You can not select more than 25 topics
Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
3059 lines
124 KiB
3059 lines
124 KiB
WEBVTT
|
|
|
|
01:30.000 --> 01:34.000
|
|
It was quite a plot, you kids, uncovered.
|
|
|
|
01:34.000 --> 01:38.000
|
|
Who would have suspected masters of dog-napping his own pet?
|
|
|
|
01:38.000 --> 01:42.000
|
|
He decided to win the dog show by dog-napping the only three dogs
|
|
|
|
01:42.000 --> 01:44.000
|
|
who could beat Big Red.
|
|
|
|
01:44.000 --> 01:48.000
|
|
Then Big Red was to turn up just before the show and win first prize.
|
|
|
|
01:48.000 --> 01:52.000
|
|
You said something about a phantom Indian on horseback. What about that?
|
|
|
|
01:52.000 --> 01:56.000
|
|
Simple. He used a movie projector from the back of his truck.
|
|
|
|
01:56.000 --> 02:00.000
|
|
Look, Jeronimo! He's back again!
|
|
|
|
02:26.000 --> 02:38.000
|
|
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is Gigong Biological.
|
|
|
|
02:44.000 --> 02:48.000
|
|
It's a high-resistance low-noise information brought to you by a biologist.
|
|
|
|
02:48.000 --> 02:52.000
|
|
It's the 14th of September, September, 2023.
|
|
|
|
02:52.000 --> 02:56.000
|
|
That means it's throwback Thursday.
|
|
|
|
03:14.000 --> 03:18.000
|
|
You'll notice these last few slides aren't changing in a while.
|
|
|
|
03:18.000 --> 03:22.000
|
|
It's because we're pretty solid on track here.
|
|
|
|
03:22.000 --> 03:30.000
|
|
Lots of people are starting to come to understand the pandemic as one great big Scooby Doo.
|
|
|
|
03:30.000 --> 03:36.000
|
|
And I think it's a really apt description of what's going on.
|
|
|
|
03:36.000 --> 03:42.000
|
|
Thank you very much for joining me. This is Gigong Biological High-Resistance Low Noise Information Brief brought to you by a biologist.
|
|
|
|
03:42.000 --> 03:50.000
|
|
My name is Jonathan Cooey, and this is going to be a little quick throwback Thursday hour
|
|
|
|
03:50.000 --> 03:54.000
|
|
where I want to review a German video from 2021.
|
|
|
|
03:54.000 --> 04:00.000
|
|
It should kind of help you not take the bait on TV and social media.
|
|
|
|
04:00.000 --> 04:04.000
|
|
There's just a lot of that going on right now.
|
|
|
|
04:04.000 --> 04:08.000
|
|
And so I just want to be sure that we all...
|
|
|
|
04:08.000 --> 04:11.000
|
|
Oh, I almost made that work.
|
|
|
|
04:11.000 --> 04:14.000
|
|
Then we're all on the same page here.
|
|
|
|
04:14.000 --> 04:20.000
|
|
You know, Sesame Street and PBS NewsHour are now making coloring sheets where the bravery bandage is there
|
|
|
|
04:20.000 --> 04:26.000
|
|
in order to invite children to color this page to celebrate getting vaccinated.
|
|
|
|
04:26.000 --> 04:36.000
|
|
There's not a whole hell of a lot we can do about this aspect of things at this moment.
|
|
|
|
04:36.000 --> 04:40.000
|
|
Other than to highlight the absurdity of such a coloring page.
|
|
|
|
04:40.000 --> 04:46.000
|
|
But be aware that it's there and be aware of...
|
|
|
|
04:46.000 --> 04:50.000
|
|
well, how seductive these kinds of things are.
|
|
|
|
04:50.000 --> 04:59.000
|
|
I think I'm going to try and go getvaccineanswers.org and see what's to be found there.
|
|
|
|
04:59.000 --> 05:04.000
|
|
So a few people or many people, lots of people inside and outside of government,
|
|
|
|
05:04.000 --> 05:10.000
|
|
inside and outside of industry, inside and outside of social media have changed the way we think.
|
|
|
|
05:10.000 --> 05:19.000
|
|
And it is the kind of lemming, herd mentality, conformist fear of speaking out that happens.
|
|
|
|
05:19.000 --> 05:27.000
|
|
The larger the group gets that social media has now sort of replaced with a fake feeling of consensus.
|
|
|
|
05:27.000 --> 05:37.000
|
|
And that fake feeling of consensus has been weaponized against us to make us think that certain things are really smart to think about.
|
|
|
|
05:37.000 --> 05:44.000
|
|
And certain kinds of simplifications and certain kinds of over complications are normal.
|
|
|
|
05:44.000 --> 05:47.000
|
|
And we accept them because other people on TV accept them.
|
|
|
|
05:47.000 --> 05:52.000
|
|
And as a result, they've been able to change our minds about our own biology.
|
|
|
|
05:52.000 --> 06:00.000
|
|
They've changed our minds about our vulnerability to respiratory viruses and why we might be vulnerable.
|
|
|
|
06:00.000 --> 06:08.000
|
|
They've changed our idea of why we all die every year, why there's 3 million people to die every year in America.
|
|
|
|
06:08.000 --> 06:18.000
|
|
They've changed the way we think about our own immune response to disease and kind of inverted it on his head to make us think exclusively about antibodies
|
|
|
|
06:18.000 --> 06:27.000
|
|
when there are a whole host of other autonomous cells that fight viral and pathological infection as well.
|
|
|
|
06:27.000 --> 06:36.000
|
|
And then they change the way we think about immunization and vaccination and how that is achieved, how immunity is achieved through these two methodologies.
|
|
|
|
06:36.000 --> 06:50.000
|
|
And this suite of changes was able to be achieved largely through the application of pressure, coercion and fear.
|
|
|
|
06:50.000 --> 06:53.000
|
|
And that caused doctors to change their behavior.
|
|
|
|
06:53.000 --> 07:07.000
|
|
It caused teachers to change their behavior and school boards and businesses and lawyers and people inside of the government and police officers and EMTs and everyone.
|
|
|
|
07:07.000 --> 07:18.000
|
|
And that resulted in millions of people dying for the wrong reason, maybe not even for a good reason, not a legitimate one, but a mistake.
|
|
|
|
07:18.000 --> 07:30.000
|
|
And so this is why it's a crime, this is why we have to investigate it because maybe hundreds of thousands of people were improperly treated, maybe even millions.
|
|
|
|
07:30.000 --> 07:42.000
|
|
And even on the small possibility that that's true, we need to back the truck up and figure out what's going on.
|
|
|
|
07:42.000 --> 08:01.000
|
|
And I believe that there are a lot of people again on TV and on social media and in the spotlight and behind the scenes that are working against the possibility that it will become common knowledge that a pandemic isn't really biologically possible.
|
|
|
|
08:01.000 --> 08:10.000
|
|
And that the only way an RNA sequence can show up in so many places at once in the world is as if it would put their insufficient quantity.
|
|
|
|
08:10.000 --> 08:19.000
|
|
Otherwise, it's just not possible. And that's really where this whole story starts and ends.
|
|
|
|
08:19.000 --> 08:29.000
|
|
And by controlling the discussion about the possibilities underlying the biology of the pandemic, i.e. what are the causes?
|
|
|
|
08:29.000 --> 08:42.000
|
|
What is the root cause of the pandemic? By controlling that debate very carefully from the very beginning, like the first day, that's how we got here.
|
|
|
|
08:42.000 --> 09:01.000
|
|
And we grossly underestimate, underestimated, especially in 2020, the extent to which they would go to control both sides of the narrative.
|
|
|
|
09:02.000 --> 09:23.000
|
|
And so a lot of the people that came out quite early in the pandemic are actually people that are unwittingly were involved in controlling that narrative that slowly evolved from a natural virus to a lab leak, eventually to a gain of function virus that was a lab leak.
|
|
|
|
09:24.000 --> 09:49.000
|
|
And this slow escalation of the severity of the story, the severity of the potential has actually worked perfectly in concert with the intended the intended plan to put more pressure on people to accept the countermeasures
|
|
|
|
09:49.000 --> 09:58.000
|
|
and to accept the idea that something bad happened and potentially it could be much worse next time.
|
|
|
|
09:58.000 --> 10:08.000
|
|
And now what I find such an interesting pattern here is that the people that have really questioned this narrative in all of its best forms,
|
|
|
|
10:08.000 --> 10:26.000
|
|
those people are largely marginalized and don't really gain much recognition relative to the people who have largely been on the side of this gain of function laboratory leak and the idea that it could come again and the idea that maybe the shots are screwed up because they were rushed, but we can fix them next time.
|
|
|
|
10:27.000 --> 10:49.000
|
|
That seems to be largely this what everybody in the red triangle thinks only people in the yellow have questioned more than the shot have questioned the novelty of the virus have questioned the sanctity of vaccine induced immunity have questioned the the primacy of of antibody based immunity.
|
|
|
|
10:50.000 --> 10:58.000
|
|
These people have been marginalized and for the most part cast out now as we have pushed forward over the course of these last three years.
|
|
|
|
10:58.000 --> 11:22.000
|
|
Some of these people have been have been absorbing some aspects of the skeptical narrative in the middle here where the protocols are still a question where spread is a question where variants are questioned those are not anything that anyone over here has really absorbed significantly.
|
|
|
|
11:22.000 --> 11:35.000
|
|
But just a little bit now has been absorbed some of the the the really true objections they're always going to be able to morph a little bit over here.
|
|
|
|
11:35.000 --> 11:48.000
|
|
And so that's what this is all about a controlled narrative and having people on both sides that you can trust that you know are not going to cross any big lines of the faith which is the novel virus we had to do something.
|
|
|
|
11:49.000 --> 11:59.000
|
|
The mRNA was rushed but it could have been better and it's since it was gained a function it could come again.
|
|
|
|
11:59.000 --> 12:17.000
|
|
And so I don't have to tell you that the the pandemic potential of bat caves that's accessible through cell culture and accessible through animal passage and also can be even enhanced by genetic manipulation is a suite of mythologies that has been laid down over the last
|
|
|
|
12:17.000 --> 12:33.000
|
|
couple decades with the overarching plan of using this mythology as an excuse for us to surrender our rights and invert from human rights to human permissions.
|
|
|
|
12:34.000 --> 12:53.000
|
|
And that's what the Scooby-Doo is about because again you're solving the mystery you think you solve the mystery everybody right now on TV and social media to the most part thinks that the lab leak is kind of a conclusion that everybody should come to because after the last three years it's obvious that they covered it up.
|
|
|
|
12:54.000 --> 13:12.000
|
|
Now I just want to point out here that the scenario that Dr. Giordano points out in his video is the idea that you see in a few sentinel cases and then you use the internet to claim asymptomatic transmission and then also you claim responsibility.
|
|
|
|
13:12.000 --> 13:20.000
|
|
Yes, I'm a terrorist and I released this bio weapon on you but then the real weapon I use is the internet.
|
|
|
|
13:20.000 --> 13:33.000
|
|
Right now the thing about that story and what's different about our story is that in that story he's telling a fictional story to a room of people who are in the military.
|
|
|
|
13:34.000 --> 13:45.000
|
|
And so it's a terrorist organization trying to use a bio weapon to scare a country into fragmenting and not trusting its government anymore.
|
|
|
|
13:46.000 --> 14:08.000
|
|
Now the scenario of seeding cases is very real but how would a national actor or a group of national actors come on to the scene and say that they may be involved in the virus in some way without saying that they're involved in the virus in some way.
|
|
|
|
14:08.000 --> 14:19.000
|
|
Well, the way that they would do it is they'd say first it's natural and then they would be caught in a cover up which is essentially like a whistleblower that comes out and says,
|
|
|
|
14:19.000 --> 14:26.000
|
|
Hey, I found a grant proposal and so it is basically the same story.
|
|
|
|
14:26.000 --> 14:46.000
|
|
We have a few seated cases of high fidelity likely clone generated sequences that are all the same from lots of different places in the world and those viruses don't change very much for the first six months because they originated from a clone.
|
|
|
|
14:46.000 --> 15:04.000
|
|
And then at some moment the PCR is not picking up that signal anymore but in fact is being used all over the world where that signal could have never gotten and picking up background coronavirus and over cycling of the PCR made that even worse.
|
|
|
|
15:04.000 --> 15:22.000
|
|
And so then here we are signaling a spreading virus went over only a very small portion of it ever had that sequence only a very small portion of it could have ever really been part of the original thing and none of it could have possibly been generated
|
|
|
|
15:22.000 --> 15:37.000
|
|
by a point release in Wuhan because then the virus that went to Italy would have been different forever from the virus that went to Africa or North America and that sequence would have never been Delta everywhere,
|
|
|
|
15:37.000 --> 15:40.000
|
|
Omicron everywhere or anything like that.
|
|
|
|
15:40.000 --> 15:43.000
|
|
That's not even remotely possible.
|
|
|
|
15:43.000 --> 15:49.000
|
|
That's the worst part of the narrative on television.
|
|
|
|
15:50.000 --> 16:05.000
|
|
And so the only way that this works the only way that it really makes sense is if there was a background signal and then there was the release of a clone to trigger the molecular signal around the world that you know some molecular biologists could call each other up and say
|
|
|
|
16:05.000 --> 16:10.000
|
|
we got a new one over here too and it's the same, I think it's the same sequence as yours.
|
|
|
|
16:10.000 --> 16:11.000
|
|
Wow, really?
|
|
|
|
16:11.000 --> 16:13.000
|
|
So is mine.
|
|
|
|
16:13.000 --> 16:18.000
|
|
Wow, really ours is the same too, which is just not possible.
|
|
|
|
16:18.000 --> 16:23.000
|
|
And the only remotely close example we have of that is SARS-1.
|
|
|
|
16:23.000 --> 16:34.000
|
|
The only data set we have from that is Alina Chan and that data set's not published but it clearly showed that the SARS-1 virus was changing at a much higher rate
|
|
|
|
16:35.000 --> 16:40.000
|
|
at the beginning when it first came out than this one ever achieved.
|
|
|
|
16:40.000 --> 16:43.000
|
|
And so how is that really possible?
|
|
|
|
16:43.000 --> 16:55.000
|
|
Well, it's only possible if we're looking at a background stable signal that's being, let's say, it's being misconstrued as spread.
|
|
|
|
16:55.000 --> 17:01.000
|
|
So if there is SARS virus in the background everywhere, then everywhere we sequence, we'd expect to find different ones.
|
|
|
|
17:01.000 --> 17:06.000
|
|
And so all they need to do is just tell us some story about a phylogeny, some story about change.
|
|
|
|
17:06.000 --> 17:11.000
|
|
And every time they want to make it serious, they can pick one that looks serious.
|
|
|
|
17:11.000 --> 17:20.000
|
|
It's just not a genuine tale of high fidelity molecular biology mystery solving.
|
|
|
|
17:20.000 --> 17:26.000
|
|
That's not what's happening on the gen-set database or whatever it's called.
|
|
|
|
17:26.000 --> 17:33.000
|
|
It's a carefully curated, probably, library of nonsense.
|
|
|
|
17:33.000 --> 17:40.000
|
|
And that's the unfortunate part is there are just some people who are going to be spectacularly committed to the lie.
|
|
|
|
17:40.000 --> 17:50.000
|
|
And have you believe that before the pandemic, we only had a few hundred, maybe even 50, full sequences of a coronavirus.
|
|
|
|
17:50.000 --> 18:02.000
|
|
And now, since we put our mind to it, we have several hundred thousand sequences of a coronavirus and a very detailed phylogeny of its evolution over the last three years.
|
|
|
|
18:02.000 --> 18:09.000
|
|
That in no way compares to any other phylogeny that we've ever measured in nature because we've never been able to do that before.
|
|
|
|
18:09.000 --> 18:27.000
|
|
And with the only one that we could have kind of done it with, we only got a few hundred sequences that show a speed of change, five orders of magnitude higher than this one, five times as much as this one.
|
|
|
|
18:27.000 --> 18:33.000
|
|
It's just incredible where we're at.
|
|
|
|
18:34.000 --> 18:45.000
|
|
So yeah, they released this virus and then they let out people that could tell us the story about what happened, which eventually became some debate between nature and a lab leak.
|
|
|
|
18:45.000 --> 18:57.000
|
|
And the truth is, is that with careful study and review, we've come to the conclusion that transfection is not immunization, that intramuscular injection is not a means of immunization.
|
|
|
|
18:58.000 --> 19:06.000
|
|
And so let's get right up to it. The Paul Schreier Pandemic Simulation Games is our throwback Thursday.
|
|
|
|
19:06.000 --> 19:15.000
|
|
I'm very excited about this because I think it's a really good video for us to share together.
|
|
|
|
19:15.000 --> 19:17.000
|
|
So let's check it out.
|
|
|
|
19:28.000 --> 19:40.000
|
|
Hello, my name is Paul Schreier. I'm a freelance journalist, author and co-editor of the magazine Multipolar.
|
|
|
|
19:40.000 --> 19:44.000
|
|
Today, I would like to talk about occurrences connected to the corona pandemic.
|
|
|
|
19:44.000 --> 19:55.000
|
|
The title of my talk, Pandemic Simulation Exercises Preparations for a New Age, indicates that it won't be about the present corona crisis, but about what has happened before.
|
|
|
|
19:56.000 --> 20:01.000
|
|
Indeed, most interesting events have taken place, to be specific pandemic simulations.
|
|
|
|
20:01.000 --> 20:17.000
|
|
The situation we are experiencing right now, the fear of a virus and ensuing measures that extremely restrict liberties, is exactly the situation that has been repeatedly and intensely trained and rehearsed in the past years, with all kinds of infectious disease simulations.
|
|
|
|
20:17.000 --> 20:24.000
|
|
What I am going to present to you now, are not speculations, but well-recorded and documented facts.
|
|
|
|
20:25.000 --> 20:28.000
|
|
I have chosen the subtitle Preparations for a New Age.
