WEBVTT 02:30.000 --> 02:56.000 It is scheduled for 16 minutes next. 02:56.000 --> 02:59.000 It is going on French, British, it takes a few minutes. 02:59.000 --> 03:03.000 British, Italian, Japanese television. 03:03.000 --> 03:07.000 People everywhere are starting to listen to him. 03:07.000 --> 03:10.000 It's embarrassing. 03:14.000 --> 03:16.000 Where does this one come in? 03:16.000 --> 03:19.000 What better way for a swimmer to disappear? 03:19.000 --> 03:22.000 Uncle Stewart, why did you do it? 03:22.000 --> 03:26.000 Well, I guess he can explain it to the sheriff when he gets here. 03:26.000 --> 03:28.000 I bet you kids are starving. 03:28.000 --> 03:32.000 Zoinks, that's for me. 03:32.000 --> 03:35.000 Hey, what's this? 03:35.000 --> 03:38.000 Scooby Booze was here. 03:38.000 --> 03:40.000 The whole turkey? 03:40.000 --> 03:43.000 Gone? 03:43.000 --> 03:47.000 Scooby, here we go! 03:58.000 --> 04:22.000 Music 04:22.000 --> 04:25.000 Are we to understand that you are in the city of the ages? 04:25.000 --> 04:33.000 Good evening ladies and gentlemen and welcome. 04:33.000 --> 04:35.000 Oh wow, that came out wrong. 04:35.000 --> 04:36.000 Good evening ladies and gentlemen. 04:36.000 --> 04:38.000 Welcome to Giga On Biological. 04:38.000 --> 04:43.000 This is a high-resistance low-noise information brief brought to you by a biologist. 04:43.000 --> 04:48.000 It is the 30th of September, 2023. 04:48.000 --> 04:51.000 You don't understand Mr. Brown. 04:51.000 --> 04:56.000 We are still fighting this sculpted spectrum of debate. 04:56.000 --> 05:02.000 We are still fighting this limited spectrum of debate because it is not a matter of what is true, 05:02.000 --> 05:08.000 but it is perceived to be true that matters. 05:08.000 --> 05:15.000 And they are misleading our young right now and we need to fight for this now before it's too late. 05:21.000 --> 05:44.000 Music 05:44.000 --> 05:47.000 I think you can see the bricks at the back of the theater. 05:47.000 --> 05:52.000 The question now is how can we get our family and friends to see those bricks? 05:52.000 --> 05:55.000 It is really the question. 05:55.000 --> 05:57.000 I keep thinking out of my audio here. 05:57.000 --> 05:59.000 I am not going to be sure how to avoid that. 05:59.000 --> 06:02.000 It is on my phone. 06:02.000 --> 06:05.000 We are working so well. 06:05.000 --> 06:06.000 What is happening there? 06:06.000 --> 06:07.000 I don't know what. 06:07.000 --> 06:10.000 Maybe my voice suddenly cleared up. 06:10.000 --> 06:13.000 Wouldn't that be nuts? 06:13.000 --> 06:35.000 Music 06:35.000 --> 06:39.000 We are definitely somewhere in a science fiction movie that sure feels like it to me. 06:39.000 --> 06:41.000 Good evening ladies and gentlemen. 06:41.000 --> 06:44.000 This is Kigal and Biological Eye Resistance Low Noise Information Brief. 06:44.000 --> 06:46.000 Brought to you by a biologist. 06:46.000 --> 06:50.000 It is the 30th of September, 2023. 06:50.000 --> 07:01.000 And we are still trying to figure out the easiest way to throw people an intellectual light buoy so that they can start to tread water, 07:01.000 --> 07:05.000 start to get their head above water. 07:05.000 --> 07:10.000 Thanks to the people that are scrolling above my head there, we are able to do some of this work. 07:10.000 --> 07:17.000 And we are able to do this work through almost a year and a half with no other support at all. 07:17.000 --> 07:27.000 And so that is quite a list of comradery, quite a list of contributors, producers. 07:27.000 --> 07:32.000 It has been a long, long road. 07:32.000 --> 07:35.000 But we are here now. 07:35.000 --> 07:41.000 And I am very, very, very, very happy to be here with you tonight. 07:41.000 --> 07:43.000 Still discussing the Scooby-Doo. 07:43.000 --> 07:54.000 Although I think now the goal is to try and add a little more depth and breadth to the discussion with regard to what is really going on. 07:54.000 --> 08:02.000 Because of course we know I have said it many times, other people have said it many times, that it is about the data. 08:02.000 --> 08:04.000 But it is a little bit more than that. 08:04.000 --> 08:09.000 And I think you are all very well aware that it is a little more than that. 08:09.000 --> 08:12.000 These people have changed our minds. 08:12.000 --> 08:15.000 They have changed us how we think. 08:15.000 --> 08:18.000 And we have been characterizing this as the Scooby-Doo. 08:18.000 --> 08:26.000 And in so doing, we are trying to find a way to bring people to understand, am I talking to the wrong camera? 08:26.000 --> 08:33.000 We are trying to find people, trying to find a way to get people to understand what has been done to us. 08:33.000 --> 08:39.000 And how it is not just people lying or people leaking documents. 08:39.000 --> 08:49.000 It is really bad guys with a complex plan so that even if you figured it out, you would actually still be trapped. 08:49.000 --> 08:51.000 And that is what this Scooby-Doo is all about. 08:51.000 --> 08:54.000 I think people have been co-opted into it. 08:54.000 --> 09:05.000 And one of the easiest ways to see through the fog is to listen for the voices that are actually saying that transfection is not immunization. 09:05.000 --> 09:16.000 Even harder to hear are voices that are saying that intramuscular injection of any combination of substances with the intent of augmenting the immune system is dumb. 09:16.000 --> 09:23.000 But I do think that there are going to be more and more people saying that as we move into the future. 09:23.000 --> 09:29.000 And so this has been the people map I've been playing with for quite some time. 09:29.000 --> 09:36.000 If you just highlight the people who have recently said that the whole vaccine schedule might be worth questioning. 09:36.000 --> 09:46.000 It's a crazy number of people that come up including actually nurse Erin because she started an anti-vax group in Florida before the pandemic even started her. 09:46.000 --> 09:48.000 Did she start two of them? 09:48.000 --> 09:52.000 Peter McCullough has come out very vocally about this. 09:52.000 --> 10:02.000 Of course you know that Robert F. Kennedy Jr.'s vaccine stance is that he wants them tested against the placebo so it's not exactly against the schedule. 10:02.000 --> 10:10.000 Of course if he used to talk frankly about it I think he'd probably be very much against it but it's the lawyer that you hear talking all the time. 10:10.000 --> 10:19.000 Steve Kirsch has been parading around data from Amish communities and so it's not that nobody's questioning this stuff. 10:19.000 --> 10:24.000 It's just that they have an interesting stance on the faith. 10:24.000 --> 10:35.000 And that faith is that there was a novel virus that we had to do something that the mRNA might have helped a lot of people and this could come again because you know gain of function viruses are real. 10:36.000 --> 10:45.000 And it's easy to come out against the childhood schedule in a not so vocal or kind of conservative kook sort of way. 10:48.000 --> 10:55.000 If you don't question the faith we can still keep them amplified and so I'm still quite skeptical and I need, we need... 10:55.000 --> 11:18.000 So tonight I'm just going to prep this by saying that I think the thing that Mark Koolack has brought to, there he is, has brought to the scene and really brought in the last, I don't know how many months it's been now, 11:19.000 --> 11:32.000 is this sudden understanding of this intellectual property space and the interest in it going forward through the pandemic. 11:32.000 --> 11:40.000 We've always been interested in we, I say, in the general we and I've only joined that general we in the last two years. 11:40.000 --> 11:55.000 We've always been interested in the legal space surrounding the vaccination schedule and vaccines and the legal risk allocation of vaccines onto the taxpayer. 11:56.000 --> 12:08.000 We've been talking recently about how that may set up a conflict of interest for the lawyers that use that system to never challenge it as a violation of our Seventh Amendment and regular courts. 12:08.000 --> 12:36.000 And so that's where we were kind of last time and we still want to explore and we hinted at exploring this thing that Mark had found which is the antibody patent paradox which in broad terms I want to leave to Mark but tonight again we have a special guest regular guy he doesn't have Sam the Eagle anymore but that's okay we still have the same fellow. 12:37.000 --> 12:56.000 Welcome regular guy welcome Mark if you could just give us a broad introduction to the antibody patent paradox you know as broad as you can without you know and then we'll kick it over to regular guy and he'll open up about what what makes it interesting with regard to patent pools 12:56.000 --> 13:03.000 and then I think we'll have to have to cut it short because we'll already have talked for four hours go ahead Mark good to see you my friend. 13:03.000 --> 13:08.000 Oh you're mute. 13:08.000 --> 13:09.000 Can you hear me okay. 13:09.000 --> 13:10.000 I can hear you. 13:10.000 --> 13:13.000 First of all this is a new hat I'm wearing. 13:13.000 --> 13:18.000 Oh wow it says oh that's sweet you satanic live that is awesome. 13:18.000 --> 13:28.000 Yes if they from a show fan just received it from the last week hand made for the old school sewing machine. 13:28.000 --> 13:42.000 You know who you are who you sent this in I'll just say it's from Jay not John but another fan first initial Jay and so I'm donning it tonight so cool thank you thank you. 13:43.000 --> 13:50.000 So I'm not a patent expert not really a lawyer okay. 13:50.000 --> 14:05.000 The way that I come to the conclusion or the way I got I am guided when I do research is to what's important is connections and correlations. 14:06.000 --> 14:19.000 For example if there are some people who are highly visible highly successful you know lots of connections to critical companies that are involved. 14:19.000 --> 14:29.000 And then they seem to have multiple associations with other people or particular legal disputes or some technology. 14:29.000 --> 14:35.000 The more links you see the more it will I allow that to guide me to something that's important. 14:35.000 --> 14:43.000 So I've always thought the whole patent law was this kind of bizarre I'm sure it's loaded with problems. 14:44.000 --> 15:00.000 And it was in fact your people map Jay and and us asking the question okay so why why Brett Weinstein why is Brett Weinstein in the position that he's in. 15:00.000 --> 15:09.000 And that always leads to well you know maybe they were had some phenomenal achievement throughout their career. 15:10.000 --> 15:23.000 You go to the Wikipedia page you go okay father's not there etc and then you start digging and then we realized that his father had a very influential role first patent attorney hired United States Department of Justice antitrust division. 15:23.000 --> 15:27.000 1962 pointed by John of Kennedy. 15:27.000 --> 15:34.000 And then as you showed it was in 2021 I think that Weinstein Brett Weinstein. 15:35.000 --> 15:40.000 Had RFK junior on as a guest and didn't even release it for a year. 15:40.000 --> 15:43.000 And strangely enough that it didn't even come up. 15:43.000 --> 15:45.000 You know I mean if I had a. 15:45.000 --> 15:48.000 A dear relative especially father who was appointed. 