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2906 lines
93 KiB
2906 lines
93 KiB
WEBVTT
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00:33.561 --> 00:35.171
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First chat is I am Katniss.
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01:09.339 --> 01:16.164
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The actual winner is determined by who tweets, or sorry, who enters the chat after it goes live.
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01:16.244 --> 01:23.609
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So if you're here before it goes live, that just means you're in a better position to compete for that first position.
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01:23.669 --> 01:29.173
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Free mayonnaise, if that feels like the rules have changed a little bit, I apologize.
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01:29.493 --> 01:32.335
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We've just got so much, so many people complaining.
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01:33.996 --> 01:35.037
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that you're always winning.
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01:35.117 --> 01:39.719
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So it has to be after the start of the liveness.
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01:40.659 --> 01:43.981
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And so you will still remain one of the all-time champions.
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01:44.041 --> 01:44.541
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Don't worry.
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01:45.001 --> 01:49.123
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You're going to go down in the all-star books or whatever it's called.
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01:53.506 --> 01:54.626
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It's a huge competition.
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01:54.666 --> 01:56.247
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It's like a cash prize every day.
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01:56.567 --> 01:57.167
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I'm surprised.
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01:57.187 --> 02:00.089
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I think they probably keep it secret because they don't want you to know.
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04:06.606 --> 04:06.646
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Mm.
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05:29.614 --> 05:31.155
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I think truth is good for kids.
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05:31.596 --> 05:35.419
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We're so busy lying, we don't even recognize the truth no more in society.
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05:35.439 --> 05:37.540
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We want everybody to feel good.
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05:37.661 --> 05:39.902
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That's not, that's not the way life is.
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05:42.444 --> 05:46.368
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But you can tell if someone's lying, you know, you can sort of feel it in people.
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05:48.169 --> 05:48.890
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And I have lied.
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05:48.910 --> 05:49.930
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I'm sure I'll lie again.
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05:49.950 --> 05:50.891
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I don't want to lie.
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05:51.372 --> 05:52.733
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You know, I don't think I'm a liar.
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05:52.833 --> 05:53.854
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I try not to be a liar.
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05:53.894 --> 05:54.754
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I don't want to be a liar.
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05:55.315 --> 05:58.037
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I think it's like really important not to be a liar.
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06:00.214 --> 06:20.441
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introduced Jonathan, who's going to talk about his latest distillation of what the pandemic means to society, to biology, to science, and to democracy, and the whole kind of idea of empiricism and integrity.
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06:21.522 --> 06:24.863
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And then each of us, this incredible, preeminent
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06:25.639 --> 06:30.000
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panel that we have, each one of you is going to get a chance to comment.
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06:33.820 --> 06:52.344
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It doesn't matter much at all what you believe about vaccines until we invent really important ones, you know, until we have a pandemic that's killing everyone, you know, and, you know, it's not, it's, you know, measles plus, you know, okay, I can tolerate what you think about measles because, you know, not that many people die from it.
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06:52.644 --> 06:54.584
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It's just a big hassle in the end.
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06:55.233 --> 07:10.965
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but no, when we have this new pandemic that is, you know, got 75% mortality, and it's not, there'll be no pretense of being polite in the face of these beliefs.
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07:11.005 --> 07:13.547
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It'll be a moral emergency, because it has to be.
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07:13.567 --> 07:20.512
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I'm afraid that the latest data tells us that we're dealing with essentially a worst case scenario.
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07:21.994 --> 07:25.155
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Now, Dr. Gallo and Dr. Fauci talked a lot about isolation and purification.
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07:25.635 --> 07:27.455
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Can you tell me what the difference is between the two?
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07:29.436 --> 07:29.816
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Isolation?
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07:29.856 --> 07:30.196
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What was it?
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07:30.356 --> 07:31.576
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Isolation and purification.
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07:33.297 --> 07:34.017
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Of the virus?
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07:34.117 --> 07:34.337
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Yes.
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07:35.557 --> 07:37.318
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Well, you isolate a virus by...
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finding the virus which causes a disease.
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07:47.262 --> 07:52.147
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You purify a virus by making a lot of, I mean, just by purifying it so you get a pure virus.
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07:52.928 --> 07:54.950
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I don't understand what the issue.
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07:55.070 --> 08:00.515
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Well, they interchanged the two and I wasn't sure if it was the same thing or if it was two totally different.
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08:01.617 --> 08:02.758
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No, it depends on how they used it.
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08:03.198 --> 08:04.479
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Okay.
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08:04.640 --> 08:07.042
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Can you explain the process of HIV isolation?
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08:09.605 --> 08:11.546
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Well, didn't Dr. Gallo do that?
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08:11.606 --> 08:13.907
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I mean, he actually isolated it, so.
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08:14.487 --> 08:17.648
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I mean, why should I do all of this?
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08:17.728 --> 08:19.729
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This is all textbook stuff you're asking me.
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The End
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09:16.906 --> 09:18.949
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Sorry to keep you waiting back there, David.
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09:20.071 --> 09:21.473
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We're almost ready to go.
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09:21.493 --> 09:25.939
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It usually requires me to adjust everything as I fly.
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09:25.979 --> 09:27.902
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That's why I do this long introduction.
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09:28.563 --> 09:29.504
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So I apologize.
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09:29.564 --> 09:31.327
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I'm going to be ready to go in about three minutes.
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09:32.564 --> 09:38.365
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Um, again, we're here to dispel another part of the enchantment, but today we're not going to talk about biology.
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09:39.266 --> 09:40.926
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Um, I have a guest on the show today.
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09:41.006 --> 09:53.969
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So instead of listening to me rant, um, we are going to ask some, I hope intelligent questions, um, and, and get some, get some knowledge that we aren't going to be able to get from someone like me.
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09:54.909 --> 09:54.989
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Um,
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09:56.303 --> 09:57.724
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I am very excited.
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09:57.945 --> 09:59.766
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We are living in some interesting times.
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10:00.907 --> 10:09.436
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One of the more interesting aspects of the times in which we live is this multiple angles on the truth about money.
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10:10.316 --> 10:17.523
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And I am definitely not the person to be discussing the truth about money, but I have already
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10:18.604 --> 10:28.618
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many times mentioned money and I often use the term weaponized piles of money because I think it's a general way of thinking about this stuff.
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10:28.638 --> 10:35.787
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I think weaponized piles of money are the reason why we have never really thought about there being no evidence of spread in New York City.
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10:36.815 --> 10:45.460
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I think weaponized piles of money are the reason why we are paying attention to Peter Daszak instead of the molecular biology that's called infectious clones.
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10:45.960 --> 10:51.624
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I think the reason why we are not talking about placebo batches has to do with weaponized piles of money.
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10:52.084 --> 11:00.549
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And I think the reason why transfection is not a word that everyone knows is because of weaponized piles of money, the same weaponized piles of money that have coordinatedly
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11:01.289 --> 11:08.093
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led us to believe that the protocols were necessary instead of murder, that gain of function is real and not a mythology.
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The same weaponized piles of money that coordinatedly lied in order for us to solve this mystery of the Scooby-Doo, and a spectacular commitment to this lie that this is the question to be answered,
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11:20.581 --> 11:39.462
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allows them to cover up some of the other malfeasance that's going on in the background that again involves weaponized piles of money so we're talking about weaponized piles and money and of money and intellectual property and we're also talking about different weaponized piles of money being used for
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11:39.582 --> 11:44.665
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to extract the physical wealth of nations around the world.
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11:44.765 --> 11:53.491
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And so I'm hoping that my naivety to these phenomenon will give us a heads up, a leg up on asking the right questions.
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11:55.032 --> 11:58.354
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And I think David Webb is one of these guys that has been
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11:59.154 --> 12:05.577
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They just attribute bad motives to him because his story is so annoying that they can't argue with it.
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So instead of arguing with his story of the great taking, they just attribute bad motives to him.
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12:11.780 --> 12:14.601
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And maybe they've even gotten to the stage where they just have to ignore him.
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12:16.428 --> 12:18.230
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And anyway, we know where we are.
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We know we're trying to relive or reopen our history books so that we can take back the power that these charlatans have over us.
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But ultimately, these charlatans are forward-facing charlatans, just like these charlatans are.
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They are an elaborate theater that's designed to keep us busy.
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And if we want to make gentle the life of this world and the life of our kids as we move forward, we're going to have to teach them how to see this coordinated wave of lies, of mythologies.
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12:47.797 --> 12:49.979
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And it's not just biology, ladies and gentlemen.
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It's also money.
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It's also a coordinated
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like a coordinated fake consensus about what money is and about what banking is and about how rich people get rich.
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These are all mythologies that are agreed upon on the internet and on social media and if our kids are not clever enough to see through these mythologies then they will be
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victims of them just like we were in our young adult lives.
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Ladies and gentlemen, we stay focused on the biology here, we don't take the bait on social media, and we love our neighbors at Giga Home Biological.
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If you don't know, this is a message produced by an American for America, but it is also a message for the world.
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I recently met David Webb at the Red Pill conference in South Dakota a month ago and sharing that Red Pill talk and his Red Pill talk.
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It's not like any of these things go viral, but we are dependent on sharing these messages.
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We need this message shared.
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13:57.039 --> 14:01.082
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I think David is one of these guys who just wants the truth out.
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You don't have to buy his book.
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Just spread the truth learn it and spread it spread his videos And so I'm really excited to have the chance to talk to him today, so I'm just gonna go through the horn And put up the talking the first talking slide, and then we'll bring David on immediately Wow it's 10 after already not good not good timing bad coffee Took too long to boil or something.
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I don't know what my excuse is
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We're trying to create a paradigm shift all around the world, and it's got to be a paradigm shift on multiple fronts, not just on biology and public health.
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It's also got to be a paradigm shift on how money is curated and how money is created and who has that power.
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And so the only way to really engage in noncompliance is to understand it.
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So you've got to understand how the banks have lied to us.
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And I'm hoping that we're going to get there a little headway today.
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Okay, well, shall I start?
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I'm not sure at what point to enter into this, but shall I just give a bit of an introduction and start talking about the subject?
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Yeah, I think since you already waited so long, and I am really sorry about that, but it's sometimes it's a
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I'm going to slip this up over here.
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15:29.516 --> 15:31.057
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And there you are on the screen.
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And so I'm going to put myself down in the corner and then you won't see me anymore, just down here in the corner.
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Can you see everything fine now?
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You know, I just see myself.
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I don't see anybody else.
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15:41.604 --> 15:51.710
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So if you go up to the top right corner and change the way it views to either a gallery or to the speaker, then you'll see everybody.
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And in the meantime, I'm going to switch down here and I put myself down in the corner.
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Oh, maybe you can't see me because I haven't started my virtual camera.
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Oh, there we go.
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Wow.
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So see, this is just amateur hour here.
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I apologize.
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So ladies and gentlemen, this is David Webb.
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He's the author of The Great Taking, and he knows that we are not an economist and we are not traders and day traders.
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And so I've prefaced a little bit about where we are, but I do want to just hand it over to David.
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So thank you very much for joining me.
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I'll interrupt you if you've gone too fast, too far, and otherwise, whatever you would like to say, the floor is yours.
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OK.
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Well, I'll just start by saying I think
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A big part of the reason I'm doing what I'm doing is because of my grandmother, who was in our household when I was a little boy.
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And she was a nurse in the Great War and went into World War I with my grandfather, who was a surgeon.
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They were not married yet.
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They married after the war.
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They were the first people from the U.S.
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into the war.
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It was a medical unit that went into France before the U.S.
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entered the war.
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And I think that they were really marked by this experience.
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The casualties they were dealing with on a daily basis was just
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dwarfing the ability of their facility to handle this.
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So it's like a scene from Gone with the Wind.
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And I grew up, she somehow put across to me the idea that life should be about more than making money.
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And that medicine is,
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a real profession in the sense that it's a calling.
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And that's what it was for my grandmother and grandfather.
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But in the 1960s, things started going badly in Cleveland.
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My father's side of the family were engineers, and they were in business.
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And Cleveland was going through the beginning of the industrial collapse of the US.
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at that time.
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So I ended up, I would have become a physician, but I ended up going into business really to try to understand what was hurting us, what was going wrong.
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So Cleveland was something like the canary in the coal mine in this.
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And I've been in business.
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I went into finance.
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I went to Wall Street.
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But oddly enough, it was never about making money for me.
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It was about understanding things.
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And I've gone from one thing to the next that way.
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So then let's start getting into money a little bit.
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In the late 90s, I was managing hedge funds in the aftermath of what was called the Asian financial crisis, and then leading up to the dot-com bubble and bust.
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And I started seeing just strange behavior in the equity markets, meaning, as I would describe it, that the markets might go up straight up on bad news, unabashedly bad news.
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So there was some kind of hidden injection coming into the markets at that point.
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I started developing the idea that the Federal Reserve System and the central banks were actually influencing the financial markets.
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20:16.466 --> 20:22.267
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Now, believe it or not, at that point, that was considered conspiracy theory in the late 90s.
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20:22.487 --> 20:26.208
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And my partners thought that that was conspiracy theory.
