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1421 lines
67 KiB
1421 lines
67 KiB
WEBVTT
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01:12.000 --> 01:23.000
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Janet, how are ya? Pamela, good to see you. Lots of the same humans here, good to see you team human.
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01:23.000 --> 01:29.000
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Just another meeting of the control group.
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02:42.000 --> 02:55.000
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Please don't forget to check out Mark's work. There's a lot of serendipitous synergy happening here. Please check Mark's work.
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02:55.000 --> 03:13.000
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He's scheduled for 60 minutes next. He's going on French, British, Italian, Japanese television. People everywhere are starting to listen to him. It's embarrassing.
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03:13.000 --> 03:18.000
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The kids deserve a lot of credit. This town's been flooded with phony 20s for weeks.
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03:18.000 --> 03:26.000
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Oh, it was nothing, really. But old Mr. Pietro posing as a doorman sure had us fooled for a while.
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03:26.000 --> 03:30.000
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He really gave himself away when he put on his little puppet show for us.
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03:30.000 --> 03:38.000
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The real hero of Scooby-Doo. And by the way, where is he? Oh no, look at him.
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Like I said before, what a ham.
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03:42.000 --> 03:46.000
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Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa.
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03:46.000 --> 04:11.000
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Not a super long show for you today, ladies and gentlemen. I hope I can keep it under an hour.
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Why would you understand that you're in the city of the AIDS?
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Yes, yes, two days ago. Why would you understand that you're in the city of the AIDS?
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04:21.000 --> 04:27.000
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Yes, yes, two days ago. Why would you understand that you're in the city of the AIDS?
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04:27.000 --> 04:31.000
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Yes, yes, two days ago. Why would you understand that you're in the city of the AIDS?
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04:31.000 --> 04:39.000
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Yes, yes, two days ago. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is Gigo on Biological Eye Resistance Low Noise Information Brief brought to you by a biologist.
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It's the 18th of October, 2023.
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We are trying to stop these people from misleading the young any further by spreading the truth of the biology that was concealed for the last three years and longer.
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Because if we don't struggle hard enough to get the power back from these charlatans now, our children will never get it back.
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We need to call attention.
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We need to call attention to the bricks at the back of the theater.
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While our kids still have a chance to see them.
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Sorry about that.
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Thank you.
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My name is Jonathan Cooley and I'm coming to you live from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in the United States of America.
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We have been trying to fight against an ongoing narrative in the United States and around the world.
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06:50.000 --> 07:02.000
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It seems to have fooled all of us with a TV or a cell phone into believing that there was a lab leak of a gain of function virus in Wuhan that led to all of Western society having to shut down.
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And the absolute calamity that was the last three years.
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And we are trying to stop taking the bait on TV and social media to avoid continually perpetuating this mythology.
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We're essentially trying to stop talking about it so that our kids stop believing in it.
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But we also need to actually actively dispel it now.
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So we need to work against that was supposed to fly in a little better than that.
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07:32.000 --> 07:34.000
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That's annoying.
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So I'm just going to get out of here for a second. That's annoying.
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That's what we want to actually like that.
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Exactly.
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So I've told you already before that this Scooby-Doo mystery that we've been led to solve is ongoing.
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And I've shown you how it's ongoing.
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There is a book coming out by Rand Paul that's called The Great Cover Up With a Man on the cover with a mask that needs to be taken off to reveal his identity.
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Exactly what a Scooby-Doo mystery is.
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08:11.000 --> 08:23.000
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It's kind of hilarious actually how on the head this is really from the perspective of my recent sort of narrative attempt at explaining to people what has happened.
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08:23.000 --> 08:32.000
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But it shouldn't surprise you that Robert Malone is retweeting something by Ford Fisher of a video of somebody being arrested in the Capitol.
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08:33.000 --> 08:47.000
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It shouldn't surprise you that some of the people on this little diagram that I've been using for a long time now to remind you that the intellectual dark web was a social media construct that was created in around 2018.
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By a guy who was then becoming quite rich under the under the direction of and helping another person by the name of Peter Teal become rich.
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08:56.000 --> 09:08.000
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Eric Weinstein who is from the weird symbology perspective oddly just portrayed as the guy here if you can see my arrow.
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Under the black umbrella of all of the guys and gals in this picture up here at the top.
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Man I didn't do that again I keep forgetting to set up my secondary camera because I'm always being such a dork here.
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Sorry about that.
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09:37.000 --> 09:40.000
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And I should have cut already.
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So this picture that I'm talking about up here here's Eric Weinstein he's at the top underneath the black umbrella if you know any of the kind of you know spooky symbology that goes along with the conspiracy theories of modern Western society you know that being under a black
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09:57.000 --> 10:02.000
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umbrella is a symbol and he's the only one there under a black umbrella.
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10:02.000 --> 10:15.000
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I would suggest to you that that means he's more or less the guy who organized this and I can give you a number of wonderful examples in the coming weeks of why that's likely true and what the real plan was.
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10:15.000 --> 10:27.000
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It's probably likely that Eric Weinstein was encouraged to organize the intellectual dark web by Peter Teal or some you know permutation of that.
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10:27.000 --> 10:38.000
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So it shouldn't surprise you that like Robert Malone retweeting a Palestinian demonstration and in the capital.
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10:38.000 --> 10:45.000
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He also have Brett Weinstein retweeting and and talking about Majeed.
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He's on this picture back here as well.
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Where is he.
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Maybe he's behind my head here.
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He's one of these guys.
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10:56.000 --> 11:03.000
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Or maybe he didn't make it into this picture he made it into a different no there he is right there that's that's the picture he's in.
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11:04.000 --> 11:09.000
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Here's Brett Weinstein talking about Majeed I think his name is for sure.
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But he's he had tweeted that that they put a black flag over some mosque and wherever and so that means that it's time for World War or some nonsense like that I don't know what it is.
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11:22.000 --> 11:32.000
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But of course he's got that wrong and even Wikipedia and the and the things under here get it right I mean all you have to do is click on that and realize that this isn't the flag he's talking about at least according to Wikipedia.
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Which tends to be correct it just tends to omit things usually the things on Wikipedia check out.
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And it certainly seemed like in this case it does but that didn't seem to stop Brett Weinstein from feeling it was okay to you know tweet stuff about Jews and Muslims and stuff.
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So they're all playing the same game they're all playing the same misdirection game.
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They're all playing this governance game of governance by mythology and it's not just mythology about immunology of course.
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But the mythology about biology is the stuff that's easiest to see through because it doesn't involve so much personal opinion and who said what.
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And that's what makes politics a real politics so complicated.
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Because biology is just straightforward and when you find out that they're lying they're just playing lion.
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And so this illusion of consensus is what we're trying to break and it's an illusion of consensus about a novel virus for which we were all vulnerable that we all had to do something that the RNA saved people from but could have been better.
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And even if it wasn't the next one could be.
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That's about the best that I can summarize the consensus of all these people.
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They all think the same thing.
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And crazy enough the people that watch the view and the people that watch CNN and the people that watch Saturday Night Live also think basically the same thing.
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It's all a question of how dark they want to imagine their reality but they realize that it's all possible or they think they've realized that it's all possible because by assuming the challenge of the Scooby-Doo mystery you assume or you rather take on its presuppositions.
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The Scooby-Doo mystery relies on the idea that the McGuffin of a dangerous novel virus circulating the planet a dangerous RNA sequence that McGuffin has to be real otherwise the whole thing falls apart.