15:48.000 --> 15:57.000 By my guests uncle to a top role I would be I would be I would be so eager to say I cut them off right. 15:58.000 --> 16:09.000 Anyways what this led to was digging in through the history of Brett Weinstein's father also had something to do with why Eric Weinstein got to where he is. 16:09.000 --> 16:15.000 And you go through the cases and then one thing leads to next and you go okay so there's this. 16:15.000 --> 16:23.000 This center core company which was a one of the first companies into monoclonal antibodies. 16:24.000 --> 16:34.000 And how it all connects to a very large white paper that's heavily has been heavily promoted before we even knew about it and is now being cited by the United States Supreme Court. 16:34.000 --> 16:47.000 So it's the connections and the evidence out there that basically I did we just listened to it and it says this is really blank important and that's it. 16:47.000 --> 16:54.000 And then from there it's like okay we need to understand why we need to find some experts to help us figure this out. 16:54.000 --> 17:03.000 So we know things that are important before we even understand why we allow that to guide us. 17:03.000 --> 17:09.000 And then one thing leads to next and then you just find a wealth of other connections and people connected to it. 17:09.000 --> 17:21.000 But in the long the antibody patents if you will started before the technology even existed to describe them in almost any way whatsoever. 17:21.000 --> 17:30.000 So they were very, very loosely defined patents that were almost based more on function before they could describe them. 17:30.000 --> 17:37.000 So clearly certainly before they could have Chris use x ray crystallography and make a little models of them. 17:37.000 --> 17:43.000 Much was unknown about the immune system then much is still unknown about the immune system now matter of fact. 17:43.000 --> 17:49.000 So as technology has advanced to model and to understand these things. 17:49.000 --> 17:54.000 The ability to now create patents with more specificity is there. 17:54.000 --> 18:03.000 And as the patents get more specific more and more patent issues start coming up and and complaints and what has been discovered. 18:03.000 --> 18:11.000 And this is my interpretation of it is that the it's been realized that there is there's almost no. 18:11.000 --> 18:21.000 We used to think of the world as like a series of antibodies and they have different functions and as it's turned out there's almost a galactic range of different antibodies. 18:21.000 --> 18:31.000 Which can be unique to the the the foreign contaminants or molecule of the body's dealing with it can be unique to someone's own DNA. 18:31.000 --> 18:37.000 It can be unique to that we don't know there's so many and there's different structures which can do the same thing. 18:37.000 --> 18:40.000 And then sometimes the same structures do different things in different people. 18:40.000 --> 18:44.000 How do you make patents for this and even more so. 18:44.000 --> 18:47.000 How do you. 18:47.000 --> 18:55.000 You don't want everyone to know this because this breaks down every rule about virology which has been taught. 18:55.000 --> 18:59.000 Over the last time 50 plus years. 18:59.000 --> 19:07.000 So it exposes a lot of fraudulent thinking in the process also exposes potentially as you mentioned earlier Jay. 19:07.000 --> 19:21.000 The need to have a big data agenda over the next generation perhaps to to collect more data and to maybe reverse engineer and understand these things in great detail so. 19:21.000 --> 19:30.000 With you would think that with more specificity the patents would get easier but in fact with more specificity the patents have gotten more confusing. 19:31.000 --> 19:40.000 Because we've learned more and if of all the people and I was actually so pleased to hear this in a way because it's confirmation. 19:40.000 --> 19:46.000 Someone who did use the word although it wasn't specifically about antibodies but it was about the. 19:46.000 --> 19:50.000 How to say. 19:50.000 --> 19:56.000 Vaccine efficacy if you will was Malone and he actually used the word paradox and a. 19:56.000 --> 20:02.000 2021 video I think with Paul Catrell so this is issues known of course it would be known because. 20:02.000 --> 20:09.000 I believe Malone was on that red wine scene show because Malone is deeply familiar with this particular topic. 20:09.000 --> 20:15.000 But that's the story in a nutshell we know it's important because our connections have led us there. 20:15.000 --> 20:25.000 And unfortunately we have some people who've been reaching out to you more so than me in particular on this topic to help us out and that's where. 20:25.000 --> 20:33.000 Think the Lord Sam Eagle has come into the picture or just regular guy if you will. 20:33.000 --> 20:36.000 How is that for a start J. 20:36.000 --> 20:44.000 That's pretty good let me spin it back for everybody from a little bit to go over to the next step. 20:44.000 --> 20:52.000 There's a variety of reasons to think that as we move forward with our understanding of biotechnology. 20:52.000 --> 20:55.000 That it has become ever clear. 20:55.000 --> 21:06.000 That certain patents or let's say whole groups or categories of patents were based on science that has become obsolete. 21:06.000 --> 21:11.000 And the question becomes how does that really. 21:11.000 --> 21:26.000 How does reality in law or how does reality in patent space catch up with reality in academia or reality in the hospital or reality in the laboratory. 21:26.000 --> 21:41.000 And in the case of antibodies it seems that the way that antibody patents were granted before a certain time I don't know in the late 2015's 20's. 21:41.000 --> 21:56.000 There was a certain level of requirement that certain requirements that included I guess the you're supposed to be able to do whatever it is that's described in the patent. 21:56.000 --> 22:07.000 If it says your you know it's chocolate cake antibody then you should be able to read the patent and make chocolate cake antibody at your laboratory. 22:07.000 --> 22:24.000 And the question became how detailed were those explanations how specific was the target how specific was the result and as the biology became more high fidelity we found that this was wholly inadequate to describe what was happening. 22:25.000 --> 22:49.000 And this has resulted in of course potentially a huge problem because patents are some of the ways that value is stored in in big corporate organizations and and we have discovered ways through talking with other people of how these intellectual constructs 22:49.000 --> 23:09.000 which are vulnerable to the cutting edge science and are vulnerable in a real value sense because if they are tested and in a court of law someone is able to show that what they're based on doesn't specify enough of what is being made or what is being claimed 23:09.000 --> 23:30.000 then that patent will essentially be worthless and so the whole point of a patent being value is is your ability to monopolize that space based on your owning the patent and so if it's never tested or you for example have other players in the market with patents similar to yours 23:30.000 --> 23:52.000 and you all agree not to test each other's patents but help one another to enforce that no one else can get into that space that's one of the ways that these could be called them antiquated patents are used or extended in their life lifespan. 23:53.000 --> 24:04.000 So another way they can be extended in their life span or perhaps buoyed in their potential value is if they can be treated as a pool. 24:04.000 --> 24:21.000 So a regular guy welcome to the show thanks for joining us you wanted to come here and kind of clarify the idea of a patent pool and how in other other places in our society and in our culture in our economy. 24:21.000 --> 24:32.000 Patent pools have been used to spread technology through a sector or through a space you want to give us a one two three are you there. 24:33.000 --> 24:56.000 This is a regular guy check one yeah you're there thank you okay all right yeah so I try to pick up where JC left off I think it's helpful for me to back up a little bit and to kind of think fundamentally more 24:56.000 --> 25:15.000 fundamentally about what patents are I'm not an expert in patent law but I'm aware that patents are referenced in the Constitution and they have a long intellectual history that predates the founding of the 25:16.000 --> 25:23.000 of America and probably predates the establishment of the English colonies in America. 25:25.000 --> 25:42.000 And what patents were partly intended to do is to avoid the problems we had with Greek fire at some point we forgot how to make Greek fire this ancient technology so knowledge was being lost and the idea was that 25:43.000 --> 25:53.000 it was you know wouldn't it be a shame if every great invention were kept as a trade secret and nobody felt nobody felt free to tell the world that they had discovered. 25:54.000 --> 26:11.000 And so we long story short there's this social contract that we allegedly entered into around like the 1500s or something in England where we said okay if you disclose your technology to the world 26:12.000 --> 26:28.000 we'll give you a limited monopoly limited property right in it okay we're just going to now this is where the idea of intellectual property kind of comes you know has its origins because it's kind of a kooky idea how can you own an idea. 26:29.000 --> 26:37.000 Well the short answer to that is the government will force your ownership rights. 26:38.000 --> 26:51.000 The government will punish anyone that you know crosses your infringes on your property rights and so the government will just invent this concept called intellectual property and the government will enforce it. 26:52.000 --> 27:05.000 And so the government created these patents and they said okay have at it for I think that's 15 years it's a limited time it's not forever but for certain like the time you get a monopoly. 27:07.000 --> 27:20.000 You have an exclusive right to that idea to the use of that idea so you can an exclusive right is really just about telling it's the same idea is telling somebody to get out. 27:22.000 --> 27:32.000 You're saying get off my stop stop copying my invention stop using my idea and the government will come and enforce that for you. 27:33.000 --> 27:37.000 So there's that's supposed to be the the social contract there's supposed to be a disclosure and we're supposed to be able to learn from it and then you know after a period of time has passed 15 years or whatever we can all make generic copies of whatever it is that you invent it you only have 15 years to 27:51.000 --> 27:52.000 make money off of it. 27:52.000 --> 28:12.000 Now the way that I came to understand patents again not being an expert or even qualified to be an expert in patent law was more from an antitrust perspective which sounds really boring but antitrust for me is a really fascinating subject because 28:12.000 --> 28:25.000 the antitrust it's almost something cultural in us that we don't like big monopolies you know we seem to all intuitively understand that Comcast sucks right. 