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20:28.248 --> 20:30.169
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But I began studying this.
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20:30.269 --> 20:32.309
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And one thing I noticed was that
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20:32.910 --> 20:44.816
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For example, in the news, financial news, they were saying that liquidity was coming from the Bank of Japan buying US treasury securities.
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20:46.056 --> 20:52.480
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And the argument was that Japan had to recycle its trade surpluses into these treasuries.
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20:53.240 --> 20:58.042
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So I started looking at, well, what was the scale of these treasury purchases?
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20:58.162 --> 21:01.204
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And what was the scale of the trade surplus?
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21:02.006 --> 21:10.891
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And I found that the scale of the treasury purchases was maybe an order of magnitude larger than whatever the trade surplus could be.
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21:11.771 --> 21:21.677
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So this kind of hyper-financialization was beginning to occur at that point in the late 90s.
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21:21.757 --> 21:24.939
|
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But I began studying
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21:27.904 --> 21:35.572
|
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the scale of injections by the Federal Reserve System into the banking system.
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21:36.553 --> 21:41.098
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And I was able to see the rate of growth in money.
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21:41.238 --> 21:48.466
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I was following the rate of growth in money supply, the change from week to week.
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21:49.019 --> 22:03.904
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And I could see when I began looking at it, I saw that in some weeks, the amount of new money created was maybe more than 1% of GDP of the US.
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22:04.685 --> 22:10.747
|
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Now, if the economy was growing at 3% or 4%, and you had an annualized
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22:11.553 --> 22:15.337
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rate of money growth in a week of 50% or more, something was happening.
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22:21.519 --> 22:26.103
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Now, I have done a... Can I interrupt you here for a second?
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22:27.424 --> 22:33.789
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When you say money supply increases, are you talking also about banks loaning money?
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22:33.809 --> 22:36.491
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Or are you specifically talking about governments printing money?
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22:36.532 --> 22:38.293
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Are you talking about the collective total?
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22:38.393 --> 22:39.634
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Well, no.
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22:39.814 --> 22:47.721
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In this case, this was a measure called M3 at that time, which is
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22:49.070 --> 22:54.694
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a measure of money, which is basically bank deposits.
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22:54.934 --> 22:59.316
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It's liquid funds available.
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22:59.336 --> 23:13.785
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And what the Fed does to, at least at that point, to load the banking system with money was to enter into repurchase agreements with the banks.
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23:14.360 --> 23:15.741
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for treasury securities.
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23:15.821 --> 23:20.564
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So the Fed would buy treasuries from the banks and load them with cash.
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23:21.144 --> 23:27.608
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And then that would, in theory, lead to loans in the real economy.
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23:28.188 --> 23:34.752
|
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But what was happening was that money was going into the financial markets, not into the real economy.
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23:35.152 --> 23:37.414
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So let me explain.
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23:37.474 --> 23:43.017
|
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It's about the relationship between growth in money and growth in the real economy.
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23:43.695 --> 23:48.897
|
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So it used to be that the created money was actually going into the real economy.
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23:50.338 --> 23:53.279
|
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There's a term called velocity of money.
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23:53.879 --> 24:04.263
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And that means the number of times that created money is then turned around and spent in the real economy.
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24:04.283 --> 24:06.724
|
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So in the
|
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24:09.591 --> 24:22.539
|
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let's say in 1980 when I did a money and banking course, it was considered that the velocity was maybe six to eight times on newly created money.
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24:23.720 --> 24:25.461
|
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Now, so think of it this way.
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24:26.862 --> 24:31.125
|
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If you or I need to come up with money, we have to sell something.
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24:32.486 --> 24:37.289
|
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You have to sell a product or a service, but the central banks have this power to
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24:39.517 --> 24:41.719
|
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to create this money out of thin air.
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24:43.380 --> 24:50.624
|
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And initially it is an awesome power because things happen that wouldn't have happened otherwise.
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24:51.165 --> 24:55.467
|
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Projects are begun that wouldn't have happened otherwise.
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24:56.088 --> 25:02.432
|
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So the money spent is received and then re-spent and so on.
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25:02.832 --> 25:03.293
|
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And this is
|
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25:04.383 --> 25:12.649
|
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The measure of six to eight times is the number of times that the newly created money is used in the real economy.
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25:12.769 --> 25:19.153
|
|
So the GDP multiplier on the created money was a high single digit.
|
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25:20.134 --> 25:30.221
|
|
So what was beginning to happen in the late 90s after the Asian financial crisis was this ratio had inverted and now the created money
|
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25:30.928 --> 25:35.791
|
|
was multiples of any economic growth that was happening.
|
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25:36.631 --> 25:42.974
|
|
So now they had to create more and more money to keep the economy from contracting.
|
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25:44.015 --> 25:57.582
|
|
So this was beginning in the US in the late 90s, but what happens is when this phenomena, the collapse in the transmission
|
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25:58.363 --> 26:01.005
|
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of the created money into the real economy.
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26:01.125 --> 26:04.047
|
|
When that occurs, it's intractable.
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|
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26:04.987 --> 26:07.068
|
|
It is pushing on a string.
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|
26:07.689 --> 26:11.331
|
|
And they go to higher and higher levels of money creation.
|
|
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26:11.751 --> 26:15.293
|
|
But ultimately, the real economy is not responding.
|
|
|
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26:15.734 --> 26:24.479
|
|
So that created money increasingly goes into financialization, financial bubbles, and as we've seen, warfare.
|
|
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|
26:25.217 --> 26:29.599
|
|
into escalating global war.
|
|
|
|
26:30.279 --> 26:39.783
|
|
So this same phenomenon was occurring leading into World War I from the 19th century into the 20th century.
|
|
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|
26:39.803 --> 26:43.644
|
|
And we saw between 1912 and 1918
|
|
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26:48.732 --> 26:59.917
|
|
collapse of the Qing dynasty, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Turk-Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the destruction of Germany.
|
|
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|
27:00.417 --> 27:08.921
|
|
So it's really leading up to a profound geopolitical process when this is occurring.
|
|
|
|
27:08.941 --> 27:08.981
|
|
So
|
|
|
|
27:13.213 --> 27:21.298
|
|
I believe that is why we are seeing such seemingly unprecedented things happening now.
|
|
|
|
27:21.318 --> 27:26.762
|
|
As they say, we don't commit the sins of our fathers, we commit the sins of our grandfathers.
|
|
|
|
27:27.142 --> 27:33.807
|
|
You have to go back a couple of generations to find an analogous period for what is happening now.
|
|
|
|
27:33.827 --> 27:34.828
|
|
So by
|
|
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|
27:38.430 --> 27:42.534
|
|
The fourth quarter of 99, this is the peak of the dot com bubble.
|
|
|
|
27:43.094 --> 27:51.141
|
|
Money was growing at a 40 percent annual rate on an economy that was growing maybe three percent.
|
|
|
|
27:51.782 --> 27:55.625
|
|
So this is so it was really blowing out at that point.
|
|
|
|
27:55.705 --> 28:00.389
|
|
So we have been in this process for over 20, 20 years, quarter of a century.
|
|
|
|
28:01.059 --> 28:04.740
|
|
of this, so this is a paradigm collapse.
|
|
|
|
28:07.021 --> 28:16.824
|
|
So the ability to control things with money, that is a very sophisticated control system.
|
|
|
|
28:17.825 --> 28:24.167
|
|
It requires low energy, low physical intervention because people just chase the money.
|
|
|
|
28:24.627 --> 28:27.168
|
|
They just chase their money incentives.
|
|
|
|
28:27.708 --> 28:30.329
|
|
So money is really a control system
|
|
|
|
28:31.372 --> 28:37.754
|
|
And when you enter this kind of a process, the control system is really in collapse.
|
|
|
|
28:38.614 --> 28:51.277
|
|
So they are then going into a process to try to maintain control through some kind of a reset, which we have been promised.
|
|
|
|
28:52.838 --> 29:00.080
|
|
So this is the kind of macro, my macro explanation for why this is happening.
|
|
|
|
29:01.090 --> 29:03.512
|
|
I actually navigated using this.
|
|
|
|
29:04.012 --> 29:07.935
|
|
So this isn't just from reading about it.
|
|
|
|
29:08.075 --> 29:15.040
|
|
I studied it and applied it to what I was doing to navigate through the bubble and the bust.
|
|
|
|
29:15.320 --> 29:20.523
|
|
So then we go forward a bit.
|
|
|
|
29:21.104 --> 29:24.266
|
|
I knew that we were going into a collapse in 2007, 2008.
|
|
|
|
29:24.326 --> 29:25.987
|
|
I was preparing for that.
|
|
|
|
29:31.014 --> 29:39.020
|
|
And I noticed that this little, again, you look for canaries in the coal mine.
|
|
|
|
29:39.100 --> 29:48.426
|
|
There was a collapse of a little broker dealer in Florida, the first insolvency, and I was expecting many.
|
|
|
|
29:49.447 --> 29:59.294
|
|
And the thing that really got my attention was all of the client securities were encumbered in bankruptcy estate of the broker.
|
|
|
|
30:00.310 --> 30:06.352
|
|
Now that blew my mind because that should never have happened.
|
|
|
|
30:08.053 --> 30:14.375
|
|
So now I'll go into the explanation of what has changed here.
|
|
|
|
30:14.955 --> 30:25.799
|
|
For 400 years from the beginning of creation of securities, they were personal property, a chattel.
|
|
|
|
30:26.819 --> 30:28.440
|
|
It was your property.
|
|
|
|
30:29.308 --> 30:41.473
|
|
And if it was held by a custodian and the custodian failed, became insolvent, you were entitled to return of your property immediately.
|
|
|
|
30:41.953 --> 30:44.174
|
|
And if they did not do that, that was theft.
|
|
|
|
30:45.495 --> 30:49.236
|
|
Now, the shocking thing is that is no longer the case.
|
|
|
|
30:50.437 --> 30:58.600
|
|
They have been working on this so that we no longer have property rights as we would understand them.
|
|
|
|
31:00.221 --> 31:01.922
|
|
to securities.
|
|
|
|
31:02.002 --> 31:03.082
|
|
Now, what are securities?
|
|
|
|
31:03.143 --> 31:06.645
|
|
That means stocks, basically stocks and bonds.
|
|
|
|
31:07.626 --> 31:12.869
|
|
And so, and not just held by individuals in their IRAs.
|
|
|
|
31:12.949 --> 31:14.370
|
|
This is comprehensive.
|
|
|
|
31:14.450 --> 31:19.814
|
|
This is all securities held in investment funds, in pension funds.
|
|
|
|
31:20.734 --> 31:29.000
|
|
And now globally, there has been a, so there was a process of changing the law in the US
|
|
|
|
31:29.997 --> 31:34.221
|
|
beginning in the 90s.
|
|
|
|
31:34.241 --> 31:44.110
|
|
So they changed what is called the uniform commercial code, which is commercial law at the state level.
|
|
|
|
31:45.231 --> 31:46.532
|
|
And it
|
|
|
|
31:48.171 --> 31:52.072
|
|
Part of the reason doing it that way was it could be done very quietly.
|
|
|
|
31:52.152 --> 31:55.432
|
|
There was no attention at the federal level to this.
|
|
|
|
31:55.452 --> 31:58.353
|
|
It took from 94 to maybe 2001 to get it implemented in all 50 states.
|
|
|
|
31:58.373 --> 32:00.133
|
|
But that was done.
|
|
|
|
32:00.153 --> 32:00.553
|
|
And then in
|
|
|
|
32:14.113 --> 32:24.980
|
|
In 2005, they changed something called safe harbor, which sounds nice, safe harbor.
|
|
|
|
32:26.161 --> 32:38.369
|
|
But what that means is safe harbor for secured creditors to have priority to the client assets.
|
|
|
|
32:40.591 --> 32:50.573
|
|
and to be able to keep those assets, even if their control is passed to the creditors right on the eve of a bankruptcy.
|
|
|
|
32:51.894 --> 33:06.877
|
|
And even if fraud and wrongdoing was involved, so things that would have been fraudulent prior to 2005 are no longer fraudulent.
|
|
|
|
33:07.651 --> 33:15.334
|
|
Now, how do we know that all this is the case, what I'm telling you?
|
|
|
|
33:17.215 --> 33:24.937
|
|
After this was done in the US, the EU was being pressured to conform to the same system.
|
|
|
|
33:26.318 --> 33:33.581
|
|
And in Europe, there were property rights to securities, direct property rights to securities.
|
|
|
|
33:33.621 --> 33:36.902
|
|
So they had a problem with that, and they had to figure out how to subvert it.
|
|
|
|
33:37.828 --> 33:54.717
|
|
and they formed something called the Legal Certainty Group, which, again, sounds nice, legal certainty, but what they meant was legal certainty that the secured creditors keep the assets, that they won't be returned to the clients.
|
|
|
|
33:57.278 --> 34:02.761
|
|
So the Legal Certainty Group wrote a questionnaire to the Fed
|
|
|
|
34:03.564 --> 34:04.724
|
|
the New York Fed.