|
|
|
|
20:32.000 --> 20:46.000
|
|
Well, many people are under the impression that a new era has begun with this crisis, and that it might not be a good era, but one in which democratic structures are dismantled, an age in which liberties are phased out, reduced and abolished.
|
|
|
|
20:46.000 --> 20:52.000
|
|
With this talk, I would like to go some way towards a wider view, a more historical perspective.
|
|
|
|
20:52.000 --> 20:56.000
|
|
Let me just briefly say a few words about the table of contents.
|
|
|
|
20:56.000 --> 21:03.000
|
|
I will begin in the 1990s. Indeed, it was already in the 90s that we had the fight against terror as a political instrument.
|
|
|
|
21:03.000 --> 21:07.000
|
|
Then I will present several bioterror simulation exercises.
|
|
|
|
21:07.000 --> 21:20.000
|
|
After that, we will take a look at the very interesting lockstep scenario in 2010, and then investigate a few more recent pandemic simulation exercises that were executed during the Trump presidency.
|
|
|
|
21:21.000 --> 21:27.000
|
|
My final topic are the events at the stock market in September 2019.
|
|
|
|
21:27.000 --> 21:34.000
|
|
In my view, this is an interesting, a crucial topic, which you do not find in the book that I have written about this subject.
|
|
|
|
21:34.000 --> 21:41.000
|
|
So, for all of you who have already read my book, this topic probably contains information which might be new for you.
|
|
|
|
21:44.000 --> 21:49.000
|
|
Yes, a new era is beginning. What is the era that has come to an end?
|
|
|
|
21:49.000 --> 21:54.000
|
|
Well, of course, it is the era of the Cold War, which has ended in 1990.
|
|
|
|
21:54.000 --> 21:57.000
|
|
Let us briefly recall what kind of age it was.
|
|
|
|
21:57.000 --> 22:04.000
|
|
As you all know, it was marked by the two superpowers confronting each other to Soviet Union on the one side and the US on the other.
|
|
|
|
22:04.000 --> 22:09.000
|
|
Or to put it more generally, the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc facing each other.
|
|
|
|
22:09.000 --> 22:15.000
|
|
Both were heavily armed with nuclear weapons and threatened each other with total annihilation.
|
|
|
|
22:15.000 --> 22:20.000
|
|
That was the global situation from approximately 1945 until 1990.
|
|
|
|
22:20.000 --> 22:24.000
|
|
It was a situation shaped by a lot of fears and great insecurity.
|
|
|
|
22:24.000 --> 22:27.000
|
|
Many people were afraid of the threat of nuclear war.
|
|
|
|
22:27.000 --> 22:38.000
|
|
Now, is it entirely crazy to think that they might not have had 5,000 nuclear warheads in the USSR aimed at us?
|
|
|
|
22:38.000 --> 22:43.000
|
|
And we might not have had 3,000 warheads aimed at them.
|
|
|
|
22:43.000 --> 22:53.000
|
|
That the Soviet Union might not have had enough warheads to destroy the Earth 8 times over and we didn't have enough to destroy it 5 times over.
|
|
|
|
22:53.000 --> 23:06.000
|
|
But it was useful to tell that story, useful to tell that story in secret meetings, useful to tell that story on the second page of a newspaper or in the editorial.
|
|
|
|
23:07.000 --> 23:17.000
|
|
Have you ever considered the possibility that even if we could make nuclear weapons that we wouldn't make thousands of them?
|
|
|
|
23:17.000 --> 23:33.000
|
|
And yet somehow if you question the whole narrative possibility of nuclear weapons and whether they exist, it's not the same as questioning if they exist would we make thousands of them?
|
|
|
|
23:33.000 --> 23:38.000
|
|
And could we make ones that are 10 times the size of the ones we used to have?
|
|
|
|
23:38.000 --> 23:43.000
|
|
And if we could, why would we make them?
|
|
|
|
23:43.000 --> 23:55.000
|
|
And so I think it's worth considering now that we're looking at the pandemic as a Scooby-Doo to think about how many other facts in history are actually kind of the same thing.
|
|
|
|
23:55.000 --> 24:09.000
|
|
An exaggeration of what really happened in order to make sure that the mythology around that historical event or that series of historical events could be used to govern in the future.
|
|
|
|
24:09.000 --> 24:11.000
|
|
I think it's really important point.
|
|
|
|
24:11.000 --> 24:14.000
|
|
Which was an absolutely real possibility.
|
|
|
|
24:14.000 --> 24:17.000
|
|
Several times an outbreak of a nuclear war was imminent.
|
|
|
|
24:18.000 --> 24:21.000
|
|
1962 there was the Cuban Missile Crisis.
|
|
|
|
24:21.000 --> 24:32.000
|
|
In the 80s as well there were a few highly precarious situations that might readily have escalated into a full-scale nuclear war, which was only prevented with a lot of luck at the last moment.
|
|
|
|
24:32.000 --> 24:34.000
|
|
At least that's how we see it today.
|
|
|
|
24:34.000 --> 24:43.000
|
|
So when you put the above in a wider historical context, that Cold War period was an absolutely crazy time with a threat so massive and existential.
|
|
|
|
24:43.000 --> 24:49.000
|
|
But this period came to a close in 1990, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall.
|
|
|
|
24:49.000 --> 24:53.000
|
|
A great sigh of relief was felt all over the world.
|
|
|
|
24:53.000 --> 25:06.000
|
|
The Soviet Union disintegrated, there was Glaznosten, Paris Troika, a process that had already begun in the second half of the 80s when reforms were initiated in Eastern Bloc countries that led to greater liberties.
|
|
|
|
25:06.000 --> 25:09.000
|
|
People breath the size of relief.
|
|
|
|
25:09.000 --> 25:15.000
|
|
With the sense of greater freedom, fears dissipated not only for the populace of former communist countries.
|
|
|
|
25:15.000 --> 25:24.000
|
|
That was basically the attitude towards life from the 1990s onwards, not all over the world of course, but in great many parts of it, especially in the Eastern Bloc.
|
|
|
|
25:28.000 --> 25:32.000
|
|
That period, however, did not please everyone.
|
|
|
|
25:32.000 --> 25:40.000
|
|
There were influential groups of people that had a big problem with this kind of development, for example the military and the entire defense complex.
|
|
|
|
25:40.000 --> 25:44.000
|
|
Because with the collapse of the USSR, the enemy was gone.
|
|
|
|
25:44.000 --> 25:49.000
|
|
How could you now justify to maintain such an immense military budget?
|
|
|
|
25:49.000 --> 25:59.000
|
|
Here we have the picture of an American aircraft carrier, which is the symbol par excellence for the security state and the military, the necessity of exercising power all over the world,
|
|
|
|
25:59.000 --> 26:03.000
|
|
for which the military juggernaut and such weapon systems are needed.
|
|
|
|
26:03.000 --> 26:06.000
|
|
How could that be justified from now on?
|
|
|
|
26:10.000 --> 26:20.000
|
|
Well, I found a striking quote of Colin Powell from this period, who at that time was the highest military official of the US and thus the chief military advisor to the president.
|
|
|
|
26:20.000 --> 26:23.000
|
|
Later he became Secretary of State.
|
|
|
|
26:23.000 --> 26:33.000
|
|
In 1991, he said in a newspaper interview, with a slightly sarcastic undertone, but he certainly was serious, I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of villains.
|
|
|
|
26:33.000 --> 26:36.000
|
|
I'm down to Castro and Kim Il-sung.
|
|
|
|
26:38.000 --> 26:50.000
|
|
At the time, Castro was president of Cuba and Kim Il-sung, president of North Korea, thus referring to two of the few remaining communist countries that couldn't seriously serve as formidable enemies.
|
|
|
|
26:50.000 --> 27:01.000
|
|
The countries were way too insignificant and much too weak in regards to their military force, so how could the US claim an earnest after 1990 that a strong military complex was still needed?
|
|
|
|
27:04.000 --> 27:11.000
|
|
It wasn't that context and with that key problem that the fight against terror began in the 90s.
|
|
|
|
27:11.000 --> 27:20.000
|
|
It truly was a historical turning point, symbolized by the change of political actors. President George Bush Sr. was succeeded by Bill Clinton.
|
|
|
|
27:20.000 --> 27:28.000
|
|
Bush had been strongly influenced by the Cold War. It was not only as CIA director in the 70s that he could be called a cold warrior.
|
|
|
|
27:28.000 --> 27:32.000
|
|
So that transition of power from Bush to Clinton steered up hope.
|
|
|
|
27:32.000 --> 27:43.000
|
|
Yes, the election of Clinton was a sign of hope for many. He was not at all considered a hawk, but an open-minded young president who was inaugurated in January 1993.
|
|
|
|
27:44.000 --> 27:53.000
|
|
Just a few weeks later, there was a terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, with the Twin Towers still erect since this was long before 9-11.
|
|
|
|
27:54.000 --> 28:05.000
|
|
The detonation in the underground car park of the North Tower, here a picture from February 1993, was the greatest ever terror attack in the history of the USA with 700 injured.
|
|
|
|
28:06.000 --> 28:08.000
|
|
The car park was completely devastated.
|
|
|
|
28:11.000 --> 28:16.000
|
|
The intention was to bring down those towers, a scheme that was ultimately accomplished in 2001.
|
|
|
|
28:17.000 --> 28:20.000
|
|
The backers of this bombing are said to have been Islamists.
|
|
|
|
28:24.000 --> 28:31.000
|
|
The next year President Clinton announced his national security strategy, something that per se was not that unusual.
|
|
|
|
28:32.000 --> 28:35.000
|
|
Basically, almost every president releases ANS as report.
|
|
|
|
28:36.000 --> 28:41.000
|
|
Clinton here specified his vision and explained where he intended to set his priorities.
|
|
|
|
28:42.000 --> 28:44.000
|
|
I would like to quote from it, because it is quite interesting.
|
|
|
|
28:45.000 --> 28:51.000
|
|
Clinton said that the Cold War may be over, but the need for American leadership abroad remains as strong as ever.
|
|
|
|
28:52.000 --> 28:57.000
|
|
I am committed to forging a new public consensus to sustain our active engagement abroad.
|
|
|
|
28:59.000 --> 29:04.000
|
|
Well, this is, so to speak, code language. You might be familiar with that kind of wording.
|
|
|
|
29:05.000 --> 29:11.000
|
|
Active engagement abroad means nothing other than military interventions abroad or wars, just sugarcoating.
|
|
|
|
29:12.000 --> 29:15.000
|
|
The crucial point here is that Clinton expresses the need for public consensus.
|
|
|
|
29:16.000 --> 29:25.000
|
|
He makes clear that he desires consensus so that we can continue to use our military anywhere, which means this consensus did not exist at the time.
|
|
|
|
29:26.000 --> 29:28.000
|
|
To the contrary, there were heated debates.
|
|
|
|
29:30.000 --> 29:33.000
|
|
People said we want a peace DVD now. That was the cue.
|
|
|
|
29:34.000 --> 29:40.000
|
|
We want the money that for decades was spent for armament, those funds should now be used for building our own national economy.
|
|
|
|
29:41.000 --> 29:45.000
|
|
Our society should benefit. The defense budget should be reduced.
|
|
|
|
29:46.000 --> 29:50.000
|
|
And indeed, in the 1990s, the budget was cut back because of public pressure.
|
|
|
|
29:52.000 --> 29:58.000
|
|
So that was 1994, and now we get to 1995, or more specifically, March 95.
|
|
|
|
29:59.000 --> 30:08.000
|
|
This is a picture of Joe Biden, now US President, who 25 years ago already had an important function as he headed the Senate Judiciary Committee.
|
|
|
|
30:09.000 --> 30:12.000
|
|
Here he is pictured in the Senate introducing a law.
|
|
|
|
30:13.000 --> 30:20.000
|
|
It was a law that should give more power to the president and in general to the executive branch in case of a major terror attack.
|
|
|
|
30:25.000 --> 30:28.000
|
|
That law was met with great resistance at the time.
|
|
|
|
30:29.000 --> 30:33.000
|
|
Looking into press archives, we can see that there was a passionate debate on that law.
|
|
|
|
30:34.000 --> 30:40.000
|
|
We learned that influential civil liberties groups immediately went to the barricades and expressed that that was going too far.
|
|
|
|
30:41.000 --> 30:45.000
|
|
No special powers for the president and the government. Everything should be democratically controlled.
|
|
|
|
30:46.000 --> 30:48.000
|
|
We do not want that law. Great resistance.
|
|
|
|
30:52.000 --> 30:56.000
|
|
A few weeks later, in April 95, another terrorist attack happened.
|
|
|
|
30:57.000 --> 31:00.000
|
|
This time it was aimed at a federal building in Oklahoma City.
|
|
|
|
31:00.000 --> 31:07.000
|
|
Since this was before 9-11, the attack was again the largest and deadliest single terrorist attack in US history.
|
|
|
|
31:08.000 --> 31:11.000
|
|
Around 170 people died and roughly 1,000 were injured.
|
|
|
|
31:12.000 --> 31:16.000
|
|
We can see that the damage is immense, a truck bomb with two tons of explosives.
|
|
|
|
31:17.000 --> 31:18.000
|
|
It was a gigantic damage.
|
|
|
|
31:19.000 --> 31:25.000
|
|
Public attention on the subject of terrorism skyrocketed with this attack and remained high for a long time afterwards.
|
|
|
|
31:26.000 --> 31:35.000
|
|
This attack on the federal building in Oklahoma City truly was a milestone, a divide, a defining moment for the subject of terrorism.
|
|
|
|
31:36.000 --> 31:40.000
|
|
Now the danger of terrorism was perceived differently. It attained new meaning.
|
|
|
|
31:43.000 --> 31:52.000
|
|
There is a lot of secondary footage from the Oklahoma City bombing which indicated that there were several devices on the site.
|
|
|
|
31:53.000 --> 32:05.000
|
|
A guy by the name of Ted Gunderson has been reporting for a very long time that actually you can't make an explosion like what was done there in the federal building where I just blew up one side of the street
|
|
|
|
32:06.000 --> 32:08.000
|
|
and took down the whole face of that building.
|
|
|
|
32:09.000 --> 32:15.000
|
|
He said it was some kind of device called the Pineapple Bomb which had some kind of directionality to it.
|
|
|
|
32:16.000 --> 32:34.000
|
|
But anyway, already back in 1997 there was quite a good portion of the people that were reading understood that it was likely that whatever happened in Oklahoma City was being orchestrated and covered it up.
|
|
|
|
32:35.000 --> 32:38.000
|
|
Timothy McVey wasn't some mastermind dude.
|
|
|
|
32:39.000 --> 32:41.000
|
|
Certainly not somebody capable of doing that.
|
|
|
|
32:42.000 --> 32:49.000
|
|
Writing this wave, the wave of terrorism so to speak, fears were fueled.
|
|
|
|
32:53.000 --> 33:04.000
|
|
This year is a newspaper article from 1997. It was however not written by journalists but by politicians, namely the CIA director at the time, James Woolsey, and a very high Pentagon official.
|
|
|
|
33:05.000 --> 33:12.000
|
|
The title of the article is Defend Against a Shadow Enemy.
|
|
|
|
33:13.000 --> 33:18.000
|
|
The first sentence directly refers to the two great attacks which I just mentioned, to quote,
|
|
|
|
33:19.000 --> 33:25.000
|
|
the destruction of the federal building in Oklahoma City and the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York shocked Americans.
|
|
|
|
33:26.000 --> 33:35.000
|
|
But, and this is the pivotal point, those tragedies would have been far worse if nuclear, biological or chemical materials had been involved.
|
|
|
|
33:36.000 --> 33:47.000
|
|
The authors further on in the article explain that the danger of chemical and biological weapons in the hands of terrorists is real and would be the most likely physical threat to the US homeland.
|
|
|
|
33:48.000 --> 33:51.000
|
|
Great efforts need to be put in to guard against it.
|
|
|
|
33:56.000 --> 34:00.000
|
|
This article is only one example of the media campaign at that time.
|
|
|
|
34:01.000 --> 34:03.000
|
|
A lot of articles were actually published in this vein.
|
|
|
|
34:04.000 --> 34:07.000
|
|
Now I would like to present you another example of the same year.
|
|
|
|
34:08.000 --> 34:17.000
|
|
William Cohen, then Secretary of Defense, announced during a press conference here at the top on the agenda that chemical and biological weapons would be likely.
|
|
|
|
34:17.000 --> 34:46.000
|
|
I really need you to see that this is so parallel to what Marco like has been teaching us and bringing to us on his show, which is that around the turn before the year 2000, there was this ongoing campaign to again pivot this threat from terrorism to bioterrorism and chemical and biological weapons.
|
|
|
|
34:47.000 --> 34:53.000
|
|
And so here we are in 1997, William Cohen is already in front of the Pentagon talking about it.
|
|
|
|
34:54.000 --> 35:06.000
|
|
I think William Cohen might be the guy who goes on ABC News and says that a flower bag size with a bag of flowers saying this much anthrax could kill a lot of people like a city or something.
|
|
|
|
35:07.000 --> 35:15.000
|
|
The elements of future warfare and with that claim he justifies to put one billion dollar more into the defense budget within the next five years.
|
|
|
|
35:18.000 --> 35:24.000
|
|
So you can see that from the beginning we are dealing with large sums of money, huge budgets justified by that.
|
|
|
|
35:27.000 --> 35:33.000
|
|
In the same year William Cohen appeared before the press in quite a different manner as guest on a morning show.
|
|
|
|
35:34.000 --> 35:40.000
|
|
That was not like a press briefing at the Pentagon, but a program where the viewers usually are not confronted with politics.
|
|
|
|
35:41.000 --> 35:46.000
|
|
We sat there on the morning show holding up a five pound bag of sugar.
|
|
|
|
35:48.000 --> 36:01.000
|
|
He said if Saddam Hussein sprayed an equivalent amount of anthrax over a city like Washington DC, at least half of the inhabitants would with one breath be sent into writhing death throes and probably die within five days.