28:27.000 --> 28:34.000 Only if you know we only had one cell phone provider we all just we know it would suck right I mean we just know that. 28:35.000 --> 28:44.000 And and that's been ingrained in our our conscience since at least the 1890s when we passed the Sherman antitrust act. 28:45.000 --> 28:56.000 And that's just how we acted actually for a long time for the next 80 years or so we acted like you know if you were you were big if you were monopoly well that was bad we would break you up. 28:56.000 --> 29:00.000 So Alcoa aluminum break him up AT&T break him up. 29:01.000 --> 29:22.000 But something happened in the 70s and in the 80s there was a an intellectual hijacking took place driven by Milton Friedman and some people who were connected to him to cope with this problem they saw which was that companies weren't being allowed to become big enough. 29:23.000 --> 29:34.000 They thought hey why punish success maybe some companies are just you know maybe they should just be allowed to be big maybe there's and and I think there were probably some some. 29:35.000 --> 29:51.000 There's some corrupt ideas behind that movement but anyway this this way of thinking came to infect the way that the whole world well I shouldn't say the whole world but certainly the United States court systems and justice systems. 29:51.000 --> 29:59.000 Came to understand the problem so that now they no longer reflexively think that monopolies are bad or that giant companies are bad. 30:00.000 --> 30:06.000 You're supposed to be able to go and identify some harm to the consumer yada yada. 30:07.000 --> 30:16.000 And then you know as an antitrust lawyer nowadays your job is to find some excuse to accuse someone of violating antitrust law and it's very hard to do. 30:17.000 --> 30:22.000 The governments in the courts and made it very hard to accuse anyone to violating an antitrust law. 30:24.000 --> 30:30.000 But antitrust lawyers are always looking for ways to do it so it's like this uphill battle they're always fighting some some respects. 30:31.000 --> 30:42.000 And then to see patents being abused let's say within patent law there's a term called patent misuse and that's a big no no. 30:43.000 --> 30:49.000 Okay the rule with patents is that you can do whatever you want as long as it doesn't constitute patent misuse. 30:50.000 --> 30:54.000 And then there's like a bucket of things the constitute patent misuse. 30:55.000 --> 31:11.000 Well antitrust lawyers see all these things going on in patent law that there would be illegal in an antitrust context even in our permissive you know allowing big corporate even in our current permissive environment where we allow big corporations to do that. 31:13.000 --> 31:20.000 And so if you look at the literature on this you'll see frequent references to fights between patent lawyers and antitrust lawyers. 31:21.000 --> 31:25.000 And it's usually a turf it's usually framed in terms of a turf war. 31:26.000 --> 31:31.000 The patent lawyers are telling the antitrust lawyers. 31:32.000 --> 31:51.000 The Constitution says we get a monopoly monopoly by definition is just allowed you know this is a monopoly that's allowed to exist screw your rules whatever they are about monopolies because we got a monopoly from the government here for 15 years we're going to do whatever we want with it. 31:52.000 --> 32:11.000 And so that's kind of the attitude that they have about their business practices whereas antitrust lawyers trying to look at this stuff and say that boy that sure looks like price fixing that sure looks like you know you're trying to gain market power as it's a turn that they throw around market power. 32:12.000 --> 32:14.000 And then attempt to seek monopoly power. 32:14.000 --> 32:32.000 Now I'll cut to the what JC want to talk about which is patent pools now these patent pools are there's a case involving Phillips electronics from the like 1995 it's not a Supreme Court case. 32:32.000 --> 32:49.000 You're welcome to go read if you want but it it's it's for complicated reasons it's the law or it's the main controlling law in this it's sort of the Constitution as far as as far as these patent pools are concerned. 32:50.000 --> 32:57.000 And this goes back to the day when people still burned CDs you could get a CDR drive for your computer to go to the store and get a stack of blank CDs. 32:57.000 --> 33:04.000 And so compact disc or compact disc recordable that was like an industry standard. 33:04.000 --> 33:22.000 Okay everybody had to it didn't matter who made the drive it didn't matter what country it came out it could be made in China could be made in Malaysia could be made in America but it had to conform to this industry standard. 33:22.000 --> 33:29.000 And then the same was true of any of the discs that were that were made for this they had to conform to some industry standard. 33:29.000 --> 33:48.000 So what was happening was that companies were going to Phillips and they were saying well you know we don't need the whole we don't need to license all this technology from you we just need you know this one laser patent or something and then we'll go and make the rest of the device 33:49.000 --> 33:56.000 Ourself and Phillips was saying no if you want to if you want that patent you have to buy all these other patents. 33:56.000 --> 34:06.000 Now the best analogy I can think of here is let's say you really enjoy watching a breaking bad. 34:06.000 --> 34:12.000 I'm not saying I like that show but let's say you just like that show and you don't want to watch anything else on cable. 34:13.000 --> 34:17.000 You just want to get the network that it was an AMC that breaking bad is on. 34:17.000 --> 34:25.000 But then Comcast says we'll know if you want to get you want to watch that show you have to buy the gold package it's $99 a month. 34:25.000 --> 34:35.000 You know it includes all these other channels you don't want all this ESPN stuff you didn't want you just want to watch breaking bad Comcast is saying no you got to buy this package. 34:35.000 --> 34:45.000 So that's what Phillips was doing it was it was telling any company that wanted to get in the CDR game that they had to buy this pool of patents. 34:45.000 --> 34:59.000 And these and these other these these companies that were looking to make these products they were saying look that's that's any competitive behavior that's that's that's that's you know it's one company using its influence over the market to dictate. 35:00.000 --> 35:11.000 You know that everybody else has to use all these unrelated what they called non-essential patents patents that were not essential to making a CDR making a CD recordable. 35:11.000 --> 35:28.000 And so economists that had been trained now through by you know 30 40 years of brainwashing by Milton Friedman's accolades analyze this issue and they said well you know this doesn't really look harmful because you're not required to use the patents 35:28.000 --> 35:40.000 and well and it also frees you from any concern that you're going to be sued for infringement because you know if you if when you bought the Phillips patent if you also acquired the Sony patent. 35:40.000 --> 35:51.000 Then you know you you know you're in the all clear is Sony can't sue you for patent infringement you know even if you accidentally use Sony's technology. 35:51.000 --> 36:05.000 You know you don't have to use it you can use other technology and and for that matter Phillips could could just jack up the price and you know sell sell you know not sell you the package would be the equivalent of Comcast saying okay well just for 36:05.000 --> 36:10.000 you know we'll let you watch only AMC for $99 a month. 36:11.000 --> 36:16.000 And so the short of it is that this this practice became blessed. 36:16.000 --> 36:30.000 Now what's happened since then is that patent pools have been explored in a range of contexts and they've been utilized in a range of contexts and they're used with respect to setting industry standards. 36:30.000 --> 36:50.000 So I think where I'll end here is that maybe the easiest example I can think of and this is just hypothetical I haven't looked to see whether this exists but let's say you've got a patent on a strand of RNA and a patent on a delivery mechanism 36:50.000 --> 36:57.000 a lipid nanoparticle and they're both patents are owned set by separate companies. 36:57.000 --> 37:09.000 There are competitors to produce each of those products but these two companies form a patent pool and they effectively dictate the industry standard. 37:10.000 --> 37:30.000 And so all you really need at this point is one big patent one technology that one you know that that's really hot that the market's really interested in and you can package all this other shovelware along with it and what you end up with is effectively a cartel a group of 37:30.000 --> 37:42.000 companies ganging up and getting together and carving up the market and deciding how they're going to exercise this market power that they hope to establish by setting an industry standard. 37:42.000 --> 37:56.000 And so I think if you go and start looking at what's been said about patent pools and medicine and COVID therapies and all that just in the last couple of years, you'll find that there's been enormous interest in this. 37:57.000 --> 38:08.000 I think that's understating it and as you might expect there's competition you know to see who's going to get in who's going to get in the pool and who's going to get left out. 38:08.000 --> 38:13.000 Some of these are being run by international organizations like the World Health Organization. 38:13.000 --> 38:19.000 So if the World Health Organization is setting let's say an industry standard for a type of vaccine therapy. 38:20.000 --> 38:33.000 It's obviously to your benefit to have your patent included in the patent pool that the World Health Organization is selling because your patent even if it's not essential, even if it's not that great. 38:33.000 --> 38:48.000 It's you're still getting royalties off of it and it would be to your disadvantage of course to not to have patented technology that's not in that pool so I'll leave it there and I'll see if that gets things started. 38:48.000 --> 38:59.000 Who would have technology that would have maybe been in a patent pool or not in a patent pool and then when you weren't in a patent pool you might be pissed about it. 38:59.000 --> 39:17.000 Um, you mean like let's say for example the counter measures of the pandemic could have been one patent pool and if you if you made the cut then regardless of whether countries were using your patent you might still get some kickback from that. 39:17.000 --> 39:43.000 Yeah so I think if you if you imagine sort of a a perfect controlled environment where all the industry players are allowed to meet in a room and you know draw charts on a whiteboard. 39:44.000 --> 39:55.000 They might decide how you know they might come up with an estimate of how big the market is and how much they can get away with charging overall for the patent pool. 39:56.000 --> 40:18.000 And they're going to set a price. Now this is all this is all activity that would theoretically be illegal under antitrust law at some level, but it's it's not illegal for a patent holders to sit in brainstorm this stuff how they can set prices globally and they can do what's called price discrimination, 40:18.000 --> 40:30.000 where you charge a different price and for one level of consumer you charge lower prices in the developing world for example for your patents versus what you charge Americans okay that's called price discrimination. 