|
|
|
|
34:04.984 --> 34:08.565
|
|
Now, the New York Fed is really the Fed.
|
|
|
|
34:08.945 --> 34:11.326
|
|
This is the business end of the Federal Reserve.
|
|
|
|
34:12.246 --> 34:28.731
|
|
And we have an incredibly important document, which is the legal response, formal, prepared by attorneys at the New York Fed and provided to the EU, explaining exactly how this works.
|
|
|
|
34:29.682 --> 34:43.589
|
|
And it begins by explaining that this is specifically addressing the Uniform Commercial Code, Articles 8 and 9.
|
|
|
|
34:43.889 --> 34:57.576
|
|
And what is explained there is that investors, whether they're individuals or institutions, don't have a direct property right extending to the securities.
|
|
|
|
34:58.049 --> 35:04.292
|
|
They have an interest, a pro rata share in a pool of securities.
|
|
|
|
35:05.253 --> 35:06.833
|
|
And this is the sucker fuge.
|
|
|
|
35:06.914 --> 35:08.334
|
|
This is how it is done.
|
|
|
|
35:09.055 --> 35:14.117
|
|
So they have an appearance of a property, right?
|
|
|
|
35:14.237 --> 35:25.383
|
|
You may hear the term beneficial ownership, which again sounds nice, but it means that you have an appearance of control.
|
|
|
|
35:25.976 --> 35:29.699
|
|
You can decide when to sell, when to buy and sell something.
|
|
|
|
35:30.040 --> 35:31.861
|
|
You're paid the dividends.
|
|
|
|
35:31.901 --> 35:33.623
|
|
You're given a proxy statement.
|
|
|
|
35:34.243 --> 35:40.169
|
|
But all the while, the security is held in pooled form.
|
|
|
|
35:40.969 --> 35:48.616
|
|
And if there is a failure in the financial system, you are entitled to only prorate a share of what remains in that pool.
|
|
|
|
35:48.636 --> 35:50.358
|
|
Now, here's the problem.
|
|
|
|
35:51.761 --> 36:04.328
|
|
those pooled securities are being used on a vast scale without restriction and FOP is the acronym, free of payment.
|
|
|
|
36:05.029 --> 36:17.997
|
|
So the securities are used as collateral within the financial system by the, essentially the,
|
|
|
|
36:19.485 --> 36:25.507
|
|
the custodians throughout, through the intermediaries within the financial system.
|
|
|
|
36:26.087 --> 36:35.070
|
|
So in the U.S., for example, all securities are held in pooled form at something called Depository Trust Corp.
|
|
|
|
36:36.250 --> 36:36.971
|
|
in New York.
|
|
|
|
36:37.771 --> 36:41.712
|
|
And so the essentially the entire U.S.
|
|
|
|
36:41.772 --> 36:47.354
|
|
financial system, all securities are held in pools there.
|
|
|
|
36:48.918 --> 36:57.306
|
|
So all of the US financial system is exposed to this and much of the world financial system is exposed to this.
|
|
|
|
36:59.469 --> 37:07.156
|
|
These securities are really being used underpinning the derivatives complex.
|
|
|
|
37:07.677 --> 37:09.459
|
|
Now, what is a derivative?
|
|
|
|
37:09.899 --> 37:11.521
|
|
It's a kind of intimidating
|
|
|
|
37:12.062 --> 37:15.943
|
|
term, it means it's derived from something else.
|
|
|
|
37:16.723 --> 37:19.884
|
|
It is not a real thing itself.
|
|
|
|
37:20.744 --> 37:25.865
|
|
It is a contract written about the behavior of something else.
|
|
|
|
37:26.665 --> 37:36.507
|
|
So if this other thing goes up or down, it results in a payment made or a payment received.
|
|
|
|
37:36.927 --> 37:39.388
|
|
Basically, that's the idea behind it.
|
|
|
|
37:41.721 --> 37:49.334
|
|
And when this direct property rights and securities was subverted in 94, that's when the growth in
|
|
|
|
37:52.463 --> 37:59.386
|
|
financial contracts, derivatives, really took off exponentially.
|
|
|
|
38:00.126 --> 38:09.250
|
|
So by 2001, derivatives outstanding were about twice the size of global GDP.
|
|
|
|
38:09.971 --> 38:14.493
|
|
So again, we see this, the beginning of this hyper financialization.
|
|
|
|
38:14.993 --> 38:18.434
|
|
By 2007, derivatives outstanding were 10 times global GDP.
|
|
|
|
38:22.549 --> 38:33.494
|
|
So from two to 10 times global GDP over five or six years, it's estimated that now it's maybe two quadrillion.
|
|
|
|
38:34.054 --> 38:37.616
|
|
So about 20 times global GDP.
|
|
|
|
38:38.296 --> 38:45.119
|
|
So there is not enough of anything in the world to back this.
|
|
|
|
38:45.860 --> 38:50.622
|
|
So you have these, the pooled collateral being used
|
|
|
|
38:51.594 --> 39:04.866
|
|
over and over again as reused as to provide some argument that there is a collateral backing behind this.
|
|
|
|
39:05.327 --> 39:11.532
|
|
And that's done through what's called hypothecation and re-hypothecation.
|
|
|
|
39:11.572 --> 39:15.456
|
|
That means that the party that has received this
|
|
|
|
39:16.075 --> 39:24.179
|
|
collateral out of these pools as a secured creditor, then extends that as collateral in another trade.
|
|
|
|
39:24.579 --> 39:29.201
|
|
And then it's used again by that secured creditor that has received it.
|
|
|
|
39:29.702 --> 39:39.787
|
|
So these collateral chains have to be maybe seven times, something like that, when you look at that for reuse of the collateral.
|
|
|
|
39:40.387 --> 39:44.509
|
|
So what has been set up here is a game of musical chairs.
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39:45.362 --> 39:58.287
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where more claims have been created on the pooled assets than there are assets in these pools, and that's assured.
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39:59.247 --> 40:12.832
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And under these changes to the Uniform Commercial Code, it is clear that the secured creditors that have received the collateral have legal certainty that they will keep the collateral.
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40:13.191 --> 40:15.473
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It won't be returned to the owners.
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40:18.255 --> 40:22.218
|
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So again, this is explained in the Federal Reserve document.
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40:22.278 --> 40:34.588
|
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There is another document that was published in the UCLA Law Review in 1996, so contemporaneous with the implementation of this.
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40:35.308 --> 40:41.393
|
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And that was written, it's very extensive, written by what's
|
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40:42.230 --> 40:57.739
|
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called the reporter, the lawyer that actually writ or wrote, the reporter that wrote the amendments, the legal changes to the Uniform Commercial Code.
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40:57.779 --> 41:01.342
|
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So he knows firsthand.
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41:02.342 --> 41:08.366
|
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And it's pretty shocking because he explains that, you know,
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41:09.708 --> 41:22.272
|
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that it was already the case by 94 that the assets were being used in this way on a vast scale.
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41:22.872 --> 41:24.232
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And he gives this example.
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41:24.292 --> 41:26.393
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He says, what do brokers do?
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41:26.793 --> 41:28.053
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They sell securities.
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41:29.054 --> 41:33.395
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So if they've sold the security, the party that bought the security
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41:34.031 --> 41:41.057
|
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doesn't know if that was done wrongly, if that was a client's security that was sold wrongly.
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41:41.797 --> 41:52.446
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And the same is true when securities are loaned, when securities are used as collateral for the firm to do a trade or borrow money.
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41:54.328 --> 41:56.690
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That's done through swap contracts.
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41:59.610 --> 42:04.595
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So the party on the other side of that contract doesn't know if that was done wrongly.
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42:04.997 --> 42:08.980
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They can't possibly know that because this is a normal thing.
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42:09.821 --> 42:14.104
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They also can't know how many times it's already been used as collateral for something else.
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42:14.865 --> 42:15.406
|
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Yes.
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42:15.746 --> 42:17.507
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And does that matter in the end?
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42:17.988 --> 42:23.652
|
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Is that need to be sorted out and that's what the trick is or it doesn't matter because it's all zero?
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42:24.353 --> 42:25.374
|
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No, it does matter.
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42:25.494 --> 42:29.597
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What they've done is created a mush ball intentionally.
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42:29.957 --> 42:33.240
|
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Again, you could put this in front of a classroom of 12-year-olds
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42:34.885 --> 42:42.755
|
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And it explained that you have client assets that are now being used in this way without restriction.
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42:43.356 --> 42:44.837
|
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Is there going to be a problem with that?
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42:45.538 --> 42:51.666
|
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And so they knew full well that this was going to be a problem and it was actually illegal.
|
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42:52.501 --> 43:02.047
|
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what they were doing, and so they made these amendments in 94 to make it legal, what they were doing.
|
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43:02.067 --> 43:09.092
|
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But those amendments you're talking about had to be, and I think this is a crucial part of the history, had to be changed at the state level, is that correct?
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43:10.256 --> 43:12.437
|
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Well, they chose to do it at the state level.
|
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43:12.477 --> 43:18.538
|
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But then that suggests a very organized effort over several years to put people in position.
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43:18.618 --> 43:19.659
|
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Oh, those those.
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43:19.679 --> 43:35.443
|
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Well, that's that's what I, you know, explain in the book is that this was a very sophisticated, very intelligent design, deliberate process implemented over half a century.
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43:35.463 --> 43:39.024
|
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And that
|
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43:41.273 --> 43:46.315
|
|
That's very important to know that, that this is not something that happened accidentally.
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43:46.335 --> 43:55.457
|
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It is not something that happened organically because the market was demanding it.
|
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43:55.617 --> 44:03.019
|
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It was done through a conscious design, start to finish.
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44:03.919 --> 44:06.560
|
|
So it was really beginning
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44:07.669 --> 44:10.230
|
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in the late 1960s.
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44:10.751 --> 44:13.272
|
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And now we're getting down into the weeds a little bit here.
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44:13.292 --> 44:16.614
|
|
In 1968, they created something they refer to as the paperwork crisis.
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44:24.608 --> 44:38.793
|
|
And what they did was every Wednesday for just six months, they closed the New York Stock Exchange because they said they couldn't keep up with dealing with the volume of trading with paper certificates.
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44:40.346 --> 44:44.868
|
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And then in December, that stopped.
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44:45.769 --> 44:55.333
|
|
But they used that as a justification to dematerialize securities, to get rid of paper certificates.
|
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44:56.154 --> 44:57.214
|
|
Now, what did that do?
|
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44:57.775 --> 45:04.738
|
|
When we had paper certificates, it was very clear who had control of the collateral.
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45:06.136 --> 45:08.719
|
|
If you had the certificate, you had control.
|
|
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45:08.779 --> 45:16.546
|
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But on the movies, the terrorists are still carrying around like whole suitcases full of bearer bonds or something like that.
|
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45:16.586 --> 45:23.532
|
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I mean, they still occasionally show us images of some form of money at that level or not.
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45:24.164 --> 45:28.645
|
|
I think bearer bonds have been phased out to a large extent.
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45:28.685 --> 45:29.985
|
|
That used to be a thing.
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45:30.005 --> 45:32.446
|
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I don't know that you can get bearer bonds anymore.
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45:32.466 --> 45:33.206
|
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I see, okay.
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45:33.766 --> 45:36.666
|
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But they use them in movies for sure still, which is pretty funny.