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13:53.000 --> 14:11.000
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And so these pieces have been moving around Peter McCullough has been really doing a lot of good in my mind recently by coming out against the vaccine but I have collected some videos in the last 25 minutes that have just made me want to bang my head on a wall.
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He was on Dr. Drew with Kelly Victory again and I didn't have time to put him into this thing I'm going to use them tomorrow but they're just suffice it to say that I'm not happy because we are again talking about variants and about how variants are being pushed around by the vaccines or
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by Pax Lovid or Mopovineer and I'm just not going to have this anymore these people don't have any evidence for this they don't have any evidence for it other than the cartoonish data dumps by the CDC themselves
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and so like it or not Kelly Victory is going along with the CDC story and perpetuating this faith 100% the faith and unless we correct Dr. Peter McCullough then he's going to be perpetuating the faith as well
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that there is a novel virus out there in circulation that they can track with a PCR test
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and that people are getting sick from it and it's different than the flu and it came from a lab and it's all one story and this can't be possible
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it's we're in big trouble because we're not winning it feels like we're winning but we're not winning we're going to talk a lot about it with Jolie tomorrow it's at five o'clock Eastern
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it's just crazy to me how every time I get excited we take three steps backwards
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so we've got to keep working and just keep reminding yourselves of the truth and make sure that you understand it well enough to share with your family and friends but the show is definitely going to go on yesterday we had a really good broadcast
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I was really strong I hit a couple real high notes in there with regard to what the modern biologists the modern molecular biologists really understands about what they do at the bench and therefore what a virologist really understands what he or he or she does at the bench
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the sheer lack of awe and reverence for the sacred of biology that's evident in all of these people just making products
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and so as we go through this thing once again of course we had to have Kevin McCurnan come back up I don't want to ignore him because I do believe that they have to use the truth in order to make the narrative work
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and so we have to make sure that we don't not use the truths that we are given in order to make the narrative crumble and so I believe that Kevin McCurnan has many many times been present
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at key moments during the pandemic to be present to health control monitor or even influence groups of people that were on the verge of making too much known
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and so tonight I want to watch his presentation to the world council for health is only a 12 minute presentation and then I just want to talk a little bit with some notes about what I see as being some of the oddities with regard to this guy's sort of presence in the in the COVID dissident movement from really the very beginning
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but not quite as early as I thought oh yeah so we don't need to go there yet so first of all just remind you
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in late 2020 I'm not sure what month this group of authors published a a critique of the who and its published PCR protocol and of the people that are on this paper I think you'll find a number of extremely interesting names
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Peter Borger is somebody you might know from Twitter Rajish Kumar Mahaltra is a guy who talks all the time about glowing mice and for a while he was my friend and then he blocked me
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Michael Eden you know Claire Elizabeth honor Craig is one of the founders of the heart foundation H A R T a UK group Kevin McCurnan is the hero of the day
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Thomas Binder is of course somebody I've shared with you a few times he's a doctor from Switzerland one of the most steadfast outspoken heroes of the pandemic
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and I'm not I think I know all more commerce also but they those are the names that really come to mind and I think that you should probably know of and then they made this a denim to it so I'll give you this these links just so you can maybe follow up on your own I love Thomas Binder too I think he's fantastic
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he's really a no holds barred what is this why is that could we all because I opened it of course okay so we'll do this
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and then there's this one I think there's one here but that's also on my download so I gotta get those back so anyway that's what we're doing we're gonna watch this video and then we can talk a little bit about what
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in total what we got because he was on my stream twice plus I've done a couple live streams with him on other streams I think once with Matthew I think we did this five person stream that's on rumble that John Bodwin hosted
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so yeah there we've had a lot of interaction during the course of the three years before he blocked me
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and to be quite frank the reason why he blocked me is because he doesn't like the clone discussion and doesn't like RNA clones as being important
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and it is really the thing he decided to blow me off about which is really weird because that's definitely a home run like
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there's no denying that that basically is RNA virology it's infectious clones where you basically have almost nothing and the idea that they want to cover that up is just the biggest red flag of them all it's like a denny size red flag flapping in the wind off the interstate here we go
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so with no further ado on that intro to get this where we are in history at this epic time and very grateful for expert panel we'd like to start with Kevin McCurnan Kevin was a team leader of R&D for the Human Genome Project he co founded
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Agincourt Biosciences Corporation and acted as the CSO until its sole Kevin was the president and chief officer of Agincourt Personal Genomics a startup company he co founded in 2005 to
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in revolutionary sequencing technologies. In 2023 Kevin used Nuschiger RNA vaccines as positive controls in an RNA sequence experiment aiming to understand the pathogenicity of hop late and bureau infections in cannabis and this sequencing revealed the double stranded DNA contamination in the widely
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demonstrated messenger RNA vaccines so Kevin's really been at the front of this discovery he has facilitated labs around the world including David Spellich here in Canada who just published in great work and confirming his work so with no further
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you Kevin if you please come forward and enlighten the audience I know this could be a this could be a two day in very interesting lecture but in brief if you could help bring people up to speed what you found and where we're at
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absolutely thank you for having me I'm just going to move this over to present hopefully this behaves
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all right there we are so I'm going to touch on some of the technical details on what we're measuring here and how we ran into them so this is discussion about the quantity of plasmids that we can find inside of these messenger RNA vaccines
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and I don't have any conflicts to declare I don't work in the scene I
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so you know the funny thing is I was going to make a joke but I thought my space bar would pause it I would speed it up but I don't think we need to speed it up with Kevin he is about the fastest rapid fire talker that we've come across during the pandemic
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and he's going to throw so much information at the next 14 minutes it's pretty impressive team space this all started back in April with this preprint where we did this RNA sequencing that Mark was just mentioning this can give you more of the details that we're going to go into here very briefly
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this will remind you which not in that what is not in that preprint is something that retziflevi and Josh Goodscow presented in the BMJ which is that the the vials that were in fact approved are not the vials that were given to the public
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the clinical trial was run on something known as process one that used PCR to make the DNA that was going to then turn into the RNA to make the spike protein
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once the trial was complete they switched this is a big bait and switch they moved to a production process that manufactured this DNA in a coli and with that comes a different risk there's clean DNA on the left which is process one there's no background a coli there's no endotoxin present in this in this process
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when they switch to scale this up they put this plasmid into a coli to grow it and replicate it and now you have to get the DNA out of a coli and not have any of the parts of a coli come with it and unfortunately there are parts of a coli that can create
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anaphylaxis something known as endotoxin and there are these plasmids that have additional DNA that were not present in the actual clinical trial so we started sequencing lots that were a mixture some that were in fact not expired but had been tapped into by clinicians and other ones that were
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unopened but were expired these are the monovalent vaccines for Pfizer the prior ones were the bivalent vaccines for Moderna and Pfizer
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upon sequencing these I think the most striking revelation was that the Pfizer vaccines actually had a component that was not disclosed the regulators this this plasmid map on the right is what was disclosed the EMA and there's no mention of the SV40 components that are in that are now known to be inside this DNA sequence
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and the plasma on the left is what we actually found very similar in length but has all these other components in it that are not disclosed the regulators nor to the patients taking these
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why do we care about SV40 well SV40 is a known tool this particular enhancer the 72 base part enhancer that David Dean's lab has studied so well it binds transcription factors that drags any DNA attached to it into the nucleus so it's actually a well published tool for gene therapy
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if you want to get DNA into the nucleus this is the this is the shuttle that you use to get it done if you have lipid nanoparticles that are encapsulating this material you now have a Trojan horse to get into the cells as well
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so what did we do once we found the sequencing we knew peer review was going to be quite challenging and it would take a long time so the best thing you can do in those circumstances are publish methods that allow other people to reproduce the work faster than peer review can occur and I think you'll see that's exactly what's happened so we designed three different assays
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one that targets the vector this this bacterial origin of replication inside of the plasmid and the other one that targets this spike protein we have a third assay now that we're working on as well to track the presence of this SV40 promoter in particular biopsies of interest
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the sequencing I'm sorry that the quantitative PCR of this will give you numbers that don't add up to 35% it's much lower than that with PCR and I'm going to explain why PCR does not capture every piece of DNA that's in the files