40:30.000 --> 40:38.000 So they're allowed to come up with all these tactics in terms of how they're going to carve up the market and they'll come up with estimates of what they think the global market's going to be. 40:39.000 --> 40:52.000 And keep in mind too that I think most of these purchases are being made by governments and so you know if they have a commitment from a you know a European government to buy a certain amount of product it's probably you know they're probably going to pay. 40:53.000 --> 40:59.000 So I think they have probably a reliable sense of what their market is and how much they can get away with charging. 40:59.000 --> 41:07.000 And then they're going to apportion the royalties among the participants in the pool. 41:07.000 --> 41:15.000 I don't know how you would you what metrics they would use to determine how royalties would be distributed. 41:16.000 --> 41:24.000 But if you know there's there are no rules in essence and how they do this. 41:24.000 --> 41:34.000 There could be patents in the pool that have no value to anyone who's making the product okay these are called non-essential patents right. 41:34.000 --> 41:44.000 And there there have been arguments about whether it makes sense to allow patent pools to include all these non-essential patents or who should be allowed to determine what's 41:45.000 --> 41:49.000 which patents are non-essential and whether it matters. 41:49.000 --> 41:55.000 And you know the trend has been to just kind of say who cares there's no harm no harm no foul. 41:55.000 --> 41:59.000 That's that's the economists have been trained to look at it this way. 41:59.000 --> 42:13.000 It would take hours for me to explain why but they were enchanted with this Milton Friedman view of antitrust pushed through in the 70s and 80s that gave them a totally different 42:13.000 --> 42:21.000 perspective on this area of the law and how it should be understood. 42:21.000 --> 42:36.000 Now I think what I would be concerned about these days is what Mark brought up which is that some of these patents are kind of science fiction okay. 42:37.000 --> 42:45.000 The antibody patent paradox really illustrates this it was a paper that was pushed it was pushed through Yale law journal. 42:45.000 --> 42:53.000 I think February this year and then all of a sudden in May get cited by the Supreme Court kind of ridiculous. 42:53.000 --> 42:59.000 And the Supreme Court in one fell swoop. 43:00.000 --> 43:11.000 Well invalidated at least some antibody patents right there on the spot but also potentially invalidated other antibody patents that are premised on the same scientific theories. 43:11.000 --> 43:25.000 And so, you know, there's a question I think whether companies have been able to exploit the US patent trade office to get patents on science fiction in a sense. 43:26.000 --> 43:27.000 Okay. 43:27.000 --> 43:47.000 You know, if you watch JC's broadcast, you know, even I think just the other night, you know, there was an example of who's that fellow Vanden Bosch here at Vanden Bosch showing all these diagrams, giving these jumbled explanations of how things work. 43:48.000 --> 43:53.000 If you're allowed to push that through the patent system. 43:53.000 --> 44:06.000 If you're allowed to get it past US patent trade office and you're allowed to get it into patent pool and nobody is allowed to challenge it as nonessential. 44:06.000 --> 44:09.000 Who's, you know, who's in a position to do anything about it. 44:09.000 --> 44:10.000 Okay. 44:10.000 --> 44:13.000 Who's checking who are the gatekeepers. 44:14.000 --> 44:18.000 This most recent case in May, the Supreme Court acted as the gatekeepers. 44:18.000 --> 44:23.000 They said, no, we'll be the gatekeepers now that standard they use theirs is an old standard. 44:23.000 --> 44:28.000 They said that in order for patent, this gets back again to the original purpose of a patent. 44:28.000 --> 44:31.000 It's to it's to make information available to the public. 44:31.000 --> 44:40.000 I said, look, in order for the patent to be useful, somebody has to know somebody looking at it has to know how to make the end product. 44:41.000 --> 44:46.000 They use an analogy to somebody trying to patent a recipe for bread where they just say. 44:46.000 --> 44:52.000 Mix various starches with water at various ratios and see what you get. 44:52.000 --> 44:53.000 All right. 44:53.000 --> 44:56.000 They said that's too generic doesn't tell somebody how to actually make bread. 44:56.000 --> 44:57.000 Okay. 44:57.000 --> 44:59.000 And that's the analogy they drew. 44:59.000 --> 45:07.000 And they used lots of old, you know, 19th century examples involving telegraphs and whatnot to illustrate their point. 45:08.000 --> 45:11.000 They weren't really snowed by any of the new science behind it. 45:11.000 --> 45:13.000 And they kind of made that the standard. 45:13.000 --> 45:18.000 What that means, it's hard to say because it's too early, I think, to say. 45:18.000 --> 45:26.000 But certainly it had the effect of invalidating, you know, or I should say reducing the value of some of these antibody patents. 45:26.000 --> 45:28.000 You'd have to think. 45:28.000 --> 45:34.000 And maybe that's to the advantage of companies that were competing with these antibody patents. 45:35.000 --> 45:44.000 Maybe you have competing versions of science fiction narratives that are being pushed through the US patent and trade office. 45:44.000 --> 45:52.000 And, you know, once the US patent and trade office signs off on something and says this is a valid patent, well, it could be worth billions of dollars. 45:52.000 --> 45:55.000 And, you know, there could be investors on Wall Street. 45:55.000 --> 46:00.000 You don't really know anything about the underlying science, but they say, well, this looks like a good patent. 46:00.000 --> 46:04.000 They say it's going to cure cancer, you know, should be valid technology. 46:04.000 --> 46:07.000 And it could be that a lot of people are getting snowed. 46:07.000 --> 46:12.000 I myself can't find the gatekeeper who's checking any of this stuff. 46:12.000 --> 46:18.000 My hat's off to Mark for spotting this stuff because I wouldn't have known to look for it. 46:18.000 --> 46:29.000 Really just Mark was chasing down some rabbit hole on, you know, the Weinstein family and starts asking questions about patents and finds a paper on patent law. 46:29.000 --> 46:33.000 And, you know, weeks later, I'm kind of, I'm dizzy. 46:33.000 --> 46:35.000 Over. 46:35.000 --> 46:56.000 Yeah, the science fiction part is that's a good word to use the phrase that's repeated a few times in that document regular guy is the galactic level of the galactic range of antibodies. 46:56.000 --> 47:01.000 And just to be clear, antibodies are a protein. 47:01.000 --> 47:09.000 So many of these patents are actually overlapping with just just the ability to patent proteins in general. 47:09.000 --> 47:24.000 And with the more that is discovered about how proteins are manufactured via the ribosome and about how they work based upon a variety of holding and epigenetic conditions and so on. 47:24.000 --> 47:27.000 The more we realize, we don't know. 47:27.000 --> 47:30.000 It's a it's an endless loop. 47:30.000 --> 47:36.000 Yeah, at the same time, you have all of these companies, governments, NGOs that need to patent it. 47:36.000 --> 47:40.000 It's it's it's a real pickle. 47:40.000 --> 47:42.000 It's a real pickle. 47:42.000 --> 47:53.000 My take on it is, well, first of all, you need to, you need, you don't want people to know that there's so much mystery involved because that's not going to do a good job of getting people to adopt and try out. 47:53.000 --> 47:56.000 The technology and help in advance. 47:56.000 --> 48:02.000 So the patent in addition to the challenges of the company is protecting their own intellectual property. 48:02.000 --> 48:04.000 I suspect again, this is my own speculation. 48:04.000 --> 48:22.000 And I was here asked to agree with it is that things are being done in a way to sort of conceal how much is unknown to sell it, you know, to over sell it, if you will, with with more confidence, because there needs to be a lot more work done. 48:22.000 --> 48:31.000 A lot more data collected to potentially someday understand these nuances in greater detail. 48:31.000 --> 48:36.000 It's again, I'm sure different people have different spins on it. 48:36.000 --> 48:43.000 I've just reached the point where I think we're we're looking at issues which almost transcend money. 48:44.000 --> 48:54.000 These issues are just so big right now and there's just more money behind it than you can shake a stick at, really. 48:54.000 --> 49:07.000 Maybe it's expressed as, you know, different companies and profits and some revenue sharing and so on, but there's just more money behind this and more enthusiasm in ways that you can shake a stick at. 49:07.000 --> 49:15.000 So thank you. I think that's a fantastic summary over to you, Jay. 49:15.000 --> 49:20.000 So yeah, I'm, I'm still trying to digest the. 49:20.000 --> 49:29.000 The idea as antibodies as a patent pool or as countermeasures as a patent pool, rather, and other examples of a patent pool. So we had CDs. 49:29.000 --> 49:35.000 Well, let me let me maybe share something that that's that's contemporary that kind of gave me a chuckle. 49:35.000 --> 49:39.000 Oh, it says, I can't share screens. 49:39.000 --> 49:42.000 Oh, that's just me. That's not setting it right. 49:42.000 --> 49:44.000 But yeah, just on. 49:44.000 --> 49:46.000 You're protecting my privacy there. 49:46.000 --> 49:54.000 Yeah, regarding that the pool issue was I just had a couple of my notes here. 49:54.000 --> 50:03.000 You know, I would, I would think that patents should be written to, for some extent, be standalone. 50:03.000 --> 50:09.000 And if there's like multiple patents that need each other, they should be packaged together in a way. So is it? 50:09.000 --> 50:23.000 I can understand there's maybe some to perhaps some instances where there's interconnectivity, but to think that, you know, non essential patents also get thrown in, you know, like, you have to watch. You have to. 50:23.000 --> 50:30.000 You know, you want HBO Max, you need to get, you know, the 27 ESPN channels, even if you hate sports. 50:30.000 --> 50:36.000 I ended up that's that's a bit absurd. 50:36.000 --> 50:38.000 What are we looking at here? Letter to Mark. 50:38.000 --> 50:39.000 Hammer. 50:39.000 --> 50:45.000 Yeah, sorry, I'm trying to try to find the mute button there. So, okay, this is. 50:45.000 --> 50:51.000 This is a letter that was issued by the Department of Justice antitrust division. 50:51.000 --> 50:58.000 These are the people who are supposed to be in charge of criminal enforcement of antitrust laws. 50:58.000 --> 51:02.000 Somebody had asked them. 51:02.000 --> 51:10.000 You know, is it okay if we form a patent pool to develop a 5G standard, an industry standard for 5G. 51:11.000 --> 51:12.000 All right. 