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45:36.726 --> 45:50.169
|
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Yeah, it's kind of a thing of the past, but that was used... They create the impression that there's something wrong with people having control of their own property.
|
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45:51.069 --> 45:51.649
|
|
Yeah, right.
|
|
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45:53.779 --> 46:14.263
|
|
So this paperwork crisis, what happened at that point was they created the Justification of Form Depository Trust Corp to house all the dematerialized securities.
|
|
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46:14.783 --> 46:19.044
|
|
Now, the guy they tasked with doing that was a guy named William Denser.
|
|
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|
46:19.977 --> 46:23.158
|
|
who was a career CIA operative.
|
|
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|
46:23.938 --> 46:30.519
|
|
And this is just very clear in his own memoir, in his interviews that he did.
|
|
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46:30.539 --> 46:44.781
|
|
He had come out of college and essentially worked for the CIA in Europe, forming anti-communist student organizations, and they arranged his draft deferment so he could do that.
|
|
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46:45.481 --> 46:49.362
|
|
And then he worked explicitly for the CIA for five years
|
|
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46:50.171 --> 46:53.294
|
|
And then he went with USA to Latin America.
|
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46:54.434 --> 46:58.437
|
|
And then he came back to do this task.
|
|
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46:59.218 --> 47:07.845
|
|
And it's interesting in his memoir, he says his interest had shifted back to the US following the assassinations.
|
|
|
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47:09.546 --> 47:12.688
|
|
So it's a very strange comment.
|
|
|
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47:13.289 --> 47:16.171
|
|
What would the assassinations have to do with this?
|
|
|
|
47:16.954 --> 47:26.298
|
|
But the paperwork crisis began six days after the assassination of Robert Kennedy and ran for six months.
|
|
|
|
47:27.119 --> 47:40.745
|
|
And they brought Denser back and he had no background in banking or finance at all and was appointed by Nelson Rockefeller as superintendent of banks in New York state.
|
|
|
|
47:42.505 --> 47:43.506
|
|
And then they appointed him
|
|
|
|
47:46.949 --> 47:54.791
|
|
to be the CEO of the newly formed Depository Trust, which would house all of the dematerialized securities in the U.S.
|
|
|
|
47:54.831 --> 47:55.832
|
|
financial system.
|
|
|
|
47:56.752 --> 47:57.872
|
|
So that's how that worked.
|
|
|
|
47:58.472 --> 48:06.435
|
|
So the dematerialization, what that allows is fuzzing up who has control of the property.
|
|
|
|
48:08.675 --> 48:11.076
|
|
So it's a necessary precondition
|
|
|
|
48:11.923 --> 48:21.633
|
|
But it did not have to be done that way because at the same time, they were also forcing all the G30 countries to dematerialize.
|
|
|
|
48:21.673 --> 48:27.259
|
|
So this is a vast geopolitical strategy that was being put in place.
|
|
|
|
48:29.424 --> 48:37.289
|
|
Now, Sweden, Sweden is the kind of place where they want the gold star and the pat on their head.
|
|
|
|
48:37.469 --> 48:39.690
|
|
So they do it the first, the best.
|
|
|
|
48:40.291 --> 48:42.792
|
|
So they dematerialize very fast.
|
|
|
|
48:43.292 --> 48:51.498
|
|
But they did not understand that they were actually supposed to sever people's property rights in doing that.
|
|
|
|
48:51.978 --> 48:55.220
|
|
So they implemented it so that they made sure
|
|
|
|
48:55.976 --> 49:02.218
|
|
that in the electronic record keeping, you had specific identification to securities.
|
|
|
|
49:02.838 --> 49:07.800
|
|
So there's no reason that it couldn't be implemented, especially with computerization.
|
|
|
|
49:08.220 --> 49:12.722
|
|
It couldn't be implemented so that you could know exactly who owns what.
|
|
|
|
49:13.642 --> 49:16.203
|
|
and that is what Sweden did.
|
|
|
|
49:16.223 --> 49:30.950
|
|
Then the legal certainty group identified Sweden as being problematic because Sweden had done it in a way to assure that people had property rights to their securities.
|
|
|
|
49:31.490 --> 49:36.633
|
|
So I'm relating this to show there's a long beginning to this
|
|
|
|
49:37.250 --> 49:53.695
|
|
But it's been, there's been a very consistent, relentless implementation decade by decade to get to a point where this is now the case globally.
|
|
|
|
49:54.115 --> 49:59.837
|
|
So it's done first in the US, but then it had to be harmonized, as they say.
|
|
|
|
50:00.419 --> 50:14.925
|
|
So pressure had to be brought on the rest of the world to conform to this way of doing it, to treat securities as a fungible thing that could then be used elsewhere.
|
|
|
|
50:15.405 --> 50:16.726
|
|
So where is this going?
|
|
|
|
50:17.146 --> 50:18.606
|
|
This is the sleight of hand.
|
|
|
|
50:20.547 --> 50:24.249
|
|
So the public used to have a direct property interest.
|
|
|
|
50:24.349 --> 50:25.369
|
|
It was very clear.
|
|
|
|
50:25.909 --> 50:29.891
|
|
It meant if there were failures in the financial system, it wasn't your problem.
|
|
|
|
50:30.373 --> 50:33.195
|
|
You just said, here's where you return my property.
|
|
|
|
50:33.876 --> 50:36.177
|
|
So that has been severed.
|
|
|
|
50:36.257 --> 50:43.182
|
|
Now you have, and by you, I mean, even the big boys, the big players, it's the same thing.
|
|
|
|
50:43.643 --> 50:54.150
|
|
The big institutions have essentially an unsecured claim in the event of insolvency.
|
|
|
|
50:54.470 --> 50:56.512
|
|
Now at the other end of the food chain,
|
|
|
|
50:59.545 --> 51:03.429
|
|
You have these derivatives contracts where the collateral is being used.
|
|
|
|
51:03.509 --> 51:04.330
|
|
Now, what are those?
|
|
|
|
51:04.430 --> 51:05.791
|
|
Those are contracts.
|
|
|
|
51:06.432 --> 51:10.136
|
|
Contracts never would have had a property interest.
|
|
|
|
51:10.894 --> 51:12.616
|
|
in insolvency.
|
|
|
|
51:13.296 --> 51:30.930
|
|
So they've severed the property interest at the investor level, and they've given a super priority to the pooled assets, to the secured creditors behind the derivatives complex.
|
|
|
|
51:31.570 --> 51:39.797
|
|
So now the other thing to know is that it is only, as we were explaining here,
|
|
|
|
51:40.310 --> 51:41.971
|
|
It's a game of musical chairs.
|
|
|
|
51:42.031 --> 51:46.012
|
|
There isn't enough collateral to go around, and that is by design.
|
|
|
|
51:46.453 --> 51:53.316
|
|
It means that, you know, the great unwashed will be left out.
|
|
|
|
51:53.696 --> 52:01.579
|
|
The public, globally, the... When you say globally, it's maybe a good time for me to inject this in.
|
|
|
|
52:01.619 --> 52:04.360
|
|
How does Russia and the BRICS fit into this?
|
|
|
|
52:04.420 --> 52:05.421
|
|
Are they just another...
|
|
|
|
52:06.221 --> 52:09.724
|
|
reflection of the same control mechanism with different people at the top?
|
|
|
|
52:09.804 --> 52:12.547
|
|
Or are they actually separate fighting this New World Order?
|
|
|
|
52:12.567 --> 52:14.889
|
|
Because some people think Russia's against the New World Order.
|
|
|
|
52:17.571 --> 52:29.322
|
|
I, I would have to say that I would I would observe that the Russian Central Bank is in appearance of
|
|
|
|
52:30.457 --> 52:33.481
|
|
a public institution.
|
|
|
|
52:33.721 --> 52:39.808
|
|
It is privately owned and controlled, just as all the other central banks are.
|
|
|
|
52:42.331 --> 52:48.117
|
|
To say it is a public institution, it means that the government may own the building.
|
|
|
|
52:48.564 --> 52:49.445
|
|
that they're using.
|
|
|
|
52:49.945 --> 52:56.050
|
|
But since the collapse of the USSR, it is privately controlled.
|
|
|
|
52:56.070 --> 52:59.272
|
|
It is a member of the Bank for International Settlements.
|
|
|
|
53:00.553 --> 53:11.301
|
|
The assets, Russian assets, are in Euroclear, which is vulnerable to this in the same way that
|
|
|
|
53:14.859 --> 53:20.705
|
|
You know, the Depository Trust Corp is a structure for this.
|
|
|
|
53:22.086 --> 53:26.571
|
|
So I don't see Russia as being outside of this system.
|
|
|
|
53:28.673 --> 53:28.973
|
|
I see.
|
|
|
|
53:29.073 --> 53:31.376
|
|
Now, I can't, I can't
|
|
|
|
53:32.276 --> 53:35.061
|
|
I haven't gone into looking at China.
|
|
|
|
53:35.161 --> 53:44.598
|
|
I just observed that you can look at what China has done through the whole COVID period, and they have clearly been a participant in all of this.
|
|
|
|
53:45.487 --> 53:52.992
|
|
So I don't see the idea that the Bricks are somehow outside of this.
|
|
|
|
53:53.432 --> 54:01.517
|
|
Is there a mechanism in your imagination or in your knowledge where these separate entities could still be competing within this?
|
|
|
|
54:02.237 --> 54:09.421
|
|
So, you know, they all know that this is a charade and they all know it's a game of musical chairs, so they could be competing for the chairs that are left.
|
|
|
|
54:09.582 --> 54:10.922
|
|
I think that's possible.
|
|
|
|
54:11.163 --> 54:15.005
|
|
I think of them as kind of like the playground bullies.
|
|
|
|
54:15.848 --> 54:22.531
|
|
that are beating up on everybody else, but they kind of jostle each other for dominance.
|
|
|
|
54:22.631 --> 54:23.991
|
|
I think that's possible.
|
|
|
|
54:25.872 --> 54:31.014
|
|
But they have intelligence capabilities.
|
|
|
|
54:31.094 --> 54:35.636
|
|
They know full well that this is the case.
|
|
|
|
54:36.316 --> 54:39.238
|
|
But they're in a situation where they can't leave the planet.
|
|
|
|
54:39.698 --> 54:41.759
|
|
They're in this epic,
|
|
|
|
54:43.389 --> 54:46.513
|
|
geopolitical process that is unfolding now.
|
|
|
|
54:46.853 --> 54:49.316
|
|
They have to be a part of it.
|
|
|
|
54:49.717 --> 54:52.280
|
|
But one thing you see is they never call it out.
|
|
|
|
54:53.000 --> 54:56.244
|
|
They're not going to out these things.
|
|
|
|
54:56.665 --> 54:58.787
|
|
So they're participating on some basis.
|
|
|
|
54:59.087 --> 54:59.308
|
|
Right.
|
|
|
|
55:00.089 --> 55:00.269
|
|
Wow.
|
|
|
|
55:01.880 --> 55:10.982
|
|
It's I mean it's magnificent so since you publish your book, I mean is there another book in the making, I mean it seems to me like it's not a finished story or is it a finished story, I mean.
|
|
|
|
55:12.282 --> 55:28.506
|
|
Well, I mean there's a lot to work with with this and let me let me explain I I say to people this is a gift to us because we're we we've been in
|
|
|
|
55:30.658 --> 55:33.018
|
|
There's a science to overwhelming us.
|
|
|
|
55:35.099 --> 55:54.063
|
|
It began with manufactured consent in the 80s, the idea of, you know, getting into the news cycle, frightening, often conflicting, distasteful, relentless exposure to this stuff so that people reach a point where they just say, just leave me alone.
|
|
|
|
55:54.083 --> 55:56.143
|
|
I don't I don't want to hear more about this.
|
|
|
|
55:57.010 --> 56:00.631
|
|
And now we've gone to a kind of full spectrum assault.
|
|
|
|
56:01.071 --> 56:02.911
|
|
We're in a global hybrid war.
|
|
|
|
56:03.011 --> 56:07.552
|
|
So people are so overwhelmed that they can't.
|
|
|
|
56:08.532 --> 56:16.853
|
|
There are so many problems coming at us that we can't really deal with them all, taking them one by one.
|
|
|
|
56:17.834 --> 56:25.775
|
|
So what is valuable about this insight into what they've done here
|
|
|
|
56:26.790 --> 56:33.931
|
|
is firstly, it's something that can unite all people globally once they understand this.
|
|
|
|
56:34.031 --> 56:39.572
|
|
So, you know, when people are overwhelmed, it's like an oil canvas.
|
|
|
|
56:40.253 --> 56:43.393
|
|
More information doesn't penetrate.
|
|
|
|
56:43.413 --> 56:44.653
|
|
It just runs off.
|
|
|
|
56:44.853 --> 56:45.094
|
|
Right.
|
|
|
|
56:45.434 --> 56:52.855
|
|
So there is something is needed that will punch the hole so that the information starts going in.
|
|
|
|
56:53.288 --> 56:55.909
|
|
And as we know, it's been different for each of us.
|
|
|
|
56:57.730 --> 56:59.291
|
|
It's different for each person.
|
|
|
|
56:59.992 --> 57:12.058
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But for some reason, what's happened here is while people may have been shut down about everything that happened in the COVID period, it's just too unpleasant for them to deal with.
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57:13.479 --> 57:15.900
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This gets through to people.
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57:17.000 --> 57:21.243
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It's weird that people would care more about their IRAs than
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57:22.705 --> 57:24.347
|
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being injected with something.
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57:24.747 --> 57:25.989
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But that is the case.
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57:26.029 --> 57:27.030
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People care about their money.
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57:27.110 --> 57:27.931
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And so it punches the hole.
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57:27.951 --> 57:28.992
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And then we have this
|
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57:40.633 --> 57:47.297
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irrefutable primary source documentation that this really is the case.
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57:47.417 --> 58:00.164
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You also actually told a wonderful story or shared a wonderful story with some other people on stage at the Red Pill Conference about what you've done in America, where you've actually changed a law or two, right?
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58:00.864 --> 58:02.825
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Well, what's happened is, so
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58:07.369 --> 58:17.876
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People might read the book or see the documentary and some part of the mind says, well, maybe this isn't really true, even though all the evidence is there and you can know it.
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58:18.296 --> 58:27.042
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But then once it was put in a bill, so this is, JJ, where you're going, in the first, this has happened very quickly.
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58:27.562 --> 58:29.564
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So the book, the PDF came out in July.
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58:29.584 --> 58:30.724
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So it's been nearly a year now.
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58:35.100 --> 58:38.264
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The documentary was in really the beginning of December.
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58:38.924 --> 58:47.814
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And then, so Lightspeed, the first bill to reverse this was in South Dakota in February.
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58:48.856 --> 58:55.383
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And when you have something in a bill, it starts making it real for people.