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26:44.000 --> 26:53.000
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but if you take a one to a hundred dilution of these things you'll get CTs in the 22 range that puts them in there on the 17 range if you don't if you shoot them straight in
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26:54.000 --> 27:07.000
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for context when you're getting a COVID test you you could be called positive in a CT of 35 this is a log to scale that's about a million times less material than what we're injecting into people with the actual vaccine
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27:07.000 --> 27:20.000
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so COVID might call you positive and COVID test might call you positive at 35 we're injecting stuff that's closer to 17 a million times more concentrated than what you'll see that you can be called positive from the actual nasal test so there's a lot in there
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27:20.000 --> 27:32.000
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some critiques of the work have centered around that these vaccines are expired well they've injected expired vaccines into people that's not a very good argument but you can also measure how degraded these things are by running these RNA integrity
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27:32.000 --> 27:46.000
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assays that Pfizer uses we've done that we don't see excessive degradation of the violence of the sequence to date and you're going to see other people who have who have touched on these vaccines and sequenced them that are not expired and have better chain of custody than we had received
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27:47.000 --> 28:01.000
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now several other people have replicated this it started with a group in Japan who took our sequence data and reassembled it and actually found the same vector that we found some other folks were playing around with PCR finding low levels of DNA but they found DNA indeed in Japan
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28:02.000 --> 28:09.000
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through Twitter that some folks in France and D.D. a Realtz Lab found DNA as well I've not seen the methods yet but we're open to further discussion on that
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28:09.000 --> 28:16.000
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William Engel has also sequenced his own vials in Europe and found the Pfizer sequence as well
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28:16.000 --> 28:24.000
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but this shouldn't surprise anybody because the EMA made note of the high variance of DNA contamination in the Pfizer vials that were presented to them
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28:24.000 --> 28:29.000
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I've got to go back a little bit because I'm taking too many notes here and I'm missing things
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28:29.000 --> 28:37.000
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I'm going to go back just a little bit I'm very sorry but I don't want to miss stuff
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28:37.000 --> 28:44.000
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up to 35% it's much lower than that with PCR and I'm going to explain why PCR does not capture every piece of DNA that's in the vials
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28:44.000 --> 28:53.000
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but if you take a one to a hundred dilution of these things you'll get CT's in the 22 range that puts them in there on the 17 range if you don't if you shoot them straight in
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28:53.000 --> 29:06.000
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for context when you're getting a COVID test you you could be called positive at a CT of 35 this is a log to scale that's about a million times less material than what we're injecting into people with the actual vaccine
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29:06.000 --> 29:19.000
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so COVID might call you positive and COVID test might call you positive at 35 we're injecting stuff that's closer to 17 a million times more concentrated than what you'll see that you can be called positive from the actual nasal test so there's a lot in there
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29:19.000 --> 29:32.000
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some critiques of the work have centered around that these vaccines are expired well they've injected expired vaccines into people that's not a very good argument but you can also measure how how degraded these things are by running these RNA integrity
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29:32.000 --> 29:44.000
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assays that Pfizer uses we've done that we don't see excessive degradation of the vials of the sequence to date and you're going to see other people who have who have touched on these vaccines and sequence them that are not expired and have better chain of custody
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29:44.000 --> 29:56.000
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than what we had received now several other people have replicated this it started with a group in Japan who took our sequence data and reassembled it and actually found the same vector that we found some other folks were playing around with PCR
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29:56.000 --> 30:08.000
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that we got to stop right there
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30:08.000 --> 30:19.000
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so first of all I apologize because I really lose my breath very easy now and I need to kind of rest for a minute before I start talking again
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30:19.000 --> 30:33.000
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I'm not sure why he's explaining that they have to do a 1 to 100 dilution here it might just be to make it more available for the PCR reaction to start
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30:33.000 --> 30:44.000
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then goes on to say though that one of the limitations was that the lots are expired and so people are saying it's not fair to evaluate those
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30:44.000 --> 30:55.000
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but he says that they've done RNA integrity confirmations and seen that that's indeed the case that their RNA is intact
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30:55.000 --> 31:08.000
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shoulders here right of unknown RNA fragments and those are very dangerous for small interfering RNAs if I understand my biology correctly
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31:08.000 --> 31:14.000
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but he seems to indicate that those are pretty okay but he's got question marks there that he doesn't mention now
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31:14.000 --> 31:27.000
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but he says that the RNA integrity is confirmed on arrival and then when he says that other people have started to replicate his work
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31:27.000 --> 31:47.000
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if you listen carefully the first people to replicate his work are people that are in Japan and all they do is take his sequencing data and reassemble it and find a similar or the same plasmid
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31:47.000 --> 32:04.000
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so that's not really the same thing as replicating your work it's like if you I don't know this word scramble comes out the same way when you do it and I do it is not exactly replicating the work at least not in the same way
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32:04.000 --> 32:16.000
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but then he goes on to say that other people are doing similar reactions but it's just key to see that that I don't think that's super surprising maybe I'm a little naive but
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32:16.000 --> 32:25.000
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if what he said he found is in there and that's what's really in there then what else are they gonna find
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32:25.000 --> 32:35.000
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and then they didn't try to find it again they just took his sequencing data and found it well done it's a bit like oh here's a COVID variant that's all scrambled here
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32:35.000 --> 32:43.000
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why don't you see what you find when you put it together oh look I found SARS-CoV-2 wow must be a pandemic then
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32:44.000 --> 33:03.000
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I mean it's not convincing to me but anyway that's what he's listing here I'm putting way too much weight on that though the more important thing or interesting thing is DDA rolled in France also replicating his data
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33:03.000 --> 33:19.000
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of course DDA was also the guy who had the first paper about hydroxychloroquine working with the first people that were infected in France so in a lot of respects DDA is responsible for
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33:19.000 --> 33:33.000
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seeding a narrative of a novel virus spreading around the earth and we've talked about that before so it's interesting that again he comes up here as part of the narrative oh yeah there's definitely DDA big time bad news
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33:33.000 --> 33:48.000
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which I agree with it is big time bad news but I hope you can see that five years ago they could have had this on the planning table and then how are we gonna do it yeah well we're gonna delay everybody for a year or so
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33:48.000 --> 34:10.000
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maybe even two years with all kinds of nonsense about I don't know how about nanoparticles and graphene and hydras and magnetism and we'll talk about RNA codon optimization and pseudo uridine and the RNA not being pure
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34:11.000 --> 34:23.000
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but we'll never let any of those stories none of those will get traction it'll just keep everybody spinning their wheels in the background everybody'll ignore it and then when it's time to blow up the whole thing
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34:23.000 --> 34:38.000
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we'll send Kevin out there with the with the wonderful evidence that it's contaminated and then he can give primers to everybody and everybody can confirm that all the lots were contaminated
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34:38.000 --> 34:50.000
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and so without a doubt in this very talk you're gonna hear at some point him saying how this therapeutic can be better better brought out in the future
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34:50.000 --> 35:03.000
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or maybe he'll even use the words regulated in the future to prevent this kind of thing and then you'll know then you'll know that Jay was a hundred percent right like a hundred percent right
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35:03.000 --> 35:14.000
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just keep listening through Twitter that some folks in France and D.D. A. Realt's lab found DNA as well I've not seen the methods yet but we're open to further discussion on that
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35:14.000 --> 35:28.000
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William Engel has also sequenced his own vials in Europe and found the Pfizer sequence as well but this shouldn't surprise anybody because the EMA made note of the high variance of DNA contamination in the Pfizer vials that were presented to them
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35:28.000 --> 35:37.000
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and 815 fold variance in just the 10 vials that they were given. The EMA didn't measure this as his data that Pfizer gave to the EMA.
