Stream.Transcripts/twitch/1939505012 (2023-09-30) - Mark Kulacz and Regular Guy LIVE -- 30 Sept 2023/1939505012 (2023-09-30) - Mark Kulacz and Regular Guy LIVE -- 30 Sept 2023 -- Gigaohm Biological High Resistance Low Noise Information Brief.vtt

WEBVTT

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It is scheduled for 16 minutes next.

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It is going on French, British, it takes a few minutes.

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British, Italian, Japanese television.

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People everywhere are starting to listen to him.

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It's embarrassing.

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Where does this one come in?

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What better way for a swimmer to disappear?

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Uncle Stewart, why did you do it?

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Well, I guess he can explain it to the sheriff when he gets here.

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I bet you kids are starving.

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Zoinks, that's for me.

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Hey, what's this?

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Scooby Booze was here.

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The whole turkey?

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Gone?

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Scooby, here we go!

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Music

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Are we to understand that you are in the city of the ages?

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Good evening ladies and gentlemen and welcome.

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Oh wow, that came out wrong.

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Good evening ladies and gentlemen.

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Welcome to Giga On Biological.

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This is a high-resistance low-noise information brief brought to you by a biologist.

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It is the 30th of September, 2023.

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You don't understand Mr. Brown.

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We are still fighting this sculpted spectrum of debate.

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We are still fighting this limited spectrum of debate because it is not a matter of what is true,

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but it is perceived to be true that matters.

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And they are misleading our young right now and we need to fight for this now before it's too late.

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Music

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I think you can see the bricks at the back of the theater.

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The question now is how can we get our family and friends to see those bricks?

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It is really the question.

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I keep thinking out of my audio here.

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I am not going to be sure how to avoid that.

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It is on my phone.

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We are working so well.

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What is happening there?

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I don't know what.

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Maybe my voice suddenly cleared up.

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Wouldn't that be nuts?

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Music

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We are definitely somewhere in a science fiction movie that sure feels like it to me.

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Good evening ladies and gentlemen.

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This is Kigal and Biological Eye Resistance Low Noise Information Brief.

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Brought to you by a biologist.

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It is the 30th of September, 2023.

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And we are still trying to figure out the easiest way to throw people an intellectual light buoy so that they can start to tread water,

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start to get their head above water.

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Thanks to the people that are scrolling above my head there, we are able to do some of this work.

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And we are able to do this work through almost a year and a half with no other support at all.

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And so that is quite a list of comradery, quite a list of contributors, producers.

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It has been a long, long road.

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But we are here now.

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And I am very, very, very, very happy to be here with you tonight.

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Still discussing the Scooby-Doo.

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Although I think now the goal is to try and add a little more depth and breadth to the discussion with regard to what is really going on.

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Because of course we know I have said it many times, other people have said it many times, that it is about the data.

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But it is a little bit more than that.

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And I think you are all very well aware that it is a little more than that.

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These people have changed our minds.

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They have changed us how we think.

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And we have been characterizing this as the Scooby-Doo.

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And in so doing, we are trying to find a way to bring people to understand, am I talking to the wrong camera?

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We are trying to find people, trying to find a way to get people to understand what has been done to us.

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And how it is not just people lying or people leaking documents.

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It is really bad guys with a complex plan so that even if you figured it out, you would actually still be trapped.

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And that is what this Scooby-Doo is all about.

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I think people have been co-opted into it.

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And one of the easiest ways to see through the fog is to listen for the voices that are actually saying that transfection is not immunization.

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Even harder to hear are voices that are saying that intramuscular injection of any combination of substances with the intent of augmenting the immune system is dumb.

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But I do think that there are going to be more and more people saying that as we move into the future.

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And so this has been the people map I've been playing with for quite some time.

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If you just highlight the people who have recently said that the whole vaccine schedule might be worth questioning.

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It's a crazy number of people that come up including actually nurse Erin because she started an anti-vax group in Florida before the pandemic even started her.

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Did she start two of them?

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Peter McCullough has come out very vocally about this.

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Of course you know that Robert F. Kennedy Jr.'s vaccine stance is that he wants them tested against the placebo so it's not exactly against the schedule.

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Of course if he used to talk frankly about it I think he'd probably be very much against it but it's the lawyer that you hear talking all the time.

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Steve Kirsch has been parading around data from Amish communities and so it's not that nobody's questioning this stuff.

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It's just that they have an interesting stance on the faith.

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And that faith is that there was a novel virus that we had to do something that the mRNA might have helped a lot of people and this could come again because you know gain of function viruses are real.

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And it's easy to come out against the childhood schedule in a not so vocal or kind of conservative kook sort of way.

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If you don't question the faith we can still keep them amplified and so I'm still quite skeptical and I need, we need...

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So tonight I'm just going to prep this by saying that I think the thing that Mark Koolack has brought to, there he is, has brought to the scene and really brought in the last, I don't know how many months it's been now,

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is this sudden understanding of this intellectual property space and the interest in it going forward through the pandemic.

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We've always been interested in we, I say, in the general we and I've only joined that general we in the last two years.

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We've always been interested in the legal space surrounding the vaccination schedule and vaccines and the legal risk allocation of vaccines onto the taxpayer.

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We've been talking recently about how that may set up a conflict of interest for the lawyers that use that system to never challenge it as a violation of our Seventh Amendment and regular courts.

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And so that's where we were kind of last time and we still want to explore and we hinted at exploring this thing that Mark had found which is the antibody patent paradox which in broad terms I want to leave to Mark but tonight again we have a special guest regular guy he doesn't have Sam the Eagle anymore but that's okay we still have the same fellow.

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Welcome regular guy welcome Mark if you could just give us a broad introduction to the antibody patent paradox you know as broad as you can without you know and then we'll kick it over to regular guy and he'll open up about what what makes it interesting with regard to patent pools

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and then I think we'll have to have to cut it short because we'll already have talked for four hours go ahead Mark good to see you my friend.

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Oh you're mute.

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Can you hear me okay.

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I can hear you.

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First of all this is a new hat I'm wearing.

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Oh wow it says oh that's sweet you satanic live that is awesome.

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Yes if they from a show fan just received it from the last week hand made for the old school sewing machine.

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You know who you are who you sent this in I'll just say it's from Jay not John but another fan first initial Jay and so I'm donning it tonight so cool thank you thank you.

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So I'm not a patent expert not really a lawyer okay.

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The way that I come to the conclusion or the way I got I am guided when I do research is to what's important is connections and correlations.

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For example if there are some people who are highly visible highly successful you know lots of connections to critical companies that are involved.

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And then they seem to have multiple associations with other people or particular legal disputes or some technology.

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The more links you see the more it will I allow that to guide me to something that's important.

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So I've always thought the whole patent law was this kind of bizarre I'm sure it's loaded with problems.

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And it was in fact your people map Jay and and us asking the question okay so why why Brett Weinstein why is Brett Weinstein in the position that he's in.

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And that always leads to well you know maybe they were had some phenomenal achievement throughout their career.

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You go to the Wikipedia page you go okay father's not there etc and then you start digging and then we realized that his father had a very influential role first patent attorney hired United States Department of Justice antitrust division.

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1962 pointed by John of Kennedy.

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And then as you showed it was in 2021 I think that Weinstein Brett Weinstein.

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Had RFK junior on as a guest and didn't even release it for a year.

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And strangely enough that it didn't even come up.

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You know I mean if I had a.

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A dear relative especially father who was appointed.

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By my guests uncle to a top role I would be I would be I would be so eager to say I cut them off right.

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Anyways what this led to was digging in through the history of Brett Weinstein's father also had something to do with why Eric Weinstein got to where he is.

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And you go through the cases and then one thing leads to next and you go okay so there's this.

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This center core company which was a one of the first companies into monoclonal antibodies.

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And how it all connects to a very large white paper that's heavily has been heavily promoted before we even knew about it and is now being cited by the United States Supreme Court.

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So it's the connections and the evidence out there that basically I did we just listened to it and it says this is really blank important and that's it.

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And then from there it's like okay we need to understand why we need to find some experts to help us figure this out.

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So we know things that are important before we even understand why we allow that to guide us.

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And then one thing leads to next and then you just find a wealth of other connections and people connected to it.

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But in the long the antibody patents if you will started before the technology even existed to describe them in almost any way whatsoever.

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So they were very, very loosely defined patents that were almost based more on function before they could describe them.

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So clearly certainly before they could have Chris use x ray crystallography and make a little models of them.

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Much was unknown about the immune system then much is still unknown about the immune system now matter of fact.

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So as technology has advanced to model and to understand these things.

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The ability to now create patents with more specificity is there.

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And as the patents get more specific more and more patent issues start coming up and and complaints and what has been discovered.

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And this is my interpretation of it is that the it's been realized that there is there's almost no.

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We used to think of the world as like a series of antibodies and they have different functions and as it's turned out there's almost a galactic range of different antibodies.