|
|
|
|
36:02.000 --> 36:03.000
|
|
There you go. I told you.
|
|
|
|
36:03.000 --> 36:06.000
|
|
Most of the TV show were speechless and backed him to stop.
|
|
|
|
36:10.000 --> 36:14.000
|
|
This TV appearance made waves in the press because the example had been so drastic.
|
|
|
|
36:15.000 --> 36:21.000
|
|
It is quite clear. I can't help but identify such a statement as fear mongering or scare tactics.
|
|
|
|
36:22.000 --> 36:24.000
|
|
It obviously was employed to trigger extreme fears.
|
|
|
|
36:25.000 --> 36:30.000
|
|
People were talked into believing that they were in immediate mortal danger. That was the mood.
|
|
|
|
36:33.000 --> 36:37.000
|
|
In the second half of the 90s, that kind of gloom was worked up more and more.
|
|
|
|
36:38.000 --> 36:40.000
|
|
On the one side, a new threat was declared and debated.
|
|
|
|
36:41.000 --> 36:47.000
|
|
On the other side, that self-same dangerous weaponry was being fabricated by U.S. facilities at one and the same time.
|
|
|
|
36:48.000 --> 36:52.000
|
|
This is an interesting fact unbeknownst to me before I did research on this subject.
|
|
|
|
36:53.000 --> 36:59.000
|
|
In 1997, highly questionable research into bio warfare agents was conducted in the U.S.
|
|
|
|
37:00.000 --> 37:05.000
|
|
There was, for example, the covert CIA project Clear Vision, an effort to create a bacteria bomblet.
|
|
|
|
37:06.000 --> 37:12.000
|
|
Project Jefferson of the Pentagon's DIA was aiming to reproduce a genetically modified strain of the anthrax bacterium.
|
|
|
|
37:13.000 --> 37:20.000
|
|
These laboratory studies of offensive biological weapons agents were conducted in absolute secrecy without any parliamentary control.
|
|
|
|
37:21.000 --> 37:26.000
|
|
It was only in September 2001 that these doings were unveiled in a New York Times article.
|
|
|
|
37:27.000 --> 37:29.000
|
|
There upon a press conference was convened.
|
|
|
|
37:30.000 --> 37:35.000
|
|
The Pentagon claimed that it was mere defensively-minded research, which is of course quite nonsensical.
|
|
|
|
37:36.000 --> 37:41.000
|
|
When bio warfare agents are created in secret, it's certainly not defensive research.
|
|
|
|
37:44.000 --> 37:53.000
|
|
At that time, this man took center stage, Colonel Robert Cadlak, who had served as UN bio weapons inspector in the Iraq War in 1991.
|
|
|
|
37:54.000 --> 38:01.000
|
|
He was one of the leading U.S. bio weapons experts, who in 1998, in an internal strategy paper of the Pentagon, wrote the following.
|
|
|
|
38:02.000 --> 38:07.000
|
|
This quote was pointed out to me by my colleague Doug Pullman. It is remarkable and he serves closer attention.
|
|
|
|
38:12.000 --> 38:20.000
|
|
Using biological weapons under the cover of an endemic or natural disease occurrence provides an attacker the potential for plausible denial.
|
|
|
|
38:21.000 --> 38:33.000
|
|
Biological warfare's potential to create significant economic loss and subsequent political instability, coupled with plausible denial, exceeds the possibilities of any other known weapon.
|
|
|
|
38:34.000 --> 38:36.000
|
|
The nyre-cram of loss and subsequent-
|
|
|
|
38:37.000 --> 38:38.000
|
|
Do you hear this?
|
|
|
|
38:39.000 --> 38:50.000
|
|
Using biological weapons under the cover of an endemic or natural disease occurrence provides an attacker the potential for plausible denial.
|
|
|
|
38:51.000 --> 39:03.000
|
|
Biological warfare's potential to create significant economic loss and subsequent political instability, coupled with plausible denial, exceeds the possibilities of any other known weapon.
|
|
|
|
39:08.000 --> 39:23.000
|
|
If you use a bio weapon that is able to be plausibly denied because it's also endemic, it's the best kind of bio weapon, says Robert Cadlak.
|
|
|
|
39:24.000 --> 39:51.000
|
|
So if you had a background of coronaviruses and then you used a coronavirus to claim that there was a pandemic and then piggybacked on the background in order to cause the pandemic with PCR, do you see how easy it is to see how these subtle changes in the way that Robert Cadlak speaks or the way that the Giordano speaks?
|
|
|
|
39:51.000 --> 40:16.000
|
|
That you can get really quickly toward a scenario where an absolutely harmless exosomic signal called coronaviruses that had been looked at as a possibility for a wide variety of biological tech applications has now suddenly become the central danger that mother nature presents to us
|
|
|
|
40:16.000 --> 40:32.000
|
|
in an everlasting potential danger in the future because people can tweak them and then now we have Robert Cadlak saying in 1998 that the best one would be to have a virus that was also endemic so then you can kind of use it as an excuse.
|
|
|
|
40:33.000 --> 40:45.000
|
|
And so you can already see them thinking about how can they use the endemic signal, how can they use an existing virus as a weapon?
|
|
|
|
40:45.000 --> 41:00.000
|
|
And then you get somebody like Giordano or someone else who taught Giordano to come along and say, hey, we don't even need a weapon if we can convince people that what is out there represents the potential for danger.
|
|
|
|
41:00.000 --> 41:20.000
|
|
So that if they just test positive for something, they might already take on the average, very dangerous treatments in order to avoid this hypothetical worst-case scenario outcome from this non-able thing that's actually just a signal in the background and they don't even know it.
|
|
|
|
41:21.000 --> 41:23.000
|
|
I hear it perfectly.
|
|
|
|
41:25.000 --> 41:30.000
|
|
Those sentences must be regarded within the historical context of the late 90s.
|
|
|
|
41:30.000 --> 41:35.000
|
|
Robert Cadlak warns that enemies of the USA might use such bio-weapons against them.
|
|
|
|
41:35.000 --> 41:43.000
|
|
When you read the paper carefully, however, you notice that the author on several occasions stresses the potential for plausible denier.
|
|
|
|
41:45.000 --> 41:48.000
|
|
That makes you prick up your ears somewhat.
|
|
|
|
41:51.000 --> 41:58.000
|
|
Right at that time, an institution was found at which today looms large given our situation.
|
|
|
|
41:58.000 --> 42:03.000
|
|
I am referring to what today is called the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.
|
|
|
|
42:03.000 --> 42:08.000
|
|
You probably have come across that name within the context of the corona crisis.
|
|
|
|
42:08.000 --> 42:19.000
|
|
This institution has played a major role since vital data pertaining to corona are being compiled, displayed and analyzed on a global dashboard, which was developed in January 2020.
|
|
|
|
42:19.000 --> 42:21.000
|
|
These data are disseminated by...
|
|
|
|
42:21.000 --> 42:26.000
|
|
Actually, it was developed much earlier than that by a guy named John Cullen, right?
|
|
|
|
42:26.000 --> 42:33.000
|
|
He used to work for some company that made that dashboard and so when he saw the dashboard and it was all read, he was like, wait a minute.
|
|
|
|
42:34.000 --> 42:36.000
|
|
Media all over the world.
|
|
|
|
42:36.000 --> 42:48.000
|
|
The center was founded in 1998 under another name, Center for Civilian Bio Defense Strategies, so we can see that name obviously still has a somewhat military ring to it.
|
|
|
|
42:49.000 --> 42:56.000
|
|
Later, in terms of public image, the emphasis would be on health. The focus, though, has always been the same.
|
|
|
|
42:59.000 --> 43:07.000
|
|
This center has organized a few very important and essential simulation exercises in the field of disaster response strategies.
|
|
|
|
43:07.000 --> 43:12.000
|
|
I would like to go into this subject more in detail. It started in 1999.
|
|
|
|
43:13.000 --> 43:21.000
|
|
The center came into being with the help of the Sloan Foundation, which was established by then-president of General Motors, Alfred Sloan.
|
|
|
|
43:21.000 --> 43:26.000
|
|
The Sloan Foundation is a very large sponsor of the PBS NewsHour.
|
|
|
|
43:27.000 --> 43:29.000
|
|
Who has died long since?
|
|
|
|
43:29.000 --> 43:35.000
|
|
The Sloan Foundation managers have put many, many millions into these bioterror exercises.
|
|
|
|
43:36.000 --> 43:41.000
|
|
So in 1999, just one year after establishing the center, a first conference was organized.
|
|
|
|
43:42.000 --> 43:54.000
|
|
Many hundreds of participants from 10 countries met in Arlington, home to the Pentagon, were the capital directly across the Potomac, for a national symposium on medical and public health response to bioterrorism.
|
|
|
|
43:55.000 --> 44:00.000
|
|
At this conference, problems arising in the wake of a bioterror attack were assessed and discussed.
|
|
|
|
44:00.000 --> 44:03.000
|
|
It was a big event that February, 1999.
|
|
|
|
44:04.000 --> 44:15.000
|
|
Here we have the organizing agency, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefence Strategies, in collaboration with the Department of Health and various other scientific organizations.
|
|
|
|
44:20.000 --> 44:24.000
|
|
In the context of this conference, a simulation exercise took place for the first time.
|
|
|
|
44:25.000 --> 44:33.000
|
|
It was the real-life replication of a smallpox terrorist attack in the U.S., where the resulting smallpox epidemic and a massive number of victims.
|
|
|
|
44:34.000 --> 44:37.000
|
|
How could the situation be effectively addressed?
|
|
|
|
44:38.000 --> 44:49.000
|
|
Just picture experts from various fields, sitting at a conference desk in a role play, acting as officials in different functions, talking to each other just as these people would communicate in such a crisis.
|
|
|
|
44:50.000 --> 44:54.000
|
|
See them conduct a mock telephone conference coordinating strategic responses.
|
|
|
|
44:55.000 --> 45:02.000
|
|
That kind of conference was acted out by who says what and who should decide what, where do conflicts and problems arise.
|
|
|
|
45:07.000 --> 45:10.000
|
|
In the final report on the exercise, we find the following quotes.
|
|
|
|
45:11.000 --> 45:14.000
|
|
How far can police go to detain current-time patients?
|
|
|
|
45:14.000 --> 45:18.000
|
|
A consensus must be reached as how to proceed with the vaccinations.
|
|
|
|
45:18.000 --> 45:21.000
|
|
Should martial law have been implemented?
|
|
|
|
45:21.000 --> 45:24.000
|
|
How to control the message going to the public?
|
|
|
|
45:26.000 --> 45:33.000
|
|
These kinds of questions were discussed there in 1999, questions that remind us obviously a lot of our present time.
|
|
|
|
45:33.000 --> 45:43.000
|
|
One of the speakers there was Richard Clark, a high-level counter-terrorism advisor to the U.S. government, who emphasized the fact that, for the first time, the Department of Health,
|
|
|
|
45:43.000 --> 45:47.000
|
|
is part of the national security apparatus of the United States.
|
|
|
|
45:47.000 --> 45:54.000
|
|
Indeed, at that time, a new path was treated and that these public health issues were rendered military problems.
|
|
|
|
45:57.000 --> 46:03.000
|
|
In itself, same year, 1999, the Pentagon continued its bio-weapons research.
|
|
|
|
46:04.000 --> 46:05.000
|
|
What's the date there?
|
|
|
|
46:05.000 --> 46:08.000
|
|
For example, Project Backos, a covert program in the desert of Nevada.
|
|
|
|
46:08.000 --> 46:12.000
|
|
The goal was to find out whether it was possible for terrorists.
|
|
|
|
46:12.000 --> 46:14.000
|
|
What's the date there?
|
|
|
|
46:15.000 --> 46:19.000
|
|
New York Times, 4th of September, 2001.
|
|
|
|
46:19.000 --> 46:21.000
|
|
Do you see?
|
|
|
|
46:21.000 --> 46:38.000
|
|
I mean, it's really impressive. Mark has really stitched this up so well with regard to letting us see how maybe September 11th wasn't quite what we thought it was.
|
|
|
|
46:38.000 --> 46:46.000
|
|
I don't know, but I'm interested to see what this guy, Paul Schreier, is going to frame September 11th as.
|
|
|
|
46:46.000 --> 46:48.000
|
|
Program in the desert of Nevada.
|
|
|
|
46:48.000 --> 46:57.000
|
|
The goal was to find out whether it was possible for terrorists to construct a small anthrax production facility by just using off-the-shelf equipment.
|
|
|
|
46:57.000 --> 47:04.000
|
|
After a few months, the Pentagon specialists did actually succeed in reaching their goal and managed to produce a few pounds of anthrax.
|
|
|
|
47:04.000 --> 47:09.000
|
|
It was only several years later that this Pentagon project was disclosed.
|
|
|
|
47:09.000 --> 47:23.000
|
|
When we now assume evil purposes, the Pentagon here will develop the capability to perform a bioterror attack while claiming that it must have been the work of some terrorists since all necessary ingredients were readily available in the stores.
|
|
|
|
47:23.000 --> 47:33.000
|
|
So let us note that this extremely dangerous skill was developed at that time right there on this military base in Nevada, where in former years nuclear weapons were tested.
|
|
|
|
47:33.000 --> 47:40.000
|
|
Now in the 1990s, the base was used for bioweapons research, far from any settlement.
|
|
|
|
47:40.000 --> 47:47.000
|
|
The pandemic simulation exercises went on.
|
|
|
|
47:47.000 --> 47:56.000
|
|
Already by the next year, the second National Symposium on the response to bioterrorism took place at the same conference venue organized by the same institution.
|
|
|
|
47:56.000 --> 48:02.000
|
|
The only difference was that this time the focal problem was not smallpox, but the plague.
|
|
|
|
48:02.000 --> 48:06.000
|
|
This year is the original website of the event of the year 2000.
|
|
|
|
48:06.000 --> 48:14.000
|
|
By the way, all the documents I have used are generally accessible on the Internet, so all quotations are verifiable since they are publicly available.
|
|
|
|
48:14.000 --> 48:19.000
|
|
If you would like to investigate or subject yourself, you can find the documents quite easily.
|
|
|
|
48:19.000 --> 48:21.000
|
|
It's not whistle-blower material.
|
|
|
|
48:21.000 --> 48:31.000
|
|
So you can see here Margaret Hamburg, Thomas Inglesby, somebody we know still, Michael Ulsterholm, of course we know very well.
|
|
|
|
48:31.000 --> 48:40.000
|
|
Tara O'Toole, we know her from, I think she's at the University of Pittsburgh, even if I recall correctly, or at least used to be.
|
|
|
|
48:40.000 --> 48:44.000
|
|
That's quite a list, all the same show.
|
|
|
|
48:44.000 --> 48:46.000
|
|
It's pretty impressive.
|
|
|
|
48:46.000 --> 48:49.000
|
|
Hey, Eustonics in the chat, nice to see you buddy.
|
|
|
|
48:49.000 --> 48:50.000
|
|
Plague.
|
|
|
|
48:50.000 --> 48:54.000
|
|
This year is the original website of the event of the year 2000.
|
|
|
|
48:54.000 --> 49:02.000
|
|
By the way, all the documents I have used are generally accessible on the Internet, so all quotations are verifiable since they are publicly available.
|
|
|
|
49:02.000 --> 49:09.000
|
|
If you would like to investigate or subject yourself, you can find the documents quite easily. It's not whistle-blower material.
|
|
|
|
49:12.000 --> 49:17.000
|
|
Now I would like to quote a few sentences from the documents for this conference in the year 2000.
|
|
|
|
49:18.000 --> 49:24.000
|
|
Decide of an armed military presence in U.S. cities has provoked protests about curtailment of civil liberties.
|
|
|
|
49:24.000 --> 49:28.000
|
|
The question is, how do we enforce it and to what degree?
|
|
|
|
49:28.000 --> 49:31.000
|
|
How much force do we use to keep people in their homes?
|
|
|
|
49:31.000 --> 49:38.000
|
|
So these are the things that have been discussed and debated in these exercises by high-level officials 20 years ago.
|
|
|
|
49:39.000 --> 49:48.000
|
|
Many of you might remember that at this time there were important presidential elections.
|
|
|
|
49:48.000 --> 49:52.000
|
|
President Bush Jr. came into office in January 2001.
|
|
|
|
49:52.000 --> 49:58.000
|
|
Here in this picture you see him with Vice President Dick Cheney, who was of high influence in that administration.
|
|
|
|
50:01.000 --> 50:06.000
|
|
Shortly after the inauguration, the third big bioterrorism exercise took place.
|
|
|
|
50:07.000 --> 50:12.000
|
|
It was called Dark Winter, and again it was a smallpox scenario.
|
|
|
|
50:12.000 --> 50:16.000
|
|
Here this colorful page is the center's original website of 2001.
|
|
|
|
50:16.000 --> 50:18.000
|
|
Yes, it is the original one.
|
|
|
|
50:18.000 --> 50:23.000
|
|
Websites then were quite a bit more colorful and somewhat messy compared to today.
|
|
|
|
50:23.000 --> 50:25.000
|
|
I did find it in an Internet archive.
|
|
|
|
50:25.000 --> 50:28.000
|
|
Its sponsors are explicitly mentioned.
|
|
|
|
50:28.000 --> 50:32.000
|
|
See here this long foundation and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
|
|
|
|
50:32.000 --> 50:35.000
|
|
This time the simulation exercise was professionalized.
|
|
|
|
50:36.000 --> 50:39.000
|
|
The previous ones took place in conference rooms in hotels.
|
|
|
|
50:39.000 --> 50:41.000
|
|
They were quite simple.
|
|
|
|
50:41.000 --> 50:46.000
|
|
But in 2001 the venue of this event was a military base, Andrew's Air Force Base.
|
|
|
|
50:46.000 --> 50:50.000
|
|
It's a large military base just a few miles from Washington D.C.
|
|
|
|
50:50.000 --> 50:54.000
|
|
So the exercise was upgraded and was even given a name.