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35:37.000 --> 35:49.000
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Since then more quantitative reproduction has been done with Phillip Buckholt's work he has actually replicated this with RQPCR assays. He's also sequenced this with Oxford Nanopore and has found the fragment size distribution.
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35:49.000 --> 36:00.000
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Dr. Sin Lee has done replication of this on Sanger sequencing. Now this was not quantitative replication but it did give us nice Sanger gold standard confirmation that the primers were using in fact target this vector.
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36:00.000 --> 36:13.000
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And I think you're going to hear later today Brigitte Conning has also replicated this in Germany. The reason I emphasize this is that half of the papers that come through peer review can't be reproduced so the attention should be on reproduction not on peer review.
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36:13.000 --> 36:21.000
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And I want to touch on today that some new data that just came from David Speacher's lab. He studied 24 vials. This is the largest study done to date.
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36:21.000 --> 36:34.000
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You can contact him at these contacts I have down here on the left. He has a sub stack and a Twitter handle. He went through 24 different vials, 8 from Pfizer, 12 from Dernan.
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36:34.000 --> 36:39.000
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And he's also finding DNA contamination in every one of these vials.
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36:40.000 --> 36:43.000
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I wonder what Jessica Rose is doing for that.
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36:43.000 --> 36:52.000
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And why is Jessica Rose doing anything? She's an independent researcher in Canada. Has she ever had independent with an A?
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36:52.000 --> 37:06.000
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Has she ever had a faculty position anywhere? Not that a faculty position matters but generally speaking before the pandemic if you were going to be a scientist you either worked for a company or you worked for a university.
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37:07.000 --> 37:17.000
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Or you couldn't really call yourself an independent researcher. That's a bit like barista then. I don't know I find it a bit odd.
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37:17.000 --> 37:27.000
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I don't know what she's doing for them in this in this case. It'd be interesting to know what exactly she's doing for them.
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37:27.000 --> 37:33.000
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And I wanted the barrel to watch with her because she's been on Malik.
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37:33.000 --> 37:41.000
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I'm in Malik's podcast and it's a really insightful interview.
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37:41.000 --> 37:46.000
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24 different vials, 8 from Pfizer, 12 from Dernan.
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37:46.000 --> 37:50.000
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And he's also finding DNA contamination in every one of these vials.
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37:50.000 --> 37:57.000
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The majority of vials are below the 10 nanogram FDA limit which we're going to touch on why that number is a bit arbitrary based on how you measure it.
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37:57.000 --> 38:05.000
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But the Pfizer vials, three of them were all over the limit. And if you chart these with the adverse events Jessica Rose will be touching on this perhaps bit later.
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38:05.000 --> 38:11.000
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The adverse events seem to stack with the vials that have higher DNA concentrations.
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38:11.000 --> 38:15.000
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If you put this through a dose response curve David Wiseman put this together.
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38:15.000 --> 38:21.000
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You can see that there does seem to be a response with the small number of samples that we have based on dose.
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38:21.000 --> 38:23.000
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Now there can be other confounders in this data.
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38:23.000 --> 38:31.000
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What we cannot control for is what we would call process three. There is another change in the manufacturing process where they change TRIS and PBS.
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38:31.000 --> 38:36.000
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So initially initial lots were in PBS. They moved them over to TRIS for Pfizer Moderna was always in TRIS.
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38:36.000 --> 38:40.000
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And this may have its own impact that we have not yet considered in this.
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38:40.000 --> 38:44.000
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And I could be confounding some of the signals that we're seeing on this dose response curve.
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38:44.000 --> 38:50.000
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Okay, I want to touch on the variance you're going to see measuring this is very dependent on what technology you use.
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38:50.000 --> 38:53.000
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You'll see some large numbers that vary out there in the news.
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38:53.000 --> 38:56.000
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And that's because if you use different tools you'll get different numbers.
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38:56.000 --> 39:03.000
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And this is a vulnerability in the regulations right now because you can cherry pick different tools to give the regulators whatever you want.
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39:03.000 --> 39:11.000
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All right, so if you put this tool through Oxford Nanopore, which sequences all of the molecules as single molecules does a great job finding a large fragments.
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39:11.000 --> 39:14.000
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In fact, we found a fragment in just a short 800.
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39:14.000 --> 39:32.000
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I find it a little odd that he says that does a great job of finding the large fragments because when I was talking about the infectious cycle and about how they used Oxford Nanopore to look at viral replication of an infectious clone and culture.
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39:32.000 --> 39:45.000
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And they could only find 11 full genomes of the virus or even let's say 11 transcripts that represented anything close to a full genome.
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39:45.000 --> 39:56.000
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His argument was is that you got to know the limitations of the methodology or using an Oxford Nanopore doesn't work very well for long sequences.
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39:57.000 --> 40:04.000
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Did you hear what I said?
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40:04.000 --> 40:06.000
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It doesn't work for long sequences.
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40:06.000 --> 40:07.000
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Now that may be true.
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40:07.000 --> 40:18.000
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Maybe it doesn't work for a long sequence like 30,000 bases, which is what the full genome of a virus would be in according to the cartoon.
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40:18.000 --> 40:20.000
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But I know that I heard him say it.
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40:20.000 --> 40:27.000
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And the capabilities of Oxford Nanopore sequencing are beyond 2 million contiguous bases.
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40:27.000 --> 40:35.000
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So 30,000 is by no means outside of the ballpark range of possibility.
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40:35.000 --> 40:47.000
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And yet one of the arguments that he made on Twitter as dunking on me before he blocked me was that one of the limitations of Oxford Nanopore was it wasn't very good with long sequences.
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40:47.000 --> 40:52.000
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Here he is telling the world that it's great at finding long sequences. It doesn't like little ones.
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40:52.000 --> 40:59.000
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66 read a small sequencing run that was 3.5 KB long and encompassed the entire backbone of the plasmid.
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40:59.000 --> 41:02.000
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We found another one that was 2.5 KB.
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41:02.000 --> 41:07.000
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But the important thing to know about this is that it doesn't do a very good job capturing the very small molecules.
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41:07.000 --> 41:11.000
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And you can see from this molecule distribution map here, a lot of the mass is actually small.
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41:11.000 --> 41:17.000
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They are trying to get rid of this, but the process of getting rid of this is creating something that's a little bit more dangerous for DNA integration.
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41:17.000 --> 41:23.000
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This is the process that they use to get to purify the DNA before it goes on to Oxford Nanopore.
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41:23.000 --> 41:27.000
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It's called ampere. I'm familiar with this. I spent a lot of time commercializing this tool.