51:12.000 --> 51:20.000 This company called, I guess, a Vanshi. All right. I don't know who Vanshi is, but anyway, they asked for DOJ and analyze this. 51:20.000 --> 51:24.000 DOJ wrote them a very long letter. 51:24.000 --> 51:25.000 I can't. 51:25.000 --> 51:33.000 I won't pretend to really understand what a lot of this says, but the upshot of it is it says it's okay for you to do this. 51:33.000 --> 51:34.000 All right. 51:34.000 --> 51:46.000 Now, that prompted a letter that for some reason is available on SSRN. 51:46.000 --> 51:48.000 I don't know. 51:48.000 --> 51:57.000 Normally, when I open a PDF on SSRN, I don't expect to see by overnight mail and email at the top. 51:57.000 --> 52:04.000 But it's a group of people who are kind of upset about this. 52:04.000 --> 52:07.000 They don't like this letter. 52:07.000 --> 52:13.000 And they say, DOJ, you know, you're not really given this. 52:13.000 --> 52:16.000 You're not looking at this the right way. There's some real harm here. 52:16.000 --> 52:20.000 And they talk about the way this patent pool is set up. 52:20.000 --> 52:23.000 They have a problem with it and it's signed by all these people. 52:24.000 --> 52:32.000 We've seen this before, you know, where petitions pop up that have a bunch of, you know, famous people attached to them. 52:32.000 --> 52:37.000 But I think it leads off with, yeah, I don't know. 52:37.000 --> 52:43.000 All right. And then there is a response to that that was filed. 52:43.000 --> 52:45.000 Somebody else. 52:46.000 --> 52:55.000 These are former judges and academics who also are upset about this. 52:55.000 --> 53:00.000 Okay. They're arguing about the 5G standard and whether this should be allowed. 53:00.000 --> 53:10.000 Now, here we've got former general counsel, the federal trade commission, somebody at the Mercatus Center, George Mason University. 53:11.000 --> 53:17.000 And they're saying that here that this, you know, this patent pool is fine. 53:17.000 --> 53:24.000 Go ahead. Now, what's at stake here seems to be what gets established as the industry standard for 5G. 53:24.000 --> 53:28.000 Okay. If you can get, you can get this. 53:28.000 --> 53:37.000 I think if I'm reading this correctly, a company is trying to use this, create this patent pool and then use it to push. 53:38.000 --> 53:51.000 And it for that pool of patents to be adopted as the industry standard for 5G wireless in the United States, or at least one industry standard or competitor for the industry standard in the United States. 53:51.000 --> 54:04.000 And, you know, if you were, and the concern there is that what if you, if you have a pool of patents that becomes the industry standard, it means everybody's reliant on it to make that product at that point. 54:04.000 --> 54:11.000 And it can become, you know, in a sense, like a monopoly, like a cartel, like this thing we're supposed to fear, right? 54:11.000 --> 54:23.000 So I think the idea here is that with respect to medical therapies, there may be discussions about what constitutes an mRNA vaccine. 54:24.000 --> 54:37.000 Okay. What's the industry standard? Or what's the industry standard for, you know, a medical therapy, a cancer therapy that's called, you know, whatever, that's got a name attached to it, right? 54:38.000 --> 54:55.000 And then pharmaceutical companies may be allowed to tinker, but they at least have to buy the rights to these other ancillary technologies when they purchase the rights to make that particular pharmaceutical product. 54:55.000 --> 55:15.000 And so if the patent pool includes not just the RNA chain, but also a patent for the liquid nanoparticle delivery system, why would you then invest in your own separate liquid nanoparticle delivery system? 55:15.000 --> 55:20.000 We already own the rights to make this one. You're just going to make that one, right? And it's going to become the industry standard. 55:20.000 --> 55:26.000 It's going to become the one that people are going to use by default, or the company end users will use by default. 55:26.000 --> 55:32.000 It's the safest option because it saves you from any risk of being sued for infringing on someone else's patent. 55:32.000 --> 55:36.000 You already own the rights to the one in the patent pool, so you'll just use that. 55:36.000 --> 55:53.000 And so by getting your patent in the patent pool, you make it more likely that it's going to be the one that's taken up and used by the end user, which in this case is most likely a government health care system. 55:54.000 --> 56:08.000 And so in the case of the mRNA patents that were that were enforceable that at one point, Robert Malone was the owner of, but then long long ago was not anymore. 56:09.000 --> 56:18.000 Those were valid or still enforceable until like two years into the pandemic and then they became, they expired. 56:18.000 --> 56:27.000 Well, yeah, it's hard to say, you know, there's a statutory limit on the life of patents, which is 15 years. 56:28.000 --> 56:29.000 Okay. 56:29.000 --> 56:38.000 No, there is a narrow, like I said, there's certain things that have been considered construed as patent misuse by courts. 56:38.000 --> 56:52.000 And one of the rare occasions where the Supreme Court actually found that something was patent misuse was a case where a company tried to use 56:53.000 --> 56:58.000 a licensing agreement to effectively extend the life of the patent. 56:58.000 --> 57:12.000 So somebody who wanted to pay for royalties on a patent that was going to expire in five years, they would have a contract where they would continue to pay royalties for another five years after the patent had expired and became public domain. 57:13.000 --> 57:16.000 And the Supreme Court, the lower courts looked at this and said, who cares? 57:16.000 --> 57:22.000 You're just stretching out payments over a longer period of time and, you know, where's the harm? 57:22.000 --> 57:32.000 But the Supreme Court, for whatever reason, didn't like this, said it was that it was patent misuse because it tried to extend the life of the patent. 57:32.000 --> 58:00.000 Now, where this gets complicated is that there is scholarship coming out of one or two corners on how the use of private arbitration and private settlement agreements between firms to reach terms that would be illegal under other circumstances. 58:00.000 --> 58:07.000 And these could include agreements to extend royalty payments past the 15-year life of the patent. 58:07.000 --> 58:13.000 But, you know, these agreements could have non-disclosure clauses attached to them. 58:13.000 --> 58:17.000 There's no reason that you or I would know about them, right? 58:17.000 --> 58:23.000 So you can look at, I've seen patents where Robert Malone is listed as an inventor. 58:24.000 --> 58:31.000 And I haven't seen any that were filed or that were granted after 2007. 58:31.000 --> 58:41.000 So, you know, if I count up, I have to assume that those patents expired in 2022. 58:41.000 --> 58:48.000 But I don't know what could have happened in private litigation, you know, after 2007. 58:48.000 --> 58:51.000 For that matter, I don't know if the patents were ever worth anything. 58:51.000 --> 58:55.000 It may be that they were competitors. 58:55.000 --> 58:58.000 Maybe that they were picked up and that Malone was paid out on them. 58:58.000 --> 59:00.000 He could have made quite a penny off them. 59:00.000 --> 59:08.000 But, you know, it may have been that the royalties ran out in 2022. 59:08.000 --> 59:10.000 I'm trying to formulate this question here. 59:10.000 --> 59:15.000 If you have something you want to throw in, Mark, go ahead. 59:15.000 --> 59:24.000 Could the who and the U.S. or, you know, like, for example, would the FDA or the U.S. 59:24.000 --> 59:32.000 CDC have been in a especially advantageous position to put together us? 59:33.000 --> 59:45.000 I mean, if I'm trying to think how something like this could have been used to guarantee a more control over the pandemic response. 59:45.000 --> 59:54.000 Well, the patents are specifically designed to put money in the pockets of their owners. 59:54.000 --> 59:57.000 That wasn't the original idea. 59:58.000 --> 01:00:05.000 As I said, the original idea here was supposed to be about informing the public, right? 01:00:05.000 --> 01:00:15.000 Because the idea here is that if we don't allow, if we don't have patents, if we don't allow these intellectual property monopolies to exist, 01:00:15.000 --> 01:00:18.000 then everything will be kept as a trade secret. 01:00:18.000 --> 01:00:20.000 That's the fear. 01:00:20.000 --> 01:00:24.000 Everybody will keep everything as a trade secret and knowledge will never get spread. 01:00:24.000 --> 01:00:32.000 And so, but the patent holders themselves, they're not thinking, gee, how can I inform the public? 01:00:32.000 --> 01:00:39.000 How can I better advance mankind's understanding of molecular biology? 01:00:39.000 --> 01:00:45.000 They're thinking, how can I make the most money possible off of this? 01:00:45.000 --> 01:00:53.000 Now, if you can sell it to the U.S. Patent Trade Office, that gives it a stamp of authenticity that you can take to the FDA. 01:00:53.000 --> 01:01:04.000 Imagine trying to take an unpatented pharmaceutical product to the FDA and asking to do safety and efficacy testing on it. 01:01:04.000 --> 01:01:15.000 A lot of the complaints that you'll see about the FDA too, really relate to the length of time that these companies have to go through safety and efficacy testing. 01:01:16.000 --> 01:01:25.000 Because while that safety and efficacy testing is ongoing, the 15-year lifespan on that patent is the clock is ticking. 01:01:25.000 --> 01:01:36.000 So if you get a patent on a drug and it takes eight years to do safety and efficacy testing, you've only got seven years left on that patent. 01:01:37.000 --> 01:01:45.000 And so that can affect how companies end up pricing the drugs that come out of those patents or whatnot. 01:01:45.000 --> 01:01:58.000 But it's all about attracting money. At the end of the day, you want to convince people that this patent that you have is worth X amount of dollars because it cures this disease. 01:01:58.000 --> 01:02:08.000 It produces, in these case of the antibody patents, they were saying, it literally allows you to cure disease. 01:02:08.000 --> 01:02:23.000 And according to the article, by the way, that Mark brought to my attention, that was the time of February 2023, something like $150 billion a year industry. 01:02:23.000 --> 01:02:36.000 And you know that the revenues, maybe it was even profits off these patents were over $150 billion a year and growing. 01:02:36.000 --> 01:02:48.000 So if you can convince enough people that your science is legit, if you can launder it through the USPTO, then you can launder it through the FDA, 01:02:48.000 --> 01:02:58.000 and you can launder it through the World Health Organization, and you can launder it through MSNBC and the president of the United States. 01:02:58.000 --> 01:03:06.000 I don't know, is Robert Malone saying no. 01:03:07.000 --> 01:03:24.000 Speaking of the efficacy testing, and Jay and I talk a lot about this, is if the mRNA platform itself can be demonstrated or is generally understood to be safe and effective in and of itself. 