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Which can be unique to the the the foreign contaminants or molecule of the body's dealing with it can be unique to someone's own DNA.

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It can be unique to that we don't know there's so many and there's different structures which can do the same thing.

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And then sometimes the same structures do different things in different people.

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How do you make patents for this and even more so.

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How do you.

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You don't want everyone to know this because this breaks down every rule about virology which has been taught.

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Over the last time 50 plus years.

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So it exposes a lot of fraudulent thinking in the process also exposes potentially as you mentioned earlier Jay.

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The need to have a big data agenda over the next generation perhaps to to collect more data and to maybe reverse engineer and understand these things in great detail so.

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With you would think that with more specificity the patents would get easier but in fact with more specificity the patents have gotten more confusing.

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Because we've learned more and if of all the people and I was actually so pleased to hear this in a way because it's confirmation.

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Someone who did use the word although it wasn't specifically about antibodies but it was about the.

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How to say.

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Vaccine efficacy if you will was Malone and he actually used the word paradox and a.

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2021 video I think with Paul Catrell so this is issues known of course it would be known because.

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I believe Malone was on that red wine scene show because Malone is deeply familiar with this particular topic.

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But that's the story in a nutshell we know it's important because our connections have led us there.

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And unfortunately we have some people who've been reaching out to you more so than me in particular on this topic to help us out and that's where.

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Think the Lord Sam Eagle has come into the picture or just regular guy if you will.

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How is that for a start J.

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That's pretty good let me spin it back for everybody from a little bit to go over to the next step.

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There's a variety of reasons to think that as we move forward with our understanding of biotechnology.

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That it has become ever clear.

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That certain patents or let's say whole groups or categories of patents were based on science that has become obsolete.

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And the question becomes how does that really.

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How does reality in law or how does reality in patent space catch up with reality in academia or reality in the hospital or reality in the laboratory.

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And in the case of antibodies it seems that the way that antibody patents were granted before a certain time I don't know in the late 2015's 20's.

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There was a certain level of requirement that certain requirements that included I guess the you're supposed to be able to do whatever it is that's described in the patent.

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If it says your you know it's chocolate cake antibody then you should be able to read the patent and make chocolate cake antibody at your laboratory.

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And the question became how detailed were those explanations how specific was the target how specific was the result and as the biology became more high fidelity we found that this was wholly inadequate to describe what was happening.

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And this has resulted in of course potentially a huge problem because patents are some of the ways that value is stored in in big corporate organizations and and we have discovered ways through talking with other people of how these intellectual constructs

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which are vulnerable to the cutting edge science and are vulnerable in a real value sense because if they are tested and in a court of law someone is able to show that what they're based on doesn't specify enough of what is being made or what is being claimed

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then that patent will essentially be worthless and so the whole point of a patent being value is is your ability to monopolize that space based on your owning the patent and so if it's never tested or you for example have other players in the market with patents similar to yours

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and you all agree not to test each other's patents but help one another to enforce that no one else can get into that space that's one of the ways that these could be called them antiquated patents are used or extended in their life lifespan.

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So another way they can be extended in their life span or perhaps buoyed in their potential value is if they can be treated as a pool.

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So a regular guy welcome to the show thanks for joining us you wanted to come here and kind of clarify the idea of a patent pool and how in other other places in our society and in our culture in our economy.

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Patent pools have been used to spread technology through a sector or through a space you want to give us a one two three are you there.

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This is a regular guy check one yeah you're there thank you okay all right yeah so I try to pick up where JC left off I think it's helpful for me to back up a little bit and to kind of think fundamentally more

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fundamentally about what patents are I'm not an expert in patent law but I'm aware that patents are referenced in the Constitution and they have a long intellectual history that predates the founding of the

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of America and probably predates the establishment of the English colonies in America.

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And what patents were partly intended to do is to avoid the problems we had with Greek fire at some point we forgot how to make Greek fire this ancient technology so knowledge was being lost and the idea was that

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it was you know wouldn't it be a shame if every great invention were kept as a trade secret and nobody felt nobody felt free to tell the world that they had discovered.

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And so we long story short there's this social contract that we allegedly entered into around like the 1500s or something in England where we said okay if you disclose your technology to the world

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we'll give you a limited monopoly limited property right in it okay we're just going to now this is where the idea of intellectual property kind of comes you know has its origins because it's kind of a kooky idea how can you own an idea.

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Well the short answer to that is the government will force your ownership rights.

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The government will punish anyone that you know crosses your infringes on your property rights and so the government will just invent this concept called intellectual property and the government will enforce it.

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And so the government created these patents and they said okay have at it for I think that's 15 years it's a limited time it's not forever but for certain like the time you get a monopoly.

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You have an exclusive right to that idea to the use of that idea so you can an exclusive right is really just about telling it's the same idea is telling somebody to get out.

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You're saying get off my stop stop copying my invention stop using my idea and the government will come and enforce that for you.

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So there's that's supposed to be the the social contract there's supposed to be a disclosure and we're supposed to be able to learn from it and then you know after a period of time has passed 15 years or whatever we can all make generic copies of whatever it is that you invent it you only have 15 years to

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make money off of it.

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Now the way that I came to understand patents again not being an expert or even qualified to be an expert in patent law was more from an antitrust perspective which sounds really boring but antitrust for me is a really fascinating subject because

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the antitrust it's almost something cultural in us that we don't like big monopolies you know we seem to all intuitively understand that Comcast sucks right.

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Only if you know we only had one cell phone provider we all just we know it would suck right I mean we just know that.

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And and that's been ingrained in our our conscience since at least the 1890s when we passed the Sherman antitrust act.

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And that's just how we acted actually for a long time for the next 80 years or so we acted like you know if you were you were big if you were monopoly well that was bad we would break you up.

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So Alcoa aluminum break him up AT&T break him up.

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But something happened in the 70s and in the 80s there was a an intellectual hijacking took place driven by Milton Friedman and some people who were connected to him to cope with this problem they saw which was that companies weren't being allowed to become big enough.

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They thought hey why punish success maybe some companies are just you know maybe they should just be allowed to be big maybe there's and and I think there were probably some some.

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There's some corrupt ideas behind that movement but anyway this this way of thinking came to infect the way that the whole world well I shouldn't say the whole world but certainly the United States court systems and justice systems.

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Came to understand the problem so that now they no longer reflexively think that monopolies are bad or that giant companies are bad.

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You're supposed to be able to go and identify some harm to the consumer yada yada.

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And then you know as an antitrust lawyer nowadays your job is to find some excuse to accuse someone of violating antitrust law and it's very hard to do.

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The governments in the courts and made it very hard to accuse anyone to violating an antitrust law.

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But antitrust lawyers are always looking for ways to do it so it's like this uphill battle they're always fighting some some respects.

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And then to see patents being abused let's say within patent law there's a term called patent misuse and that's a big no no.

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Okay the rule with patents is that you can do whatever you want as long as it doesn't constitute patent misuse.

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And then there's like a bucket of things the constitute patent misuse.

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Well antitrust lawyers see all these things going on in patent law that there would be illegal in an antitrust context even in our permissive you know allowing big corporate even in our current permissive environment where we allow big corporations to do that.

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And so if you look at the literature on this you'll see frequent references to fights between patent lawyers and antitrust lawyers.

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And it's usually a turf it's usually framed in terms of a turf war.

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The patent lawyers are telling the antitrust lawyers.

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The Constitution says we get a monopoly monopoly by definition is just allowed you know this is a monopoly that's allowed to exist screw your rules whatever they are about monopolies because we got a monopoly from the government here for 15 years we're going to do whatever we want with it.

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And so that's kind of the attitude that they have about their business practices whereas antitrust lawyers trying to look at this stuff and say that boy that sure looks like price fixing that sure looks like you know you're trying to gain market power as it's a turn that they throw around market power.

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And then attempt to seek monopoly power.

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Now I'll cut to the what JC want to talk about which is patent pools now these patent pools are there's a case involving Phillips electronics from the like 1995 it's not a Supreme Court case.

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You're welcome to go read if you want but it it's it's for complicated reasons it's the law or it's the main controlling law in this it's sort of the Constitution as far as as far as these patent pools are concerned.

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And this goes back to the day when people still burned CDs you could get a CDR drive for your computer to go to the store and get a stack of blank CDs.

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And so compact disc or compact disc recordable that was like an industry standard.

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Okay everybody had to it didn't matter who made the drive it didn't matter what country it came out it could be made in China could be made in Malaysia could be made in America but it had to conform to this industry standard.

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And then the same was true of any of the discs that were that were made for this they had to conform to some industry standard.

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So what was happening was that companies were going to Phillips and they were saying well you know we don't need the whole we don't need to license all this technology from you we just need you know this one laser patent or something and then we'll go and make the rest of the device

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Ourself and Phillips was saying no if you want to if you want that patent you have to buy all these other patents.