|
|
|
|
50:54.000 --> 50:57.000
|
|
Dark Winter sounds like the title of a Hollywood movie.
|
|
|
|
50:57.000 --> 51:00.000
|
|
It reminds of a marketing campaign for the whole topic.
|
|
|
|
51:00.000 --> 51:03.000
|
|
The public relations aspect is visible.
|
|
|
|
51:03.000 --> 51:06.000
|
|
It was definitely meant to be made known to the public.
|
|
|
|
51:06.000 --> 51:10.000
|
|
Quite a number of articles were published about Dark Winter.
|
|
|
|
51:15.000 --> 51:18.000
|
|
So let's take a look at who has taken part in this exercise.
|
|
|
|
51:18.000 --> 51:20.000
|
|
Who were the key participants?
|
|
|
|
51:20.000 --> 51:27.000
|
|
I could find a list of attendance among the original documents for this major infectious disease simulation exercise.
|
|
|
|
51:27.000 --> 51:29.000
|
|
Margaret Hamburg.
|
|
|
|
51:30.000 --> 51:32.000
|
|
Honorable David Gergen.
|
|
|
|
51:32.000 --> 51:34.000
|
|
Sam Nunn.
|
|
|
|
51:34.000 --> 51:36.000
|
|
Frank Weisner.
|
|
|
|
51:38.000 --> 51:41.000
|
|
William Sessions.
|
|
|
|
51:42.000 --> 51:45.000
|
|
James Woosley, let's see.
|
|
|
|
51:46.000 --> 51:52.000
|
|
If you are familiar with American politics at that time, many of these names will be known to you.
|
|
|
|
51:52.000 --> 51:56.000
|
|
They were senior executives and reasonably high positions of power.
|
|
|
|
51:56.000 --> 52:04.000
|
|
Here, for example, the role of the CIA director was played by James Woolsey, who, a few years ago, had actually held that position.
|
|
|
|
52:04.000 --> 52:05.000
|
|
I let mention him before.
|
|
|
|
52:05.000 --> 52:13.000
|
|
Here, Frank Keating, a governor of Oklahoma, who, at the time of that infectious disease simulation, actually was serving as governor of Oklahoma.
|
|
|
|
52:13.000 --> 52:18.000
|
|
He held that position also while the mentioned Oklahoma City bombing occurred.
|
|
|
|
52:18.000 --> 52:22.000
|
|
Similarly, the other positions were occupied by high-ranking officials.
|
|
|
|
52:23.000 --> 52:27.000
|
|
You can truly say a full-scale national emergency was practiced.
|
|
|
|
52:27.000 --> 52:34.000
|
|
We are not dealing here with the middle management of authorities, but top-level operatives, who discussed strategies for such a scenario.
|
|
|
|
52:34.000 --> 52:39.000
|
|
When you look at the documents for this simulation event, you can't but notice the role of the press.
|
|
|
|
52:39.000 --> 52:49.000
|
|
The media were a vital part of this exercise, and those who participated and played their part were not in any way minor journalists, but nationally known journalists.
|
|
|
|
52:49.000 --> 52:55.000
|
|
Therefore, example, we have the well-known Judith Miller of the New York Times, an expert on national security affairs.
|
|
|
|
52:55.000 --> 53:00.000
|
|
And here are a few representatives of major TV networks, NBC, CBS, and BBC.
|
|
|
|
53:00.000 --> 53:04.000
|
|
This is a photograph from the exercise. We can see a mock press conference.
|
|
|
|
53:04.000 --> 53:13.000
|
|
The politicians are announcing a state of emergency because of a bioterrorism attack on the U.S., this time the biological warfare agent is Smallpox.
|
|
|
|
53:14.000 --> 53:21.000
|
|
A press conference is being conducted. The reporters ask questions and the politicians respond and note how the press reacts.
|
|
|
|
53:21.000 --> 53:30.000
|
|
They develop skills to respond in an appropriate way, so they train the questions and responses thoroughly on a high level and learn their strategic lessons.
|
|
|
|
53:30.000 --> 53:33.000
|
|
Isn't that what exercises are for?
|
|
|
|
53:33.000 --> 53:38.000
|
|
It became obvious then that the U.S. were ill-prepared for a bioweapons attack.
|
|
|
|
53:38.000 --> 53:41.000
|
|
The quantity of vaccine stockpiles was not sufficient.
|
|
|
|
53:41.000 --> 53:47.000
|
|
Forcible constraints on citizens would likely be the only tools available when vaccine stocks were depleted.
|
|
|
|
53:47.000 --> 53:53.000
|
|
So the conclusion was that civil liberties have to be restricted. That was in 2001.
|
|
|
|
53:53.000 --> 54:07.000
|
|
Here we come across Robert Cadillac again, the official who has written the above mentioned Pentagon's strategy paper suggesting that biological warfare agents would work well because they could be used under the cover of a natural epidemic and therefore plausible denial would be easy.
|
|
|
|
54:08.000 --> 54:14.000
|
|
This Robert Cadillac participated at Exercise Dark Winter as an expert on bioterrorism.
|
|
|
|
54:14.000 --> 54:17.000
|
|
Here in this picture we see him appearing on a fictional news channel.
|
|
|
|
54:17.000 --> 54:22.000
|
|
You should know that such simulation exercises provide as many details of reality as possible.
|
|
|
|
54:22.000 --> 54:27.000
|
|
So on huge screens the participants watched fictional news reports that were produced beforehand.
|
|
|
|
54:27.000 --> 54:38.000
|
|
So bioterrorism expert Robert Cadillac appears on screen saying that there was a problem of insufficient stocks of vaccine and he adds that this means that a dark winter could be ahead in America.
|
|
|
|
54:38.000 --> 54:42.000
|
|
A very dark winter. And as you know this is the name of the exercise.
|
|
|
|
54:42.000 --> 54:54.000
|
|
When we now take a look at what became of that man we see in the year 2020, the year of the corona crisis Robert Cadillac resurfaces as one of the most important advisors to the government under Trump.
|
|
|
|
54:54.000 --> 54:58.000
|
|
In this photo you see him at the lectern next to Vice President Mike Pence.
|
|
|
|
54:58.000 --> 55:10.000
|
|
But now let's have a look at Joe Biden who just a few days after major US news outlets had declared him the winner of the presidential election said that the US was facing a dark winter.
|
|
|
|
55:10.000 --> 55:13.000
|
|
He used exactly the same words. Coincidence?
|
|
|
|
55:13.000 --> 55:23.000
|
|
I can't prove the connection to the exercise. You might call it Coincidence although you could also suspect that his choice of words was related to the exercise.
|
|
|
|
55:23.000 --> 55:37.000
|
|
Anyway, let's go back to 2001 now. We can read in the final script of the dark winter exercise that Americans can no longer take basic civil liberties such as freedom of assembly or travel for granted.
|
|
|
|
55:37.000 --> 55:52.000
|
|
So that was the third simulation exercise on the subject within a brief period of time. That was in June 2001 and just a few months later the September 11 attacks happened and the topic of terrorism is again pushed to a higher level.
|
|
|
|
55:52.000 --> 55:59.000
|
|
9-11 was the day the terrorist threat was literally being brought home to everybody in the global community.
|
|
|
|
55:59.000 --> 56:07.000
|
|
For years the topic of terrorist threat has been engaging and informing the entire political debate.
|
|
|
|
56:07.000 --> 56:14.000
|
|
A little later over the course of several weeks the so-called 2001 anthrax attacks happened.
|
|
|
|
56:14.000 --> 56:27.000
|
|
Letters containing a fine white powder laced with spores of the bacterium bacillus anthracis were sent to several news media offices and to those two senators, Patrick Lee and Tom Daschle.
|
|
|
|
56:27.000 --> 56:34.000
|
|
Daschle served as US Senate Majority Leader and Lee shared the Senate Judiciary Committee.
|
|
|
|
56:34.000 --> 56:38.000
|
|
Both were critical of the legal changes proposed after the 9-11 attacks.
|
|
|
|
56:38.000 --> 56:46.000
|
|
See the controversial Patriot Act which led to constitutional infringements on civil liberties by expanding the government's surveillance powers.
|
|
|
|
56:46.000 --> 56:53.000
|
|
Like for example the NSA's warrantless wiretapping at home and abroad and using broad data mining systems.
|
|
|
|
56:53.000 --> 56:59.000
|
|
They felt it was necessary to discuss and carefully weigh each case of legal change.
|
|
|
|
57:03.000 --> 57:07.000
|
|
So in this situation these two senators received anthrax letters.
|
|
|
|
57:07.000 --> 57:11.000
|
|
To this day it is not clear who was responsible for those attacks.
|
|
|
|
57:11.000 --> 57:17.000
|
|
First bin Laden and al-Qaeda were the supposed culprits, then Iraq's Saddam Hussein was blamed.
|
|
|
|
57:17.000 --> 57:18.000
|
|
There's a...
|
|
|
|
57:18.000 --> 57:19.000
|
|
Nothing came of it.
|
|
|
|
57:19.000 --> 57:24.000
|
|
Finally a mentally fragile scientist of a US bio-defense laboratory was in the focus.
|
|
|
|
57:24.000 --> 57:36.000
|
|
So I hope you remember that you need to go to his satanic lives sub-stack and read about all the reasons why one Robert Malone might actually have a pretty good idea of who did it also stay.
|
|
|
|
57:36.000 --> 57:40.000
|
|
Who did it also Steven Hatfield might have a pretty good idea of who did it.
|
|
|
|
57:40.000 --> 57:44.000
|
|
Maybe Sina Bovari has some idea who did it.
|
|
|
|
57:44.000 --> 58:00.000
|
|
It probably wasn't this mentally fragile US scientist who maybe stole a notebook from some girl that Robert Malone used to know ten years earlier and then decided to kill himself.
|
|
|
|
58:00.000 --> 58:03.000
|
|
This allegation proved to be wrong too.
|
|
|
|
58:03.000 --> 58:05.000
|
|
Many different stories are circulating.
|
|
|
|
58:05.000 --> 58:09.000
|
|
To date doubts exist about the FBI's conclusions.
|
|
|
|
58:09.000 --> 58:12.000
|
|
But to come back to the two menaced senators.
|
|
|
|
58:12.000 --> 58:17.000
|
|
We can imagine that if you send a letter containing highly dangerous Patogans to a politician,
|
|
|
|
58:17.000 --> 58:23.000
|
|
it is clear that the person addressed is not endangered since he or she of course has employees to open the mail,
|
|
|
|
58:23.000 --> 58:30.000
|
|
which means that whoever had planned the attack did not intend to kill the politician in question but only to intimidate.
|
|
|
|
58:30.000 --> 58:33.000
|
|
There are other ways to kill inconvenient individuals.
|
|
|
|
58:33.000 --> 58:38.000
|
|
They say it was just a signal that a certain red line should not be crossed.
|
|
|
|
58:38.000 --> 58:41.000
|
|
These two senators were merely meant to be intimidated.
|
|
|
|
58:41.000 --> 58:47.000
|
|
I do not know how they assessed the threat but it is a fact that right after having received those letters,
|
|
|
|
58:47.000 --> 58:52.000
|
|
they stopped opposing the disputed legal changes and the laws were passed.
|
|
|
|
58:53.000 --> 59:02.000
|
|
Something interesting occurred in November 2001 immediately after the Antrex scare.
|
|
|
|
59:06.000 --> 59:11.000
|
|
On the initiative of the American government, a new international organization was founded
|
|
|
|
59:11.000 --> 59:16.000
|
|
called Global Health Security Initiative because it was deemed necessary.
|
|
|
|
59:17.000 --> 59:21.000
|
|
The reasoning for founding this organization was the Antrex scare,
|
|
|
|
59:21.000 --> 59:25.000
|
|
which was a major topic all over the world at that time.
|
|
|
|
59:25.000 --> 59:29.000
|
|
It was emphasized that every government was in immediate danger.
|
|
|
|
59:29.000 --> 59:36.000
|
|
Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein might ship this deadly Patogane in letters to each and every country.
|
|
|
|
59:36.000 --> 59:40.000
|
|
We now need to unite and jointly take action.
|
|
|
|
59:40.000 --> 59:45.000
|
|
So this organization was founded in November 2001.
|
|
|
|
59:45.000 --> 59:48.000
|
|
The participating countries are symbolized by flex.
|
|
|
|
59:48.000 --> 59:54.000
|
|
Here is Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Great Britain, USA
|
|
|
|
59:54.000 --> 59:58.000
|
|
and finally the WHO as technical advisor.
|
|
|
|
01:00:01.000 --> 01:00:04.000
|
|
This group of countries more or less are the G8,
|
|
|
|
01:00:04.000 --> 01:00:09.000
|
|
the most influential industrial nations of the West, complemented by Mexico.
|
|
|
|
01:00:09.000 --> 01:00:14.000
|
|
From then on, senior officials and health ministers of those countries regularly came together
|
|
|
|
01:00:14.000 --> 01:00:18.000
|
|
or sent high-level representatives and discussed the topic of bioterrorism
|
|
|
|
01:00:18.000 --> 01:00:21.000
|
|
in order to coordinate with each other.
|
|
|
|
01:00:24.000 --> 01:00:28.000
|
|
In 2002, the matter was taken one crucial step further.
|
|
|
|
01:00:28.000 --> 01:00:33.000
|
|
The group declared that emergency planning for bioterrorism is quite similar
|
|
|
|
01:00:33.000 --> 01:00:36.000
|
|
to that foreign influenza pandemic.
|
|
|
|
01:00:36.000 --> 01:00:41.000
|
|
So from 2002 on, both scenarios were exercised and prepared for.
|
|
|
|
01:00:42.000 --> 01:00:45.000
|
|
It must not necessarily be the danger of a bioterror attack,
|
|
|
|
01:00:45.000 --> 01:00:50.000
|
|
but it could just be a dangerous influenza virus spreading in a natural way.
|
|
|
|
01:00:50.000 --> 01:00:56.000
|
|
It was concluded that such a case would be just as perilous and needed to be prepared for.
|
|
|
|
01:00:56.000 --> 01:01:02.000
|
|
From pandemic preparedness on an international level means being able to globally coordinate
|
|
|
|
01:01:02.000 --> 01:01:05.000
|
|
the implementation of measures for such a scenario.
|
|
|
|
01:01:05.000 --> 01:01:11.000
|
|
A strategic planning group for an influenza pandemic was led by Great Britain and the U.S.
|
|
|
|
01:01:11.000 --> 01:01:16.000
|
|
From then on, this series of exercises were not only taking place in the USA
|
|
|
|
01:01:16.000 --> 01:01:19.000
|
|
but were coordinated internationally.
|
|
|
|
01:01:19.000 --> 01:01:21.000
|
|
Wow!
|
|
|
|
01:01:21.000 --> 01:01:24.000
|
|
Twenty years they prepared!
|
|
|
|
01:01:25.000 --> 01:01:30.000
|
|
The first one was called Global Mercury and convened in 2003.
|
|
|
|
01:01:30.000 --> 01:01:35.000
|
|
This is a chart from the Robert Koch Institute taken from the post-exercise report.
|
|
|
|
01:01:35.000 --> 01:01:40.000
|
|
The players are the European Union as an entity and then France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
|
|
|
|
01:01:40.000 --> 01:01:45.000
|
|
Mexico, Great Britain, the USA, the WHO and Canada.
|
|
|
|
01:01:45.000 --> 01:01:50.000
|
|
See here at the top the exercise planning group, the director and the higher control staff
|
|
|
|
01:01:50.000 --> 01:01:53.000
|
|
who planned and designed the exercise.
|
|
|
|
01:01:53.000 --> 01:01:57.000
|
|
This time Germany participated too, represented by the Robert Koch Institute.
|
|
|
|
01:01:58.000 --> 01:02:01.000
|
|
It was an elaborate exercise stretching over several days.
|
|
|
|
01:02:01.000 --> 01:02:09.000
|
|
Either you participate and get on board or when this happens you'll be left behind.
|
|
|
|
01:02:11.000 --> 01:02:17.000
|
|
Get on board and participate or when this actually goes down you'll be left behind.
|
|
|
|
01:02:17.000 --> 01:02:26.000
|
|
I think a lot of countries may have been offered a very similar heads you in, tails you lose kind of thing or whatever.
|
|
|
|
01:02:27.000 --> 01:02:29.000
|
|
Many hundreds of people participated.
|
|
|
|
01:02:29.000 --> 01:02:33.000
|
|
In those years there was a whole series of such exercises.
|
|
|
|
01:02:33.000 --> 01:02:38.000
|
|
An important one, convened in the year 2005, was called Atlantic Storm.
|
|
|
|
01:02:38.000 --> 01:02:44.000
|
|
Here at the speaker's desk, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, who played the US President.
|
|
|
|
01:02:44.000 --> 01:02:48.000
|
|
In the post-exercise report we can read the following key questions.
|
|
|
|
01:02:48.000 --> 01:02:53.000
|
|
How should national leaders determine measures such as border closure or current time?
|
|
|
|
01:02:54.000 --> 01:03:00.000
|
|
If actions are taken to restrict the movement of people for how long would restrictions have to be maintained,
|
|
|
|
01:03:00.000 --> 01:03:05.000
|
|
how would they be coordinated internationally and how would the decision be made to lift them?
|
|
|
|
01:03:08.000 --> 01:03:14.000
|
|
This is exactly the same kind of questions that are being discussed worldwide right now in 2020
|
|
|
|
01:03:14.000 --> 01:03:19.000
|
|
and which have already been debated intensely on a very high level during that exercise.
|
|
|
|
01:03:20.000 --> 01:03:25.000
|
|
I'd like to show you now two of the players who were politicians.
|
|
|
|
01:03:25.000 --> 01:03:32.000
|
|
Werner Huier of the German FDP, a classical liberal political party, and Bernard Cushney of France,
|
|
|
|
01:03:32.000 --> 01:03:38.000
|
|
then Secretary of Health. Later he became Minister of Foreign Affairs, so he was part of the French government.