01:03:25.000 --> 01:03:47.000 That would cut down, as you know, a significant amount of time and expedite the ability to maybe patent new things based upon that platform with the very least get it out to market without burning, potentially burning less of the clock, if you will. 01:03:48.000 --> 01:04:09.000 And the strategy that we've seen is, we see that there's a lot of emphasis being put on the protein or proteins that this platform is causing the recipients of it to produce via on the transfection itself. 01:04:10.000 --> 01:04:27.000 And plenty of individuals have suggested and put forth evidence that the protein that's produced is sometimes or oftentimes toxic in and of itself. 01:04:28.000 --> 01:04:36.000 Now, while that can be misconstrued as by some as the platform itself is is is the whole thing is bad. 01:04:36.000 --> 01:04:56.000 The reality is that if one can make the case that the virus was bad because of the protein and the transfection is only causing harm because it made a perfect copy of that bad protein, then the consensus has to be the platform works perfectly. 01:04:58.000 --> 01:05:07.000 It's a so it's a, I think a lot of people are getting baited into this and they don't realize what they are going to be acknowledging as a consequence of it. 01:05:07.000 --> 01:05:25.000 But perhaps the, you know, to add some credence to your statement of products and patents being pursued to to maybe expedite things expert to ensure that the clock isn't burned as new stuff rolls out. 01:05:25.000 --> 01:05:30.000 Perhaps this the standardized platform plays into that. 01:05:30.000 --> 01:05:49.000 You know, that's an excellent point because suppose that your patent pool is anchored by one fundamental patent that everybody wants like in that Phillips CDR case, I suppose Phillips was the, the owner of the patent that the people really wanted. 01:05:50.000 --> 01:05:57.000 They didn't want the Sony patent and the other whatever patents that came along with it. 01:05:57.000 --> 01:06:14.000 But that could shit. But if you've got a pool of patents, it could be that over time that that Phillips patent expires, but that there's another patent that's in the pool that's newer and that continues to drive the pool. 01:06:15.000 --> 01:06:34.000 And so you have a six. I don't, you know, and again, these are the kinds of practices that are discussed and hypothesized in things like the letters that I showed on the screen, which are current with written within the last year where lawyers are arguing with DOJ. 01:06:35.000 --> 01:06:46.000 You know, and who writes a letter to DOJ saying, wow, we really appreciate the analysis you did. 01:06:46.000 --> 01:06:59.000 Somebody wrote a letter to the government thanking them for doing such an academic sort of a letter to DOJ saying, thank you for your academic analysis saying that this patent pooling process is entirely lawful here. 01:07:00.000 --> 01:07:09.000 That's an odd thing to do. And it, and it, and it provoked an outcry. And so this is a, this is an, this is an oddly contested area of the law. 01:07:09.000 --> 01:07:16.000 The other thing I noticed too though, is that these, you know, hold on, hold on one second regular guy. Don't change the subject yet. Mark wants to ask some. 01:07:16.000 --> 01:07:21.000 I, well, when it's appropriate. 01:07:21.000 --> 01:07:37.000 Are these patent pools identified on the patent? I mean, is there like a section that says part of a pool, which also includes either patents or do you do you find out mysteriously by surprise? How would one inquire about how patent pools are constructed? 01:07:37.000 --> 01:07:40.000 That's a great question. 01:07:40.000 --> 01:07:49.000 As far as I know, you find out when you, when you go to buy the patent and you enter into discussions with the patent holder. 01:07:49.000 --> 01:08:04.000 He has to find what's in it. Right. Right. You have to go and try to license the product. Now, you know, I see, for example, the World Health Organization is trying to establish some sort of medicine's patent pool. 01:08:04.000 --> 01:08:08.000 Okay. So they want to have everything. 01:08:08.000 --> 01:08:14.000 You know, I suppose made made publicly known to any perspective buyer, but. 01:08:14.000 --> 01:08:32.000 And, and, and, you know, that's the kind of thing where the economist will get into arguments about, you know, whether it's good to have that level of transparency in the market, whether that should be a condition of participation in the market that you, you know, have that some kind of transparency 01:08:32.000 --> 01:08:38.000 or central registry. But right now, from my understanding, it's the Wild West. 01:08:38.000 --> 01:08:43.000 That's what it comes down to. But, you know, 01:08:43.000 --> 01:08:55.000 I think I would, I really am inviting is others to enter into the discussion because I'm, I'm an amateur. 01:08:55.000 --> 01:08:59.000 Well, you're an amateur. What does that make the rest of us? 01:09:00.000 --> 01:09:13.000 I mean, can we mention that? Can we mention the article or the author that you that we found when we were, we were trying to find somebody to read who had written about this? 01:09:13.000 --> 01:09:28.000 Is it? Oh, well, yes. You know, I guess if I'm going to, I'm not sure which article of this person's there are a couple of people that that I've stumbled across as I've, as I've looked into this. 01:09:28.000 --> 01:09:35.000 Now, one of them is an academic named Eric Hovenkamp. 01:09:35.000 --> 01:09:42.000 He, I don't know where he teaches right now. I think he may be at University of Southern California. 01:09:42.000 --> 01:09:48.000 For many years, he was located at Northwestern University. 01:09:48.000 --> 01:09:57.000 So he was sort of on the other side of the lake from University of Chicago where all this antitrust business was coming out of. 01:09:57.000 --> 01:10:06.000 You know, that, that, and, and Hovenkamp, it was, it was, it has, has for years really stuck out to me as knowledgeable about this. 01:10:06.000 --> 01:10:14.000 There's another Hovenkamp that also is an antitrust law professor at some law school. And I think that may be his father. 01:10:14.000 --> 01:10:22.000 I haven't tried to do that. Herbert Herbert. Yes. Yeah. I assume, I assume that father and son. 01:10:22.000 --> 01:10:30.000 I, I, I'm, I'm, you know, respecting their privacy there because I'm, I'm only interested in what they have to say as academics. Yes, I see. 01:10:30.000 --> 01:10:47.000 But to the extent that, you know, anyone's really, I think, putting out good, consistent, solid research, well written papers on, on the intersection of patent and antitrust law. 01:10:47.000 --> 01:10:55.000 That's Hovenkamp. Unfortunately, with respect to patent pools, the only work by him that I could find were really descriptive. 01:10:55.000 --> 01:11:11.000 I did find, I don't know if I can share a screen with a YouTube link or how I would do that, but a random video on YouTube put out by University of Pennsylvania. 01:11:11.000 --> 01:11:21.000 And if you just do a search or you pen patent antitrust law, you'll get this one that'll say lecture 20 patents and antitrust one. 01:11:21.000 --> 01:11:36.000 That's actually an excellent condensed introduction to, to this area of the law. And I'd be interested to know whether other people are really find it as engaging as I did. 01:11:36.000 --> 01:11:45.000 So, I, I learned all of this from, from a guy named Randy Picker. 01:11:45.000 --> 01:11:56.000 And Randy Picker didn't, he, let's just say his, his, his take on things reflected in institutional bias. 01:11:56.000 --> 01:12:12.000 He's closely affiliated with one school in particular. And so I didn't get an outside view of this area of the law until I started looking into this and seeing what people from other institutions had to say about antitrust and, and intellectual property. 01:12:12.000 --> 01:12:18.000 So, get there. 01:12:19.000 --> 01:12:30.000 What antitrust law per se violations. Less than 10 of 29 or that's not the right one. Less than 20. It's a lecture 20. 01:12:30.000 --> 01:12:36.000 I can, I can share my screen here. If it's not a problem. 01:12:36.000 --> 01:12:41.000 I don't know. Yeah. Okay. I see. Wait. Yeah. 01:12:42.000 --> 01:13:04.000 But it's a pretty, it's a pretty, I guess it's going to be pretty, pretty long or what 45 minutes. Yeah, 45 minutes. It's, it's, it's fairly academic. The thing is, I don't know a non academic way to bring somebody into how this area of the law is understood and analyze. 01:13:05.000 --> 01:13:15.000 I think it might be easier in some ways to think about it as something analogous to the housing. 01:13:15.000 --> 01:13:29.000 What the derivatives, you know, collapse that happened. Remember Michael Burries looking at these derivatives and says, you know, oh my God, there's a whole bunch of fraud and then they made the movie, the big short about this guy. 01:13:30.000 --> 01:13:47.000 Right. It may be that it really is a matter of somebody saying, Hey, there's a whole pool of patents being pushed here that, you know, are drawing all kinds of love from investors, but they all have a fundamental flaw, which is that they're based on science fiction. 01:13:48.000 --> 01:14:04.000 Science fiction that was laundered to the US patent trade office. Science fiction that they are hoping to, and, and, and once, and once it's been blessed by the US patent trade office, the FDA isn't going to question anything except whether it passes safety and efficacy tests. 01:14:04.000 --> 01:14:19.000 And so investors, you know, seeing this, who's in a position to really say whether a patent is pushing science fiction, right? I think it requires outside eyes and outside attention that, that, that isn't there. 01:14:19.000 --> 01:14:36.000 And I thought it was neat that the Supreme Court picked up on these antibody patents and, and, and, and, and, you know, notice that they had this little, well, flaw in them and potentially, you know, pulled a lot of money out of that $150 billion antibody patent market. 01:14:37.000 --> 01:14:47.000 It also occurs to me that, you know, there was a time when I heard about my monoclonal antibodies being a viable therapy for people who had COVID. 01:14:47.000 --> 01:14:55.000 And then I heard that, Oh, they're being pulled from the market. They don't work. Right. Vaccines weren't pulled from the market, but the monoclonals were. 01:14:55.000 --> 01:15:05.000 And then it's sometimes, sometime after that, we saw an article in Yale Law Review saying antibody patents have all these flaws in the science. 01:15:05.000 --> 01:15:13.000 And then the Supreme Court may of 2023 says, Oh, yeah, we see flaws in the science of these antibody patents. 01:15:14.000 --> 01:15:30.000 I don't hear it. You know, so was it did some did did was there was there a competing cartel of farmer companies that wanted to push a standard treatment for there for COVID. 01:15:30.000 --> 01:15:35.000 You know, that was, it was patented and could attract some some private sector investors. 01:15:36.000 --> 01:15:44.000 But, you know, it was competing with these mount monoclonal monoclonal antibodies and wanted to, you know, pull the wind out of the competitor sales. 01:15:44.000 --> 01:15:52.000 That's the question I have there. I don't know that we're looking at a situation where, you know, the good guys came to the rescue. 