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Now the best analogy I can think of here is let's say you really enjoy watching a breaking bad.

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I'm not saying I like that show but let's say you just like that show and you don't want to watch anything else on cable.

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You just want to get the network that it was an AMC that breaking bad is on.

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But then Comcast says we'll know if you want to get you want to watch that show you have to buy the gold package it's $99 a month.

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You know it includes all these other channels you don't want all this ESPN stuff you didn't want you just want to watch breaking bad Comcast is saying no you got to buy this package.

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So that's what Phillips was doing it was it was telling any company that wanted to get in the CDR game that they had to buy this pool of patents.

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And these and these other these these companies that were looking to make these products they were saying look that's that's any competitive behavior that's that's that's that's you know it's one company using its influence over the market to dictate.

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You know that everybody else has to use all these unrelated what they called non-essential patents patents that were not essential to making a CDR making a CD recordable.

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And so economists that had been trained now through by you know 30 40 years of brainwashing by Milton Friedman's accolades analyze this issue and they said well you know this doesn't really look harmful because you're not required to use the patents

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and well and it also frees you from any concern that you're going to be sued for infringement because you know if you if when you bought the Phillips patent if you also acquired the Sony patent.

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Then you know you you know you're in the all clear is Sony can't sue you for patent infringement you know even if you accidentally use Sony's technology.

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You know you don't have to use it you can use other technology and and for that matter Phillips could could just jack up the price and you know sell sell you know not sell you the package would be the equivalent of Comcast saying okay well just for

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you know we'll let you watch only AMC for $99 a month.

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And so the short of it is that this this practice became blessed.

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Now what's happened since then is that patent pools have been explored in a range of contexts and they've been utilized in a range of contexts and they're used with respect to setting industry standards.

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So I think where I'll end here is that maybe the easiest example I can think of and this is just hypothetical I haven't looked to see whether this exists but let's say you've got a patent on a strand of RNA and a patent on a delivery mechanism

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a lipid nanoparticle and they're both patents are owned set by separate companies.

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There are competitors to produce each of those products but these two companies form a patent pool and they effectively dictate the industry standard.

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And so all you really need at this point is one big patent one technology that one you know that that's really hot that the market's really interested in and you can package all this other shovelware along with it and what you end up with is effectively a cartel a group of

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companies ganging up and getting together and carving up the market and deciding how they're going to exercise this market power that they hope to establish by setting an industry standard.

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And so I think if you go and start looking at what's been said about patent pools and medicine and COVID therapies and all that just in the last couple of years, you'll find that there's been enormous interest in this.

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I think that's understating it and as you might expect there's competition you know to see who's going to get in who's going to get in the pool and who's going to get left out.

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Some of these are being run by international organizations like the World Health Organization.

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So if the World Health Organization is setting let's say an industry standard for a type of vaccine therapy.

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It's obviously to your benefit to have your patent included in the patent pool that the World Health Organization is selling because your patent even if it's not essential, even if it's not that great.

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It's you're still getting royalties off of it and it would be to your disadvantage of course to not to have patented technology that's not in that pool so I'll leave it there and I'll see if that gets things started.

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Who would have technology that would have maybe been in a patent pool or not in a patent pool and then when you weren't in a patent pool you might be pissed about it.

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Um, you mean like let's say for example the counter measures of the pandemic could have been one patent pool and if you if you made the cut then regardless of whether countries were using your patent you might still get some kickback from that.

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Yeah so I think if you if you imagine sort of a a perfect controlled environment where all the industry players are allowed to meet in a room and you know draw charts on a whiteboard.

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They might decide how you know they might come up with an estimate of how big the market is and how much they can get away with charging overall for the patent pool.

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And they're going to set a price. Now this is all this is all activity that would theoretically be illegal under antitrust law at some level, but it's it's not illegal for a patent holders to sit in brainstorm this stuff how they can set prices globally and they can do what's called price discrimination,

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where you charge a different price and for one level of consumer you charge lower prices in the developing world for example for your patents versus what you charge Americans okay that's called price discrimination.

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So they're allowed to come up with all these tactics in terms of how they're going to carve up the market and they'll come up with estimates of what they think the global market's going to be.

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And keep in mind too that I think most of these purchases are being made by governments and so you know if they have a commitment from a you know a European government to buy a certain amount of product it's probably you know they're probably going to pay.

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So I think they have probably a reliable sense of what their market is and how much they can get away with charging.

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And then they're going to apportion the royalties among the participants in the pool.

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I don't know how you would you what metrics they would use to determine how royalties would be distributed.

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But if you know there's there are no rules in essence and how they do this.

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There could be patents in the pool that have no value to anyone who's making the product okay these are called non-essential patents right.

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And there there have been arguments about whether it makes sense to allow patent pools to include all these non-essential patents or who should be allowed to determine what's

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which patents are non-essential and whether it matters.

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And you know the trend has been to just kind of say who cares there's no harm no harm no foul.

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That's that's the economists have been trained to look at it this way.

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It would take hours for me to explain why but they were enchanted with this Milton Friedman view of antitrust pushed through in the 70s and 80s that gave them a totally different

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perspective on this area of the law and how it should be understood.

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Now I think what I would be concerned about these days is what Mark brought up which is that some of these patents are kind of science fiction okay.

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The antibody patent paradox really illustrates this it was a paper that was pushed it was pushed through Yale law journal.

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I think February this year and then all of a sudden in May get cited by the Supreme Court kind of ridiculous.

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And the Supreme Court in one fell swoop.

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Well invalidated at least some antibody patents right there on the spot but also potentially invalidated other antibody patents that are premised on the same scientific theories.

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And so, you know, there's a question I think whether companies have been able to exploit the US patent trade office to get patents on science fiction in a sense.

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Okay.

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You know, if you watch JC's broadcast, you know, even I think just the other night, you know, there was an example of who's that fellow Vanden Bosch here at Vanden Bosch showing all these diagrams, giving these jumbled explanations of how things work.

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If you're allowed to push that through the patent system.

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If you're allowed to get it past US patent trade office and you're allowed to get it into patent pool and nobody is allowed to challenge it as nonessential.

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Who's, you know, who's in a position to do anything about it.

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Okay.

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Who's checking who are the gatekeepers.

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This most recent case in May, the Supreme Court acted as the gatekeepers.

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They said, no, we'll be the gatekeepers now that standard they use theirs is an old standard.

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They said that in order for patent, this gets back again to the original purpose of a patent.

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It's to it's to make information available to the public.

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I said, look, in order for the patent to be useful, somebody has to know somebody looking at it has to know how to make the end product.

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They use an analogy to somebody trying to patent a recipe for bread where they just say.

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Mix various starches with water at various ratios and see what you get.

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All right.

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They said that's too generic doesn't tell somebody how to actually make bread.

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Okay.

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And that's the analogy they drew.

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And they used lots of old, you know, 19th century examples involving telegraphs and whatnot to illustrate their point.

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They weren't really snowed by any of the new science behind it.

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And they kind of made that the standard.

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What that means, it's hard to say because it's too early, I think, to say.

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But certainly it had the effect of invalidating, you know, or I should say reducing the value of some of these antibody patents.

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You'd have to think.

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And maybe that's to the advantage of companies that were competing with these antibody patents.

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Maybe you have competing versions of science fiction narratives that are being pushed through the US patent and trade office.

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And, you know, once the US patent and trade office signs off on something and says this is a valid patent, well, it could be worth billions of dollars.

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And, you know, there could be investors on Wall Street.

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You don't really know anything about the underlying science, but they say, well, this looks like a good patent.

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They say it's going to cure cancer, you know, should be valid technology.

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And it could be that a lot of people are getting snowed.

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I myself can't find the gatekeeper who's checking any of this stuff.

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My hat's off to Mark for spotting this stuff because I wouldn't have known to look for it.

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Really just Mark was chasing down some rabbit hole on, you know, the Weinstein family and starts asking questions about patents and finds a paper on patent law.

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And, you know, weeks later, I'm kind of, I'm dizzy.

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Over.

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Yeah, the science fiction part is that's a good word to use the phrase that's repeated a few times in that document regular guy is the galactic level of the galactic range of antibodies.

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And just to be clear, antibodies are a protein.

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So many of these patents are actually overlapping with just just the ability to patent proteins in general.

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And with the more that is discovered about how proteins are manufactured via the ribosome and about how they work based upon a variety of holding and epigenetic conditions and so on.

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The more we realize, we don't know.

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It's a it's an endless loop.

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Yeah, at the same time, you have all of these companies, governments, NGOs that need to patent it.

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It's it's it's a real pickle.

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It's a real pickle.

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My take on it is, well, first of all, you need to, you need, you don't want people to know that there's so much mystery involved because that's not going to do a good job of getting people to adopt and try out.

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The technology and help in advance.