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41:27.000 --> 41:30.000
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It doesn't do a good job capturing the small molecules.
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41:30.000 --> 41:35.000
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They're using this area in red to purify the DNA before it goes on to the Oxford Nanopore system.
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41:35.000 --> 41:37.000
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So it removes the really small material.
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41:37.000 --> 41:41.000
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So we're undercounting the small material when we use Oxford Nanopore.
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41:41.000 --> 41:43.000
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We're also undercounting it with QPCR.
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41:43.000 --> 41:47.000
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Anything that's smaller than 100 bases will not amplify with QPCR will miss it.
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41:47.000 --> 41:53.000
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But if you put this DNA in a florometer that stains any length DNA, you get numbers that are 10 to 100 fold higher.
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41:53.000 --> 41:56.000
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You'd be speckled to the same thing.
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41:56.000 --> 42:05.000
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So this is important because the regulators were given florometry data for the RNA and QPCR data for the DNA in order to cook the books to fit the regs.
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42:05.000 --> 42:09.000
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But this can be something that we all need to be attentive to making regulations going forward.
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42:09.000 --> 42:11.000
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What are the risks of DNA?
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42:11.000 --> 42:13.000
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Well, there's some papers out there suggesting it's prothrombotic.
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42:13.000 --> 42:15.000
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If you create a...
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42:15.000 --> 42:17.000
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Did you hear it? Did you hear it? You probably missed it.
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42:17.000 --> 42:19.000
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You had it as higher.
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42:19.000 --> 42:21.000
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Did you hear it? You speckled to the same thing.
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42:21.000 --> 42:30.000
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So this is important because the regulators were given florometry data for the RNA and QPCR data for the DNA in order to cook the books to fit the regs.
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42:30.000 --> 42:34.000
|
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But this can be something that we all need to be attentive to making regulations going forward.
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42:34.000 --> 42:37.000
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What are the risks of DNA? Well, there's some papers out there suggesting it.
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42:37.000 --> 42:42.000
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Making regulations going forward. Did you hear it?
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42:42.000 --> 42:44.000
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Boy, I hope you heard it.
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42:44.000 --> 42:47.000
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So this is some technology that he wants to get rid of.
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42:47.000 --> 42:52.000
|
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He doesn't want to stop all RNA transfection like a lot of doctors do.
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42:52.000 --> 42:55.000
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Like a lot of biologists do.
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42:55.000 --> 42:58.000
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Like I wanted to do from the very beginning.
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42:58.000 --> 43:03.000
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Like Mike Eden and Sukhir Bhakti wanted to do, I think.
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43:03.000 --> 43:08.000
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No. He wants better regulations to avoid these problems.
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43:13.000 --> 43:18.000
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I think it's pro thrombotic. It can create an interferon risk using oxygen in a pool.
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43:18.000 --> 43:20.000
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We're also undercounting it with QPCR.
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43:20.000 --> 43:24.000
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Anything that's smaller than 100 bases will not amplify with QPCR will miss it.
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43:24.000 --> 43:30.000
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But if you put this DNA in a florometer that stains any length DNA, you get numbers that are 10 to 100 fold higher.
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43:30.000 --> 43:33.000
|
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You'd be speckled with the same thing.
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43:33.000 --> 43:39.000
|
|
So this is important because the regulators were given florometry data for the RNA and QPCR data for the DNA
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43:39.000 --> 43:42.000
|
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in order to cook the books to fit the regs.
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43:42.000 --> 43:46.000
|
|
But this can be something that we all need to be attentive to making regulations going forward.
|
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43:46.000 --> 43:50.000
|
|
What are the risks of DNA? Well, there's some papers out there suggesting it's pro thrombotic.
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43:50.000 --> 43:53.000
|
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It can create an interferon response.
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43:53.000 --> 43:57.000
|
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Keep Pettit and has published up the FDA, some of the risks of genome integration that can occur.
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43:57.000 --> 44:02.000
|
|
And it's important to dissect his paper because his paper touches on the nanograms of DNA,
|
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44:02.000 --> 44:08.000
|
|
but we really should be talking about copy numbers of DNA because all you need in 10 nanograms of DNA,
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44:08.000 --> 44:10.000
|
|
you can get 1,000 copies of the human genome.
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44:10.000 --> 44:14.000
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But 10 nanograms of 200 bases of DNA, there's 50 billion copies of DNA.
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44:14.000 --> 44:21.000
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So he's saying that smaller copies because they have more active DNANs are more dangerous.
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44:22.000 --> 44:31.000
|
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And as was just pointed out in the chat, there's DNA in all the vaccines that we use.
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44:31.000 --> 44:37.000
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And if we actually actively look for it, I think Kevin McCurnan would find it.
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44:37.000 --> 44:43.000
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If he used that stain he just described a few minutes ago, I bet he'd find it in spades.
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44:43.000 --> 44:48.000
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And small little DNAs are dangerous, says Kevin.
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44:48.000 --> 44:55.000
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We've got to get it out of there.
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44:55.000 --> 44:57.000
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Do you see where we're going here, ladies and gentlemen?
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44:57.000 --> 45:03.000
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This is a joke.
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45:03.000 --> 45:15.000
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Applying these kinds of detailed molecular inspection to one product and not another.
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45:15.000 --> 45:29.000
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Knowing full well that the idea that there's no DNA in some of these childhood shots is just ridiculous.
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45:29.000 --> 45:39.000
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So malarities more important because it's the concentration of the sticky ends of DNA, the active 5 prime hydroxyls and phosphates that govern integration risks.
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45:39.000 --> 45:43.000
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A great paper down here will touch on this and show you how much of this stuff actually integrates.
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45:43.000 --> 45:45.000
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We also know the DNA is packaged.
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45:45.000 --> 45:48.000
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We've done some studies adding a nucleus to the vaccine.
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45:48.000 --> 45:50.000
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It does not change the CT scores.
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45:50.000 --> 45:55.000
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That tells you that the DNA is packaged inside the LNPs, which means it's transfection ready.
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45:55.000 --> 46:02.000
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Now, there's a problem with this is that when there's plasma DNA around, that means there's endotoxin around from a coli.
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46:02.000 --> 46:09.000
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And the lipid nanoparticles we know from the paper on the right basically obscure your ability to measure these things with LAL assays.
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46:09.000 --> 46:15.000
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We also know that the spike protein when expressed exacerbates the effect of endotoxin.
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46:15.000 --> 46:24.000
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So the combination of a poor readout and a protein that's expressed that exacerbates the impact of endotoxin means we need to be very close attention to the endotoxin numbers,
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46:24.000 --> 46:27.000
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which happen to be redacted in most of the information that's given.
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46:27.000 --> 46:28.000
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I don't have much more time.
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46:28.000 --> 46:31.000
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I think everyone's familiar that we can find this stuff everywhere in the body now.
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46:31.000 --> 46:35.000
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The bio distribution studies touch on this and now papers are coming out showing this in the heart.
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46:35.000 --> 46:40.000
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So to touch on your point about cancer, for the last few slides here, we are always cancering.
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46:40.000 --> 46:44.000
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It's just when mutagenesis outpaces the immune system that you begin to notice it.
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46:44.000 --> 46:47.000
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So you usually need more than one thing to cause cancer.
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46:47.000 --> 46:49.000
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So increasing the DNA alone may not do it.