|
|
|
|
01:03:38.000 --> 01:03:44.000
|
|
At the time of the exercise he was a candidate for the position of Director-General of the WHO,
|
|
|
|
01:03:44.000 --> 01:03:47.000
|
|
thus he was an important senior official in this field at the time.
|
|
|
|
01:03:48.000 --> 01:03:50.000
|
|
He acted a part of the French President.
|
|
|
|
01:03:50.000 --> 01:03:55.000
|
|
Next to him, Werner Huier, a former German Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
|
|
|
|
01:03:55.000 --> 01:03:58.000
|
|
He played the role of the Chancellor of Germany.
|
|
|
|
01:04:01.000 --> 01:04:08.000
|
|
So, the representatives of these countries were all individuals who have had former governmental responsibility
|
|
|
|
01:04:08.000 --> 01:04:10.000
|
|
or were currently in key positions.
|
|
|
|
01:04:10.000 --> 01:04:13.000
|
|
After the exercise Werner Huier remarked,
|
|
|
|
01:04:13.000 --> 01:04:17.000
|
|
for someone who has been around in a security and defense field for many years,
|
|
|
|
01:04:17.000 --> 01:04:21.000
|
|
this was quite a surprising and breathtaking exercise.
|
|
|
|
01:04:21.000 --> 01:04:26.000
|
|
This is something I think a very small minority of politicians in Europe are aware of.
|
|
|
|
01:04:32.000 --> 01:04:36.000
|
|
I have presented you quite a few of these simulation exercises,
|
|
|
|
01:04:36.000 --> 01:04:39.000
|
|
and by now you probably recognize common patterns.
|
|
|
|
01:04:39.000 --> 01:04:43.000
|
|
So, let me at this point draw a brief interim conclusion.
|
|
|
|
01:04:43.000 --> 01:04:47.000
|
|
The basic premise of every one of these scenarios was a public health emergency
|
|
|
|
01:04:47.000 --> 01:04:52.000
|
|
with ensuing questions about the decision-making process and competences.
|
|
|
|
01:04:52.000 --> 01:04:56.000
|
|
But they also involved declaring a state of emergency,
|
|
|
|
01:04:56.000 --> 01:04:59.000
|
|
implementing authoritarian leadership, bypassing parliament
|
|
|
|
01:04:59.000 --> 01:05:04.000
|
|
and investing certain federal officials with augmented decision-making power,
|
|
|
|
01:05:04.000 --> 01:05:10.000
|
|
while also suspending fundamental civil rights and effectuating plans to vaccinate the population.
|
|
|
|
01:05:10.000 --> 01:05:16.000
|
|
What strikes me as particularly noteworthy is the ready suspension of basic human rights
|
|
|
|
01:05:16.000 --> 01:05:19.000
|
|
when responding to a pandemic or a bioterror attack,
|
|
|
|
01:05:19.000 --> 01:05:23.000
|
|
because that is not necessarily a logical consequence.
|
|
|
|
01:05:23.000 --> 01:05:28.000
|
|
Observing all of this, the question arises that maybe such exercises might have served
|
|
|
|
01:05:28.000 --> 01:05:32.000
|
|
as a cover and testing ground for a state of emergency and checking out
|
|
|
|
01:05:32.000 --> 01:05:35.000
|
|
how such a political situation could be handled.
|
|
|
|
01:05:37.000 --> 01:05:40.000
|
|
At least this is my personal thing.
|
|
|
|
01:05:40.000 --> 01:05:44.000
|
|
I really like his interpretation, so I'm just going to go back a few sentences
|
|
|
|
01:05:44.000 --> 01:05:46.000
|
|
and let him say it again.
|
|
|
|
01:05:46.000 --> 01:06:02.000
|
|
So, let me draw a point, brief interim conclusions.
|
|
|
|
01:06:02.000 --> 01:06:06.000
|
|
Let me at this point draw a brief interim conclusion.
|
|
|
|
01:06:06.000 --> 01:06:11.000
|
|
The basic premise of every one of these scenarios was a public health emergency
|
|
|
|
01:06:11.000 --> 01:06:15.000
|
|
with ensuing questions about the decision-making process and competences.
|
|
|
|
01:06:15.000 --> 01:06:21.000
|
|
But they also involved declaring a state of emergency, implementing authoritarian leadership,
|
|
|
|
01:06:21.000 --> 01:06:27.000
|
|
bypassing parliament and investing certain federal officials with augmented decision-making power,
|
|
|
|
01:06:27.000 --> 01:06:33.000
|
|
while also suspending fundamental civil rights and effectuating plans to vaccinate the population.
|
|
|
|
01:06:33.000 --> 01:06:39.000
|
|
What strikes me as particularly noteworthy is the ready suspension of basic human rights
|
|
|
|
01:06:39.000 --> 01:06:42.000
|
|
when responding to a pandemic or a bioterror attack,
|
|
|
|
01:06:42.000 --> 01:06:46.000
|
|
because that is not necessarily a logical consequence.
|
|
|
|
01:06:46.000 --> 01:06:51.000
|
|
Observing all of this, the question arises that maybe such exercises might have served
|
|
|
|
01:06:51.000 --> 01:06:55.000
|
|
as a cover and testing ground for a state of emergency and checking out
|
|
|
|
01:06:55.000 --> 01:06:59.000
|
|
how such a political situation could be handled.
|
|
|
|
01:07:01.000 --> 01:07:04.000
|
|
At least this is my personal impression.
|
|
|
|
01:07:05.000 --> 01:07:13.000
|
|
Well, then, soon, the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 happened,
|
|
|
|
01:07:13.000 --> 01:07:18.000
|
|
and the topic of pandemic exercises was pushed a little to the background on the international stage.
|
|
|
|
01:07:18.000 --> 01:07:24.000
|
|
Then, in the spring of 2009, when its impact had a devastating effect on world economy,
|
|
|
|
01:07:24.000 --> 01:07:27.000
|
|
another pandemic came around the corner to put it casually.
|
|
|
|
01:07:27.000 --> 01:07:33.000
|
|
So, when the H1N1 flew, also called Swine Flu, emerged and nobody quite knew
|
|
|
|
01:07:33.000 --> 01:07:37.000
|
|
what could come of it, this gentleman here said something very interesting.
|
|
|
|
01:07:37.000 --> 01:07:41.000
|
|
He is probably not known to everybody, but in France he is prominent.
|
|
|
|
01:07:41.000 --> 01:07:46.000
|
|
His name is Jacques Ataly, who many decades has had the function of special advice
|
|
|
|
01:07:46.000 --> 01:07:51.000
|
|
and French politics, counseling several presidents, most of all Francois Mitteror,
|
|
|
|
01:07:51.000 --> 01:07:55.000
|
|
for whom he had also worked as so-called Sharpa, preparing G8 summits.
|
|
|
|
01:07:55.000 --> 01:08:00.000
|
|
So, Ataly has moved in the circles of French power elites for a very long time
|
|
|
|
01:08:00.000 --> 01:08:04.000
|
|
and has exerted substantial influence as an avant-garde thought leader.
|
|
|
|
01:08:04.000 --> 01:08:10.000
|
|
He has helped Emmanuel Macron rise to power and says of himself that he has discovered him.
|
|
|
|
01:08:11.000 --> 01:08:16.000
|
|
This is a relatively credible claim because of Ataly being a visionary networker
|
|
|
|
01:08:16.000 --> 01:08:18.000
|
|
and his extensive connections.
|
|
|
|
01:08:19.000 --> 01:08:31.000
|
|
So, as I said, he wrote something most interesting when the 2009 H1N flu came about.
|
|
|
|
01:08:31.000 --> 01:08:36.000
|
|
History teaches us that humanity advances in great strides if it is frightened.
|
|
|
|
01:08:36.000 --> 01:08:42.000
|
|
The pandemic now setting in might trigger one of these fears that cause structural changes.
|
|
|
|
01:08:42.000 --> 01:08:46.000
|
|
Then we will be able to lay the foundation for a world government,
|
|
|
|
01:08:46.000 --> 01:08:52.000
|
|
something to accomplish much faster than it would have been possible by economic reasons alone.
|
|
|
|
01:08:52.000 --> 01:08:54.000
|
|
I don't want to commend it.
|
|
|
|
01:08:54.000 --> 01:08:59.000
|
|
Those are simply Ataly's own words from the 2009 H1N1 flu.
|
|
|
|
01:08:59.000 --> 01:09:05.000
|
|
Actually, what I find striking is the fact that such ideas are usually associated with conspiracy theories,
|
|
|
|
01:09:05.000 --> 01:09:07.000
|
|
but this is a true quote.
|
|
|
|
01:09:07.000 --> 01:09:10.000
|
|
It is the utterance of a man of great influence globally.
|
|
|
|
01:09:11.000 --> 01:09:19.000
|
|
A year later in 2010, a study was published in the USA that goes along the same lines.
|
|
|
|
01:09:19.000 --> 01:09:22.000
|
|
It is the so-called lockstep scenario.
|
|
|
|
01:09:22.000 --> 01:09:25.000
|
|
Let me briefly introduce it to you.
|
|
|
|
01:09:25.000 --> 01:09:30.000
|
|
The title of the study is Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development.
|
|
|
|
01:09:30.000 --> 01:09:35.000
|
|
It sounds a little boring and bureaucratic, quite unspectacular at first glance.
|
|
|
|
01:09:35.000 --> 01:09:39.000
|
|
You wouldn't expect that the study contained newsworthy information.
|
|
|
|
01:09:40.000 --> 01:09:44.000
|
|
It was financed with money from the Rockefeller Foundation. See the logo here.
|
|
|
|
01:09:44.000 --> 01:09:49.000
|
|
That foundation is one of the oldest, wealthiest and most powerful private foundations in the world.
|
|
|
|
01:09:49.000 --> 01:09:56.000
|
|
The name is derived from the founder David Rockefeller, who 100 years ago was in fact the wealthiest man alive.
|
|
|
|
01:09:56.000 --> 01:10:00.000
|
|
Even today, the Rockefeller Foundation is influential in many fields.
|
|
|
|
01:10:01.000 --> 01:10:09.000
|
|
The study of 2010 was apparently taken scenario planning to an entire new level.
|
|
|
|
01:10:09.000 --> 01:10:19.000
|
|
A set of four different global future scenarios were envisioned in order to explore how societies might develop over the next 15 to 20 years.
|
|
|
|
01:10:19.000 --> 01:10:25.000
|
|
So in each of the four narratives, the imagined societies are shaped by certain driving forces,
|
|
|
|
01:10:25.000 --> 01:10:32.000
|
|
playing out over time like, for example, the impact of new technologies and natural catastrophes like deadly diseases.
|
|
|
|
01:10:32.000 --> 01:10:38.000
|
|
The project designers were required to think outside the box and envision plausible futures.
|
|
|
|
01:10:38.000 --> 01:10:43.000
|
|
One of these possible scenarios was called lockstep, which describes the following.
|
|
|
|
01:10:43.000 --> 01:10:47.000
|
|
A deadly flu pandemic is spreading globally and leads to panic.
|
|
|
|
01:10:47.000 --> 01:10:54.000
|
|
China, with its restrictive approach, has seen as the paragon of effective crisis management and is widely emulated.
|
|
|
|
01:10:54.000 --> 01:10:57.000
|
|
Mask-wearing becomes mandatory everywhere.
|
|
|
|
01:10:57.000 --> 01:11:03.000
|
|
Authoritarian control of citizens is imposed and remains in place even after the pandemic is over.
|
|
|
|
01:11:03.000 --> 01:11:07.000
|
|
Citizens willingly give up their sovereignty and liberties.
|
|
|
|
01:11:07.000 --> 01:11:12.000
|
|
It is only after around 10 years of top-down rule that people start rabbling.
|
|
|
|
01:11:12.000 --> 01:11:22.000
|
|
After around 10 years of top-down rule that people start rabbling.
|
|
|
|
01:11:23.000 --> 01:11:30.000
|
|
They expect us to wait seven more years until we start rabbling.
|
|
|
|
01:11:30.000 --> 01:11:33.000
|
|
That's pretty creepy, actually, right?
|
|
|
|
01:11:33.000 --> 01:11:35.000
|
|
Wow, that's creepy.
|
|
|
|
01:11:40.000 --> 01:11:47.000
|
|
It is very odd to read this now in 2020, recognizing in that depiction our present reality.
|
|
|
|
01:11:48.000 --> 01:11:57.000
|
|
You come to realize that the study's underlying objective is to seat a new strategic conversation among the key public, private and philanthropic stakeholders,
|
|
|
|
01:11:57.000 --> 01:12:03.000
|
|
so as to achieve impact more effectively for a preferred future.
|
|
|
|
01:12:04.000 --> 01:12:09.000
|
|
China is by a very powerful foundation, I guess, that quite a few key players have read the study,
|
|
|
|
01:12:09.000 --> 01:12:13.000
|
|
even though I'm not able to say how it was received and who read it.
|
|
|
|
01:12:14.000 --> 01:12:17.000
|
|
For further inquiry, just look for it on the Internet.
|
|
|
|
01:12:25.000 --> 01:12:31.000
|
|
From 2017 on, the topic of emergency response and pandemic simulation exercises gained traction
|
|
|
|
01:12:31.000 --> 01:12:36.000
|
|
when a new U.S. president moved into the White House, Donald Trump.
|
|
|
|
01:12:37.000 --> 01:12:44.000
|
|
I suggest a casual relation between the change of government and invigorating the international simulation exercises.
|
|
|
|
01:12:44.000 --> 01:12:53.000
|
|
Here a picture of outgoing U.S. President Barack Obama in conversation with President-elect Donald Trump in the Oval Office in November 2016.
|
|
|
|
01:12:53.000 --> 01:12:59.000
|
|
You all remember the days after the election, it was truly a shock affecting the media all over the world.
|
|
|
|
01:12:59.000 --> 01:13:01.000
|
|
Trump is the new U.S. president.
|
|
|
|
01:13:01.000 --> 01:13:03.000
|
|
How could that happen?
|
|
|
|
01:13:03.000 --> 01:13:10.000
|
|
Nobody had deemed it possible that an outsider like Trump, someone who had been expressing himself in such a bold and blunt manner,
|
|
|
|
01:13:10.000 --> 01:13:15.000
|
|
not caring about how his words would be received by the media, actually won the election.
|
|
|
|
01:13:15.000 --> 01:13:20.000
|
|
The news of that man becoming president sent shockwaves around the globe.
|
|
|
|
01:13:20.000 --> 01:13:25.000
|
|
You are surely familiar with the world economic forums, annual meeting, every January in Davos,
|
|
|
|
01:13:25.000 --> 01:13:28.000
|
|
and the Munich Security Conference every February.
|
|
|
|
01:13:29.000 --> 01:13:35.000
|
|
In 2017 at those events the attendees spoke about little else but the new president of the USA.
|
|
|
|
01:13:35.000 --> 01:13:41.000
|
|
What would Trump as president mean for the world trade, the financial system, and for international diplomacy?
|
|
|
|
01:13:41.000 --> 01:13:44.000
|
|
Can we keep going like we did in the past?
|
|
|
|
01:13:44.000 --> 01:13:49.000
|
|
So in February 2017 in his opening remarks in Munich, John McCain said,
|
|
|
|
01:13:49.000 --> 01:13:52.000
|
|
I refuse to accept the demise of our world order.
|
|
|
|
01:13:53.000 --> 01:13:59.000
|
|
He was a hardliner and hawk with great influence in the U.S. and in international diplomatic circles,
|
|
|
|
01:13:59.000 --> 01:14:05.000
|
|
and his address was met with a lot of applause on that conference where high-ranking representatives of military,
|
|
|
|
01:14:05.000 --> 01:14:10.000
|
|
politics and business mainly from NATO member countries get together every year.
|
|
|
|
01:14:10.000 --> 01:14:18.000
|
|
When you look at the documents and articles from that year, you come to realize that the transatlantic relations were severely challenged at the time.
|
|
|
|
01:14:18.000 --> 01:14:24.000
|
|
The members of these elite circles worried big time about the future of the Western military alliance
|
|
|
|
01:14:24.000 --> 01:14:27.000
|
|
and wondered if it might fall apart because of Trump.
|
|
|
|
01:14:27.000 --> 01:14:32.000
|
|
So in that context McCain remarked, I refuse to accept the demise of our world order,
|
|
|
|
01:14:32.000 --> 01:14:36.000
|
|
followed by louder plows of his peers from Western world countries.
|
|
|
|
01:14:41.000 --> 01:14:45.000
|
|
The next day at the same conference Bill Gates appears and gives a talk as well,
|
|
|
|
01:14:45.000 --> 01:14:51.000
|
|
warning that we ignore the link between health security and international security at our own peril,
|
|
|
|
01:14:51.000 --> 01:14:56.000
|
|
and adds that it is only a question of time that a dangerous Patogaine would spread,
|
|
|
|
01:14:56.000 --> 01:15:00.000
|
|
be it by a quirk of nature or by the hand of a terrorist.
|
|
|
|
01:15:00.000 --> 01:15:04.000
|
|
We need to be prepared with a new arsenal of weapons.
|
|
|
|
01:15:04.000 --> 01:15:09.000
|
|
The world needs to prepare for epidemics the way the military prepares for war.
|
|
|
|
01:15:10.000 --> 01:15:14.000
|
|
Right afterwards the pandemic exercises started anew.
|
|
|
|
01:15:14.000 --> 01:15:20.000
|
|
In May 2017 for the first time in history the health ministers of the G20 met in Berlin.
|
|
|
|
01:15:20.000 --> 01:15:25.000
|
|
They were sent by the 20 wealthiest and most powerful industrial nations of the world.
|
|
|
|
01:15:25.000 --> 01:15:28.000
|
|
China, India and Brazil participated as well.
|
|
|
|
01:15:28.000 --> 01:15:36.000
|
|
For the first time those health ministers came together as a team in order to organize their response to the threat of a future pandemic.