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So the patent in addition to the challenges of the company is protecting their own intellectual property.

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I suspect again, this is my own speculation.

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And I was here asked to agree with it is that things are being done in a way to sort of conceal how much is unknown to sell it, you know, to over sell it, if you will, with with more confidence, because there needs to be a lot more work done.

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A lot more data collected to potentially someday understand these nuances in greater detail.

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It's again, I'm sure different people have different spins on it.

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I've just reached the point where I think we're we're looking at issues which almost transcend money.

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These issues are just so big right now and there's just more money behind it than you can shake a stick at, really.

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Maybe it's expressed as, you know, different companies and profits and some revenue sharing and so on, but there's just more money behind this and more enthusiasm in ways that you can shake a stick at.

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So thank you. I think that's a fantastic summary over to you, Jay.

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So yeah, I'm, I'm still trying to digest the.

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The idea as antibodies as a patent pool or as countermeasures as a patent pool, rather, and other examples of a patent pool. So we had CDs.

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Well, let me let me maybe share something that that's that's contemporary that kind of gave me a chuckle.

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Oh, it says, I can't share screens.

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Oh, that's just me. That's not setting it right.

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But yeah, just on.

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You're protecting my privacy there.

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Yeah, regarding that the pool issue was I just had a couple of my notes here.

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You know, I would, I would think that patents should be written to, for some extent, be standalone.

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And if there's like multiple patents that need each other, they should be packaged together in a way. So is it?

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I can understand there's maybe some to perhaps some instances where there's interconnectivity, but to think that, you know, non essential patents also get thrown in, you know, like, you have to watch. You have to.

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You know, you want HBO Max, you need to get, you know, the 27 ESPN channels, even if you hate sports.

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I ended up that's that's a bit absurd.

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What are we looking at here? Letter to Mark.

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Hammer.

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Yeah, sorry, I'm trying to try to find the mute button there. So, okay, this is.

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This is a letter that was issued by the Department of Justice antitrust division.

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These are the people who are supposed to be in charge of criminal enforcement of antitrust laws.

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Somebody had asked them.

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You know, is it okay if we form a patent pool to develop a 5G standard, an industry standard for 5G.

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All right.

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This company called, I guess, a Vanshi. All right. I don't know who Vanshi is, but anyway, they asked for DOJ and analyze this.

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DOJ wrote them a very long letter.

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I can't.

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I won't pretend to really understand what a lot of this says, but the upshot of it is it says it's okay for you to do this.

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All right.

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Now, that prompted a letter that for some reason is available on SSRN.

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I don't know.

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Normally, when I open a PDF on SSRN, I don't expect to see by overnight mail and email at the top.

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But it's a group of people who are kind of upset about this.

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They don't like this letter.

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And they say, DOJ, you know, you're not really given this.

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You're not looking at this the right way. There's some real harm here.

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And they talk about the way this patent pool is set up.

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They have a problem with it and it's signed by all these people.

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We've seen this before, you know, where petitions pop up that have a bunch of, you know, famous people attached to them.

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But I think it leads off with, yeah, I don't know.

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All right. And then there is a response to that that was filed.

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Somebody else.

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These are former judges and academics who also are upset about this.

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Okay. They're arguing about the 5G standard and whether this should be allowed.

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Now, here we've got former general counsel, the federal trade commission, somebody at the Mercatus Center, George Mason University.

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And they're saying that here that this, you know, this patent pool is fine.

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Go ahead. Now, what's at stake here seems to be what gets established as the industry standard for 5G.

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Okay. If you can get, you can get this.

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I think if I'm reading this correctly, a company is trying to use this, create this patent pool and then use it to push.

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And it for that pool of patents to be adopted as the industry standard for 5G wireless in the United States, or at least one industry standard or competitor for the industry standard in the United States.

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And, you know, if you were, and the concern there is that what if you, if you have a pool of patents that becomes the industry standard, it means everybody's reliant on it to make that product at that point.

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And it can become, you know, in a sense, like a monopoly, like a cartel, like this thing we're supposed to fear, right?

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So I think the idea here is that with respect to medical therapies, there may be discussions about what constitutes an mRNA vaccine.

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Okay. What's the industry standard? Or what's the industry standard for, you know, a medical therapy, a cancer therapy that's called, you know, whatever, that's got a name attached to it, right?

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And then pharmaceutical companies may be allowed to tinker, but they at least have to buy the rights to these other ancillary technologies when they purchase the rights to make that particular pharmaceutical product.

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And so if the patent pool includes not just the RNA chain, but also a patent for the liquid nanoparticle delivery system, why would you then invest in your own separate liquid nanoparticle delivery system?

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We already own the rights to make this one. You're just going to make that one, right? And it's going to become the industry standard.

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It's going to become the one that people are going to use by default, or the company end users will use by default.

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It's the safest option because it saves you from any risk of being sued for infringing on someone else's patent.

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You already own the rights to the one in the patent pool, so you'll just use that.

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And so by getting your patent in the patent pool, you make it more likely that it's going to be the one that's taken up and used by the end user, which in this case is most likely a government health care system.

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And so in the case of the mRNA patents that were that were enforceable that at one point, Robert Malone was the owner of, but then long long ago was not anymore.

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Those were valid or still enforceable until like two years into the pandemic and then they became, they expired.

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Well, yeah, it's hard to say, you know, there's a statutory limit on the life of patents, which is 15 years.

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Okay.

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No, there is a narrow, like I said, there's certain things that have been considered construed as patent misuse by courts.

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And one of the rare occasions where the Supreme Court actually found that something was patent misuse was a case where a company tried to use

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a licensing agreement to effectively extend the life of the patent.

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So somebody who wanted to pay for royalties on a patent that was going to expire in five years, they would have a contract where they would continue to pay royalties for another five years after the patent had expired and became public domain.

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And the Supreme Court, the lower courts looked at this and said, who cares?

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You're just stretching out payments over a longer period of time and, you know, where's the harm?

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But the Supreme Court, for whatever reason, didn't like this, said it was that it was patent misuse because it tried to extend the life of the patent.

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Now, where this gets complicated is that there is scholarship coming out of one or two corners on how the use of private arbitration and private settlement agreements between firms to reach terms that would be illegal under other circumstances.

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And these could include agreements to extend royalty payments past the 15-year life of the patent.

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But, you know, these agreements could have non-disclosure clauses attached to them.

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There's no reason that you or I would know about them, right?

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So you can look at, I've seen patents where Robert Malone is listed as an inventor.

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And I haven't seen any that were filed or that were granted after 2007.

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So, you know, if I count up, I have to assume that those patents expired in 2022.

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But I don't know what could have happened in private litigation, you know, after 2007.

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For that matter, I don't know if the patents were ever worth anything.

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It may be that they were competitors.

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Maybe that they were picked up and that Malone was paid out on them.

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He could have made quite a penny off them.

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But, you know, it may have been that the royalties ran out in 2022.

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I'm trying to formulate this question here.

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If you have something you want to throw in, Mark, go ahead.

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Could the who and the U.S. or, you know, like, for example, would the FDA or the U.S.

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CDC have been in a especially advantageous position to put together us?

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I mean, if I'm trying to think how something like this could have been used to guarantee a more control over the pandemic response.

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Well, the patents are specifically designed to put money in the pockets of their owners.

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That wasn't the original idea.

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As I said, the original idea here was supposed to be about informing the public, right?

01:00:05.000 --> 01:00:15.000
Because the idea here is that if we don't allow, if we don't have patents, if we don't allow these intellectual property monopolies to exist,

01:00:15.000 --> 01:00:18.000
then everything will be kept as a trade secret.

01:00:18.000 --> 01:00:20.000
That's the fear.

01:00:20.000 --> 01:00:24.000
Everybody will keep everything as a trade secret and knowledge will never get spread.

01:00:24.000 --> 01:00:32.000
And so, but the patent holders themselves, they're not thinking, gee, how can I inform the public?

01:00:32.000 --> 01:00:39.000
How can I better advance mankind's understanding of molecular biology?

01:00:39.000 --> 01:00:45.000
They're thinking, how can I make the most money possible off of this?

01:00:45.000 --> 01:00:53.000
Now, if you can sell it to the U.S. Patent Trade Office, that gives it a stamp of authenticity that you can take to the FDA.

01:00:53.000 --> 01:01:04.000
Imagine trying to take an unpatented pharmaceutical product to the FDA and asking to do safety and efficacy testing on it.

01:01:04.000 --> 01:01:15.000
A lot of the complaints that you'll see about the FDA too, really relate to the length of time that these companies have to go through safety and efficacy testing.

01:01:16.000 --> 01:01:25.000
Because while that safety and efficacy testing is ongoing, the 15-year lifespan on that patent is the clock is ticking.

01:01:25.000 --> 01:01:36.000
So if you get a patent on a drug and it takes eight years to do safety and efficacy testing, you've only got seven years left on that patent.