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58:56.363 --> 58:58.845
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that this is real.
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58:59.326 --> 59:17.921
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Then when you see the response of the banking lobby, which is on record, and we see that they cannot refute this, they have to engage basically in lying and procedural tactics to prevent the bill from being heard.
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59:18.281 --> 59:19.943
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That makes it real in a big way.
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59:20.463 --> 59:22.145
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So that happened in February.
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59:23.678 --> 59:25.419
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I'll explain what happened there.
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59:27.500 --> 59:36.583
|
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So the other thing is that it forces people to actually look at what is in the UCC for the first time in decades.
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59:37.103 --> 59:41.525
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And what you see is how the subterfuge works.
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59:43.366 --> 59:49.388
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At one level, on the surface, it says that, so let me explain.
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59:49.408 --> 59:52.229
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They created this concept of an entitlement.
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59:53.083 --> 01:00:01.027
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that you don't have a direct property right, they'll call it a property right, but it's a security entitlement.
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01:00:01.387 --> 01:00:04.969
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Now, this is a legal concept that had never existed before.
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01:00:05.769 --> 01:00:13.593
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So you have an entitlement claim, which is a set of rights, basically.
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01:00:14.834 --> 01:00:20.857
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So they call it a property right, but it does not function as a property right in the event of insolvency.
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01:00:21.770 --> 01:00:33.820
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So what you see in the code is, to begin with, it says that the entitlement holders have priority over the secured creditors of the intermediary.
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01:00:34.740 --> 01:00:46.490
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And this is what was used to sell the amendments in 1994 that to say that this is assuring the protection of the entitlement holders.
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01:00:47.492 --> 01:00:51.435
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But there's then an exception, which is not read.
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01:00:51.915 --> 01:00:55.518
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And this is what the banking lobbyists did in the hearing.
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01:00:55.878 --> 01:01:00.302
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They would read the assurance and omit the exceptions.
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01:01:01.062 --> 01:01:05.546
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And the people who brought the bill were given no opportunity for rebuttal.
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01:01:07.227 --> 01:01:09.389
|
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That's what they did procedurally.
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01:01:09.789 --> 01:01:12.791
|
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But the exceptions are two things.
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01:01:14.173 --> 01:01:17.115
|
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If the secured creditor has control
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01:01:18.393 --> 01:01:21.916
|
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the secured creditor has priority over the investors.
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01:01:22.336 --> 01:01:23.577
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Now, what is control?
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01:01:24.337 --> 01:01:32.563
|
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Control is a concept in bankruptcy, which means that the creditor has the ability to sell the asset.
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01:01:33.524 --> 01:01:42.931
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And if you think about it, when we had paper certificates, if you hadn't signed over the certificate, they did not have control.
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01:01:43.711 --> 01:01:45.773
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But once they were dematerialized,
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01:01:46.269 --> 01:01:55.794
|
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and they assured that there was no specific identification to any security, they have control 100% of the time.
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01:01:56.654 --> 01:02:02.037
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So that is an exception you can drive an ocean liner through.
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01:02:03.578 --> 01:02:13.863
|
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The second exception is that if the creditor is a creditor of a clearing entity, it has priority.
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01:02:14.283 --> 01:02:16.004
|
|
Now, what's a clearing entity?
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01:02:16.377 --> 01:02:27.406
|
|
That would have been something like Lehman Brothers or Goldman Sachs, but it is also Depository Trust Corp.
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01:02:28.648 --> 01:02:36.414
|
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There are entities within Depository Trust Corp, something called a central clearing counterparty.
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01:02:38.916 --> 01:02:42.900
|
|
And this is another very important piece of this.
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01:02:44.346 --> 01:02:49.747
|
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And it shows the deliberateness of the implementation to this end stage where we are now.
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01:02:52.147 --> 01:03:00.729
|
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They use the great financial crisis, as they call it, 2008, 2009, for a number of things.
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01:03:00.829 --> 01:03:10.871
|
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They use the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy to demonstrate, to cement the case law that the secured creditors take the client assets.
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01:03:11.331 --> 01:03:12.771
|
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That was the purpose of Lehman.
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01:03:14.250 --> 01:03:18.212
|
|
And I can go into that in detail, but let's leave that for a moment.
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01:03:18.692 --> 01:03:33.078
|
|
The second thing was they used that crisis to assert that having a counterparty on your derivatives contract was too risky.
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01:03:34.798 --> 01:03:36.159
|
|
So historically,
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01:03:38.049 --> 01:03:49.174
|
|
Think of these contracts like a commodities contract where a farmer was selling the crop forward at harvest time at a given price and date.
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01:03:50.015 --> 01:03:54.577
|
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And there was some party on the other side that wanted to buy at that price and date.
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01:03:55.057 --> 01:04:00.540
|
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So it served a societal purpose.
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01:04:02.361 --> 01:04:06.563
|
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They were willingly entered into by both parties.
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01:04:08.468 --> 01:04:15.254
|
|
Then that was extended into financial contracts with things like interest rates.
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01:04:15.915 --> 01:04:22.841
|
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So that if you had a fixed rate mortgage, you could swap into a floating rate mortgage or vice versa.
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01:04:23.542 --> 01:04:27.526
|
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So they became these different types of financial contracts.
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01:04:28.246 --> 01:04:35.167
|
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So in there, but there were they were bilateral, you know, you knew what entity was on the other side.
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01:04:35.807 --> 01:04:41.268
|
|
So they use this this last financial crisis to say that's too risky.
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01:04:41.308 --> 01:04:44.849
|
|
We are going to centrally clear all derivatives.
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01:04:45.289 --> 01:04:49.990
|
|
And this is now been done globally so that you don't have a counterparty.
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01:04:50.410 --> 01:04:54.951
|
|
Your counterparty is this central clearing counterparty.
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01:04:55.734 --> 01:05:00.417
|
|
And there are a number of them around the world, but it's always a central clearing counterparty.
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01:05:01.518 --> 01:05:10.445
|
|
Now, what that means is if the central clearing counterparty fails, you have no counterparty behind your contract.
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01:05:11.105 --> 01:05:19.652
|
|
So all of the different pension funds, we know that the financial markets are at a very frothy kind of peak here.
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01:05:20.172 --> 01:05:23.535
|
|
All the entities that think that they have
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01:05:24.451 --> 01:05:27.712
|
|
hedge the downside risk for a fall in the market.
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01:05:27.812 --> 01:05:35.534
|
|
They've done that with derivatives contracts, but their counterparty is one of these central clearing counterparties.
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01:05:37.354 --> 01:05:39.815
|
|
So- Are we talking about everything?
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01:05:39.855 --> 01:05:44.396
|
|
I mean, I'm trying to think of all the kinds of weaponized piles of money that my little brain knows of.
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01:05:44.456 --> 01:05:48.897
|
|
Are we talking about like endowments at universities and- Everything, everything.
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01:05:48.937 --> 01:05:50.757
|
|
The money of townships?
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01:05:52.238 --> 01:05:53.158
|
|
You know, like, wow.
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01:05:55.131 --> 01:05:58.814
|
|
Well, what I'm talking about is there is no way out of this.
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01:05:58.914 --> 01:06:00.655
|
|
It has been done comprehensively.
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|
01:06:00.775 --> 01:06:03.317
|
|
So all securities are pooled.
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|
01:06:03.958 --> 01:06:09.902
|
|
All securities are being used as collateral behind this complex.
|
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|
01:06:09.922 --> 01:06:16.167
|
|
And all the entities that have tried to hedge their downside risk have done it in the derivatives complex.
|
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|
|
01:06:16.908 --> 01:06:22.752
|
|
So the failure point by design is the central clearing counterparties.
|
|
|
|
01:06:23.513 --> 01:06:24.554
|
|
Now here,
|
|
|
|
01:06:25.643 --> 01:06:33.925
|
|
This makes it very clear, Depository Trust Corp, which houses the entire securities complex of the U.S.
|
|
|
|
01:06:35.065 --> 01:06:47.948
|
|
and two of the major central clearing counterparties globally, the entire capital of Depository Trust Corp is about $3.5 billion.
|
|
|
|
01:06:48.188 --> 01:06:53.949
|
|
That doesn't sound like very much.
|
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|
|
01:06:54.795 --> 01:06:55.956
|
|
Yes.
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|
01:06:55.976 --> 01:06:58.097
|
|
So that will be wiped out.
|
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|
|
01:06:58.917 --> 01:07:00.698
|
|
That is absolutely nothing.
|
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|
|
01:07:02.599 --> 01:07:19.967
|
|
And so now to underscore that, the industry, including Depository Trust Corp itself, has been talking about preparing for the failure of central clearing counterparties for a number of years now.
|
|
|
|
01:07:21.256 --> 01:07:24.679
|
|
Um, I'd say the discussions of that were beginning in about 2000.
|
|
|
|
01:07:26.121 --> 01:07:44.277
|
|
I was seeing, so it's been going on for, for, uh, you know, a number of years and depository trust for its part has said, well, we don't believe that our members, you see depository trust is essentially owned by the big banks.
|
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|
|
01:07:44.778 --> 01:07:47.639
|
|
the big financial entities that stand behind this.
|
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|
|
01:07:48.319 --> 01:07:55.822
|
|
So they've said, we don't think that our members should put more capital at risk in this.
|
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|
|
01:07:56.162 --> 01:08:02.445
|
|
Our intention is to pre-fund a new central clearing counterparty when one of these fails.
|
|
|
|
01:08:04.305 --> 01:08:13.289
|
|
So what would happen when the central clearing, so it's designed to fail, when it fails, that then
|
|
|
|
01:08:14.272 --> 01:08:34.547
|
|
means that there's no counterparty behind these contracts, but the biggest banks have the ability to take the collateral at that point behind the contracts that they have with the central clearing counterparty.
|
|
|
|
01:08:34.927 --> 01:08:38.450
|
|
And only they have this super priority to do that.
|
|
|
|
01:08:39.030 --> 01:08:41.833
|
|
So let me explain how this would work.
|
|
|
|
01:08:41.893 --> 01:08:43.614
|
|
Let's say you're
|
|
|
|
01:08:44.864 --> 01:08:46.946
|
|
you're going into a financial collapse.
|
|
|
|
01:08:47.306 --> 01:08:59.816
|
|
And there's a fairly recent, there are a couple of documents from the Bank for International Settlements, one in December and one earlier this year, basically describing what is gonna happen.
|
|
|
|
01:09:00.457 --> 01:09:09.204
|
|
And so there is something called initial margin, which is the way things normally work.
|
|
|
|
01:09:09.544 --> 01:09:12.667
|
|
If you think of a margin account, when you have a brokerage account,
|
|
|
|
01:09:13.083 --> 01:09:20.909
|
|
that is a margin account, you have to have some cash in there or assets in order to lever up to buy more.
|
|
|
|
01:09:21.430 --> 01:09:28.035
|
|
So the margin is what has to be posted under a contract that is entered into.
|
|
|
|
01:09:28.516 --> 01:09:35.221
|
|
And the initial margin is typically cash and government bonds are used for that.
|
|
|
|
01:09:35.962 --> 01:09:42.147
|
|
But this document in December makes it clear there's also something called the collateral fund.
|
|
|
|
01:09:43.511 --> 01:09:51.938
|
|
And that is described as what will neutralize losses, neutralize the losses.
|
|
|
|
01:09:52.738 --> 01:10:09.011
|
|
So what will happen there is also a discussion of a kind of margin spiral, where as asset prices fall, there will be a call for more and more collateral will have to be posted.
|
|
|
|
01:10:10.011 --> 01:10:12.133
|
|
And there won't be enough cash
|
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|
|
01:10:13.261 --> 01:10:19.066
|
|
and government bonds to provide that collateral.
|
|
|
|
01:10:19.686 --> 01:10:27.292
|
|
So then there will be all kinds of things will be posted as collateral in this collateral fund.
|
|
|
|
01:10:27.392 --> 01:10:39.201
|
|
This is how the pools will then be used to backstop these derivatives contracts, these calls for more and more collateral.
|
|
|
|
01:10:39.642 --> 01:10:40.042
|
|
But then
|
|
|
|
01:10:40.672 --> 01:10:48.954
|
|
When the central clearing counterparties fail, it is only the biggest banks that have the super priority to take the collateral.
|
|
|
|
01:10:49.014 --> 01:10:51.815
|
|
So this is the answer to the game of musical chairs.
|
|
|
|
01:10:54.796 --> 01:11:02.558
|
|
It's designed so that there won't be enough seats and only certain entities will take all the collateral at that point.
|
|
|
|
01:11:03.019 --> 01:11:07.940
|
|
Now, there's another important document that I show in the book and this chart
|
|
|
|
01:11:08.476 --> 01:11:32.474
|
|
from a Bank for International Settlements document that's already 10 years old, it's from 2014, showing that there is an automated system to sweep this collateral globally and particularly in a financial crisis.
|
|
|
|
01:11:33.295 --> 01:11:37.558
|
|
So it will all be automated and through
|
|
|
|
01:11:38.254 --> 01:11:55.033
|
|
something termed collateral transformation, even things other than government bonds, high quality government bonds, so think equities, hold equities, will be used as collateral in the collapse.