|
|
|
|
01:15:36.000 --> 01:15:43.000
|
|
So we see here, sitting side by side, all the health secretaries or health ministers.
|
|
|
|
01:15:43.000 --> 01:15:48.000
|
|
Here in the front row of the German Health Minister, Harmann Gruy, the predecessor of Jenschban,
|
|
|
|
01:15:48.000 --> 01:15:53.000
|
|
next to him his colleague from China, the US, Brazil, Canada, Australia.
|
|
|
|
01:15:53.000 --> 01:15:58.000
|
|
The other day they are watching a pandemic scenario,
|
|
|
|
01:15:59.000 --> 01:16:02.000
|
|
on the screen.
|
|
|
|
01:16:02.000 --> 01:16:09.000
|
|
The name of the new dangerous virus was not Zars, but Mars, mountain-associated respiratory syndrome.
|
|
|
|
01:16:09.000 --> 01:16:14.000
|
|
Mountain-associated virus came from a mountain area.
|
|
|
|
01:16:14.000 --> 01:16:17.000
|
|
That's racist.
|
|
|
|
01:16:17.000 --> 01:16:22.000
|
|
Just see them all in unison intently watching the story unfold.
|
|
|
|
01:16:22.000 --> 01:16:39.000
|
|
When we look at that picture, we might comprehend a bit better why in today's crisis all or at least most of the countries are proceeding very co-ordinately and why in every country more or less the same is acted out.
|
|
|
|
01:16:39.000 --> 01:16:44.000
|
|
All these officials in power received the same input a while before the corona crisis.
|
|
|
|
01:16:45.000 --> 01:16:52.000
|
|
They were given the same general recipes and procedural instructions that are now being realized in a synchronized way.
|
|
|
|
01:16:52.000 --> 01:16:55.000
|
|
At least this is how it seems to be.
|
|
|
|
01:16:55.000 --> 01:16:57.000
|
|
Back to our timeline.
|
|
|
|
01:16:57.000 --> 01:17:05.000
|
|
It is now August 2017 and the German Health Minister Gruy is presenting an international advisory board for the German Health Policy.
|
|
|
|
01:17:05.000 --> 01:17:13.000
|
|
Well, actually that group will not just be counseling Germany alone because Germany was assigned for leading the way to global health policy.
|
|
|
|
01:17:14.000 --> 01:17:17.000
|
|
These ladies and gents are to advise the government.
|
|
|
|
01:17:21.000 --> 01:17:23.000
|
|
This one here in the back in Germany, we all know him.
|
|
|
|
01:17:23.000 --> 01:17:27.000
|
|
First-hand Rosten, he is a member of that advisory board.
|
|
|
|
01:17:27.000 --> 01:17:33.000
|
|
To his left, we see Ilona Kickbush, a professor who has done a lot of research about pandemic threats.
|
|
|
|
01:17:33.000 --> 01:17:37.000
|
|
She has been working in high-level positions for the WHO for many years.
|
|
|
|
01:17:37.000 --> 01:17:45.000
|
|
There is Jörk Hakka, the former director of the Robert Koch Institute, here the WHO Regional Director for Africa.
|
|
|
|
01:17:45.000 --> 01:17:53.000
|
|
In my view, however, these two gentlemen at the sides are most important for they play in a different league altogether.
|
|
|
|
01:17:53.000 --> 01:17:57.000
|
|
Here to the left is Jeremy Farrah of the Wellcome Trust.
|
|
|
|
01:17:57.000 --> 01:18:02.000
|
|
That is a British foundation with a remarkable $25 billion endowment.
|
|
|
|
01:18:03.000 --> 01:18:07.000
|
|
It is an extremely influential charitable foundation in the field of health governance.
|
|
|
|
01:18:07.000 --> 01:18:14.000
|
|
It is even more powerful in terms of funding than the Rockefeller Foundation or the George Soros Open Society foundations.
|
|
|
|
01:18:14.000 --> 01:18:19.000
|
|
So the Wellcome Trust has more funds and has built a huge network for global health governance.
|
|
|
|
01:18:19.000 --> 01:18:22.000
|
|
To the right is Christopher Elias of the Gates Foundation.
|
|
|
|
01:18:22.000 --> 01:18:26.000
|
|
This is in fact an even more important foundation in this field.
|
|
|
|
01:18:26.000 --> 01:18:30.000
|
|
With roughly 50 billions, that foundation is even better connected.
|
|
|
|
01:18:31.000 --> 01:18:34.000
|
|
The Gates Foundation plays a leading role in global health governance.
|
|
|
|
01:18:34.000 --> 01:18:37.000
|
|
One can surely say without exaggeration.
|
|
|
|
01:18:37.000 --> 01:18:42.000
|
|
So from 2017, these two weighty gentlemen have been counseling the German government
|
|
|
|
01:18:42.000 --> 01:18:46.000
|
|
and have set at a table with Christian Drosten and the German Health Minister.
|
|
|
|
01:18:46.000 --> 01:18:49.000
|
|
It could possibly help to notice.
|
|
|
|
01:18:54.000 --> 01:18:57.000
|
|
Let's move on to the year 2018.
|
|
|
|
01:18:57.000 --> 01:19:04.000
|
|
Again, there is a major bioterrorism simulation exercise in the USA, this time however, without international scope.
|
|
|
|
01:19:04.000 --> 01:19:11.000
|
|
You see very high level officials and politicians representing the US National Security Council in Washington.
|
|
|
|
01:19:11.000 --> 01:19:16.000
|
|
They are all people in high functions who act as if they were members of the National Security Council
|
|
|
|
01:19:16.000 --> 01:19:19.000
|
|
and are now coping with that emergency situation.
|
|
|
|
01:19:19.000 --> 01:19:22.000
|
|
It is interesting from different angles.
|
|
|
|
01:19:22.000 --> 01:19:26.000
|
|
There on the screen in the middle a pre-produced TV program is playing.
|
|
|
|
01:19:26.000 --> 01:19:31.000
|
|
Those two women talking to each other are well-known TV hosts in the United States.
|
|
|
|
01:19:31.000 --> 01:19:37.000
|
|
If that event had taken place in Germany, we would see, for example, Sandra Meiszberger and Muybrüt Ina
|
|
|
|
01:19:37.000 --> 01:19:42.000
|
|
conversing with each other about the bioterrorism attack that had just occurred.
|
|
|
|
01:19:44.000 --> 01:19:49.000
|
|
Those who had planned the exercise had applied a lot of effort to make it as realistic as possible,
|
|
|
|
01:19:49.000 --> 01:19:54.000
|
|
so that the trainees would experience the situation as real.
|
|
|
|
01:19:55.000 --> 01:20:00.000
|
|
The plot of the exercise was as follows.
|
|
|
|
01:20:00.000 --> 01:20:07.000
|
|
A fictional elitist cult had financed the creation of a nasty virus in the BioLab in Zurich.
|
|
|
|
01:20:07.000 --> 01:20:12.000
|
|
It was eventually let loose so that a global pandemic has arisen.
|
|
|
|
01:20:12.000 --> 01:20:19.000
|
|
The aim of that cult had been to reduce the global population, indeed a demonic ambition.
|
|
|
|
01:20:19.000 --> 01:20:23.000
|
|
So that was the scenario of this exercise which was called Clayd X.
|
|
|
|
01:20:23.000 --> 01:20:28.000
|
|
It was once more organized by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.
|
|
|
|
01:20:30.000 --> 01:20:34.000
|
|
Here are all the Quaintons to the right.
|
|
|
|
01:20:34.000 --> 01:20:38.000
|
|
I have mentioned him before as one of the addresses of the Antrex letters,
|
|
|
|
01:20:38.000 --> 01:20:42.000
|
|
who in the meantime has been employed as a lobbyist for the healthcare industry,
|
|
|
|
01:20:42.000 --> 01:20:45.000
|
|
he is now participating in this exercise.
|
|
|
|
01:20:45.000 --> 01:20:52.000
|
|
Two is left biosecurity expert Tara O'Toole, who has written a number of scripts for such simulation exercises,
|
|
|
|
01:20:52.000 --> 01:20:54.000
|
|
among them the dark winter scenario.
|
|
|
|
01:20:54.000 --> 01:20:57.000
|
|
This goes on an important role in government.
|
|
|
|
01:20:57.000 --> 01:20:58.000
|
|
It's a nice presentation.
|
|
|
|
01:20:58.000 --> 01:21:02.000
|
|
It's one of the key figures in the field of disaster response strategies.
|
|
|
|
01:21:07.000 --> 01:21:10.000
|
|
Now we are fast approaching the present time.
|
|
|
|
01:21:10.000 --> 01:21:17.000
|
|
But before I tell you about the latest simulation exercise event 201 in October 2019,
|
|
|
|
01:21:17.000 --> 01:21:23.000
|
|
allow me at this point to pose the question of why the corona pandemic did happen in January 2020.
|
|
|
|
01:21:27.000 --> 01:21:31.000
|
|
You could of course say that happened because the virus just came up then.
|
|
|
|
01:21:31.000 --> 01:21:35.000
|
|
Sticking with the official explanation, it originated in Wuhan, China
|
|
|
|
01:21:35.000 --> 01:21:40.000
|
|
and spread from one person to the next, from one country to the other, naturally.
|
|
|
|
01:21:41.000 --> 01:21:46.000
|
|
If you however assumed that the corona pandemic did not occur so faithfully,
|
|
|
|
01:21:46.000 --> 01:21:53.000
|
|
but was masterminded by some circles, it might not be uninteresting to get straight what has happened in September 2019.
|
|
|
|
01:21:53.000 --> 01:22:00.000
|
|
Many people, me included, didn't fully realize that in mid-September 2019, stock markets were in panic.
|
|
|
|
01:22:00.000 --> 01:22:06.000
|
|
It was a liquidity crisis called the cash crunch of September 2019 or repo crisis 2019.
|
|
|
|
01:22:07.000 --> 01:22:11.000
|
|
At that time I had not noticed the unusual liquidity problem of US banks.
|
|
|
|
01:22:11.000 --> 01:22:16.000
|
|
As I said at the beginning of today's talk, this money markets crisis is not mentioned in my book.
|
|
|
|
01:22:16.000 --> 01:22:21.000
|
|
I had only become aware of that extraordinary moment when working on this talk.
|
|
|
|
01:22:24.000 --> 01:22:29.000
|
|
Now I would like to show you a news report from German weekly site online of 2nd October 2019,
|
|
|
|
01:22:29.000 --> 01:22:32.000
|
|
titled Blackout in the Financial System.
|
|
|
|
01:22:33.000 --> 01:22:39.000
|
|
The Fed tries to prevent a breakdown of the cash market by injecting billions of dollars into the financial system.
|
|
|
|
01:22:39.000 --> 01:22:41.000
|
|
How alarming is the situation?
|
|
|
|
01:22:41.000 --> 01:22:43.000
|
|
Here a few excerpts.
|
|
|
|
01:22:43.000 --> 01:22:45.000
|
|
The crisis came overnight.
|
|
|
|
01:22:45.000 --> 01:22:47.000
|
|
Banks were running short of cash.
|
|
|
|
01:22:47.000 --> 01:22:51.000
|
|
The Fed was intervening with massive amounts of dollars to prevent the burst.
|
|
|
|
01:22:51.000 --> 01:22:55.000
|
|
This sounds like the climax of the global financial crisis 11 years ago,
|
|
|
|
01:22:55.000 --> 01:22:59.000
|
|
but in fact it only describes the Monday of the week before last,
|
|
|
|
01:22:59.000 --> 01:23:03.000
|
|
an important part of the global financial system was on the verge of collapse,
|
|
|
|
01:23:03.000 --> 01:23:07.000
|
|
and the general public noticed practically nothing.
|
|
|
|
01:23:09.000 --> 01:23:11.000
|
|
So what had happened?
|
|
|
|
01:23:14.000 --> 01:23:21.000
|
|
In the night of September 17, 2019, a certain interest rate unexpectedly spiked on an overnight loan market.
|
|
|
|
01:23:22.000 --> 01:23:28.000
|
|
It was to rate for short-term credits that are normally borrowed by banks at an interest rate of about 2%.
|
|
|
|
01:23:28.000 --> 01:23:31.000
|
|
But suddenly lenders were demanding 10%.
|
|
|
|
01:23:31.000 --> 01:23:38.000
|
|
The last time the Fed had to intervene was after the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008.
|
|
|
|
01:23:38.000 --> 01:23:46.000
|
|
The fall of that large bank prompted a crisis in that part of the financial system that almost led to the collapse of world economy.
|
|
|
|
01:23:50.000 --> 01:23:52.000
|
|
That development helped my attention.
|
|
|
|
01:23:53.000 --> 01:23:58.000
|
|
I have looked at the monetary policy principles and practice of the US Federal Reserve System,
|
|
|
|
01:23:58.000 --> 01:24:02.000
|
|
the US Central Bank, and checked the data on its website.
|
|
|
|
01:24:02.000 --> 01:24:04.000
|
|
There you can find this graph.
|
|
|
|
01:24:04.000 --> 01:24:08.000
|
|
Now for everyone who isn't at home at the subject of numbers and finance,
|
|
|
|
01:24:08.000 --> 01:24:09.000
|
|
don't be scared now.
|
|
|
|
01:24:09.000 --> 01:24:10.000
|
|
It's not rocket science.
|
|
|
|
01:24:10.000 --> 01:24:13.000
|
|
It's not as complicated as it looks at first glance.
|
|
|
|
01:24:13.000 --> 01:24:16.000
|
|
I will try to explain what the chart is showing.
|
|
|
|
01:24:17.000 --> 01:24:20.000
|
|
It's the balance sheet of the Fed depicting its total assets.
|
|
|
|
01:24:20.000 --> 01:24:30.000
|
|
It shows how much money the Fed is pumping into American economy by buying treasury and corporate bonds to offset the fact that banks have stopped lending money to each other.
|
|
|
|
01:24:30.000 --> 01:24:45.000
|
|
In short, the Fed actively participates in the economy by creating money and injecting it into the domestic banking system in order to compensate for the fact that the interbank lending market has dried up because banks have lost confidence and hold on to their reserves.
|
|
|
|
01:24:45.000 --> 01:24:49.000
|
|
So it is basically the fever chart of US economy.
|
|
|
|
01:24:49.000 --> 01:24:58.000
|
|
Here to the left, that's 2008, before the global financial crisis, when the Fed owned assets of almost a trillion dollars, that's 1,000 billions.
|
|
|
|
01:25:00.000 --> 01:25:03.000
|
|
This amount doubled within a few weeks in the fall of 2008.
|
|
|
|
01:25:03.000 --> 01:25:07.000
|
|
Why? The Fed's total assets doubled because the confidence was gone.
|
|
|
|
01:25:07.000 --> 01:25:10.000
|
|
The banks had stopped lending money to one another.
|
|
|
|
01:25:10.000 --> 01:25:15.000
|
|
So the Federal Reserve had to fill in, otherwise the system would have blown up.
|
|
|
|
01:25:15.000 --> 01:25:17.000
|
|
That's what happened in 2008.
|
|
|
|
01:25:17.000 --> 01:25:23.000
|
|
It's striking though that the Fed's bonds purchases were not cut back, but continued in 2010 and 11.
|
|
|
|
01:25:23.000 --> 01:25:31.000
|
|
The amount was even increased in 2012, 13 and 14, further rises then from 2015 to the end of 2017.
|
|
|
|
01:25:31.000 --> 01:25:39.000
|
|
The intervention plateaued at the high level of 4 trillion, which was roughly 4 times the amount compared to before the crisis of 2008.
|
|
|
|
01:25:39.000 --> 01:25:46.000
|
|
When you look at that from today's perspective, you read and think of what they get you to argue about with regard to student loans.
|
|
|
|
01:25:48.000 --> 01:25:56.000
|
|
Where businesses, you know, somewhere between 100,000 and 700,000 can go, I mean, I don't know what the number is.
|
|
|
|
01:25:56.000 --> 01:26:01.000
|
|
The businesses can go bankrupt for the tune of millions of dollars every year.
|
|
|
|
01:26:01.000 --> 01:26:08.000
|
|
Nobody's got any problem with that, but not, you know, the idea that student loans, they can't be bankrupt.
|
|
|
|
01:26:08.000 --> 01:26:14.000
|
|
You can't dispense of them with bankruptcy and you can't get out of them and the interest runs forever.
|
|
|
|
01:26:14.000 --> 01:26:17.000
|
|
And there's no real control on that.
|
|
|
|
01:26:17.000 --> 01:26:27.000
|
|
And then they make us fight about whether those loans are important enough when businesses are allowed to declare bankruptcy all the time.
|
|
|
|
01:26:27.000 --> 01:26:43.000
|
|
And the Fed is allowed to take on the weight of the bad choices of the banking system to the tune of multi trillions of dollars.
|
|
|
|
01:26:43.000 --> 01:26:46.000
|
|
Multi trillions of dollars.
|
|
|
|
01:26:46.000 --> 01:26:51.000
|
|
It's extraordinary to me how the bait and switch works on every level.
|
|
|
|
01:26:51.000 --> 01:26:57.000
|
|
We're never really talking about what's important if we're talking about what the TV wants us to talk about.
|
|
|
|
01:26:57.000 --> 01:27:03.000
|
|
Realize that the bubble was gigantic and it becomes clear that this practice couldn't be kept up.
|
|
|
|
01:27:03.000 --> 01:27:07.000
|
|
You either had to deflate it or it would eventually burst.
|
|
|
|
01:27:07.000 --> 01:27:16.000
|
|
Actually, that was tried by the Federal Reserve at the end of 2017 when it was decided to slowly but deliberately deflate that bubble in a steady manner.
|
|
|
|
01:27:16.000 --> 01:27:20.000
|
|
Sell assets and thus effectively take money out of the system.
|
|
|
|
01:27:20.000 --> 01:27:23.000
|
|
For two years, that went pretty well between the end of 2017.
|
|
|
|
01:27:23.000 --> 01:27:25.000
|
|
I mean, it's no different, right?