01:01:37.000 --> 01:01:45.000
And so that can affect how companies end up pricing the drugs that come out of those patents or whatnot.

01:01:45.000 --> 01:01:58.000
But it's all about attracting money. At the end of the day, you want to convince people that this patent that you have is worth X amount of dollars because it cures this disease.

01:01:58.000 --> 01:02:08.000
It produces, in these case of the antibody patents, they were saying, it literally allows you to cure disease.

01:02:08.000 --> 01:02:23.000
And according to the article, by the way, that Mark brought to my attention, that was the time of February 2023, something like $150 billion a year industry.

01:02:23.000 --> 01:02:36.000
And you know that the revenues, maybe it was even profits off these patents were over $150 billion a year and growing.

01:02:36.000 --> 01:02:48.000
So if you can convince enough people that your science is legit, if you can launder it through the USPTO, then you can launder it through the FDA,

01:02:48.000 --> 01:02:58.000
and you can launder it through the World Health Organization, and you can launder it through MSNBC and the president of the United States.

01:02:58.000 --> 01:03:06.000
I don't know, is Robert Malone saying no.

01:03:07.000 --> 01:03:24.000
Speaking of the efficacy testing, and Jay and I talk a lot about this, is if the mRNA platform itself can be demonstrated or is generally understood to be safe and effective in and of itself.

01:03:25.000 --> 01:03:47.000
That would cut down, as you know, a significant amount of time and expedite the ability to maybe patent new things based upon that platform with the very least get it out to market without burning, potentially burning less of the clock, if you will.

01:03:48.000 --> 01:04:09.000
And the strategy that we've seen is, we see that there's a lot of emphasis being put on the protein or proteins that this platform is causing the recipients of it to produce via on the transfection itself.

01:04:10.000 --> 01:04:27.000
And plenty of individuals have suggested and put forth evidence that the protein that's produced is sometimes or oftentimes toxic in and of itself.

01:04:28.000 --> 01:04:36.000
Now, while that can be misconstrued as by some as the platform itself is is is the whole thing is bad.

01:04:36.000 --> 01:04:56.000
The reality is that if one can make the case that the virus was bad because of the protein and the transfection is only causing harm because it made a perfect copy of that bad protein, then the consensus has to be the platform works perfectly.

01:04:58.000 --> 01:05:07.000
It's a so it's a, I think a lot of people are getting baited into this and they don't realize what they are going to be acknowledging as a consequence of it.

01:05:07.000 --> 01:05:25.000
But perhaps the, you know, to add some credence to your statement of products and patents being pursued to to maybe expedite things expert to ensure that the clock isn't burned as new stuff rolls out.

01:05:25.000 --> 01:05:30.000
Perhaps this the standardized platform plays into that.

01:05:30.000 --> 01:05:49.000
You know, that's an excellent point because suppose that your patent pool is anchored by one fundamental patent that everybody wants like in that Phillips CDR case, I suppose Phillips was the, the owner of the patent that the people really wanted.

01:05:50.000 --> 01:05:57.000
They didn't want the Sony patent and the other whatever patents that came along with it.

01:05:57.000 --> 01:06:14.000
But that could shit. But if you've got a pool of patents, it could be that over time that that Phillips patent expires, but that there's another patent that's in the pool that's newer and that continues to drive the pool.

01:06:15.000 --> 01:06:34.000
And so you have a six. I don't, you know, and again, these are the kinds of practices that are discussed and hypothesized in things like the letters that I showed on the screen, which are current with written within the last year where lawyers are arguing with DOJ.

01:06:35.000 --> 01:06:46.000
You know, and who writes a letter to DOJ saying, wow, we really appreciate the analysis you did.

01:06:46.000 --> 01:06:59.000
Somebody wrote a letter to the government thanking them for doing such an academic sort of a letter to DOJ saying, thank you for your academic analysis saying that this patent pooling process is entirely lawful here.

01:07:00.000 --> 01:07:09.000
That's an odd thing to do. And it, and it, and it provoked an outcry. And so this is a, this is an, this is an oddly contested area of the law.

01:07:09.000 --> 01:07:16.000
The other thing I noticed too though, is that these, you know, hold on, hold on one second regular guy. Don't change the subject yet. Mark wants to ask some.

01:07:16.000 --> 01:07:21.000
I, well, when it's appropriate.

01:07:21.000 --> 01:07:37.000
Are these patent pools identified on the patent? I mean, is there like a section that says part of a pool, which also includes either patents or do you do you find out mysteriously by surprise? How would one inquire about how patent pools are constructed?

01:07:37.000 --> 01:07:40.000
That's a great question.

01:07:40.000 --> 01:07:49.000
As far as I know, you find out when you, when you go to buy the patent and you enter into discussions with the patent holder.

01:07:49.000 --> 01:08:04.000
He has to find what's in it. Right. Right. You have to go and try to license the product. Now, you know, I see, for example, the World Health Organization is trying to establish some sort of medicine's patent pool.

01:08:04.000 --> 01:08:08.000
Okay. So they want to have everything.

01:08:08.000 --> 01:08:14.000
You know, I suppose made made publicly known to any perspective buyer, but.

01:08:14.000 --> 01:08:32.000
And, and, and, you know, that's the kind of thing where the economist will get into arguments about, you know, whether it's good to have that level of transparency in the market, whether that should be a condition of participation in the market that you, you know, have that some kind of transparency

01:08:32.000 --> 01:08:38.000
or central registry. But right now, from my understanding, it's the Wild West.

01:08:38.000 --> 01:08:43.000
That's what it comes down to. But, you know,

01:08:43.000 --> 01:08:55.000
I think I would, I really am inviting is others to enter into the discussion because I'm, I'm an amateur.

01:08:55.000 --> 01:08:59.000
Well, you're an amateur. What does that make the rest of us?

01:09:00.000 --> 01:09:13.000
I mean, can we mention that? Can we mention the article or the author that you that we found when we were, we were trying to find somebody to read who had written about this?

01:09:13.000 --> 01:09:28.000
Is it? Oh, well, yes. You know, I guess if I'm going to, I'm not sure which article of this person's there are a couple of people that that I've stumbled across as I've, as I've looked into this.

01:09:28.000 --> 01:09:35.000
Now, one of them is an academic named Eric Hovenkamp.

01:09:35.000 --> 01:09:42.000
He, I don't know where he teaches right now. I think he may be at University of Southern California.

01:09:42.000 --> 01:09:48.000
For many years, he was located at Northwestern University.

01:09:48.000 --> 01:09:57.000
So he was sort of on the other side of the lake from University of Chicago where all this antitrust business was coming out of.

01:09:57.000 --> 01:10:06.000
You know, that, that, and, and Hovenkamp, it was, it was, it has, has for years really stuck out to me as knowledgeable about this.

01:10:06.000 --> 01:10:14.000
There's another Hovenkamp that also is an antitrust law professor at some law school. And I think that may be his father.

01:10:14.000 --> 01:10:22.000
I haven't tried to do that. Herbert Herbert. Yes. Yeah. I assume, I assume that father and son.

01:10:22.000 --> 01:10:30.000
I, I, I'm, I'm, you know, respecting their privacy there because I'm, I'm only interested in what they have to say as academics. Yes, I see.

01:10:30.000 --> 01:10:47.000
But to the extent that, you know, anyone's really, I think, putting out good, consistent, solid research, well written papers on, on the intersection of patent and antitrust law.

01:10:47.000 --> 01:10:55.000
That's Hovenkamp. Unfortunately, with respect to patent pools, the only work by him that I could find were really descriptive.

01:10:55.000 --> 01:11:11.000
I did find, I don't know if I can share a screen with a YouTube link or how I would do that, but a random video on YouTube put out by University of Pennsylvania.

01:11:11.000 --> 01:11:21.000
And if you just do a search or you pen patent antitrust law, you'll get this one that'll say lecture 20 patents and antitrust one.

01:11:21.000 --> 01:11:36.000
That's actually an excellent condensed introduction to, to this area of the law. And I'd be interested to know whether other people are really find it as engaging as I did.

01:11:36.000 --> 01:11:45.000
So, I, I learned all of this from, from a guy named Randy Picker.

01:11:45.000 --> 01:11:56.000
And Randy Picker didn't, he, let's just say his, his, his take on things reflected in institutional bias.

01:11:56.000 --> 01:12:12.000
He's closely affiliated with one school in particular. And so I didn't get an outside view of this area of the law until I started looking into this and seeing what people from other institutions had to say about antitrust and, and intellectual property.

01:12:12.000 --> 01:12:18.000
So, get there.

01:12:19.000 --> 01:12:30.000
What antitrust law per se violations. Less than 10 of 29 or that's not the right one. Less than 20. It's a lecture 20.

01:12:30.000 --> 01:12:36.000
I can, I can share my screen here. If it's not a problem.