01:15:53.000 --> 01:16:15.000 Well, there we've had a lot of people tell us on our streams that there was a long standing desire to change from the quote unquote traditional methods of making vaccines and immunizations and and shifting more to these genetic based technologies. 01:16:15.000 --> 01:16:36.000 And so if you can imagine a scenario where the selection of the technologies that was going to be used during the pandemic was not a small decision, but actually a big one going forward into the future and, you know, what patents will be in the next one. 01:16:37.000 --> 01:16:45.000 What what what won't be in the next one and maybe monoclonal antibodies are something that were on the table originally. 01:16:45.000 --> 01:16:54.000 And then because of this ruling had to be removed were removed or as you said, cleared the way for newer technologies to step in. 01:16:54.000 --> 01:17:01.000 We heard Robert Malone the other day saying that he was applying for patents for combinations of repurposed drugs. 01:17:01.000 --> 01:17:23.000 And so these could have is there a possibility that that can you imagine that warp speed could have accelerated the patent approval procedure in order to, you know, rapidly get as many waiting or on the cusp of approval patents through so that they could be included in such a pool. 01:17:23.000 --> 01:17:31.000 I mean, I can see all kinds of weird games that could potentially be played because of the state of the emergency that was declared over. 01:17:32.000 --> 01:17:51.000 Yeah, I'm not in any position to know what was done, you know, behind the scenes and what two parties agree to privately to a contract for one party pays royalties to the other. 01:17:51.000 --> 01:17:57.000 There's no there isn't any reason why I would necessarily know about that. 01:17:58.000 --> 01:18:07.000 And for that matter, many of the companies that I see involved in biotech or small companies are not publicly traded. 01:18:07.000 --> 01:18:17.000 They're privately held so they don't have the same reporting requirements that a publicly traded company like Pfizer would have. 01:18:18.000 --> 01:18:26.000 So it's not clear to me what level of visibility anyone could gain into what's happening there. 01:18:26.000 --> 01:18:31.000 I think you'd have to speculate really you'd have to be in the game, right? 01:18:31.000 --> 01:18:40.000 You'd have to be a company trying to make a vaccine or trying to be available if I can get Robert Malone on a stream. 01:18:40.000 --> 01:18:46.000 Would you be available to help me, you know, keep the, keep the conversation sharp. 01:18:46.000 --> 01:18:49.000 No mark would be available. 01:18:49.000 --> 01:18:55.000 You know, I, I, I, I have to, I have to think about it. 01:18:55.000 --> 01:19:04.000 I don't know that I want to end up on Robert Malone's radar or be known to be known to him, but it's. 01:19:04.000 --> 01:19:12.000 And, and, you know, again, I'm not the best qualified person asked some of these questions. I think, I think really it would be helpful. 01:19:12.000 --> 01:19:20.000 To look up, you know, you can, you can go to the USPTO website and you can also go. 01:19:20.000 --> 01:19:26.000 There's a world international patent organization, WPI, WIPO. 01:19:26.000 --> 01:19:30.000 You can go to these websites. They're various services. 01:19:30.000 --> 01:19:36.000 You can go to government run and where you can search for patents and you can see who owns what. 01:19:36.000 --> 01:19:41.000 And it's interesting, I think, to go on there. 01:19:41.000 --> 01:19:48.000 If there's somebody, you know, you're curious about your reading and I've just started doing this in recent recent weeks. 01:19:48.000 --> 01:19:57.000 Following your show, JC, occasionally, I'll, I'll, a name will pop up on your show and I'll Google and, and I find, I do find patents. 01:19:57.000 --> 01:20:03.000 I do find these people listed as inventors on some of these patents on some of these databases. 01:20:04.000 --> 01:20:09.000 And so I think it would be helpful to know, you know, if there's some. 01:20:09.000 --> 01:20:15.000 Let's say, collusive behavior, because, you know, what antitrust law. 01:20:15.000 --> 01:20:22.000 And antitrust law isn't just about punishing monopolists. 01:20:23.000 --> 01:20:33.000 It's any monopoly-like behavior, which includes, you know, cartels that form and fix prices and, and behave like monopolists. 01:20:33.000 --> 01:20:38.000 And it's, it can be very hard to spot cartels. 01:20:38.000 --> 01:20:42.000 And what's funny about it, you know, you can do a Google search. 01:20:42.000 --> 01:20:47.000 There's a, for cartel theory, you'll see it as an actual Wikipedia page on cartel theory. 01:20:48.000 --> 01:20:57.000 But one of the things that Milton Friedman convinced us brainwash every economist in America to believe this about cartels. 01:20:57.000 --> 01:21:03.000 That no cartel can last forever, because inevitably someone will defect and undercut the competitors. 01:21:03.000 --> 01:21:13.000 In other words, there's an assumption that it's man's default nature to, to compete with fellow man, not to cooperate. 01:21:13.000 --> 01:21:18.000 And so at some point that will kick in, that competitive instinct in the cartel will, will fall apart. 01:21:18.000 --> 01:21:27.000 And so this leads to the conclusion that there isn't a real need to police against cartels because they sell, they self-destruct. 01:21:27.000 --> 01:21:31.000 Okay, think about like mutagenic death of a virus, right? 01:21:31.000 --> 01:21:36.000 It's just a matter of time before it peters out and becomes background noise. 01:21:36.000 --> 01:21:39.000 That sounds like a great strategy for cartels. 01:21:40.000 --> 01:21:51.000 Yeah, yeah, the thing is, if you ask these Milton Friedman acolytes, who again constitute 100% of economists in the West, probably in Western Europe for that matter. 01:21:51.000 --> 01:21:56.000 If you ask them, well, how long can a cartel last? 01:21:56.000 --> 01:21:59.000 They won't put a little time, you know, they won't tell you. 01:21:59.000 --> 01:22:07.000 And I've seen some, some, some pages that say, well, occasionally they can last decades or even centuries. 01:22:08.000 --> 01:22:25.000 You know, so this is, this is something that's always bothered me is that we don't police against cartels because even our regulatory agencies, our Department of Justice antitrust division, has it baked into its mind that cartels just self-destruct. 01:22:25.000 --> 01:22:27.000 And so you don't have to be on guard against them. 01:22:27.000 --> 01:22:39.000 But here's an area where patents can be utilized to form cartels with, and it totally protected, they're given a total loan. 01:22:39.000 --> 01:22:48.000 The Supreme Court, not the Supreme Court, but effectively the Supreme Court has given them a protective bubble in which to operate here. 01:22:48.000 --> 01:22:51.000 The Supreme Court is somewhat complicit in this. 01:22:52.000 --> 01:22:55.000 But I don't think it's going to get fixed through the legal system. 01:22:55.000 --> 01:23:02.000 If you, if you try to take this through the legal system, you'd have to engage in arguments with economists that you're never going to win. 01:23:02.000 --> 01:23:05.000 I think it really is more about looking at this. 01:23:05.000 --> 01:23:11.000 And that's because, and that's because you have to show that they're doing some societal harm with their monopoly. 01:23:11.000 --> 01:23:20.000 You have to show, well, under the current, under the dominant theory, you would have to show, first of all, that there's a harm to the consumer. 01:23:21.000 --> 01:23:22.000 Okay. 01:23:22.000 --> 01:23:23.000 To the, to the consumer. 01:23:23.000 --> 01:23:27.000 It has to be a consumer based analysis. 01:23:27.000 --> 01:23:30.000 Any harm that you describe has to be a harm to the consumer. 01:23:30.000 --> 01:23:35.000 It can't be a harm to a, another competitor in the market, another company who wants to do business. 01:23:35.000 --> 01:23:40.000 It has to be something, you have to show that it's harming the, the end user. 01:23:40.000 --> 01:23:49.000 And that's something that's very hard to do in the case of these patent pooling cases because the, 01:23:49.000 --> 01:23:54.000 the company raising the argument isn't saying, oh, you know, the consumer is being harmed. 01:23:54.000 --> 01:24:01.000 They're just saying, I shouldn't have to, they're, they're, they're, they're sort of assuming that if they didn't have to buy this pool of patents, 01:24:01.000 --> 01:24:06.000 it would cost much less to just buy the one patent, you know, that they want. 01:24:06.000 --> 01:24:12.000 And, and they're not, it's, when you can't allege a harm to the consumer, you don't really have a leg to stand on under current, 01:24:12.000 --> 01:24:18.000 under the dominant theory of law that governs any kind of antitrust question today. 01:24:18.000 --> 01:24:29.000 So your, your ability to allege that the consumer is being harmed by this cartel-like behavior by, by a, by a farmer, patent holders, 01:24:29.000 --> 01:24:31.000 that's a stretch. 01:24:31.000 --> 01:24:39.000 And I don't, and it's, it's really, I don't think, I mean, you know, again, I'm not qualified. 01:24:39.000 --> 01:24:45.000 I'm not qualified to even really, you know, get into some of this stuff, but it just doesn't look to me like it's a, 01:24:45.000 --> 01:24:47.000 it's a, it's a productive way to approach things. 01:24:47.000 --> 01:24:56.000 I do think it would be more productive to have some public examination of these patents because that's exactly what happened in that Yale Law Journal, 01:24:56.000 --> 01:25:08.000 the Anabani patent paradox, was that somebody, you know, purported lead to law professors sat down and, you know, examine these patents and said, 01:25:08.000 --> 01:25:13.000 well, lo and behold, these things are, you know, Star Trek science fiction. 01:25:13.000 --> 01:25:17.000 This is a, this is a head scratcher, you know, Yale Law Journal. 01:25:17.000 --> 01:25:21.000 And then three months later, it's cited by Supreme Court. 01:25:21.000 --> 01:25:33.000 Boy, you know, that, that was what it took in that case to get these anabody patents struck down, right, exposed for what they were. 01:25:33.000 --> 01:25:40.000 So I think, you know, that's, that's a, let's say you were to take that approach towards. 01:25:40.000 --> 01:25:52.000 But does that, does that look like to you more like machinations behind the scenes to feed a Supreme Court that's always looking to reign in power? 01:25:52.000 --> 01:25:59.000 Or do you think that looks more like somebody said, Hey, we need this because we're going to make this decision. 01:25:59.000 --> 01:26:04.000 And so then somebody wrote it knowing it. 01:26:04.000 --> 01:26:11.000 I, I, I, I, I, all I can say is that it was extremely well done. 01:26:11.000 --> 01:26:23.000 I mean, it was extremely well executed that normally, you know, somebody, normally if a legal academic wants to get something published, you know, the idea is that you're right at first. 01:26:24.000 --> 01:26:33.000 And then you shop it around the law journals and say, Hey, you know, can you please publish this because they're looking to, you know, they want something to put on their CV. 01:26:33.000 --> 01:26:39.000 And so, you know, Yale Law Journal is really aiming kind of high. 01:26:39.000 --> 01:26:45.000 You don't, you don't write an article and then go shopping it around and then go, Oh, golly. 