|
|
|
|
01:27:25.000 --> 01:27:34.000
|
|
The student loans are no different than somebody going into the hospital with no insurance and having somebody at the door say,
|
|
|
|
01:27:34.000 --> 01:27:38.000
|
|
you can have the best treatment. All you got to do is sign here.
|
|
|
|
01:27:38.000 --> 01:27:43.000
|
|
Because with most of these kids, they go off to school. That's how I got it.
|
|
|
|
01:27:43.000 --> 01:27:51.000
|
|
I wanted to go to a school. They said, I sign here and I can go to the school and you'll figure out the student loan debt later.
|
|
|
|
01:27:51.000 --> 01:27:58.000
|
|
Well, if you went into a hospital and they said you'll get the best care, if you just sign here, we'll pay for it and you can figure it out afterward.
|
|
|
|
01:27:58.000 --> 01:28:03.000
|
|
And then you came out with a huge bill that you never really could understand.
|
|
|
|
01:28:04.000 --> 01:28:09.000
|
|
And the hospital's not on the blocks for charging you the right amount.
|
|
|
|
01:28:09.000 --> 01:28:13.000
|
|
The university's not on the block for charging you the right amount.
|
|
|
|
01:28:13.000 --> 01:28:27.000
|
|
And so a lot of these liberal arts universities can charge $20,000 a year because they know Pell grants and guaranteed student loans are going to be given away at infant item to any kid that applies for them.
|
|
|
|
01:28:27.000 --> 01:28:45.000
|
|
And so they hire a whole financial aid department that helps these kids navigate the application process and make sure is that all of them get the financial aid that they deserve so that they can cover the bill of whatever that university decides to charge them this year.
|
|
|
|
01:28:46.000 --> 01:29:08.000
|
|
And so it's kind of a racket to put the college kid completely on the block for having gone to that university, paid the cost of the university, had the university graduate them and nobody's looking at the university for what product they provide, whether they charge what they should have.
|
|
|
|
01:29:08.000 --> 01:29:17.000
|
|
When I get that it's an open market, I get that people should be choosing the right university or going to a state university or whatever.
|
|
|
|
01:29:17.000 --> 01:29:23.000
|
|
And that if you choose out of state tuition, that's your own problem, I get all those things.
|
|
|
|
01:29:23.000 --> 01:29:37.000
|
|
But my point is, is that very similar to my analogy of if you walked into a hospital and they told you could have the best treatment if you just sign here, student loans aren't the same as getting alone for a car.
|
|
|
|
01:29:37.000 --> 01:29:45.000
|
|
Or getting a loan mortgage for a house, nobody evaluates anybody's potential to pay the loan back.
|
|
|
|
01:29:45.000 --> 01:29:51.000
|
|
You just have to sign at the dotted line and now you have four years of college.
|
|
|
|
01:29:51.000 --> 01:29:57.000
|
|
And that's a pretty weird thing to then say, by the way, you could never get out of this.
|
|
|
|
01:29:57.000 --> 01:30:08.000
|
|
Never. Never ever ever get out of this. It's on you forever. And if they want to charge you 9% interest and compound it when you can't pay it, well, that's tough shit.
|
|
|
|
01:30:08.000 --> 01:30:21.000
|
|
So it's interesting to apply that to student loans, but not to apply it to business loans, mortgage loans, any other loans that anybody has, credit card loans.
|
|
|
|
01:30:22.000 --> 01:30:29.000
|
|
Because again, that's fine. Bankruptcy is fine, but not when it comes to student loans.
|
|
|
|
01:30:29.000 --> 01:30:34.000
|
|
And so I'm just saying, this is crazy. It's extremely nuts.
|
|
|
|
01:30:34.000 --> 01:30:45.000
|
|
And student loans is a very small drop in the bucket for what goes on in the background with corporate business going out of business, corporate business cheating, corporate business tax fraud.
|
|
|
|
01:30:45.000 --> 01:30:52.000
|
|
And this federal government bank collusion that we have to admit that we don't even understand.
|
|
|
|
01:31:16.000 --> 01:31:27.000
|
|
But obviously the confidence on the repo market was reduced to nothing in mid September 2019, which means that the Fed had to completely alter its course, reversing the policy it had been pursuing for two years.
|
|
|
|
01:31:27.000 --> 01:31:34.000
|
|
So it was again buying government securities, thereby providing liquidity for the markets. What a turn.
|
|
|
|
01:31:34.000 --> 01:31:44.000
|
|
And now you see the significant rise here. It has nothing to do with Corona that is January 2020. But this year in March 2020, this is the sharp increase in the shadow of Corona.
|
|
|
|
01:31:45.000 --> 01:31:53.000
|
|
But see, October, November, December 2019, the graph indicates ever increasing cash injections that have nothing to do with Corona.
|
|
|
|
01:31:53.000 --> 01:31:58.000
|
|
After March 2020, it's the same upward movement, just much more pronounced.
|
|
|
|
01:32:03.000 --> 01:32:10.000
|
|
And now I would like to show your report from January 16, 2020, a few weeks before Corona became the major media topic.
|
|
|
|
01:32:11.000 --> 01:32:18.000
|
|
It is a report by Norbert Herring, a German economics journalist, writing about the Fed's massive bond purchases.
|
|
|
|
01:32:18.000 --> 01:32:28.000
|
|
The Fed explained its interventions with the less than convincing reason of temporary miscalculations, saying it was out of the question that the banks didn't trust each other.
|
|
|
|
01:32:28.000 --> 01:32:32.000
|
|
The alleged miscalculations apparently seem to be rather persistent.
|
|
|
|
01:32:32.000 --> 01:32:39.000
|
|
Four months later, the Fed's emergency landing is still perpetuated in unrestrained amounts, an end is not in sight.
|
|
|
|
01:32:40.000 --> 01:32:45.000
|
|
The names of the company's receiving loans are kept secret so that their reputation won't suffer.
|
|
|
|
01:32:45.000 --> 01:32:52.000
|
|
It might be that the financial market boom, fueled by central banks, is in its final phase before collapsing.
|
|
|
|
01:32:52.000 --> 01:32:56.000
|
|
I would like to put that into a wider chronological context.
|
|
|
|
01:32:56.000 --> 01:33:03.000
|
|
I found the chart depicting the historical view of the Fed balance sheet over a period of not only 10 years, but 100 years.
|
|
|
|
01:33:03.000 --> 01:33:05.000
|
|
That's how long it already exists.
|
|
|
|
01:33:06.000 --> 01:33:12.000
|
|
Here we can basically see to what extent the Fed was actively participated in US economy relative to GDP.
|
|
|
|
01:33:12.000 --> 01:33:16.000
|
|
We see that it peaks in 2008 during the global financial crisis.
|
|
|
|
01:33:16.000 --> 01:33:25.000
|
|
The value was comparable to the Great Depression in 1930, rising continually until 1940, only to decrease slowly after World War II.
|
|
|
|
01:33:25.000 --> 01:33:32.000
|
|
The level of the Fed's interventions is similarly high during the crisis of 2008 and again in September 2019.
|
|
|
|
01:33:33.000 --> 01:33:40.000
|
|
We are experiencing the same large-scale dimensions of financial intervention.
|
|
|
|
01:33:40.000 --> 01:33:53.000
|
|
In October 2019, the next simulation exercise took place at that hotel, an exceptionally luxurious venue for such an exercise on Fifth Avenue in Manhattan.
|
|
|
|
01:33:53.000 --> 01:33:59.000
|
|
Central Park is right across, and when you walk a few blocks south on Fifth Avenue, you come to the Trump Tower.
|
|
|
|
01:33:59.000 --> 01:34:02.000
|
|
So this part of Manhattan is the most expensive.
|
|
|
|
01:34:02.000 --> 01:34:09.000
|
|
The hotel Pierre was opened in 1930 during the Great Depression, financed by some big Wall Street bankers.
|
|
|
|
01:34:09.000 --> 01:34:17.000
|
|
That roof anti-architecture are reminiscent of the royal chapel of Versailles, the Baroque grandeur of Louis Catos.
|
|
|
|
01:34:17.000 --> 01:34:28.000
|
|
The Wall Street bankers whose money made it possible obviously like to live in that kind of pomp and splendor, they saw themselves on that level.
|
|
|
|
01:34:29.000 --> 01:34:34.000
|
|
The hotel still exists, and right there in New York, the exercise called Event 201 was hosted.
|
|
|
|
01:34:40.000 --> 01:34:44.000
|
|
Sure enough, it was a corona virus pandemic that was being responded to.
|
|
|
|
01:34:44.000 --> 01:34:49.000
|
|
I'd like to present you briefly who is sitting there at the conference table.
|
|
|
|
01:34:49.000 --> 01:34:55.000
|
|
This is the host from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security next to him, Christopher Elias of the Gates Foundation.
|
|
|
|
01:34:55.000 --> 01:35:02.000
|
|
I have brought him to your attention before, since he is a member of the Advisory Board on Global Health for the German Government.
|
|
|
|
01:35:02.000 --> 01:35:06.000
|
|
To his right, the Director of American Center for Disease Control.
|
|
|
|
01:35:06.000 --> 01:35:13.000
|
|
There is the Director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control, who was also part of that group of global senior leaders.
|
|
|
|
01:35:13.000 --> 01:35:20.000
|
|
There the Vice President Global Public Health at Johnson & Johnson by market value, the largest farmer corporation in the world.
|
|
|
|
01:35:21.000 --> 01:35:31.000
|
|
Here the former Deputy Director of the CIA, and there in the front, the Global Chief Operating Officer at Edelmann, the world's largest public relations and communications firm.
|
|
|
|
01:35:38.000 --> 01:35:44.000
|
|
As I've mentioned, this time a corona virus pandemic was simulated with an eye towards public relations.
|
|
|
|
01:35:45.000 --> 01:35:54.000
|
|
It says here, governments will need to partner with traditional and social media companies to research and develop nimble approaches to countering misinformation.
|
|
|
|
01:35:54.000 --> 01:36:01.000
|
|
This will require developing the ability to fluid media with fast, accurate and consistent information.
|
|
|
|
01:36:01.000 --> 01:36:13.000
|
|
For their part, media companies should commit to ensuring that authoritative messages are prioritized and that false messages are suppressed, including through the use of technology.
|
|
|
|
01:36:13.000 --> 01:36:17.000
|
|
That is basically just what is happening at this very moment.
|
|
|
|
01:36:22.000 --> 01:36:24.000
|
|
Here another picture of the conference.
|
|
|
|
01:36:24.000 --> 01:36:30.000
|
|
This is Anita Atcizero, the Deputy Director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.
|
|
|
|
01:36:30.000 --> 01:36:33.000
|
|
She was assigned to co-organize the event.
|
|
|
|
01:36:33.000 --> 01:36:42.000
|
|
She's a lawyer who, before joining the center, had worked as a farmer lobbyist in the management of a Washington, D.C law firm responsible for about 300 employees,
|
|
|
|
01:36:42.000 --> 01:36:51.000
|
|
advocating on the behalf of the farmer industry with members of Congress, likewise constructively engaging with members of the European Commission.
|
|
|
|
01:36:51.000 --> 01:36:56.000
|
|
Finally, she became Deputy Director of that Center for Health Security.
|
|
|
|
01:37:00.000 --> 01:37:02.000
|
|
These infographics there are found very interesting.
|
|
|
|
01:37:02.000 --> 01:37:10.000
|
|
The significant data of the fictive crisis of event 201 are being presented in charts, maps and tables, showing the mounting numbers of cases,
|
|
|
|
01:37:10.000 --> 01:37:15.000
|
|
and there on the map you see what countries are impacted and to what degree.
|
|
|
|
01:37:15.000 --> 01:37:19.000
|
|
There we are informed about the performance of financial markets.
|
|
|
|
01:37:19.000 --> 01:37:24.000
|
|
Here we have the projection of how the death rate will develop within the next month.
|
|
|
|
01:37:24.000 --> 01:37:31.000
|
|
This is exactly the same kind of infographics that we are now getting from the Johns Hopkins University.
|
|
|
|
01:37:31.000 --> 01:37:35.000
|
|
It is the info we are being fed by all mainstream media outlets.
|
|
|
|
01:37:36.000 --> 01:37:41.000
|
|
It's just that same graphic visualization of numbers and cases that is our reality now.
|
|
|
|
01:37:41.000 --> 01:37:51.000
|
|
And the present censorship by social media giants like YouTube and Google has been expressly advised on that event 201 just a few months before today's corona crisis.
|
|
|
|
01:37:51.000 --> 01:37:54.000
|
|
What had been planned then is now reality.
|
|
|
|
01:37:56.000 --> 01:38:04.000
|
|
As opposed, all that information taken together provides a crucial backdrop for you to form your own opinion about what is happening at the moment.
|
|
|
|
01:38:06.000 --> 01:38:08.000
|
|
Thank you for your attention.
|
|
|
|
01:38:08.000 --> 01:38:10.000
|
|
So that's pretty nice.
|
|
|
|
01:38:11.000 --> 01:38:13.000
|
|
I really like that one.
|
|
|
|
01:38:20.000 --> 01:38:22.000
|
|
It's a very, very nice video.
|
|
|
|
01:38:22.000 --> 01:38:30.000
|
|
I'm going to put a link to it here in the in the chat so you can mark it for yourself.
|
|
|
|
01:38:31.000 --> 01:38:36.000
|
|
I think it's a real nice one to share and you can also share this stream, of course, of us watching it together.
|
|
|
|
01:38:40.000 --> 01:38:43.000
|
|
I want to just make sure that we have it clear.
|
|
|
|
01:38:45.000 --> 01:38:49.000
|
|
The concept of what's going on, the illusion of consensus.
|
|
|
|
01:38:51.000 --> 01:38:57.000
|
|
And how we're using this example of left track as an illusion of consensus.
|
|
|
|
01:38:58.000 --> 01:39:00.000
|
|
That was a close one.
|
|
|
|
01:39:00.000 --> 01:39:02.000
|
|
I almost been home with that guy.
|
|
|
|
01:39:03.000 --> 01:39:04.000
|
|
You doing okay?
|
|
|
|
01:39:04.000 --> 01:39:05.000
|
|
Do we need to go?
|
|
|
|
01:39:06.000 --> 01:39:07.000
|
|
No, I'm fine.
|
|
|
|
01:39:07.000 --> 01:39:12.000
|
|
I admit all these people did take me by surprise at first, but I've learned that I can accept change.
|
|
|
|
01:39:13.000 --> 01:39:14.000
|
|
Since when?
|
|
|
|
01:39:16.000 --> 01:39:20.000
|
|
I managed it when Amy switched her shampoo from pral to pral for oily hair.
|
|
|
|
01:39:21.000 --> 01:39:24.000
|
|
Although I do miss the way her head used to slide off the pillow.
|
|
|
|
01:39:27.000 --> 01:39:31.000
|
|
And now if we remove that consensus, look at how bad it becomes.
|
|
|
|
01:39:38.000 --> 01:39:39.000
|
|
I'm over here Sheldon.
|
|
|
|
01:39:41.000 --> 01:39:42.000
|
|
That was a close one.
|
|
|
|
01:39:43.000 --> 01:39:44.000
|
|
I almost been home with that guy.
|
|
|
|
01:39:46.000 --> 01:39:47.000
|
|
You doing okay?
|
|
|
|
01:39:47.000 --> 01:39:48.000
|
|
Do we need to go?
|
|
|
|
01:39:48.000 --> 01:39:49.000
|
|
No, I'm fine.
|
|
|
|
01:39:50.000 --> 01:39:55.000
|
|
I admit all these people did take me by surprise at first, but I've learned that I can accept change.
|
|
|
|
01:39:56.000 --> 01:39:57.000
|
|
Since when?
|
|
|
|
01:39:58.000 --> 01:40:02.000
|
|
I managed it when Amy switched her shampoo from pral to pral for oily hair.
|
|
|
|
01:40:03.000 --> 01:40:06.000
|
|
Although I do miss the way her head used to slide off the pillow.
|
|
|
|
01:40:09.000 --> 01:40:18.000
|
|
And that's really what they do with this when they have five ladies on the view talk about coronavirus for three years
|
|
|
|
01:40:19.000 --> 01:40:21.000
|
|
and come to conclusions together.
|
|
|
|
01:40:22.000 --> 01:40:29.000
|
|
It creates this illusion of consensus that these three ladies who are much smarter than me
|
|
|
|
01:40:30.000 --> 01:40:36.000
|
|
and they're on TV seem to agree that it's a natural virus and these people are telling a story about lab leak
|
|
|
|
01:40:37.000 --> 01:40:39.000
|
|
and they all took the virus or they all took the shot.
|
|
|
|
01:40:40.000 --> 01:40:41.000
|
|
She has COVID.
|
|
|
|
01:40:42.000 --> 01:40:43.000
|
|
Yes, it's back.
|
|
|
|
01:40:44.000 --> 01:40:45.000
|
|
It's back.
|
|
|
|
01:40:45.000 --> 01:40:46.000
|
|
But she's on the men.
|
|
|
|
01:40:46.000 --> 01:40:48.000
|
|
She's on the tail end and she's probably back this week.
|
|
|
|
01:40:48.000 --> 01:40:52.000
|
|
But sorry, she's not here for those of you who are looking forward to seeing her.
|
|
|
|
01:40:52.000 --> 01:41:00.000
|
|
And so if you change the channel and you find this illusion of consensus, if you change and scroll on Facebook
|
|
|
|
01:41:00.000 --> 01:41:06.000
|
|
and you find this illusion of consensus, if you look on Twitter and you see this illusion of consensus
|
|
|
|
01:41:06.000 --> 01:41:13.000
|
|
that we've got to figure out whether it's a natural leak or a lab virus and then that consensus slowly starts to change
|
|
|
|
01:41:14.000 --> 01:41:17.000
|
|
to the fact that, wow, they seem to have really lied about this.
|
|
|
|
01:41:17.000 --> 01:41:21.000
|
|
It seems like they were covering stuff up and it looks like they gave money.