01:12:36.000 --> 01:12:41.000
I don't know. Yeah. Okay. I see. Wait. Yeah.

01:12:42.000 --> 01:13:04.000
But it's a pretty, it's a pretty, I guess it's going to be pretty, pretty long or what 45 minutes. Yeah, 45 minutes. It's, it's, it's fairly academic. The thing is, I don't know a non academic way to bring somebody into how this area of the law is understood and analyze.

01:13:05.000 --> 01:13:15.000
I think it might be easier in some ways to think about it as something analogous to the housing.

01:13:15.000 --> 01:13:29.000
What the derivatives, you know, collapse that happened. Remember Michael Burries looking at these derivatives and says, you know, oh my God, there's a whole bunch of fraud and then they made the movie, the big short about this guy.

01:13:30.000 --> 01:13:47.000
Right. It may be that it really is a matter of somebody saying, Hey, there's a whole pool of patents being pushed here that, you know, are drawing all kinds of love from investors, but they all have a fundamental flaw, which is that they're based on science fiction.

01:13:48.000 --> 01:14:04.000
Science fiction that was laundered to the US patent trade office. Science fiction that they are hoping to, and, and, and once, and once it's been blessed by the US patent trade office, the FDA isn't going to question anything except whether it passes safety and efficacy tests.

01:14:04.000 --> 01:14:19.000
And so investors, you know, seeing this, who's in a position to really say whether a patent is pushing science fiction, right? I think it requires outside eyes and outside attention that, that, that isn't there.

01:14:19.000 --> 01:14:36.000
And I thought it was neat that the Supreme Court picked up on these antibody patents and, and, and, and, and, you know, notice that they had this little, well, flaw in them and potentially, you know, pulled a lot of money out of that $150 billion antibody patent market.

01:14:37.000 --> 01:14:47.000
It also occurs to me that, you know, there was a time when I heard about my monoclonal antibodies being a viable therapy for people who had COVID.

01:14:47.000 --> 01:14:55.000
And then I heard that, Oh, they're being pulled from the market. They don't work. Right. Vaccines weren't pulled from the market, but the monoclonals were.

01:14:55.000 --> 01:15:05.000
And then it's sometimes, sometime after that, we saw an article in Yale Law Review saying antibody patents have all these flaws in the science.

01:15:05.000 --> 01:15:13.000
And then the Supreme Court may of 2023 says, Oh, yeah, we see flaws in the science of these antibody patents.

01:15:14.000 --> 01:15:30.000
I don't hear it. You know, so was it did some did did was there was there a competing cartel of farmer companies that wanted to push a standard treatment for there for COVID.

01:15:30.000 --> 01:15:35.000
You know, that was, it was patented and could attract some some private sector investors.

01:15:36.000 --> 01:15:44.000
But, you know, it was competing with these mount monoclonal monoclonal antibodies and wanted to, you know, pull the wind out of the competitor sales.

01:15:44.000 --> 01:15:52.000
That's the question I have there. I don't know that we're looking at a situation where, you know, the good guys came to the rescue.

01:15:53.000 --> 01:16:15.000
Well, there we've had a lot of people tell us on our streams that there was a long standing desire to change from the quote unquote traditional methods of making vaccines and immunizations and and shifting more to these genetic based technologies.

01:16:15.000 --> 01:16:36.000
And so if you can imagine a scenario where the selection of the technologies that was going to be used during the pandemic was not a small decision, but actually a big one going forward into the future and, you know, what patents will be in the next one.

01:16:37.000 --> 01:16:45.000
What what what won't be in the next one and maybe monoclonal antibodies are something that were on the table originally.

01:16:45.000 --> 01:16:54.000
And then because of this ruling had to be removed were removed or as you said, cleared the way for newer technologies to step in.

01:16:54.000 --> 01:17:01.000
We heard Robert Malone the other day saying that he was applying for patents for combinations of repurposed drugs.

01:17:01.000 --> 01:17:23.000
And so these could have is there a possibility that that can you imagine that warp speed could have accelerated the patent approval procedure in order to, you know, rapidly get as many waiting or on the cusp of approval patents through so that they could be included in such a pool.

01:17:23.000 --> 01:17:31.000
I mean, I can see all kinds of weird games that could potentially be played because of the state of the emergency that was declared over.

01:17:32.000 --> 01:17:51.000
Yeah, I'm not in any position to know what was done, you know, behind the scenes and what two parties agree to privately to a contract for one party pays royalties to the other.

01:17:51.000 --> 01:17:57.000
There's no there isn't any reason why I would necessarily know about that.

01:17:58.000 --> 01:18:07.000
And for that matter, many of the companies that I see involved in biotech or small companies are not publicly traded.

01:18:07.000 --> 01:18:17.000
They're privately held so they don't have the same reporting requirements that a publicly traded company like Pfizer would have.

01:18:18.000 --> 01:18:26.000
So it's not clear to me what level of visibility anyone could gain into what's happening there.

01:18:26.000 --> 01:18:31.000
I think you'd have to speculate really you'd have to be in the game, right?

01:18:31.000 --> 01:18:40.000
You'd have to be a company trying to make a vaccine or trying to be available if I can get Robert Malone on a stream.

01:18:40.000 --> 01:18:46.000
Would you be available to help me, you know, keep the, keep the conversation sharp.

01:18:46.000 --> 01:18:49.000
No mark would be available.

01:18:49.000 --> 01:18:55.000
You know, I, I, I, I have to, I have to think about it.

01:18:55.000 --> 01:19:04.000
I don't know that I want to end up on Robert Malone's radar or be known to be known to him, but it's.

01:19:04.000 --> 01:19:12.000
And, and, you know, again, I'm not the best qualified person asked some of these questions. I think, I think really it would be helpful.

01:19:12.000 --> 01:19:20.000
To look up, you know, you can, you can go to the USPTO website and you can also go.

01:19:20.000 --> 01:19:26.000
There's a world international patent organization, WPI, WIPO.

01:19:26.000 --> 01:19:30.000
You can go to these websites. They're various services.

01:19:30.000 --> 01:19:36.000
You can go to government run and where you can search for patents and you can see who owns what.

01:19:36.000 --> 01:19:41.000
And it's interesting, I think, to go on there.

01:19:41.000 --> 01:19:48.000
If there's somebody, you know, you're curious about your reading and I've just started doing this in recent recent weeks.

01:19:48.000 --> 01:19:57.000
Following your show, JC, occasionally, I'll, I'll, a name will pop up on your show and I'll Google and, and I find, I do find patents.

01:19:57.000 --> 01:20:03.000
I do find these people listed as inventors on some of these patents on some of these databases.

01:20:04.000 --> 01:20:09.000
And so I think it would be helpful to know, you know, if there's some.

01:20:09.000 --> 01:20:15.000
Let's say, collusive behavior, because, you know, what antitrust law.

01:20:15.000 --> 01:20:22.000
And antitrust law isn't just about punishing monopolists.

01:20:23.000 --> 01:20:33.000
It's any monopoly-like behavior, which includes, you know, cartels that form and fix prices and, and behave like monopolists.

01:20:33.000 --> 01:20:38.000
And it's, it can be very hard to spot cartels.

01:20:38.000 --> 01:20:42.000
And what's funny about it, you know, you can do a Google search.

01:20:42.000 --> 01:20:47.000
There's a, for cartel theory, you'll see it as an actual Wikipedia page on cartel theory.

01:20:48.000 --> 01:20:57.000
But one of the things that Milton Friedman convinced us brainwash every economist in America to believe this about cartels.

01:20:57.000 --> 01:21:03.000
That no cartel can last forever, because inevitably someone will defect and undercut the competitors.

01:21:03.000 --> 01:21:13.000
In other words, there's an assumption that it's man's default nature to, to compete with fellow man, not to cooperate.

01:21:13.000 --> 01:21:18.000
And so at some point that will kick in, that competitive instinct in the cartel will, will fall apart.

01:21:18.000 --> 01:21:27.000
And so this leads to the conclusion that there isn't a real need to police against cartels because they sell, they self-destruct.

01:21:27.000 --> 01:21:31.000
Okay, think about like mutagenic death of a virus, right?

01:21:31.000 --> 01:21:36.000
It's just a matter of time before it peters out and becomes background noise.

01:21:36.000 --> 01:21:39.000
That sounds like a great strategy for cartels.

01:21:40.000 --> 01:21:51.000
Yeah, yeah, the thing is, if you ask these Milton Friedman acolytes, who again constitute 100% of economists in the West, probably in Western Europe for that matter.

01:21:51.000 --> 01:21:56.000
If you ask them, well, how long can a cartel last?

01:21:56.000 --> 01:21:59.000
They won't put a little time, you know, they won't tell you.

01:21:59.000 --> 01:22:07.000
And I've seen some, some, some pages that say, well, occasionally they can last decades or even centuries.