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46:49.000 --> 46:58.000
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It may increase the mutagenesis rate, but unless you, if you also have a chronic insult to innate immune system like we know from these vaccines with lymphocytopenia and neutropenia,
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46:58.000 --> 47:02.000
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some of the effects of IgG4, some of the effects of the N1 methyl suiuridine.
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47:02.000 --> 47:06.000
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This combination can be a real potent combination.
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47:06.000 --> 47:12.000
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The third point we have is that there's some paper suggesting we're inhibiting the guardians of the genome, P53 and BRCA1.
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47:12.000 --> 47:19.000
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So all three of these things create a perfect storm that may be responsible for the cancer arise that we're seeing.
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47:19.000 --> 47:23.000
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I'd point everyone to John Bodwin's work looking at the death records in Massachusetts.
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47:23.000 --> 47:27.000
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That is a clear cut sign that we have an increase in cancer post-vaccination.
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47:27.000 --> 47:29.000
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Okay, final slide here.
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47:29.000 --> 47:31.000
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What's the call to action?
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47:31.000 --> 47:33.000
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We've put these primer sequences public.
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47:33.000 --> 47:34.000
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Anyone can download them.
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47:34.000 --> 47:35.000
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Anyone can replicate this.
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47:35.000 --> 47:39.000
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If you're not comfortable doing that, we're making some kits to enable this for pathologists.
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47:39.000 --> 47:46.000
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We've been asked for these from blood banks, burn banks, fertility clinics, people interested in breast milk, transplant organs and biopsies.
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47:46.000 --> 47:49.000
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There should be about 5,000 of these tests ready in late November.
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47:49.000 --> 48:01.000
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So Kevin is going to be controlling the PCR tests that are going to be used to find out what's going wrong in all of these tissues.
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48:01.000 --> 48:05.000
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He's going to be the guy after all these years.
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48:05.000 --> 48:13.000
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After all these different places that he's been inserted into the narrative, all the times he's come forward.
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48:13.000 --> 48:24.000
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A guy who's been working with the secret parts of the science part of the government.
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48:24.000 --> 48:32.000
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Because if you don't think the Human Genome Project was part of the DoD or nuts, since he cut his teeth with it,
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48:33.000 --> 48:35.000
|
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he's been working with the US government.
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48:35.000 --> 48:45.000
|
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The highest levels of the US government, he's got pictures of himself much younger with Francis Collins.
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48:45.000 --> 48:56.000
|
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If there's anybody that's privileged to ideas on what's going to be done with genomic data in the future, it's him.
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48:57.000 --> 49:04.000
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Hang it around with Eric Lander.
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49:04.000 --> 49:11.000
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I don't know if you recall or not, but
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49:11.000 --> 49:17.000
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when I start with this slide, this picture on his Twitter is his backyard.
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49:17.000 --> 49:23.000
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That's the Atlantic Ocean, the harbor in Boston.
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49:23.000 --> 49:31.000
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It's like a 7,000 square foot mansion in one of the most expensive places on earth.
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49:31.000 --> 49:44.000
|
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He's talking about companies, multiple biotech companies that he started and then sold.
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49:45.000 --> 50:06.000
|
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And you think that this guy is now coming to our rescue, throwing away the possibility of future military contracts, future government contracts by outing the US government's failure to provide a safe product,
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50:06.000 --> 50:17.000
|
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rather than being a controlled opposition dude who's going to make sure that this comes out in exactly the right way, at exactly the right time,
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50:17.000 --> 50:22.000
|
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with exactly the right talking points,
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50:22.000 --> 50:27.000
|
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so that we never circle back to all the other stuff,
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50:27.000 --> 50:35.000
|
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and that we just focus on this as we regulate this stuff in the future.
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50:35.000 --> 50:43.000
|
|
And for the normies, this is a great hero here, right? Wow, there was DNA in the shots. That's crazy. I can't believe it.
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50:43.000 --> 50:49.000
|
|
For the people that watch the view and CNN, this is about all they're ever going to get.
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50:49.000 --> 51:04.000
|
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A year from now or six months from now, they're going to see Kevin McCurna and think, wow, that's crazy.
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51:05.000 --> 51:12.000
|
|
This is a time for us now to get CLIA labs going and to get IRBs in place so we can begin to measure this in patients that have been injured.
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51:12.000 --> 51:16.000
|
|
And with that, I'll pass it off. Thank you.
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51:16.000 --> 51:23.000
|
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Well, thank you very much, Kevin. I'm really impressed how we ran through all this information in such a time.
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51:23.000 --> 51:26.000
|
|
I didn't think it was possible. So thank you very much.
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51:26.000 --> 51:31.000
|
|
And thank you so much for your pioneering work into this highly important topic.
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51:31.000 --> 51:39.000
|
|
And just to recap that, yeah, his findings have been confirmed multiple times, there were no exception,
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51:39.000 --> 51:51.000
|
|
and that the other interesting thing you pointed out, Kevin, was that the vials handed in for the regulatory bodies were different from the ones given to the public.
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51:51.000 --> 52:04.000
|
|
And we'll talk more about the consequences that you touched on with the other panel speakers. So thank you very much. And see you later.
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52:04.000 --> 52:19.000
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So he gave us a little talk about DNA contamination. He reminds us about endotoxin. I would like to remind you that Malone told us in an interview that he solved that problem already.
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52:19.000 --> 52:34.000
|
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I remember if it was that Vay John Health interview, or was the one before that that we were watching, but he definitely said that he had solved the endotoxin problem. I know it for sure, because it's in my notes previous pages.
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52:34.000 --> 52:48.000
|
|
The European medical something something application didn't disclose the promoters that were used in the process to write. So that's normal. We knew that that already.
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52:48.000 --> 52:55.000
|
|
This be 40 can be a nuclear targeting sequence. I didn't know that. But, you know, apparently that's, that's true. Whatever. It's fine.
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52:55.000 --> 53:05.000
|
|
QPCR primers for the spike and as we 40 and one other one that he was sending around and people were using those primers and confirming that stuff was in there.
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53:05.000 --> 53:14.000
|
|
The RNA is now intact. And they remember that he was on my stream talking about how the paperwork that was submitted by the,
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53:14.000 --> 53:20.000
|
|
by the vaccine manufacturers to the regulators indicated that the RNA indeed wasn't pure and it was a smear.
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53:20.000 --> 53:36.000
|
|
So the smear, I think was still visible in the, in the image that he used in the form of the shoulders that were on both sides of the peak, which indicated the intact RNA.
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53:37.000 --> 53:51.000
|
|
And so those small RNAs are the ones that have the potential for small interference and an interference of RNA interference. And so, especially in pregnant women where that potentially could go to the, to the fetus, those small RNAs.
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53:51.000 --> 54:00.000
|
|
Wow, crazy, hot, small DNA, small RNAs. Those are the dangerous ones are in there, but he's not really talking about those small RNAs.
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54:00.000 --> 54:18.000
|
|
He did talk about the small DNAs though. So that's fine, I guess. DNA replicated sequence assembly. And so that was the Japanese group that had taken their sequence data and replicated the assembly of the plasmid, which I again said, I don't think that's that big a deal.
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54:18.000 --> 54:25.000
|
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I did find it strange that DDARI old slab is part of this. I found it interesting.
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54:25.000 --> 54:44.000
|
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I don't think you will remember this, but just before this DNA crap came out, he had a series of tweets where he lamented that it was unfortunate that they didn't test the LNP in control experiments first because it could be that they're going to have to ditch the RNA technology
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54:44.000 --> 54:58.000
|
|
because they hadn't tested the LNP first and maybe the LNP was causing all of this, all of this havoc, all of these adverse events that were going to be blamed on the RNA. He tweeted that.