|
|
|
|
01:11:55.053 --> 01:11:56.294
|
|
So there
|
|
|
|
01:11:58.786 --> 01:12:01.528
|
|
You know, that's another primary source document.
|
|
|
|
01:12:01.949 --> 01:12:05.872
|
|
They basically show you exactly what they're doing in their own documents.
|
|
|
|
01:12:05.932 --> 01:12:09.555
|
|
So this is not conjecture.
|
|
|
|
01:12:10.055 --> 01:12:15.900
|
|
You know, it's not like reading somebody's article written about this.
|
|
|
|
01:12:16.080 --> 01:12:21.364
|
|
You can really see it in their own descriptions how this will work.
|
|
|
|
01:12:23.038 --> 01:12:28.022
|
|
And so what about the way that they bundled mortgages together?
|
|
|
|
01:12:28.142 --> 01:12:34.607
|
|
And does that put actual private property or what we think of as private property in America also technically?
|
|
|
|
01:12:34.667 --> 01:12:37.129
|
|
Yeah, I think that's a separate thing.
|
|
|
|
01:12:37.230 --> 01:12:45.897
|
|
You know, in the book, I basically say, look, people might find this difficult to believe.
|
|
|
|
01:12:45.957 --> 01:12:47.778
|
|
How could anything like this happen?
|
|
|
|
01:12:47.838 --> 01:12:49.379
|
|
But it already has happened.
|
|
|
|
01:12:50.504 --> 01:12:58.328
|
|
exactly what was done in the Great Depression, in that a crisis was created in order to take everything.
|
|
|
|
01:12:59.989 --> 01:13:01.470
|
|
But that was the great taking 1.0.
|
|
|
|
01:13:03.070 --> 01:13:11.615
|
|
And that is taking things that have been bought with financing.
|
|
|
|
01:13:12.355 --> 01:13:16.037
|
|
So yes, all real estate where you have mortgages,
|
|
|
|
01:13:18.067 --> 01:13:34.422
|
|
and toasters bought on consumer credit, you know, whatever it is, whatever it is, but that taking of things through a boom-bust cycle, through the operation of debt, that is ancient.
|
|
|
|
01:13:35.131 --> 01:13:37.512
|
|
That is an ancient, ancient practice.
|
|
|
|
01:13:37.592 --> 01:13:42.833
|
|
So there's nothing new about taking property during the bust phase.
|
|
|
|
01:13:43.213 --> 01:13:44.794
|
|
This way it's always been done.
|
|
|
|
01:13:45.494 --> 01:14:00.699
|
|
But this, in the Great Taking 2.0, they have figured out a way to take even property, think stocks and bonds, collateral, that you have not borrowed against.
|
|
|
|
01:14:01.139 --> 01:14:02.579
|
|
You own free and clear.
|
|
|
|
01:14:03.200 --> 01:14:04.280
|
|
And to do it globally.
|
|
|
|
01:14:05.060 --> 01:14:13.862
|
|
So it will be much more comprehensive than what was done even in the Depression.
|
|
|
|
01:14:16.442 --> 01:14:20.603
|
|
Now, to think well, they wouldn't do anything like this.
|
|
|
|
01:14:21.364 --> 01:14:28.185
|
|
But when you go back and you look at what was done then, J.P.
|
|
|
|
01:14:28.225 --> 01:14:32.886
|
|
Morgan was a front organization for the Rothschild banking interests.
|
|
|
|
01:14:33.859 --> 01:14:35.060
|
|
I think that's pretty clear.
|
|
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01:14:35.380 --> 01:14:35.740
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J.P.
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01:14:35.780 --> 01:14:45.464
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Morgan was not an independent actor and actually had a relatively small amount of wealth personally when he died.
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01:14:46.024 --> 01:14:50.386
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So he was he was fronting for the banking interests in Europe.
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01:14:51.026 --> 01:14:54.667
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They created a crisis in 1907.
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01:14:56.728 --> 01:15:01.170
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And then they use that as justification for
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01:15:02.233 --> 01:15:04.574
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some kind of banking reform.
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01:15:05.054 --> 01:15:06.475
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Now, why were they doing this?
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01:15:06.535 --> 01:15:10.377
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So Ed Griffin has gone into this deeply.
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01:15:10.477 --> 01:15:19.662
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And of course, the classic book Creature from Jekyll Island is a real treasure and all the supporting documentation there.
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01:15:20.142 --> 01:15:30.247
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So one thing Ed did was to go into the memoirs and statements made by the people who were present at this meeting in 1910 on Jekyll Island.
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01:15:31.270 --> 01:15:41.658
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And what is clear is that they were doing this because the growth in the economy was outside their control.
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01:15:42.739 --> 01:15:49.905
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The major growth in banking was outside of the banks controlled by the European banking interests.
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01:15:51.786 --> 01:15:53.508
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And the U.S.
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01:15:53.648 --> 01:15:57.030
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industry was largely self-financing.
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01:15:57.511 --> 01:15:59.092
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So they did not need their credit.
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01:15:59.835 --> 01:16:00.916
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So what did they do?
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01:16:02.276 --> 01:16:07.078
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They created this crisis to justify forming the Federal Reserve.
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01:16:07.739 --> 01:16:14.382
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They implemented it essentially on Christmas Eve in 1913.
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01:16:14.502 --> 01:16:17.703
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So it was done quietly.
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01:16:18.443 --> 01:16:23.185
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And then World War I began eight months later.
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01:16:23.205 --> 01:16:28.548
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Now, this is how central banks, they're joined at the hip with warfare.
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01:16:30.712 --> 01:16:38.960
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Because what happened during the war was the Fed created the money out of thin air to buy U.S.
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01:16:39.040 --> 01:16:45.526
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Treasury securities that then became the capital base for the Fed.
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01:16:46.787 --> 01:16:50.931
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It was Treasuries that they bought for nothing, essentially.
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01:16:51.591 --> 01:16:53.053
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And then with the war,
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01:16:53.652 --> 01:16:57.594
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there was a vast expansion in government debt.
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01:16:58.334 --> 01:17:04.578
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So not only in the US, but this would have worked quite well for the Bank of England as well.
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01:17:04.658 --> 01:17:06.739
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This is how the Bank of England was born.
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01:17:07.259 --> 01:17:12.241
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So they say warfare is the health of the state.
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01:17:12.622 --> 01:17:13.942
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That's not really quite right.
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01:17:14.082 --> 01:17:17.164
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It's the health of the central banks is warfare.
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01:17:17.744 --> 01:17:20.566
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So they use that to establish their,
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01:17:22.200 --> 01:17:23.041
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their power.
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01:17:23.181 --> 01:17:31.143
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Now, the entire society is essentially paying them interest on the credit creation now.
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01:17:31.683 --> 01:17:34.965
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But it's it's more brilliant than that.
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01:17:35.445 --> 01:17:42.467
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Even what they did then was they this happened pretty quickly from through.
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01:17:42.547 --> 01:17:47.829
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So the war is consolidated or gave them this vast power.
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01:17:48.496 --> 01:17:57.978
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Then they created the bubble in the 20s, and then they created the collapse in 1929 through 1933 with the bank failures.
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01:17:58.038 --> 01:18:03.960
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And then when they closed the banks in 1933, March of 1933, they put out of business literally all of their competitors.
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01:18:15.982 --> 01:18:19.243
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Over 9,000 banks were not allowed to reopen.
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01:18:19.763 --> 01:18:24.204
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So they comprehensively did that.
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01:18:24.624 --> 01:18:30.386
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The only banks allowed to reopen were the Federal Reserve System banks.
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01:18:30.506 --> 01:18:31.106
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Pretty neat.
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01:18:32.307 --> 01:18:34.227
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Yeah, that is spectacular.
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01:18:34.927 --> 01:18:43.430
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Then they confiscated the gold from the public shortly thereafter that.
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01:18:44.718 --> 01:18:47.200
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It was basically kind of a one-two punch.
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01:18:47.260 --> 01:18:49.222
|
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That also happened in March.
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01:18:49.722 --> 01:18:54.906
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So now what I point out in the book, you know, I'm from Cleveland.
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01:18:55.526 --> 01:19:07.955
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They built, the Federal Reserve Bank in Cleveland has the largest bank vault in the world with the largest hinge ever on a bank vault.
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01:19:08.756 --> 01:19:10.297
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And they built that in 1923.
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01:19:12.668 --> 01:19:16.551
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So what did they think they were going to put in this vast vault?
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01:19:17.051 --> 01:19:19.253
|
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Why were they building that in 1923?
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01:19:19.933 --> 01:19:22.355
|
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So we got the answer 10 years later.
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01:19:22.415 --> 01:19:25.076
|
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They work on these kinds of 10-year cycles.
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01:19:25.797 --> 01:19:29.820
|
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So the rationale was they had to have the gold.
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01:19:29.880 --> 01:19:37.485
|
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They had written it in the Federal Reserve Act that the Federal Reserve could only expand credit based on the gold it held.
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01:19:38.085 --> 01:19:42.008
|
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So they claimed that they had to have the gold in order to expand credit.
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01:19:42.383 --> 01:19:44.344
|
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But then they did not expand credit.
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01:19:44.764 --> 01:19:47.806
|
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They kept conditions tight for years.
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01:19:48.867 --> 01:19:50.988
|
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So what was the purpose of taking the gold?
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01:19:51.048 --> 01:19:53.449
|
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It was so there was no parallel system.
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01:19:54.090 --> 01:19:57.732
|
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There was nothing else that could start up to oppose them.
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01:19:58.412 --> 01:20:07.798
|
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So it was comprehensive and they were willing to destroy the economy.
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01:20:08.359 --> 01:20:10.881
|
|
They were willing to destroy the U.S.
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01:20:10.961 --> 01:20:15.904
|
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economy and really the global economy because this was not just the U.S.
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|
01:20:15.944 --> 01:20:17.325
|
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that was affected by this.
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01:20:17.705 --> 01:20:19.026
|
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It was a global depression.
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01:20:19.827 --> 01:20:28.673
|
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So that shows when you really go back and look at it, they're absolutely willing to do this kind of thing.
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01:20:31.414 --> 01:20:34.336
|
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I definitely agree with that wholeheartedly.
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01:20:36.077 --> 01:20:42.080
|
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I'm going to ask you to pivot really quick and you don't have to talk very long about it.
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01:20:42.200 --> 01:20:43.621
|
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Bitcoin is a good asset.
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01:20:43.681 --> 01:20:44.842
|
|
Bitcoin is crazy.
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01:20:44.922 --> 01:20:46.302
|
|
Bitcoin is NSA.
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01:20:47.263 --> 01:20:50.024
|
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Yeah, I would say that.
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01:20:51.085 --> 01:20:56.228
|
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I mean, I'm not an expert on that, but my take on it is it is NSA.
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01:20:57.328 --> 01:20:58.549
|
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I say to people,
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01:20:59.267 --> 01:21:08.854
|
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Sure, I mean, you could have some, but I wouldn't think that that is gonna rescue you.
|
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|
|
01:21:09.174 --> 01:21:18.541
|
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It's too easy to have a backdoor into it, to get people into this and then make it, it can be very easily be made unavailable.
|
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|
|
01:21:20.223 --> 01:21:27.608
|
|
The body language around it just has not been right, that for many years, it was not taxed at all.
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|
|
01:21:28.066 --> 01:21:34.469
|
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You know, the banking cabal does not allow something like that to happen unless they want it to happen.
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|
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01:21:34.649 --> 01:21:36.349
|
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Oh, that's an interesting point.
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01:21:36.389 --> 01:21:37.410
|
|
That's an interesting point.
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01:21:39.390 --> 01:21:39.871
|
|
Interesting.
|
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01:21:41.611 --> 01:21:47.214
|
|
Another question that I had that's now slipping my mind.
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01:21:50.628 --> 01:22:07.363
|
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You said very specifically that the central clearing parties or counter parties seem to have been designed failure point yes, and and so Who who like are those American people that run those companies?
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|
01:22:07.423 --> 01:22:10.746
|
|
Are they international people like how are those set up?
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01:22:11.146 --> 01:22:16.591
|
|
I'm just a guy who thinks of like Donald Trump had a bunch of LLC's, but if we're thinking about central
|
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|
|
01:22:17.631 --> 01:22:18.892
|
|
Clearing counterparties.
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|
|
01:22:18.932 --> 01:22:21.593
|
|
Are they are they is it called?
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01:22:21.653 --> 01:22:22.773
|
|
Is it a corporation?
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|
01:22:22.893 --> 01:22:27.515
|
|
Is it something that is formed legally or something?
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01:22:27.535 --> 01:22:46.903
|
|
They would be you know corporate entities, okay So with stockholders and everything Well, no, they're not publicly There for example depository trust is owned by its members its clearing members and
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|
01:22:47.521 --> 01:22:50.703
|
|
So they're the biggest banks.
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|
01:22:51.383 --> 01:22:56.685
|
|
And so the members, the members that control Depository Trust are J.P.