01:22:08.000 --> 01:22:25.000
You know, so this is, this is something that's always bothered me is that we don't police against cartels because even our regulatory agencies, our Department of Justice antitrust division, has it baked into its mind that cartels just self-destruct.

01:22:25.000 --> 01:22:27.000
And so you don't have to be on guard against them.

01:22:27.000 --> 01:22:39.000
But here's an area where patents can be utilized to form cartels with, and it totally protected, they're given a total loan.

01:22:39.000 --> 01:22:48.000
The Supreme Court, not the Supreme Court, but effectively the Supreme Court has given them a protective bubble in which to operate here.

01:22:48.000 --> 01:22:51.000
The Supreme Court is somewhat complicit in this.

01:22:52.000 --> 01:22:55.000
But I don't think it's going to get fixed through the legal system.

01:22:55.000 --> 01:23:02.000
If you, if you try to take this through the legal system, you'd have to engage in arguments with economists that you're never going to win.

01:23:02.000 --> 01:23:05.000
I think it really is more about looking at this.

01:23:05.000 --> 01:23:11.000
And that's because, and that's because you have to show that they're doing some societal harm with their monopoly.

01:23:11.000 --> 01:23:20.000
You have to show, well, under the current, under the dominant theory, you would have to show, first of all, that there's a harm to the consumer.

01:23:21.000 --> 01:23:22.000
Okay.

01:23:22.000 --> 01:23:23.000
To the, to the consumer.

01:23:23.000 --> 01:23:27.000
It has to be a consumer based analysis.

01:23:27.000 --> 01:23:30.000
Any harm that you describe has to be a harm to the consumer.

01:23:30.000 --> 01:23:35.000
It can't be a harm to a, another competitor in the market, another company who wants to do business.

01:23:35.000 --> 01:23:40.000
It has to be something, you have to show that it's harming the, the end user.

01:23:40.000 --> 01:23:49.000
And that's something that's very hard to do in the case of these patent pooling cases because the,

01:23:49.000 --> 01:23:54.000
the company raising the argument isn't saying, oh, you know, the consumer is being harmed.

01:23:54.000 --> 01:24:01.000
They're just saying, I shouldn't have to, they're, they're, they're, they're sort of assuming that if they didn't have to buy this pool of patents,

01:24:01.000 --> 01:24:06.000
it would cost much less to just buy the one patent, you know, that they want.

01:24:06.000 --> 01:24:12.000
And, and they're not, it's, when you can't allege a harm to the consumer, you don't really have a leg to stand on under current,

01:24:12.000 --> 01:24:18.000
under the dominant theory of law that governs any kind of antitrust question today.

01:24:18.000 --> 01:24:29.000
So your, your ability to allege that the consumer is being harmed by this cartel-like behavior by, by a, by a farmer, patent holders,

01:24:29.000 --> 01:24:31.000
that's a stretch.

01:24:31.000 --> 01:24:39.000
And I don't, and it's, it's really, I don't think, I mean, you know, again, I'm not qualified.

01:24:39.000 --> 01:24:45.000
I'm not qualified to even really, you know, get into some of this stuff, but it just doesn't look to me like it's a,

01:24:45.000 --> 01:24:47.000
it's a, it's a productive way to approach things.

01:24:47.000 --> 01:24:56.000
I do think it would be more productive to have some public examination of these patents because that's exactly what happened in that Yale Law Journal,

01:24:56.000 --> 01:25:08.000
the Anabani patent paradox, was that somebody, you know, purported lead to law professors sat down and, you know, examine these patents and said,

01:25:08.000 --> 01:25:13.000
well, lo and behold, these things are, you know, Star Trek science fiction.

01:25:13.000 --> 01:25:17.000
This is a, this is a head scratcher, you know, Yale Law Journal.

01:25:17.000 --> 01:25:21.000
And then three months later, it's cited by Supreme Court.

01:25:21.000 --> 01:25:33.000
Boy, you know, that, that was what it took in that case to get these anabody patents struck down, right, exposed for what they were.

01:25:33.000 --> 01:25:40.000
So I think, you know, that's, that's a, let's say you were to take that approach towards.

01:25:40.000 --> 01:25:52.000
But does that, does that look like to you more like machinations behind the scenes to feed a Supreme Court that's always looking to reign in power?

01:25:52.000 --> 01:25:59.000
Or do you think that looks more like somebody said, Hey, we need this because we're going to make this decision.

01:25:59.000 --> 01:26:04.000
And so then somebody wrote it knowing it.

01:26:04.000 --> 01:26:11.000
I, I, I, I, I, all I can say is that it was extremely well done.

01:26:11.000 --> 01:26:23.000
I mean, it was extremely well executed that normally, you know, somebody, normally if a legal academic wants to get something published, you know, the idea is that you're right at first.

01:26:24.000 --> 01:26:33.000
And then you shop it around the law journals and say, Hey, you know, can you please publish this because they're looking to, you know, they want something to put on their CV.

01:26:33.000 --> 01:26:39.000
And so, you know, Yale Law Journal is really aiming kind of high.

01:26:39.000 --> 01:26:45.000
You don't, you don't write an article and then go shopping it around and then go, Oh, golly.

01:26:45.000 --> 01:26:48.000
You're so lucky Yale Law Journal picked it up, right?

01:26:48.000 --> 01:27:02.000
And if you look at the Wikipedia page, I think there may be an entire page on just editors of the Yale Law Review, like a look at who's served as the editor of the Yale Law Review.

01:27:02.000 --> 01:27:04.000
There's a lot of names on there that you'll recognize.

01:27:04.000 --> 01:27:14.000
It seems to me that somebody that the people who wrote that paper had to know with some certainty that it was going to get run.

01:27:14.000 --> 01:27:19.000
And that particular law review, because, you know, it's like branding.

01:27:19.000 --> 01:27:21.000
They have to give it the seal.

01:27:21.000 --> 01:27:24.000
You know, Yale is, you know, been there.

01:27:24.000 --> 01:27:27.000
Are you saying, are you saying if I would have written 60 years?

01:27:27.000 --> 01:27:35.000
Are you saying if I would have written a law review and submitted it to Southern Illinois, it would have not been cited by the Supreme Court?

01:27:35.000 --> 01:27:41.000
Right, the Supreme Court, if they're going to cite anything, it's going to be a judge.

01:27:42.000 --> 01:27:49.000
You know, they don't like to, it's typically beneath the Supreme Court to cite something that's not a legal authority.

01:27:49.000 --> 01:27:50.000
Right.

01:27:50.000 --> 01:27:59.000
And journal articles are, you know, by and large, just kind of ignored, you know, some of them are intriguing.

01:27:59.000 --> 01:28:05.000
Sometimes they're useful as repositories of information, but you wouldn't have a judge.

01:28:06.000 --> 01:28:12.000
Certainly, you know, at the level of the Supreme Court citing, you know, law review article.

01:28:12.000 --> 01:28:27.000
But here, you know, in this case, since it was published in Yale, it's acceptable, you know, because who's going to, you know, who's going to argue with, you know, it's branding.

01:28:27.000 --> 01:28:29.000
It's branding is what it boils down to.

01:28:29.000 --> 01:28:32.000
You know, there's no brand of brand you can put on it.

01:28:33.000 --> 01:28:35.000
You know, it got cited.

01:28:35.000 --> 01:28:41.000
And the Supreme Court seemed to think it was, you know, very, boy, this is very intriguing thing.

01:28:41.000 --> 01:28:45.000
You know, thank God it got published three months before the Supreme Court wrote the decision.

01:28:45.000 --> 01:28:47.000
What fortuitous timing?

01:28:47.000 --> 01:28:54.000
Well, while regular guys putting more coins in the payphone marked, you want to, you want to chime in a little bit?

01:28:54.000 --> 01:28:55.000
I mean, it's kind of hard.

01:28:55.000 --> 01:28:58.000
I'm also just being kind of run over here.

01:28:58.000 --> 01:29:01.000
But, you know, it's hard when regular guys.

01:29:01.000 --> 01:29:03.000
He's working on the off the phone there.

01:29:03.000 --> 01:29:04.000
He's just talking all the time.

01:29:04.000 --> 01:29:06.000
It's hard for him when he's on the street like that.

01:29:06.000 --> 01:29:11.000
Well, I think there's only like two or three payphones like that left in all of Manhattan.

01:29:11.000 --> 01:29:20.000
So clearly that is at that that poor woman behind him is going to be pretty upset right now.

01:29:20.000 --> 01:29:26.000
I mean, I'm a little mentally burnt today.

01:29:27.000 --> 01:29:31.000
But yeah, this is what this is what happens when regular guy starts talking.

01:29:31.000 --> 01:29:32.000
We do.

01:29:32.000 --> 01:29:33.000
I'm sorry.

01:29:33.000 --> 01:29:34.000
No, no, no.