|
|
|
|
01:41:21.000 --> 01:41:28.000
|
|
And this guy and that guy and no, and there's barrack and there's fauci and there's eco-health alliance.
|
|
|
|
01:41:28.000 --> 01:41:30.000
|
|
This is all wrapped up.
|
|
|
|
01:41:33.000 --> 01:41:39.000
|
|
And none of the current players that are really talking every night, the ones that are on,
|
|
|
|
01:41:39.000 --> 01:41:47.000
|
|
are able to be on YouTube, the ones that are able to be on every podcast that they ever want to be on all the time,
|
|
|
|
01:41:47.000 --> 01:41:53.000
|
|
every channel are not talking about the PCR fraud at all anymore.
|
|
|
|
01:41:53.000 --> 01:41:56.000
|
|
I don't know if I've ever heard Robert Malone talk about that.
|
|
|
|
01:41:56.000 --> 01:42:00.000
|
|
I don't know if I've ever heard Steve Kirsch really talk about it anymore.
|
|
|
|
01:42:00.000 --> 01:42:05.000
|
|
They're not talking about the crime of the masking and lockdown anymore.
|
|
|
|
01:42:05.000 --> 01:42:06.000
|
|
That's already forgotten.
|
|
|
|
01:42:06.000 --> 01:42:12.000
|
|
The spreading, the pathogen that spread is never really spread.
|
|
|
|
01:42:12.000 --> 01:42:19.000
|
|
And now we have data from Jessica Hockett and from lots of other people, actually, like Denny Rancour,
|
|
|
|
01:42:19.000 --> 01:42:21.000
|
|
that all show the same thing.
|
|
|
|
01:42:21.000 --> 01:42:23.000
|
|
There's death certificate fraud.
|
|
|
|
01:42:23.000 --> 01:42:30.000
|
|
The journalists have uncovered in New York City and in other places around the United States.
|
|
|
|
01:42:30.000 --> 01:42:36.000
|
|
There's protocol fraud that includes do not resuscitate orders to EMTs in New York and elsewhere,
|
|
|
|
01:42:36.000 --> 01:42:43.000
|
|
because you don't want to resuscitate people and catch the virus yourself.
|
|
|
|
01:42:43.000 --> 01:42:48.000
|
|
And then all of those heart attacks that weren't resuscitated were called COVID deaths.
|
|
|
|
01:42:48.000 --> 01:42:53.000
|
|
There's the protocol ventilation fraud, the protocol treatment fraud with remdesivir,
|
|
|
|
01:42:54.000 --> 01:43:04.000
|
|
and then there's this early treatment fraud, which is the idea that something was held back.
|
|
|
|
01:43:04.000 --> 01:43:10.000
|
|
And that's why people died as opposed to treating them poorly or not treating them at all
|
|
|
|
01:43:10.000 --> 01:43:14.000
|
|
or not giving them antibiotics because antibiotics doesn't work for a virus.
|
|
|
|
01:43:15.000 --> 01:43:25.000
|
|
And in reality, anybody that's talking about this, as Mr. Sparkle, aka Mike Eden talks about it,
|
|
|
|
01:43:25.000 --> 01:43:34.000
|
|
you got to talk about it all every time in order for people to understand how it has to all be lies.
|
|
|
|
01:43:35.000 --> 01:43:44.000
|
|
It can't possibly be a lab leaked virus that killed millions of people and all of these lies.
|
|
|
|
01:43:44.000 --> 01:43:46.000
|
|
That's ridiculous.
|
|
|
|
01:43:46.000 --> 01:43:58.000
|
|
You don't need anything if you have all of these lies except for a spectacular commitment to maintaining these lies.
|
|
|
|
01:43:58.000 --> 01:44:02.000
|
|
And so I believe this is where we are, the who declared a pandemic of a dangerous novel.
|
|
|
|
01:44:02.000 --> 01:44:07.000
|
|
Virus said to be detectable by a specific PCR test, but it was not specific.
|
|
|
|
01:44:07.000 --> 01:44:13.000
|
|
I think most likely scenario is that they released, as was described in that video,
|
|
|
|
01:44:13.000 --> 01:44:22.000
|
|
they just they released a clone, which would blend into a background of an existing coronavirus background.
|
|
|
|
01:44:22.000 --> 01:44:27.000
|
|
And so they put the clone in places, maybe made people sick with it,
|
|
|
|
01:44:27.000 --> 01:44:34.000
|
|
but certainly made people detectively positive for a sequence that would be very similar around the world,
|
|
|
|
01:44:34.000 --> 01:44:41.000
|
|
and thus be plausible biological evidence for the rapid spread of a single agent.
|
|
|
|
01:44:44.000 --> 01:44:49.000
|
|
But of course, with that background, as Robert Cadillac said, with that background, a few seed cases
|
|
|
|
01:44:49.000 --> 01:44:56.000
|
|
and then testing that doesn't really cover the specific would give you the thing that Giordano said.
|
|
|
|
01:44:56.000 --> 01:45:03.000
|
|
And that would enable a larger portion of all cause mortality to be prioritized as a national security threat
|
|
|
|
01:45:03.000 --> 01:45:06.000
|
|
because the test makes it that instead of the other.
|
|
|
|
01:45:06.000 --> 01:45:10.000
|
|
And the US was ready with a plan as was described in this video.
|
|
|
|
01:45:10.000 --> 01:45:14.000
|
|
We had been rehearsing with other countries for decades.
|
|
|
|
01:45:19.000 --> 01:45:28.000
|
|
And so an NIAID funded DNA RNA infectious clone, so using DNA to generate the RNA and then spraying it around,
|
|
|
|
01:45:28.000 --> 01:45:33.000
|
|
or just DNA and spraying it around so that you can sequence for it.
|
|
|
|
01:45:33.000 --> 01:45:41.000
|
|
This clone of a coronavirus may have been used to seed the molecular idea, maybe even cases.
|
|
|
|
01:45:41.000 --> 01:45:49.000
|
|
Maybe the first SARS virus in 2002 was what a clone does when you release it in China on an apartment building.
|
|
|
|
01:45:49.000 --> 01:45:55.000
|
|
It gets 10,000 people trackably sick and it kills 700 people.
|
|
|
|
01:45:55.000 --> 01:46:03.000
|
|
And so maybe they did that in five places and then they sequenced it in five places and they found that virus.
|
|
|
|
01:46:03.000 --> 01:46:07.000
|
|
That's what I'm suggesting.
|
|
|
|
01:46:07.000 --> 01:46:14.000
|
|
After that, there doesn't need to be spread because there was a background signal that these tests cannot differentiate from
|
|
|
|
01:46:14.000 --> 01:46:18.000
|
|
and that these sequencing reactions can pick up.
|
|
|
|
01:46:18.000 --> 01:46:27.000
|
|
And since we have no sequencing data from before 2020 that's worth a darn, we don't know if that background signal didn't always exist.
|
|
|
|
01:46:27.000 --> 01:46:33.000
|
|
And it's a much more parsimonious explanation for the molecular signal we're seeing now
|
|
|
|
01:46:33.000 --> 01:46:41.000
|
|
than the point spread of an RNA species from Wuhan, China around the planet.
|
|
|
|
01:46:43.000 --> 01:46:50.000
|
|
And the reason why they're telling us this story that our fabulous commitment to lives is because they are fabulously
|
|
|
|
01:46:50.000 --> 01:46:58.000
|
|
committed to converting our children from basic human rights to basic granted permissions.
|
|
|
|
01:46:58.000 --> 01:47:03.000
|
|
They don't want our kids to feel the sovereignty that we feel over our children.
|
|
|
|
01:47:09.000 --> 01:47:12.000
|
|
And I'm going to zip through this because you know already that's what they did.
|
|
|
|
01:47:12.000 --> 01:47:17.000
|
|
So the way that they convinced us of this again is a laboratory or a bad cave zoonosis.
|
|
|
|
01:47:17.000 --> 01:47:20.000
|
|
And I think it was a conflated background signal.
|
|
|
|
01:47:20.000 --> 01:47:26.000
|
|
If you compare these two, in this scenario, the Earth is clean over here in 2018.
|
|
|
|
01:47:26.000 --> 01:47:33.000
|
|
And then a lab leak or a natural virus is released in Wuhan and it spreads around the world and it changes.
|
|
|
|
01:47:33.000 --> 01:47:36.000
|
|
And that's why the virus changes color.
|
|
|
|
01:47:36.000 --> 01:47:43.000
|
|
And what I think is a much more parsimonious explanation for what they've done is that in the background there is a signal.
|
|
|
|
01:47:43.000 --> 01:47:54.000
|
|
And they probably used a clone to seed the appearance of a homogenous novel signal on this background.
|
|
|
|
01:47:54.000 --> 01:48:01.000
|
|
And since nobody's really aware of the depth and the breadth of this background because no one was looking at it before,
|
|
|
|
01:48:01.000 --> 01:48:09.000
|
|
once they rolled out mass testing and mass sequencing, it looks like, wow, look at all this stuff, we're finding it everywhere.
|
|
|
|
01:48:09.000 --> 01:48:23.000
|
|
But in reality, if they'd have looked this hard and this often all the time with this much gusto and this many terrible products and this much, let's say, impetus to find things
|
|
|
|
01:48:23.000 --> 01:48:31.000
|
|
then they would have found this background signal a long time ago, but it just wouldn't have been conflated into a pandemic.
|
|
|
|
01:48:31.000 --> 01:48:39.000
|
|
And so it doesn't matter whether it's a leak or lease or lies, it doesn't matter because in this scenario, it is the protocols that killed everybody.
|
|
|
|
01:48:39.000 --> 01:48:46.000
|
|
It's the change in behavior that killed everybody. It's the bad information that killed everybody.
|
|
|
|
01:48:46.000 --> 01:48:52.000
|
|
It's the notion that there's a novel virus around that you don't understand that killed everybody.
|
|
|
|
01:48:52.000 --> 01:49:12.000
|
|
And they put all these young doctors on their heels and sent all the old doctors home and separated families and spouses and children from their parents as they died from what was probably an untreated secondary pneumonia brought on by a respiratory disease.
|
|
|
|
01:49:12.000 --> 01:49:19.000
|
|
And so the protocols were murder and transfection is not medicine, you can turn this around and try to explain it.
|
|
|
|
01:49:19.000 --> 01:49:32.000
|
|
But I've said a million times if you call 911 and say there's a man in my house, you shouldn't really have to tell 911 what he's doing there or what his motivations are.
|
|
|
|
01:49:32.000 --> 01:49:36.000
|
|
They should probably send the police right away and then the police figure that out.
|
|
|
|
01:49:36.000 --> 01:49:50.000
|
|
And when you realize that there wasn't a pandemic because the biology doesn't permit it, which means everybody is lying to you, then this becomes a crime scene and we're not really obligated to explain what happened.
|
|
|
|
01:49:50.000 --> 01:49:54.000
|
|
It's time to back the truck up and figure it out.
|
|
|
|
01:49:54.000 --> 01:50:00.000
|
|
All we know for sure is the protocols were murder and transfection is not medicine.
|
|
|
|
01:50:00.000 --> 01:50:05.000
|
|
So you could say it was a transfection agent release and infectious clone release.
|
|
|
|
01:50:05.000 --> 01:50:09.000
|
|
It doesn't matter because the protocols were murder and transfection is not medicine.
|
|
|
|
01:50:09.000 --> 01:50:19.000
|
|
So whatever it was, I think the best explanation to cover the most is a conflated background signal, meaning there was an agent.
|
|
|
|
01:50:19.000 --> 01:50:27.000
|
|
They likely seated the molecular signature on a background from which the PCR could not differentiate.
|
|
|
|
01:50:28.000 --> 01:50:38.000
|
|
And overuse of the PCR and people who are not sick, but with a huge background from which it couldn't differentiate, this huge signal came up.
|
|
|
|
01:50:38.000 --> 01:50:51.000
|
|
And the media and social media and governments were all primed to talk only about spread, talk only about numbers that started from zero and went to infinity.
|
|
|
|
01:50:52.000 --> 01:51:05.000
|
|
And not to adequately describe this in context of all cause mortality and instead describe it in some cartoon manner that has nothing to do with the biological reality.
|
|
|
|
01:51:05.000 --> 01:51:08.000
|
|
Protocols were murder, transfection is not medicine.
|
|
|
|
01:51:08.000 --> 01:51:18.000
|
|
And that's why the scenario of there are no viruses is definitely a trap because there is transfection.
|
|
|
|
01:51:18.000 --> 01:51:24.000
|
|
We can make gene sequences. We have made transfections working animals before.
|
|
|
|
01:51:24.000 --> 01:51:27.000
|
|
We have aerosolized these things before.
|
|
|
|
01:51:27.000 --> 01:51:30.000
|
|
Bioweapons programs are real.
|
|
|
|
01:51:30.000 --> 01:51:40.000
|
|
I think it's very, very good argument that these guys make that there aren't these obligate pathogens that replicated our bodies and fly around the world.
|
|
|
|
01:51:41.000 --> 01:51:50.000
|
|
But there are exosomes and there are lots of signals at this size scale that involve genetic material that we do not understand.
|
|
|
|
01:51:50.000 --> 01:52:00.000
|
|
Some of them go between our tissues. Some of them are signaling for our immune system and others of them may signal between conspecifics and we may not understand them.
|
|
|
|
01:52:00.000 --> 01:52:05.000
|
|
And there is likely this signaling process in animals as well.
|
|
|
|
01:52:05.000 --> 01:52:12.000
|
|
It's even possible that this signaling process is, let's say, semi-self enduring.
|
|
|
|
01:52:12.000 --> 01:52:22.000
|
|
So you might send a signal that is self-replicating for a little while to communicate with a conspecifics immune system to augment it.
|
|
|
|
01:52:22.000 --> 01:52:25.000
|
|
Maybe this is why little kids make old people sick.
|
|
|
|
01:52:25.000 --> 01:52:32.000
|
|
It's an interaction between immune systems. It's not a pathogen dirty being spread from another person who's clean.
|
|
|
|
01:52:32.000 --> 01:52:47.000
|
|
And I think what we need to do is not suddenly rush to another solution like there is no viruses or it's germ theory or it's terrain theory, but rush to stop rushing.
|
|
|
|
01:52:47.000 --> 01:53:01.000
|
|
But just sit back and relax and realize that the simple cartoon that we've been given that's supposed to make us understand how this and other diseases have been cured by vaccines is insufficient to describe our lack of knowledge.
|
|
|
|
01:53:01.000 --> 01:53:12.000
|
|
About how our immune system interacts with our environment and is augmentable by human intervention.
|
|
|
|
01:53:12.000 --> 01:53:17.000
|
|
So this isn't sufficient. Protocols or murder and transfection is not medicine.
|
|
|
|
01:53:17.000 --> 01:53:23.000
|
|
So this is where we are. This is really, really, really where I think we should stay.
|
|
|
|
01:53:23.000 --> 01:53:36.000
|
|
And I think Mike Eden and I are going to try and come up with a way of collaborating on this so that we can get some kind of message that we can be sending out more regularly and making clips of, etc.
|
|
|
|
01:53:36.000 --> 01:53:45.000
|
|
So I think people have worked together, wittingly and unwittingly, to change our minds to see this worst case scenario in the beginning.
|
|
|
|
01:53:45.000 --> 01:54:00.000
|
|
And that really put us on our heels. And it's taken us three years to realize that this mindset change allowed us to change so much behavior and a full and entire society into essentially shooting ourselves in the foot.
|
|
|
|
01:54:01.000 --> 01:54:10.000
|
|
And, or injecting ourselves in our shoulder as it were. And this was the plan. And it's been the plan all along.
|
|
|
|
01:54:10.000 --> 01:54:17.000
|
|
And once we realize that it's a plan, we're going to have to, we're going to have to put the brakes on and take control of our car again.
|
|
|
|
01:54:17.000 --> 01:54:22.000
|
|
Because the goal is bio surveillance. And it's not for us.
|
|
|
|
01:54:22.000 --> 01:54:33.000
|
|
We're too old. And we're too sovereign over ourselves and our children. So the idea is to get our children's children. This is a long game.
|
|
|
|
01:54:33.000 --> 01:54:36.000
|
|
10 years, 20 year game.
|
|
|
|
01:54:36.000 --> 01:54:51.000
|
|
And their idea is to talk all this smack about AI and stuff when they really realize the only hope they have of cracking anything of this complexity is to start sampling the diversity that's here before it's gone forever.
|
|
|
|
01:54:51.000 --> 01:55:04.000
|
|
You can communicate with me at gigaohm.bio and also gigaohmbiological.com. I'm also at JJ Cooey on Twitter.
|
|
|
|
01:55:04.000 --> 01:55:15.000
|
|
And yeah, we're just going to keep on going because transfection is not immunization. Intra muscular injection is not a valid means of augmenting your immune system.
|
|
|
|
01:55:16.000 --> 01:55:32.000
|
|
I hope you enjoyed the show. I really liked that German's presentation. It was pretty much spot on. And I thought it was appropriate because we had two videos now with Mike Eden talking about the simulations that occurred and, you know, reminding everybody that's a pretty big piece of evidence.
|
|
|
|
01:55:33.000 --> 01:55:45.000
|
|
And this hour long presentation really laid it out and smoothed it over as much bread as it can cover. And it's a lot of sandwiches. I got to say, um, yeah. Thanks for joining me.
|
|
|
|
01:55:45.000 --> 01:55:59.000
|
|
And we will see one another again tomorrow as far as I can tell you. Stop all transfections and humans full stop because they are trying to eliminate the control group. This is gigaohmbiological and high resistance low noise information stream brought to you by a biologist.
|
|
|
|
01:55:59.000 --> 01:56:02.000
|
|
That's me, Jay Cooey. See you tomorrow.
|
|
|
|
01:57:29.000 --> 01:57:44.000
|
|
Thanks, guys. I'll see you tomorrow night, maybe tomorrow afternoon, probably tomorrow night.
|
|
|
|
|