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|
|
01:22:56.725 --> 01:22:59.747
|
|
Morgan and... Oh, OK.
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|
|
01:22:59.807 --> 01:23:00.647
|
|
Now I see.
|
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|
01:23:00.667 --> 01:23:02.948
|
|
So it's not owned by the public.
|
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|
|
01:23:03.048 --> 01:23:12.773
|
|
It's owned and controlled by these, essentially the cabal owns and controls Depository Trust.
|
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|
|
01:23:13.213 --> 01:23:14.013
|
|
Now, there are
|
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|
|
01:23:17.359 --> 01:23:30.908
|
|
You know, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is also a central clearing counterparty, but there's a reciprocity where they're using the collateral from depository trust.
|
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|
|
01:23:31.349 --> 01:23:37.573
|
|
So there's a kind of plumbing, there's a kind of ecosystem with these central clearing counterparties.
|
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|
|
01:23:38.514 --> 01:23:45.659
|
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And they are, they're, you know, they are, they're different entities in different,
|
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|
|
01:23:46.479 --> 01:23:52.161
|
|
parts of the world, you know, but they're, they're, they're modeled on depository trust work.
|
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|
|
01:23:52.361 --> 01:23:56.262
|
|
And you said something about it being, uh, at some point it's going to be automatic.
|
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|
|
01:23:56.302 --> 01:24:13.247
|
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So I was thinking more like this would be a decade of court cases, but you're saying that when a collapse happens, it'll be a, that's been the whole point of this is finality that this is what James Rogers, the guy who explained, you know,
|
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|
|
01:24:13.766 --> 01:24:20.250
|
|
drafted the changes to the UCC, what they're saying is we can't know who owns what.
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|
|
01:24:20.411 --> 01:24:31.178
|
|
All we can know with certainty is that there's finality for the secured creditor to take the pooled assets.
|
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|
|
01:24:32.119 --> 01:24:39.464
|
|
And so the taking occurs with no judicial review.
|
|
|
|
01:24:40.342 --> 01:25:09.594
|
|
while and that would be that was already the the the principal legal principle you also said was solidified by the lehman brothers settlement or whatever they did with lehman brothers so they basically could even be that both sides of that case cooperated to make sure that the results of that case were exactly what they wanted to be i think it was uh... i mean while while you really i think we need was essentially uh... uh...
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|
|
01:25:11.742 --> 01:25:37.708
|
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you know, sacrifice was used to create the pretext for these, the legal certainty that the secured creditors keep the assets, but also making a sufficiently frightening crisis to justify, you know, unlimited powers and for the Fed and
|
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|
|
01:25:40.649 --> 01:25:44.452
|
|
moving toward central clearing without any question.
|
|
|
|
01:25:45.173 --> 01:25:51.538
|
|
So let me just explain for your group here what happened in Lehman, which is pretty shocking.
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|
01:25:52.078 --> 01:26:05.249
|
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Some people say, well, the retail investors were made whole, and they get confused about that because
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|
|
01:26:06.449 --> 01:26:19.498
|
|
Um, what happened was the retail accounts, that ox was not gored directly, but, but what happened was, um, all retail accounts were encumbered in the bankruptcy.
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|
01:26:20.539 --> 01:26:21.479
|
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So that was clear.
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|
01:26:21.780 --> 01:26:31.406
|
|
Everybody was stuck in the bankruptcy, which would not have occurred prior to these changes, um, to, to the uniform commercial code.
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|
|
01:26:32.407 --> 01:26:32.527
|
|
Um,
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|
01:26:33.573 --> 01:26:35.894
|
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which were not fully implemented until 2001.
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|
01:26:36.635 --> 01:26:41.098
|
|
So, you know, we're we're this is the preparation.
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|
01:26:41.718 --> 01:26:48.522
|
|
So what they did was basically they sold the Lehman retail business.
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|
01:26:49.122 --> 01:27:01.450
|
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But if you think about it, you're in the midst of a financial collapse and your broker goes bust and you have no access to your accounts now during the crisis.
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|
01:27:02.031 --> 01:27:22.407
|
|
And the analogy I use is, if you come out of your house to go to work in the morning and your car is gone, and then a month later, the police bring back a car, not necessarily your car, but a car, does that mean that your car was not stolen?
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|
|
01:27:23.448 --> 01:27:28.732
|
|
That's basically what happened there with the retail clients.
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|
|
01:27:28.792 --> 01:27:30.554
|
|
But the more frightening thing
|
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|
01:27:31.229 --> 01:27:37.153
|
|
is to think that the biggest, most sophisticated players, what happened to them?
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|
01:27:38.214 --> 01:27:47.180
|
|
They had treasury securities that was their collateral that they were going to use.
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|
|
01:27:47.301 --> 01:27:50.563
|
|
They needed to have during the crisis to operate with.
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|
|
01:27:51.484 --> 01:27:54.286
|
|
And so Lehman was their broker.
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|
|
01:27:54.766 --> 01:27:55.266
|
|
J.P.
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|
|
01:27:55.306 --> 01:27:58.969
|
|
Morgan was the custodian for their assets.
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|
|
01:27:59.910 --> 01:28:08.016
|
|
And JP Morgan was also the secured creditor that took their assets in the bankruptcy.
|
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|
|
01:28:08.697 --> 01:28:14.401
|
|
So it was both their custodian and the secured creditor that took the client assets.
|
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|
|
01:28:14.861 --> 01:28:16.062
|
|
Now, how did that happen?
|
|
|
|
01:28:17.103 --> 01:28:27.511
|
|
Lehman was using the client assets in swap contracts for its own financing with JP Morgan.
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|
|
01:28:28.030 --> 01:28:32.032
|
|
including right up to the bankruptcy itself.
|
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|
|
01:28:32.573 --> 01:28:34.374
|
|
So right on the eve of the bankruptcy.
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|
|
01:28:35.054 --> 01:28:52.665
|
|
And JP Morgan, it's clear, JP Morgan knew they were using the client assets and knew they were using the client assets in escalating amounts right into the bankruptcy and then took them under these contracts.
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|
|
01:28:52.805 --> 01:28:55.967
|
|
Again, it's the operation of the contracts in the bankruptcy.
|
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|
|
01:28:57.035 --> 01:29:04.861
|
|
And so five years later, there is a bankruptcy court decision.
|
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|
|
01:29:05.001 --> 01:29:10.566
|
|
So these big players, you'd think, well, they would be able, the big boys would be able to protect themselves.
|
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|
|
01:29:10.626 --> 01:29:13.548
|
|
These are some of the biggest institutions in the world.
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|
|
01:29:14.369 --> 01:29:24.897
|
|
And they sued to try to recover their assets under this argument of constructive fraudulent transfer.
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|
|
01:29:26.207 --> 01:29:43.657
|
|
And the idea of constructive fraud is that the assets are transferred out without consideration having been given for the assets and on the eve of the bankruptcy, which is clearly what happened.
|
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|
|
01:29:44.077 --> 01:29:51.201
|
|
So that would have been it's called constructive fraud because you don't even have to prove anything just on the face of it.
|
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|
|
01:29:51.261 --> 01:29:52.061
|
|
It's fraudulent.
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|
|
01:29:52.661 --> 01:29:52.921
|
|
But
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|
|
01:29:54.503 --> 01:29:59.445
|
|
The bankruptcy court found that J.P.
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|
|
|
01:29:59.485 --> 01:30:10.168
|
|
Morgan was entitled to keep the client assets because that is exactly what is intended under the expanded safe harbor protections.
|
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|
|
01:30:10.988 --> 01:30:14.729
|
|
And that the only question was whether J.P.
|
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|
|
01:30:14.789 --> 01:30:21.491
|
|
Morgan was entitled as a member of the protected class.
|
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|
|
01:30:22.572 --> 01:30:23.592
|
|
And they found that
|
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|
|
01:30:24.093 --> 01:30:26.676
|
|
They use that term that J.P.
|
|
|
|
01:30:26.696 --> 01:30:33.543
|
|
Morgan, as one of the biggest financial institutions, is clearly a member of the protected class.
|
|
|
|
01:30:34.344 --> 01:30:46.757
|
|
So it's it is this was really the purpose of the Lehman failure was to make this all crystal clear that that's how it's going to operate.
|
|
|
|
01:30:48.456 --> 01:30:48.896
|
|
Wow!
|
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|
|
01:30:49.037 --> 01:30:50.778
|
|
I mean, I don't know what to say.
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|
|
01:30:50.798 --> 01:31:02.786
|
|
I'm really excited because one thing is for sure, me seeing your Red Pill presentation and then that little group presentation at the end really made this sink in well.
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01:31:04.908 --> 01:31:16.997
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It's a really big picture kind of... What percentage of the people that are working in these industries do you think are aware of this and others are just going on thinking they're...
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01:31:17.691 --> 01:31:20.533
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They're just, you know, in the place where the money turns around.
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01:31:21.694 --> 01:31:26.118
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Well, you know, it's people don't want to know.
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01:31:26.138 --> 01:31:38.048
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I would say that, for example, I met with the top securities attorney at one of the banks in Sweden.
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01:31:38.589 --> 01:31:41.051
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This was some years ago.
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01:31:41.111 --> 01:31:45.655
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This is when I was trying to prevent Sweden from going along with this.
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01:31:46.827 --> 01:31:49.609
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And so this is the top securities attorney.
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01:31:49.989 --> 01:31:51.730
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He did not know anything about this.
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01:31:52.270 --> 01:31:59.854
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He had to go away for several days and come back and acknowledge that, yes, this is true.
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01:32:00.334 --> 01:32:00.654
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Wow.
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01:32:00.854 --> 01:32:03.696
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And that's that's how it is.
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01:32:04.336 --> 01:32:09.519
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People people will find that if they go to their, for example,
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01:32:13.213 --> 01:32:22.580
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Chris, Chris Martinson has done a lot of work on this and segments on this, and I appreciate what he's done because he's really gone and drilled down into it.
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01:32:23.441 --> 01:32:38.492
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And he said, I'm not sure if he says it in the in one of the interviews, but he told me that he found he had to go up four layers of management where it was denied, denied, denied, and then ultimately
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01:32:39.281 --> 01:32:41.923
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The answer was, well, yes, this is true.
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01:32:41.943 --> 01:32:43.724
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This is the case.
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01:32:43.804 --> 01:32:48.048
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So the people on the front lines do not know this.
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01:32:48.628 --> 01:32:50.689
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You know, your broker is not gonna know this.
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01:32:50.770 --> 01:32:53.672
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And this is, this again is the sight of hand.
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01:32:53.732 --> 01:32:59.676
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What they do is in federal law, there are supposedly protections.
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01:33:00.517 --> 01:33:03.199
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And this is the sight of, it's the misdirection.
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01:33:03.279 --> 01:33:04.500
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Watch this hand.
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01:33:05.020 --> 01:33:07.402
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This is the federal law protecting you.
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01:33:08.328 --> 01:33:09.608
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Keep your eye on that hand.
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01:33:09.628 --> 01:33:18.711
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And what the federal law is saying is that by law, the broker has to keep the client assets separate from the broker's assets.
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01:33:19.992 --> 01:33:23.113
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That is in the books and records of the broker.
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01:33:23.613 --> 01:33:29.415
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Meanwhile, they are all in the same pool at the higher level.
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01:33:29.995 --> 01:33:32.616
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It's called the indirect holding system.
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01:33:33.476 --> 01:33:36.497
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So that the broker at the broker level
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01:33:37.259 --> 01:33:40.515
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they don't have to know anything about that.
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01:33:41.713 --> 01:33:42.454
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Yeah, I see it.
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01:33:42.854 --> 01:33:43.675
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I see it clearly.
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01:33:43.735 --> 01:33:44.035
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Wow.
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01:33:44.335 --> 01:33:57.747
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It's it's it is mind boggling to me that it's as simple, in some ways, when you explained it also, that Sweden was able to implement their system, but still maintain some record of ownership.
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01:33:57.847 --> 01:33:59.048
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And that was annoying to them.
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01:34:00.009 --> 01:34:02.711
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Very clear, clearly and easily done.
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01:34:02.751 --> 01:34:05.073
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This is what shows the intention.
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01:34:05.533 --> 01:34:08.296
|
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It absolutely could be done to protect people.
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01:34:08.356 --> 01:34:09.757
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That is not the intention.
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01:34:11.089 --> 01:34:11.249
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Yeah.
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01:34:11.649 --> 01:34:16.610
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So, um, I have seen a link in my chat a couple of times to a PDF.
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01:34:16.690 --> 01:34:19.771
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Is that freely available in different places, including the web?
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01:34:20.431 --> 01:34:20.691
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Okay.
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01:34:20.991 --> 01:34:21.211
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Yeah.
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01:34:21.251 --> 01:34:28.192
|
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You can go to the great taking.com and it's a free PDF.
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01:34:28.252 --> 01:34:29.373
|
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You can download it.
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01:34:29.973 --> 01:34:34.634
|
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That is really what has allowed this to spread globally.
