scale because all of our tissues communicate with signals at that time
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01:33:19.400 --> 01:33:26.120
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scale that include DNA and RNA and proteins and all the mammals and all the plants and all the
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01:33:26.120 --> 01:33:33.800
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fungi and all the bacteria that we know also communicate with particles, vesicles and other
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01:33:35.480 --> 01:33:40.680
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things at that time scale or size scale that are very hard to separate from one another
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01:33:42.360 --> 01:33:46.920
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and virology would like you to believe that when they spin stuff down and it's that size in the
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01:33:47.000 --> 01:33:51.000
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sucrose gradient the only thing that's there are us only viruses here
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01:33:53.080 --> 01:34:00.360
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when in reality they know that that fraction it goes down the farthest in that sucrose gradient
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01:34:00.920 --> 01:34:09.320
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is full of exosomes full of vesicles full of protein blobs full of things of the same size
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01:34:09.320 --> 01:34:16.600
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scale not of all of which are these crazy viruses that's what Nathan Wolf was selling as his big
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01:34:16.600 --> 01:34:24.600
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thing that he could explore this crazy unknown place and find unknown life forms
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01:34:27.800 --> 01:34:31.880
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there's a conflated background signal ladies and gentlemen leak release lies it doesn't even
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01:34:31.880 --> 01:34:35.960
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matter because the protocols were murder and transfection is not medicine these people have
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01:34:35.960 --> 01:34:41.400
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fooled us into believing that it is medicine they've fooled us into believing that there is a novel
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01:34:41.400 --> 01:34:48.600
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virus they fooled us into believing that gain of function is real in order to invert our
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01:34:48.600 --> 01:34:53.320
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sovereignty and take it away from our children come on ladies and gentlemen they caused this stuff
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01:34:54.920 --> 01:34:56.440
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by inverting the way we think
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01:34:59.800 --> 01:35:04.040
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this graph was never shown to us just this one down here in the bottom and they just
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01:35:04.040 --> 01:35:09.480
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used the red one that's it went from zero and went up to something and they were just tacking on
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01:35:09.480 --> 01:35:16.920
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stuff that they killed people with bad protocols and bad tests if they needed a signal if you need
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01:35:16.920 --> 01:35:24.760
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a signal it's a clone that's all you need is a clone
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01:35:27.160 --> 01:35:31.720
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i don't know if it's all about the genetic data but it's it's a lot about that and it's about
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01:35:31.720 --> 01:35:36.600
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convincing your kids right it's not about you they don't need you your old all your data that's
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01:35:36.600 --> 01:35:41.720
|
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useful is gone they don't want to they can't tell all you got here without the data from before
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01:35:42.600 --> 01:35:47.320
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but they've got to convince your kids that when they have kids they should be giving up their data
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01:35:48.040 --> 01:35:52.280
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that's what this is about i know it's crazy but that's how they work that's their time frame their
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01:35:52.280 --> 01:35:59.000
|
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time scale their time horizon they've got this plan for a lot farther than you think so if you
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01:35:59.000 --> 01:36:06.120
|
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want to turn this cruise ship around it's going to be a long process we got to get untied we got to
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01:36:06.120 --> 01:36:12.280
|
|
get back to the bridge we got to disable the autopilot we got to slow the ship down
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01:36:14.280 --> 01:36:21.880
|
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and then we can start turning the rudder ladies and gentlemen please join me at giga-ohm biological
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01:36:21.880 --> 01:36:29.960
|
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and that's dot com and then giga-ohm dot bio for communications for support thank you very much
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01:36:30.040 --> 01:36:36.200
|
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transfection is not immunization it's the first of october 2023 i never dreamed i would still be
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01:36:36.200 --> 01:36:42.040
|
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using this slide stop all transfections and humans because they are trying to eliminate the control
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01:36:42.040 --> 01:36:48.680
|
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group by any means necessary i never thought i'd be using this slide in 2023 but it's still fully
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01:36:48.680 --> 01:36:54.840
|
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relevant and it will remain relevant until the truth really is out there this has been giga-ohm
|
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01:36:54.840 --> 01:36:59.640
|
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biological a high resistance low noise information brought to you by a biologist thanks for joining
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01:36:59.640 --> 01:37:06.120
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me sorry i was late i'll see you again tomorrow night maybe tomorrow afternoon but tomorrow for
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01:37:06.120 --> 01:37:22.040
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sure because we do a show every day here at giga-ohm biological thanks very much
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01:37:36.120 --> 01:37:53.160
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so
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01:38:06.120 --> 01:38:28.120
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My one wheel has a flat, I was filming today, I got a flat, not so any way, but I think I have a solution, I'm in the mail tomorrow.
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01:38:28.120 --> 01:38:57.000
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I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world, I'm going to change my world
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