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54:58.000 --> 55:11.000
|
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That's for sure. And so, it's just another one of those things that he mentioned as a flash in the pan, but it never really became anything except for his two followers on the few podcasts that he talked to at that time.
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55:12.000 --> 55:21.000
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And he's been doing that since about the end of 2020 when he first came on the scene.
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55:21.000 --> 55:31.000
|
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So then he says that the LNP prevents you from testing for the concentration of the endotoxin, which I found curious, and that the spike makes it worse.
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55:32.000 --> 55:35.000
|
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So what a crazy narrative this is.
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55:35.000 --> 55:40.000
|
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And so the DNA plus an immune assault could equal cancer.
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55:40.000 --> 55:49.000
|
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And of course, also the interference with P 53 and broke one is also possible increases in cancer.
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55:49.000 --> 55:59.000
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So I just want to make a quick list before I say good night of the things that Kevin has come out against or about or spoken out against.
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55:59.000 --> 56:04.000
|
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So you can see how what my problem is.
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56:04.000 --> 56:20.000
|
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So this is a list of Kevin McCurnan objections.
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56:20.000 --> 56:26.000
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So the first one that he came out with was the PCR test.
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56:26.000 --> 56:31.000
|
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And I showed you that over here with this paper.
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56:31.000 --> 56:45.000
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And the addendum, which has a lot more data on what they found and undiluted samples and what they think they should have done with the primers and this kind of thing.
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56:45.000 --> 56:51.000
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So first they objected to it in short form and then they put an addendum that explained some of the things that they thought were wrong.
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56:51.000 --> 56:55.000
|
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Sorry, I'm looking at the camera, but you can't see me.
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56:55.000 --> 57:04.000
|
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And so this was already in 2020 and then the addendum was sometime in early 2021.
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57:04.000 --> 57:20.000
|
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And so first he came out objecting to the PCR test, but not.
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57:20.000 --> 57:31.000
|
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It's important to realize that not the use of PCR to detect COVID, but the specific design of the PCR test that was being used.
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57:31.000 --> 57:42.000
|
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In other words, it's fine to use PCR test to test for a novel virus during a pandemic. It's just not that the way you designed it.
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57:42.000 --> 57:45.000
|
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I know how to design it better.
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57:45.000 --> 57:49.000
|
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That's the first objection.
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57:49.000 --> 57:59.000
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The second objection that he had, I believe, was that the RNA wasn't pure.
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57:59.000 --> 58:09.000
|
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And this came from the regulatory agencies paperwork where there was a smear of RNA instead of what should have been a band.
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58:09.000 --> 58:20.000
|
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And the third thing he came out with was in concert with Stephanie Sineff.
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58:20.000 --> 58:29.000
|
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And that was the code on optimization.
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58:29.000 --> 58:31.000
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And why did he come out with that?
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58:31.000 --> 58:41.000
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I think it was because we came out with it around this a lot earlier and we were still pushing the idea that silent mutations can cause genetic diseases.
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58:41.000 --> 58:49.000
|
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Silent mutations are changes in the genetic code, which don't change the amino acid coded for in the RNA.
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58:49.000 --> 59:02.000
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But somehow or another, changing those codons that are synonymous codons can change the way the protein folds and still result in and actually often in disease.
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59:02.000 --> 59:10.000
|
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So part of the codon optimization problem is the idea that it will be folded differently than the viral protein will be folded.
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59:10.000 --> 59:17.000
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And then the second thing is the chemical alteration.
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59:17.000 --> 59:21.000
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And the chemical alteration is the pseudo-uridine, right?
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59:21.000 --> 59:31.000
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And the pseudo-uridines, as he said, could cause premature stop codons.
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59:31.000 --> 59:42.000
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And also other things, because they're we wobble bases, so you could cause substitutions as well.
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59:42.000 --> 59:48.000
|
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Sorry about that. I was looking through my glasses there for a minute.
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59:48.000 --> 59:54.000
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And so this is also RNA, right? This is also RNA.
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59:54.000 --> 01:00:02.000
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And it's two things really, but we put codon optimization and chemical alteration in the same, in the same bunch here.
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01:00:02.000 --> 01:00:13.000
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Then for about two weeks, I just mentioned it a minute ago, he said the LNP hadn't been dang it.
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01:00:13.000 --> 01:00:20.000
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hadn't been control tested.
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01:00:21.000 --> 01:00:30.000
|
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And he tweeted that out and he said he lamented that we might be throwing away the RNA or blaming the RNA because the lipid nanoparticle wasn't properly tested.
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01:00:30.000 --> 01:00:38.000
|
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Then that objection completely disappeared and then came the CDNA contamination.
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01:00:39.000 --> 01:00:50.000
|
|
Now what I want you to understand is that in all of these objections, there might be valid biology here.
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01:00:50.000 --> 01:00:55.000
|
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In fact, I believe there is.
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01:00:55.000 --> 01:01:00.000
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And it's valid biology that needed covering up and needed control.
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01:01:00.000 --> 01:01:03.000
|
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It needed muffling.
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01:01:04.000 --> 01:01:16.000
|
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It needed somebody that could be promoted in social media that would satisfy the need to be heard of other people.
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01:01:16.000 --> 01:01:18.000
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Like me.
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01:01:19.000 --> 01:01:33.000
|
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Me complaining needs to have somebody like Jessica Rose or Robert Malone or Kevin McKernan out ahead of me saying the things that I think need to be said so that I can cheer for them.
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01:01:33.000 --> 01:01:38.000
|
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Instead of promote me instead of think that my work needs to be done.
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01:01:38.000 --> 01:01:43.000
|
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I mean, my goodness, if these great people are doing it, what do I need to do?
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01:01:43.000 --> 01:01:53.000
|
|
And I believe that Kevin is likely a person that was installed on purpose to step in front of people like Claire Craig and Mike Eden and Thomas Binder.
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01:01:53.000 --> 01:02:02.000
|
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Look at this list of people that he was allowed to step with in front or out with together.
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01:02:03.000 --> 01:02:19.000
|
|
Thomas Binder, Mike Eden, Claire Craig, those three already are enough for me to believe that he was added to that paper or joined that paper just to make sure that he could be on them and influence them.
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01:02:19.000 --> 01:02:20.000
|
|
Should they need a phone call?
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01:02:20.000 --> 01:02:21.000
|
|
Remember me?
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01:02:21.000 --> 01:02:22.000
|
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I'm Kevin.
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01:02:22.000 --> 01:02:25.000
|
|
I got to straighten you out on something.
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01:02:25.000 --> 01:02:36.000
|
|
And then he goes through the PCR test to the RNA is in pure to the code on optimization and chemical alteration over the course of about a year and a half.
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|
01:02:36.000 --> 01:02:48.000
|
|
Keeping everybody running in this hamster wheel about what's going to be the right objection. Oh, is there another reason to object? Is there another reason to object? Oh, my goodness.
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01:02:48.000 --> 01:02:56.000
|
|
Then the LNP, then the DNA contamination and all the while in there, no one's ever talking about infectious clones.
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01:02:56.000 --> 01:03:00.000
|
|
All the while in there, nobody's talking about the swarm.
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01:03:00.000 --> 01:03:13.000
|
|
All the while in here, everybody is moving from one thing to another and not talking about transfection in its best form would be garbage.
|
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|
01:03:13.000 --> 01:03:23.000
|
|
And least of all is Kevin is definitely never saying that transfection of a healthy child is absolutely murderous.