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01:34:35.714 --> 01:34:40.855
|
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Um, and I would, I would say that, I mean, it's possible that,
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01:34:41.678 --> 01:34:44.781
|
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you know, millions of people have this at this point.
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01:34:46.743 --> 01:34:55.090
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And so that's a very hopeful thing because there are, it's been examined.
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01:34:55.891 --> 01:34:57.172
|
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No one can refute this.
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01:34:57.512 --> 01:34:58.813
|
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It's absolutely the case.
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01:34:59.114 --> 01:35:02.637
|
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And you might say, well, then we're all screwed.
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01:35:02.657 --> 01:35:06.781
|
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I mean, this isn't that bad, but it's good
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01:35:09.008 --> 01:35:18.772
|
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that it is so apparent, unlike this is where I'm saying they're coming at us in this full spectrum hybrid war.
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01:35:20.373 --> 01:35:25.555
|
|
And we're never going to prevail if we have to take all these threats one by one.
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01:35:25.575 --> 01:35:27.136
|
|
It's just too much.
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01:35:27.656 --> 01:35:29.877
|
|
Yeah, well, I think a lot of these threats aren't real.
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01:35:29.937 --> 01:35:36.040
|
|
It sounds like your threat is a lot more real than the circulating coronavirus that's been going around for the last five years.
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01:35:36.100 --> 01:35:37.681
|
|
And that's what bothers me the most.
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01:35:39.212 --> 01:35:51.522
|
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The more unreal things our kids are concerned with, the less likely their parents are to figure out how our assets are being stolen, how our life's work is being robbed.
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01:35:53.317 --> 01:35:53.637
|
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I don't know.
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01:35:53.677 --> 01:35:55.439
|
|
I think this is a really important message.
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01:35:55.499 --> 01:35:57.882
|
|
I think your work is really, really important.
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01:35:57.922 --> 01:35:59.464
|
|
I don't want to take up too much more of your time.
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01:35:59.504 --> 01:36:01.626
|
|
And I also want to keep this video a little bit succinct.
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01:36:02.026 --> 01:36:08.173
|
|
Okay, so I think it points rightly at who is behind all this.
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01:36:08.734 --> 01:36:11.356
|
|
You see all the all the misinformation.
|
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|
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01:36:12.273 --> 01:36:38.411
|
|
all this so i might i might stop you there and challenge you just just because i can um you you say that it says who's behind it but who who would we say is like who would we summarize it is it jp morgan oh as a you know the clearly jp morgan has been behind this for decades okay so it's it's entity jp morgan entities like jp morgan
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|
|
01:36:39.292 --> 01:36:45.865
|
|
Um, what, what, what I think the really urgent thing to know is if you want all these.
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|
01:36:46.533 --> 01:36:50.436
|
|
that all these threats against us are being funded somehow.
|
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|
|
01:36:50.797 --> 01:36:52.919
|
|
It's not your tax dollars doing it.
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|
|
01:36:53.439 --> 01:36:57.342
|
|
This is created money on a vast scale globally.
|
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|
|
01:37:00.025 --> 01:37:08.632
|
|
So it's the taxation system is basically just a means of harassing and- Oh, wow.
|
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|
|
01:37:08.692 --> 01:37:10.314
|
|
What a great statement that is.
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01:37:10.494 --> 01:37:10.954
|
|
I love it.
|
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|
|
01:37:11.915 --> 01:37:19.143
|
|
So if you want all the threats against you to stop, good luck taking them one by one.
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|
|
01:37:19.563 --> 01:37:20.464
|
|
You can't do it.
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|
|
01:37:21.485 --> 01:37:28.252
|
|
As I say, the one ring that binds them all is the central banking power.
|
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|
|
01:37:29.593 --> 01:37:35.199
|
|
So very simply, what you would do is revoke the Federal Reserve Act.
|
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|
|
01:37:37.128 --> 01:37:42.749
|
|
You have to literally, and this is Stockholm syndrome, that people think, oh, well, you couldn't do that.
|
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|
|
01:37:43.349 --> 01:37:44.090
|
|
Yes, you can.
|
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|
|
01:37:44.110 --> 01:37:55.852
|
|
It is that power that controls all the political parties, all the governments, all the media, everything that is arrayed against you.
|
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|
|
01:37:56.412 --> 01:37:59.453
|
|
You are essentially sharpening the ax that is aimed at your neck.
|
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|
|
01:38:05.163 --> 01:38:13.646
|
|
And the only way to stop, and the problem is we are now, they're in a phase now where they can't stop.
|
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|
|
01:38:14.206 --> 01:38:17.307
|
|
So we're going into an escalating global war.
|
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|
|
01:38:17.447 --> 01:38:19.128
|
|
A lot of people are dying now.
|
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|
|
01:38:19.668 --> 01:38:22.489
|
|
It's already happening and it's going to escalate.
|
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|
|
01:38:23.410 --> 01:38:26.831
|
|
And it will be on the scale of World War I, World War II.
|
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|
|
01:38:26.871 --> 01:38:29.092
|
|
You know, this is what we're going into.
|
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|
|
01:38:30.328 --> 01:38:31.729
|
|
It has to be stopped.
|
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|
|
01:38:31.789 --> 01:38:35.111
|
|
We have to face up to the reality.
|
|
|
|
01:38:35.471 --> 01:38:37.933
|
|
So that is why this is a gift.
|
|
|
|
01:38:38.513 --> 01:38:52.963
|
|
It focuses rightly on who is behind this and it can unite people all the way to the top of the system and globally in this understanding that that's where it has to be stopped.
|
|
|
|
01:38:54.062 --> 01:38:54.322
|
|
Wow.
|
|
|
|
01:38:55.083 --> 01:38:57.504
|
|
Um, can I just say thank you for coming on the show.
|
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|
|
01:38:57.544 --> 01:39:00.626
|
|
I'm sorry it took you so long or me so long to get my act together.
|
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|
|
01:39:00.906 --> 01:39:06.550
|
|
And, uh, I will, I will promise to do a study hall of one of your other presentations.
|
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|
|
01:39:06.650 --> 01:39:12.654
|
|
And then, um, maybe I can contact you in a couple of weeks with some better questions and some deeper understanding, and maybe we can do it again.
|
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|
|
01:39:13.414 --> 01:39:13.915
|
|
Absolutely.
|
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|
|
01:39:13.935 --> 01:39:17.437
|
|
JJ, I want to say, I enjoyed meeting you so much and, uh,
|
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|
|
01:39:18.217 --> 01:39:20.439
|
|
It was kind of meant to be.
|
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|
|
01:39:20.679 --> 01:39:25.844
|
|
We bumped into each other, and it was a powerful experience for me.
|
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|
|
01:39:26.064 --> 01:39:27.226
|
|
Me too, man.
|
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|
|
01:39:27.386 --> 01:39:29.988
|
|
I can't stress enough how that's exactly how I feel.
|
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|
|
01:39:30.028 --> 01:39:33.011
|
|
So I'm really excited we finally made this happen, and I will be in touch.
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|
|
01:39:34.052 --> 01:39:34.392
|
|
OK.
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|
01:39:34.692 --> 01:39:34.973
|
|
Thanks.
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|
01:39:35.073 --> 01:39:35.433
|
|
Thank you.
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|
|
01:39:35.453 --> 01:39:36.414
|
|
All right.
|
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|
|
01:39:36.554 --> 01:39:37.235
|
|
Bye, everybody.
|
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|
|
01:39:38.430 --> 01:39:42.253
|
|
Wow, wow, wow, wow, wow, wow.
|
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|
|
01:39:42.353 --> 01:39:44.255
|
|
Okay, so sometimes you just get lucky.
|
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|
01:39:44.575 --> 01:39:50.360
|
|
And I got to thank G. Edward Griffin for inviting me to the Red Pill Show.
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|
|
01:39:51.101 --> 01:39:59.729
|
|
And I can't, I got so lucky because actually after the Red Pill Conference, wow, this is not.
|
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|
|
01:40:05.114 --> 01:40:05.514
|
|
There we go.
|
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|
|
01:40:06.375 --> 01:40:13.719
|
|
After the red pill, actually, I found myself, we were kind of on the way to the airport at the same time.
|
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|
|
01:40:17.261 --> 01:40:26.087
|
|
And so we shared a Uber to the airport together before we realized that another friend from Sweden actually had a rental car.
|
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|
|
01:40:26.147 --> 01:40:30.549
|
|
So then he went in the rental car and David and I took a
|
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|
|
01:40:33.447 --> 01:40:49.166
|
|
an uber together and then we spent the rest of the week as we're waiting for the same flight and then actually that flight was the flight where Dave David sat in front of me on the plane in the middle seat which is a fun seat for me.
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|
|
01:40:50.067 --> 01:40:53.649
|
|
And then right next to David sat Andy Kaufman.
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01:40:53.689 --> 01:40:55.610
|
|
So that was a real interesting.
|
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|
01:40:56.210 --> 01:40:59.451
|
|
It was interesting to be a fly on the wall for that.
|
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|
01:40:59.891 --> 01:41:05.234
|
|
I will confess that occasionally I put my ear in between the seats to try and hear what they were talking about.
|
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|
|
01:41:06.074 --> 01:41:07.195
|
|
But I didn't hear very much.
|
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|
|
01:41:08.075 --> 01:41:12.397
|
|
And as you know, I did say hello to Andy Kaufman after we got off the plane.
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|
01:41:13.097 --> 01:41:19.018
|
|
Ladies and gentlemen, intramuscular injection of any combination of substances with the intent of augmenting the immune system is dumb.
|
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|
|
01:41:19.538 --> 01:41:24.119
|
|
Transfection in healthy humans is criminally negligent and RNA cannot pandemic.
|
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|
|
01:41:24.559 --> 01:41:26.720
|
|
Thank you very much for joining me on the show.
|
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|
|
01:41:27.100 --> 01:41:37.222
|
|
There are other ways to say it, and I think one of the best ways to say it is to refer to weaponized piles of money, which I think I've got a little tiny bit
|
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|
|
01:41:37.862 --> 01:41:50.469
|
|
better understanding of what weaponized piles of money are capable of doing and how they're being positioned to extract as much wealth as possible from us and eventually, in a collapse, grab it all.
|
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|
|
01:41:51.009 --> 01:41:56.932
|
|
So which is, that's pretty disturbing, but it's also a very important message and one that I think David is right about.
|
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01:41:56.972 --> 01:41:57.852
|
|
It could unite us.
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|
01:41:57.932 --> 01:42:05.476
|
|
It could bring us all together, rich and poor, so that we all realize how much this has been orchestrated in
|
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|
|
01:42:06.937 --> 01:42:12.426
|
|
in terms of, you know, even this mythology here and how much we've argued about it while this stuff has been going on behind the scenes.
|
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|
|
01:42:13.128 --> 01:42:18.617
|
|
So yeah, stop all transfections in humans because they are trying to eliminate the control group by any means necessary.
|
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|
|
01:42:19.378 --> 01:42:20.260
|
|
And yeah.
|
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|
01:42:21.860 --> 01:42:25.463
|
|
There was a really, really, really good show yesterday.
|
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|
|
01:42:25.984 --> 01:42:40.457
|
|
So if you didn't see it, skip the beginning and watch the reading of that paper because you can really see how Joshua Lederberg and others have really been formative in our understanding of these ideas and form
|
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|
|
01:42:40.957 --> 01:42:53.381
|
|
melding them, wordsmithing them, if you will, into the shape that is the least threatening to our irreducible complexity, the sacred biology that we all have reverence for.
|
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|
|
01:42:54.801 --> 01:42:59.883
|
|
Ladies and gentlemen, if you enjoyed the show, please share the stream at stream.gigaohm.bio.
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|
|
01:43:00.883 --> 01:43:08.105
|
|
I am going to convert solely to gigaohm.bio as my means of communication within the next week.
|
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|
|
01:43:08.125 --> 01:43:10.266
|
|
That means I will not be on X anymore.
|
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|
|
01:43:10.826 --> 01:43:15.749
|
|
If I'm on X it will be only to post the time of the show and that's it.
|
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|
|
01:43:15.789 --> 01:43:34.882
|
|
So that transition is going to happen really fast and that transition has been spurred in part by the absolute angel in the chat named Pamela who has kind of slapped me on the head and made me realize that that community is coming together and that work is happening there and I'm ignoring it.
|
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|
|
01:43:35.762 --> 01:43:51.272
|
|
And so after underestimating the uptake on PeerTube and on Soapbox, I think it's time for GigaOM to kind of convert to that as being the primary front and not Twitter and not Twitch anymore.
|
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|
|
01:43:52.133 --> 01:43:53.654
|
|
So that's where we're going.
|
|
|
|
01:43:53.674 --> 01:43:55.035
|
|
That's definitely the plan.
|
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|
|
01:43:55.255 --> 01:43:57.817
|
|
And short courses are coming next week.
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|
|
01:43:57.917 --> 01:43:59.037
|
|
So get ready.
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01:43:59.057 --> 01:43:59.718
|
|
Buy a notebook.
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|
|
01:44:00.498 --> 01:44:01.199
|
|
I'm pretty excited.
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