01:29:34.000 --> 01:29:35.000
We do tend to get.

01:29:35.000 --> 01:29:37.000
Mark, Mark, you started this.

01:29:37.000 --> 01:29:43.000
Mark, you are the reason you found that.

01:29:43.000 --> 01:29:53.000
You know, you went to, you had to find out who Brett Weinstein's parents were and you found out.

01:29:53.000 --> 01:29:57.000
And that got the ball rolling and had you not done that.

01:29:57.000 --> 01:30:02.000
It's one of those F around and find out moments, I guess, right?

01:30:02.000 --> 01:30:10.000
And then it was that coupled with, you know, JC's analysis of Weinstein's statements showing

01:30:10.000 --> 01:30:19.000
where he ducked and dove around certain topics, feigned ignorance, right?

01:30:20.000 --> 01:30:27.000
You know, you can, at that point, you're seeing, you can triangulate.

01:30:27.000 --> 01:30:31.000
And that's how I started to approach this.

01:30:31.000 --> 01:30:40.000
But then I had to go back and review stuff that I learned a long time ago, but never put to use.

01:30:40.000 --> 01:30:42.000
It was never relevant to anything I was doing.

01:30:42.000 --> 01:30:47.000
But it was something that at the time I studied very hard and took very seriously and learned

01:30:48.000 --> 01:30:53.000
from some, when I learned antitrust and when I learned about intellectual property,

01:30:53.000 --> 01:31:04.000
I learned it from people who were, at the time, dominant in, you know, let's say in that field.

01:31:04.000 --> 01:31:14.000
I'll end by saying that one of these days, I hope to inform the public about how Anthony Kennedy

01:31:15.000 --> 01:31:19.000
gave us the $1,500 iPhone.

01:31:19.000 --> 01:31:27.000
There's no reason that iPhones shouldn't cost $800 or $900, but there was a kink in the law

01:31:27.000 --> 01:31:33.000
that Anthony Kennedy ironed out for Apple in 2007 that allowed certain type of activity

01:31:33.000 --> 01:31:38.000
to take place that allowed them to set 60% profit margins on these products.

01:31:38.000 --> 01:31:40.000
And Samsung does it too.

01:31:40.000 --> 01:31:41.000
They all do it.

01:31:41.000 --> 01:31:43.000
And it's just due to one stroke.

01:31:43.000 --> 01:31:46.000
One little change in the law that happened in 2007.

01:31:46.000 --> 01:31:48.000
Anyhow, I'll leave it there.

01:31:48.000 --> 01:31:56.000
But I do hope to, you know, continue the discussion with the three of you and not dominate.

01:31:56.000 --> 01:31:57.000
You're never dominating.

01:31:57.000 --> 01:32:00.000
It's just funny because you're a fountain of information.

01:32:00.000 --> 01:32:08.000
And as you said or admitted, Marcus sent us both on this little trip that we never really intended to go on.

01:32:08.000 --> 01:32:13.000
And it's become much more interesting than we thought it would be.

01:32:13.000 --> 01:32:15.000
So thank you very much, Mark.

01:32:15.000 --> 01:32:16.000
Way to go.

01:32:16.000 --> 01:32:17.000
Yeah.

01:32:17.000 --> 01:32:20.000
I'm humbled by your dedication and your attention to detail.

01:32:20.000 --> 01:32:22.000
You know, that really.

01:32:22.000 --> 01:32:23.000
Likewise.

01:32:23.000 --> 01:32:24.000
Thank you.

01:32:24.000 --> 01:32:25.000
So to you.

01:32:25.000 --> 01:32:26.000
Yeah.

01:32:26.000 --> 01:32:27.000
Thank you.

01:32:27.000 --> 01:32:28.000
Awesome.

01:32:28.000 --> 01:32:29.000
Thank you.

01:32:29.000 --> 01:32:31.000
Thanks for setting this up, Jay.

01:32:31.000 --> 01:32:32.000
Yeah.

01:32:32.000 --> 01:32:33.000
Okay.

01:32:33.000 --> 01:32:34.000
You want to leave it there, guys?

01:32:34.000 --> 01:32:35.000
Is that good?

01:32:35.000 --> 01:32:36.000
I don't know really.

01:32:37.000 --> 01:32:41.000
I'm going to take a break off though for the evening if that's okay.

01:32:41.000 --> 01:32:44.000
Well, if you're tired, regular guy's tired, we'll do it again.

01:32:44.000 --> 01:32:47.000
You know, it looked like he's still fumbling with change there.

01:32:47.000 --> 01:32:50.000
So you might not have much time left on his call anyway.

01:32:50.000 --> 01:32:54.000
You know, yeah, I don't want to.

01:32:54.000 --> 01:32:58.000
I'm afraid if I go, I'll just ramble and go off script tonight.

01:32:58.000 --> 01:33:00.000
I'd rather have be prepared.

01:33:00.000 --> 01:33:01.000
It's perfect.

01:33:01.000 --> 01:33:03.000
I'm so glad you joined me.

01:33:03.000 --> 01:33:04.000
I'm so glad you joined me.

01:33:04.000 --> 01:33:10.000
I'm so glad Mark had had the chance to come to and keep up the good work and make sure

01:33:10.000 --> 01:33:13.000
you keep pinging me so I do my daily as well.

01:33:13.000 --> 01:33:14.000
Thanks, man.

01:33:14.000 --> 01:33:16.000
Thanks, regular guy.

01:33:16.000 --> 01:33:17.000
All right.

01:33:17.000 --> 01:33:18.000
Appreciate it.

01:33:18.000 --> 01:33:19.000
Later.

01:33:19.000 --> 01:33:26.880
Thanks, ladies and gentlemen, for joining me on this stream tonight.

01:33:26.880 --> 01:33:30.760
Just a little heads up.

01:33:30.760 --> 01:33:36.520
I noticed I read this thing called big by Matt Stoller and he's been writing about antitrust

01:33:36.520 --> 01:33:37.520
for a while.

01:33:37.520 --> 01:33:42.680
It's a little bit different kind of antitrust than with patents, although it wouldn't surprise

01:33:42.680 --> 01:33:48.760
me if there are patents involved in the Google and Amazon suits as well.

01:33:48.760 --> 01:33:52.200
I'm going to escape out of here.

01:33:52.200 --> 01:33:55.200
We're not going to do any of that stuff now.

01:33:55.200 --> 01:33:57.320
I don't think we're going to do any of that stuff either.

01:33:57.320 --> 01:34:01.200
We're just going to end it tonight because it's been a nice stream with Mark and a nice

01:34:01.200 --> 01:34:03.920
stream with a regular guy.

01:34:03.920 --> 01:34:13.120
Please don't forget that intramuscular injection of any combination of substances with the intent

01:34:13.120 --> 01:34:18.520
of augmenting the immune system is silly.

01:34:18.520 --> 01:34:26.560
And please don't forget you can go to giga-homebiological.com, you can go scrolling down and you can become

01:34:26.560 --> 01:34:34.160
a subscribing supporter, you can join us at soapbox, which is giga-home.bio.

01:34:34.160 --> 01:34:40.040
And if you feel the need, you really want to help us get bigger.

01:34:40.040 --> 01:34:44.880
You can also support my work there at that link, but it is not necessary.

01:34:44.880 --> 01:34:50.000
That's the way to help me is to share this work and share the message that a transfection

01:34:50.000 --> 01:34:56.080
must be stopped because they are trying to eliminate the control group by making this

01:34:56.160 --> 01:35:00.400
a widely accepted therapeutic that nobody questions anymore.

01:35:00.400 --> 01:35:03.120
And that's a terribly dangerous place to go.

01:35:03.120 --> 01:35:04.960
Thank you very much for joining me.

01:35:04.960 --> 01:35:06.960
I'll see you guys again tomorrow.

01:35:14.400 --> 01:35:15.400
Whoa.

01:35:17.600 --> 01:35:18.800
Sorry about that.

01:35:21.200 --> 01:35:23.200
Good night Pamela, good night Jeff.

01:35:23.200 --> 01:35:25.680
Good night Katniss, good night Lisa.

01:35:26.080 --> 01:35:27.440
Thank you guys for joining me.

01:35:27.440 --> 01:35:28.440
Good night Kristi.

01:35:28.440 --> 01:35:33.440
Good night Vimal, one, two, three, four, five, M, thanks for the links.

01:35:33.440 --> 01:35:41.040
Good night Moderna and Jason, Matt Z, crypto, AG, all of you guys are here regularly and

01:35:41.040 --> 01:35:43.200
I thank you very much for being here today.

01:35:45.040 --> 01:35:51.520
If I missed anybody, Fletch, Sue Spider, viewer number one tonight.

01:35:51.520 --> 01:35:54.800
Thanks for coming and Janet Reno, good night.

01:35:56.080 --> 01:35:59.680
Can we good night?