01:26:45.000 --> 01:26:48.000 You're so lucky Yale Law Journal picked it up, right? 01:26:48.000 --> 01:27:02.000 And if you look at the Wikipedia page, I think there may be an entire page on just editors of the Yale Law Review, like a look at who's served as the editor of the Yale Law Review. 01:27:02.000 --> 01:27:04.000 There's a lot of names on there that you'll recognize. 01:27:04.000 --> 01:27:14.000 It seems to me that somebody that the people who wrote that paper had to know with some certainty that it was going to get run. 01:27:14.000 --> 01:27:19.000 And that particular law review, because, you know, it's like branding. 01:27:19.000 --> 01:27:21.000 They have to give it the seal. 01:27:21.000 --> 01:27:24.000 You know, Yale is, you know, been there. 01:27:24.000 --> 01:27:27.000 Are you saying, are you saying if I would have written 60 years? 01:27:27.000 --> 01:27:35.000 Are you saying if I would have written a law review and submitted it to Southern Illinois, it would have not been cited by the Supreme Court? 01:27:35.000 --> 01:27:41.000 Right, the Supreme Court, if they're going to cite anything, it's going to be a judge. 01:27:42.000 --> 01:27:49.000 You know, they don't like to, it's typically beneath the Supreme Court to cite something that's not a legal authority. 01:27:49.000 --> 01:27:50.000 Right. 01:27:50.000 --> 01:27:59.000 And journal articles are, you know, by and large, just kind of ignored, you know, some of them are intriguing. 01:27:59.000 --> 01:28:05.000 Sometimes they're useful as repositories of information, but you wouldn't have a judge. 01:28:06.000 --> 01:28:12.000 Certainly, you know, at the level of the Supreme Court citing, you know, law review article. 01:28:12.000 --> 01:28:27.000 But here, you know, in this case, since it was published in Yale, it's acceptable, you know, because who's going to, you know, who's going to argue with, you know, it's branding. 01:28:27.000 --> 01:28:29.000 It's branding is what it boils down to. 01:28:29.000 --> 01:28:32.000 You know, there's no brand of brand you can put on it. 01:28:33.000 --> 01:28:35.000 You know, it got cited. 01:28:35.000 --> 01:28:41.000 And the Supreme Court seemed to think it was, you know, very, boy, this is very intriguing thing. 01:28:41.000 --> 01:28:45.000 You know, thank God it got published three months before the Supreme Court wrote the decision. 01:28:45.000 --> 01:28:47.000 What fortuitous timing? 01:28:47.000 --> 01:28:54.000 Well, while regular guys putting more coins in the payphone marked, you want to, you want to chime in a little bit? 01:28:54.000 --> 01:28:55.000 I mean, it's kind of hard. 01:28:55.000 --> 01:28:58.000 I'm also just being kind of run over here. 01:28:58.000 --> 01:29:01.000 But, you know, it's hard when regular guys. 01:29:01.000 --> 01:29:03.000 He's working on the off the phone there. 01:29:03.000 --> 01:29:04.000 He's just talking all the time. 01:29:04.000 --> 01:29:06.000 It's hard for him when he's on the street like that. 01:29:06.000 --> 01:29:11.000 Well, I think there's only like two or three payphones like that left in all of Manhattan. 01:29:11.000 --> 01:29:20.000 So clearly that is at that that poor woman behind him is going to be pretty upset right now. 01:29:20.000 --> 01:29:26.000 I mean, I'm a little mentally burnt today. 01:29:27.000 --> 01:29:31.000 But yeah, this is what this is what happens when regular guy starts talking. 01:29:31.000 --> 01:29:32.000 We do. 01:29:32.000 --> 01:29:33.000 I'm sorry. 01:29:33.000 --> 01:29:34.000 No, no, no. 01:29:34.000 --> 01:29:35.000 We do tend to get. 01:29:35.000 --> 01:29:37.000 Mark, Mark, you started this. 01:29:37.000 --> 01:29:43.000 Mark, you are the reason you found that. 01:29:43.000 --> 01:29:53.000 You know, you went to, you had to find out who Brett Weinstein's parents were and you found out. 01:29:53.000 --> 01:29:57.000 And that got the ball rolling and had you not done that. 01:29:57.000 --> 01:30:02.000 It's one of those F around and find out moments, I guess, right? 01:30:02.000 --> 01:30:10.000 And then it was that coupled with, you know, JC's analysis of Weinstein's statements showing 01:30:10.000 --> 01:30:19.000 where he ducked and dove around certain topics, feigned ignorance, right? 01:30:20.000 --> 01:30:27.000 You know, you can, at that point, you're seeing, you can triangulate. 01:30:27.000 --> 01:30:31.000 And that's how I started to approach this. 01:30:31.000 --> 01:30:40.000 But then I had to go back and review stuff that I learned a long time ago, but never put to use. 01:30:40.000 --> 01:30:42.000 It was never relevant to anything I was doing. 01:30:42.000 --> 01:30:47.000 But it was something that at the time I studied very hard and took very seriously and learned 01:30:48.000 --> 01:30:53.000 from some, when I learned antitrust and when I learned about intellectual property, 01:30:53.000 --> 01:31:04.000 I learned it from people who were, at the time, dominant in, you know, let's say in that field. 01:31:04.000 --> 01:31:14.000 I'll end by saying that one of these days, I hope to inform the public about how Anthony Kennedy 01:31:15.000 --> 01:31:19.000 gave us the $1,500 iPhone. 01:31:19.000 --> 01:31:27.000 There's no reason that iPhones shouldn't cost $800 or $900, but there was a kink in the law 01:31:27.000 --> 01:31:33.000 that Anthony Kennedy ironed out for Apple in 2007 that allowed certain type of activity 01:31:33.000 --> 01:31:38.000 to take place that allowed them to set 60% profit margins on these products. 01:31:38.000 --> 01:31:40.000 And Samsung does it too. 01:31:40.000 --> 01:31:41.000 They all do it. 01:31:41.000 --> 01:31:43.000 And it's just due to one stroke. 01:31:43.000 --> 01:31:46.000 One little change in the law that happened in 2007. 01:31:46.000 --> 01:31:48.000 Anyhow, I'll leave it there. 01:31:48.000 --> 01:31:56.000 But I do hope to, you know, continue the discussion with the three of you and not dominate. 01:31:56.000 --> 01:31:57.000 You're never dominating. 01:31:57.000 --> 01:32:00.000 It's just funny because you're a fountain of information. 01:32:00.000 --> 01:32:08.000 And as you said or admitted, Marcus sent us both on this little trip that we never really intended to go on. 01:32:08.000 --> 01:32:13.000 And it's become much more interesting than we thought it would be. 01:32:13.000 --> 01:32:15.000 So thank you very much, Mark. 01:32:15.000 --> 01:32:16.000 Way to go. 01:32:16.000 --> 01:32:17.000 Yeah. 01:32:17.000 --> 01:32:20.000 I'm humbled by your dedication and your attention to detail. 01:32:20.000 --> 01:32:22.000 You know, that really. 01:32:22.000 --> 01:32:23.000 Likewise. 01:32:23.000 --> 01:32:24.000 Thank you. 01:32:24.000 --> 01:32:25.000 So to you. 01:32:25.000 --> 01:32:26.000 Yeah. 01:32:26.000 --> 01:32:27.000 Thank you. 01:32:27.000 --> 01:32:28.000 Awesome. 01:32:28.000 --> 01:32:29.000 Thank you. 01:32:29.000 --> 01:32:31.000 Thanks for setting this up, Jay. 01:32:31.000 --> 01:32:32.000 Yeah. 01:32:32.000 --> 01:32:33.000 Okay. 01:32:33.000 --> 01:32:34.000 You want to leave it there, guys? 01:32:34.000 --> 01:32:35.000 Is that good? 01:32:35.000 --> 01:32:36.000 I don't know really. 01:32:37.000 --> 01:32:41.000 I'm going to take a break off though for the evening if that's okay. 01:32:41.000 --> 01:32:44.000 Well, if you're tired, regular guy's tired, we'll do it again. 01:32:44.000 --> 01:32:47.000 You know, it looked like he's still fumbling with change there. 01:32:47.000 --> 01:32:50.000 So you might not have much time left on his call anyway. 01:32:50.000 --> 01:32:54.000 You know, yeah, I don't want to. 01:32:54.000 --> 01:32:58.000 I'm afraid if I go, I'll just ramble and go off script tonight. 01:32:58.000 --> 01:33:00.000 I'd rather have be prepared. 01:33:00.000 --> 01:33:01.000 It's perfect. 01:33:01.000 --> 01:33:03.000 I'm so glad you joined me. 01:33:03.000 --> 01:33:04.000 I'm so glad you joined me. 01:33:04.000 --> 01:33:10.000 I'm so glad Mark had had the chance to come to and keep up the good work and make sure 01:33:10.000 --> 01:33:13.000 you keep pinging me so I do my daily as well. 01:33:13.000 --> 01:33:14.000 Thanks, man. 01:33:14.000 --> 01:33:16.000 Thanks, regular guy. 01:33:16.000 --> 01:33:17.000 All right. 01:33:17.000 --> 01:33:18.000 Appreciate it. 01:33:18.000 --> 01:33:19.000 Later. 01:33:19.000 --> 01:33:26.880 Thanks, ladies and gentlemen, for joining me on this stream tonight. 01:33:26.880 --> 01:33:30.760 Just a little heads up. 01:33:30.760 --> 01:33:36.520 I noticed I read this thing called big by Matt Stoller and he's been writing about antitrust 01:33:36.520 --> 01:33:37.520 for a while. 01:33:37.520 --> 01:33:42.680 It's a little bit different kind of antitrust than with patents, although it wouldn't surprise 01:33:42.680 --> 01:33:48.760 me if there are patents involved in the Google and Amazon suits as well. 01:33:48.760 --> 01:33:52.200 I'm going to escape out of here. 01:33:52.200 --> 01:33:55.200 We're not going to do any of that stuff now. 01:33:55.200 --> 01:33:57.320 I don't think we're going to do any of that stuff either. 01:33:57.320 --> 01:34:01.200 We're just going to end it tonight because it's been a nice stream with Mark and a nice 01:34:01.200 --> 01:34:03.920 stream with a regular guy. 01:34:03.920 --> 01:34:13.120 Please don't forget that intramuscular injection of any combination of substances with the intent 01:34:13.120 --> 01:34:18.520 of augmenting the immune system is silly. 01:34:18.520 --> 01:34:26.560 And please don't forget you can go to giga-homebiological.com, you can go scrolling down and you can become 01:34:26.560 --> 01:34:34.160 a subscribing supporter, you can join us at soapbox, which is giga-home.bio. 01:34:34.160 --> 01:34:40.040 And if you feel the need, you really want to help us get bigger. 01:34:40.040 --> 01:34:44.880 You can also support my work there at that link, but it is not necessary. 01:34:44.880 --> 01:34:50.000 That's the way to help me is to share this work and share the message that a transfection 01:34:50.000 --> 01:34:56.080 must be stopped because they are trying to eliminate the control group by making this 01:34:56.160 --> 01:35:00.400 a widely accepted therapeutic that nobody questions anymore. 01:35:00.400 --> 01:35:03.120 And that's a terribly dangerous place to go. 01:35:03.120 --> 01:35:04.960 Thank you very much for joining me. 01:35:04.960 --> 01:35:06.960 I'll see you guys again tomorrow. 01:35:14.400 --> 01:35:15.400 Whoa. 01:35:17.600 --> 01:35:18.800 Sorry about that. 01:35:21.200 --> 01:35:23.200 Good night Pamela, good night Jeff. 01:35:23.200 --> 01:35:25.680 Good night Katniss, good night Lisa. 01:35:26.080 --> 01:35:27.440 Thank you guys for joining me. 01:35:27.440 --> 01:35:28.440 Good night Kristi. 01:35:28.440 --> 01:35:33.440 Good night Vimal, one, two, three, four, five, M, thanks for the links. 01:35:33.440 --> 01:35:41.040 Good night Moderna and Jason, Matt Z, crypto, AG, all of you guys are here regularly and 01:35:41.040 --> 01:35:43.200 I thank you very much for being here today. 01:35:45.040 --> 01:35:51.520 If I missed anybody, Fletch, Sue Spider, viewer number one tonight. 01:35:51.520 --> 01:35:54.800 Thanks for coming and Janet Reno, good night. 01:35:56.080 --> 01:35:59.680 Can we good night?