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01:03:23.000 --> 01:03:28.000
|
|
It's absolutely foul.
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01:03:28.000 --> 01:03:32.000
|
|
But he's just saying that the DNA in there is foul.
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01:03:32.000 --> 01:03:38.000
|
|
We should be careful with it as we go forward as we regulate these things going forward.
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01:03:38.000 --> 01:03:50.000
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He should be saying because of all of these list of things, he should be saying that the injection of these kinds of things into healthy humans is dumb.
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01:03:50.000 --> 01:03:52.000
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But he's not saying that.
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01:03:52.000 --> 01:03:59.000
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And I need you to see it as clearly as possible. He's not saying that. He's never said that.
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01:03:59.000 --> 01:04:04.000
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He's never said that PCR shouldn't be used. He said it could be better.
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01:04:04.000 --> 01:04:11.000
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He's never said the RNA is dangerous and transfection should never be done. No, it could be better.
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01:04:11.000 --> 01:04:24.000
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It could be made cleaner. Maybe the LNP should have been tested better. Do you see it?
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01:04:25.000 --> 01:04:30.000
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I hope you can see it, ladies and gentlemen, that this is a elaborate hoax.
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01:04:30.000 --> 01:04:41.000
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We have been led by our noses and people are still being led by their noses to believe that this was just kind of an emergency worst-case scenario.
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01:04:41.000 --> 01:04:48.000
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We fumbled the ball a few times. Thankfully, we got it across the finish line. Next time, we'll do it better.
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01:04:48.000 --> 01:05:03.000
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And this illusion of consensus has been started with this illusion of consensus about gain of function viruses so that they can mislead our children and invert their freedoms to something of fascism.
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01:05:03.000 --> 01:05:18.000
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They did it by lying to us about this biology, this steady biology here in the sky blue and told us a narrative about these little tiny numbers down here.
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01:05:18.000 --> 01:05:30.000
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A narrative about a novel virus that everybody was vulnerable to that was detectable from a non-specific PCR test influenced by the fact that you could get a lot of money if you used it.
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01:05:30.000 --> 01:05:40.000
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And for a while, in the beginning, you didn't even have to use it and you could get a lot of money if you just said it was COVID and we know that, but none of those people will talk about it.
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01:05:40.000 --> 01:05:58.000
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Kevin won't ever say that that's a problem, that the protocols were a problem, that the protocols killed people for two and a half years and we called it COVID because it was handy for the national security state because we wanted to mislead the young
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01:05:58.000 --> 01:06:01.000
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because he's part of misleading the young.
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01:06:01.000 --> 01:06:08.000
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Wittingly or unwittingly, it's hard for me to believe he's unwittingly involved at this stage.
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01:06:08.000 --> 01:06:27.000
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Given that he's never really tried to become a friend, that despite the fact that we've had lots of contact together and been on stream lots of times, it's always been an antagonistic relationship that's friendly when we're on stream and when on Twitter, he's a dick on wheels.
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01:06:28.000 --> 01:06:31.000
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It's really extraordinary how these people behave.
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01:06:31.000 --> 01:06:43.000
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It's all because they want to sustain this illusion of consensus that I'm trying to break about gain a function virus leak that allowed them to change our minds about what we know about immunology.
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01:06:43.000 --> 01:06:50.000
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And once they changed our minds about what we know about immunology, they killed people with hospital protocols and called it COVID.
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01:06:51.000 --> 01:06:56.000
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That's what happened, ladies and gentlemen, this illusion of consensus allowed it to happen.
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01:06:56.000 --> 01:07:06.000
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And if we don't break this, it will brainwash our children into believing that they too experienced a lab leak in 2020.
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01:07:06.000 --> 01:07:15.000
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And that's the reason why they feel more comfortable with a shitty ass mask on their face as a teenager.
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01:07:15.000 --> 01:07:24.000
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It was really a conflated background signal, ladies and gentlemen, whether it's a real signal or a fake signal or a combination of planted signal and fake signal and real and fake.
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01:07:24.000 --> 01:07:27.000
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It doesn't matter.
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01:07:27.000 --> 01:07:32.000
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They've never proved to you that there was no signal in 2019.
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01:07:32.000 --> 01:07:39.000
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They never proved to you that there's any difference and they have not acknowledged how many people they killed in hospitals.
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01:07:39.000 --> 01:07:44.000
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And so as a conflated background signal, protocols were murdered in transfection is a medicine.
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01:07:44.000 --> 01:07:48.000
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It doesn't matter if it was an infectious clone or a transfection or whatever you want to call it.
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01:07:48.000 --> 01:07:52.000
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As long as you don't say there were no viruses.
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01:07:52.000 --> 01:07:57.000
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Because those people are the worst.
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01:07:57.000 --> 01:08:04.000
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I think they are mostly unwittingly thinking that they're doing something right because they're just not clever enough to know.
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01:08:04.000 --> 01:08:08.000
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But the ones that know they're just rotten.
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01:08:08.000 --> 01:08:14.000
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Absolutely rotten.
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01:08:14.000 --> 01:08:17.000
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They lied to us. That's for damn sure.
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01:08:17.000 --> 01:08:20.000
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They got lots of other people to lie to us.
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01:08:20.000 --> 01:08:27.000
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And they kept those people comfortable as long as they told the lie as long as they didn't cross the faith.
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01:08:27.000 --> 01:08:37.000
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And they have lucrative sub-stacks and sell books and make a living just fine and they don't address any of this anymore.
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01:08:37.000 --> 01:08:47.000
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The fact that Robert Malone and all these people don't talk about this stuff anymore is all you need to know because they should be repeating it all the time.
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01:08:47.000 --> 01:08:50.000
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And you know what's missing from this list?
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01:08:50.000 --> 01:08:52.000
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It should be obvious but they're up there.
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01:08:52.000 --> 01:08:54.000
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Protocols are murder.
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01:08:54.000 --> 01:08:58.000
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And nobody says it anymore.
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01:08:58.000 --> 01:09:03.000
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Because there's plan is going perfectly. We've already almost there.
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01:09:03.000 --> 01:09:06.000
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Our rights have almost all been inverted.
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01:09:06.000 --> 01:09:10.000
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And the data collection is about to begin.
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01:09:10.000 --> 01:09:13.000
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So buckle your seats, seat belts ladies and gentlemen.
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01:09:13.000 --> 01:09:20.000
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Intramuscular injection of any combination of substances with the intent of augmenting the immune system is probably dumb.
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01:09:20.000 --> 01:09:23.000
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And I know for sure the transfection is not immunization.
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01:09:23.000 --> 01:09:29.000
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The fact that these people won't say that is all you need to know.
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01:09:29.000 --> 01:09:34.000
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Stop all transfections in humans. I love you all very much. Thanks for coming.
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01:09:34.000 --> 01:09:40.000
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This has been a wonderful, painful stream for me.
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01:09:40.000 --> 01:09:48.000
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But I need to use my voice and I don't know I'd make a sit around all day.
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01:09:48.000 --> 01:09:52.000
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Thanks for listening and I'll see you guys again tomorrow.
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01:10:18.000 --> 01:10:24.000
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Thanks for listening.
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01:10:48.000 --> 01:11:13.000
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Thanks for making those clips, Jeff. Thanks, Jeff.
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01:11:18.000 --> 01:11:25.000
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Thank you.
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